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Introduction
Le Financial Times du 30 juin 2006 proposait dans l’article "M&As fever surpasses
dotcom era" une estimation saisissante à hauteur de 1930 milliards de dollars pour la
valeur globale des fusions et acquisitions à travers le monde pour la première moitié de
l’année. Ceci constitue un record absolu, et donne à penser que l’explosion courante de
l’activité de concentration pourrait bien dépasser l’épisode similaire du début des années
2000 avec la bulle Internet. Le fait que l’activité de fusions et acquisitions comporte des
vagues périodiques est une réalité bien connue — le siècle dernier a pu ainsi voir plusieurs
telles épisodes, à la fin des années 20, 60, 80 ou 90. De telles vagues successives de fusions
et acquisitions rappellent en fait régulièrement qu’il s’agit d’une pratique généralisée de la
part des entreprises1, avec des conséquences de plus en plus étendues au niveau national
et international.
Tout aussi généralisées apparaissent les conclusions portant sur les eﬀets des concen-
trations. Des études successives (voir Ravenscraft et Scherer (1987), Banerjee et Eckard
(1998), ou bien Tichy (2001) pour un résumé d’environ 80 études empiriques) montrent
que les transactions profitables ne sont pas les plus fréquentes, au contraire. Ainsi, la
1En 2005, The Wall Street Journal du 17 fevrier dans l’article "Bosses Prefer Buying Businesses to
Building Them" expliquait en partie l’intense activité de fusions acquisitions par le fait qu’acheter une
entreprise est toujours considéré comme plus facile que la créer à partir de zéro.
vii
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comparaison internationale réalisée par Gügler et al. (2003) établit que tout au plus la
moitié des concentrations augmentent les profits des firmes participantes. De plus, leur
étude constate qu’environ la moitié de ces concentrations profitables se solde par des ré-
ductions d’output, et par conséquent mène à des hausses des prix, ce qui aboutit à ce que
les consommateurs ne profitent au plus que d’un quart des fusions acquisitions qui ont lieu.
Gügler et al. (2003) concluent ainsi que si les concentrations qui augmentent le pouvoir de
marché des participants, ou bien qui conduisent à une réduction de l’eﬃcacité productive,
étaient qualifiées comme néfastes pour le bien-être, alors la majorité des transactions qui
ont été réalisées dans le monde depuis environ 15 ans feraient partie de cette catégorie.
Cette conclusion a des implications importantes. D’un point de vue très pratique,
les fusions acquisitions peuvent comporter un coût pour les actionnaires en cas de dé-
nouement non profitable, mais aussi pour les consommateurs en cas de hausse du prix
ex-post. En termes de recherche économique, il devient donc intéressant d’approfondir
l’étude des motivations conduisant à la décision de fusionner, compte tenu du constat de
manque de profitabilité. De plus, pouvoir rendre compte des justifications économiques qui
sous-tendent les concentrations constitue non seulement un objet d’étude théorique, mais
également une étape préliminaire indispensable au contrôle de ces transactions par les au-
torités de concurrence, qui sont censées protéger la concurrence et les intérêts des consom-
mateurs. En eﬀet, le contrôle des concentrations permet d’identifier les transactions qui
soulèvent des problèmes pour le bon déroulement de la concurrence sur les marchés, et/ou
qui vont conduire à la baisse du bien-être des consommateurs. Confrontées à l’ampleur et
la complexité des fusions acquisitions, les autorités de concurrence doivent constamment
adapter leurs instruments et procédures, dans l’espoir de mieux prévenir et contenir les
eﬀets négatifs des concentrations.
Néanmoins, des constats empiriques indiquent que cet objectif n’est pas toujours at-
teint. L’analyse d’une centaine de cas de fusions acquisitions soumises à l’aval de la Com-
mission Européenne en application du Règlement CE sur le contrôle des concentrations a
permis à Neven et Röller (2002) de conclure que la Commission Européenne a eﬀectué peu
d’erreurs de type I (fusions pro-concurrentielles qui auraient été interdites à tort), mais
qu’elle est beaucoup plus assujettie à des erreurs de type II (accépter à tort des fusions
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anti-concurrentielles). Duso et al. (2003) ont trouvé en retour des fréquences de 28% et
respectivement 23% pour les deux types d’erreur, sur la base d’une étude de 164 décisions
prises par la Commission Européenne. Il apparaît donc que le contrôle des concentrations
n’est pas toujours eﬃcace, ce qui incite à poursuivre l’analyse des explications possibles
de ces erreurs et par conséquent du profile optimal de la politique de la concurrence à
appliquer aux opérations de concentrations. En particulier, l’étude des mesures correc-
tives requises pour réduire les eﬀets négatifs des fusions devrait être enrichie, compte tenu
des premières évaluations disponibles concernant cette pratique. Ainsi, la Federal Trade
Commission aux Etats-Unis a publié en 1999 une étude2 sur les eﬀets des mesures cor-
rectives de type cessions obligatoires d’actifs imposées de 1990 à 1994, avec des résultats
plutôt mitigés : les entreprises fusionnantes, aussi bien que l’acheteur des actifs transférés,
ont tendance à agir selon des intérêts privés bien distincts des objectifs pro-concurrentiels
poursuivis par l’autorité de concurrence, et environ 25% des mesures correctives ont com-
plètement manqué leur but, malgré l’aval préalable reçu de la part de la Federal Trade
Commission. En 2005, le Directorat Général Concurrence de la Commission Européenne
a publié une étude similaire3, avec une conclusion semblable: les mesures correctives ont
été qualifiées d’eﬃcaces dans seulement environ 57% des cas de fusions analysés. Au vu de
ces résultats, il convient d’approfondir l’étude de l’interaction des autorités de concurrence
avec les firmes fusionnantes lors de l’application de la politique de la concurrence.
L’objectif et le domaine de recherche de cette thèse
Les faits stylisés et les constats empiriques cités soulèvent des interrogations quant
aux explications économiques de la baisse des profits après une fusion, sur les incitations à
fusionner (ou non) qui en découlent, ou bien sur les contraintes qui pèsent sur le contrôle
des concentrations et les stratégies à mettre en place par les autorités de la concurrence
pour en améliorer le résultat.
L’objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à l’analyse théorique des fusions acquisitions,
en proposant des éléments de réponse aux questions précédentes. La première partie se pro-
2Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition, A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process,
August 6, 1999
3European Commission, Merger Remedies Study, DG Comp, October 2005
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pose d’approfondir l’étude positive des incitations privées motivant les stratégies de fusion
des entreprises et des conséquences sur les marchés d’une telle décision. La deuxième
partie examinera d’un point de vue normatif l’interaction stratégique entre les autorités
de concurrence et les firmes fusionnantes, pour tirer des conclusions concernant le profile
optimal du contrôle des concentrations.
De manière générale, la politique de la concurrence appliquée aux fusions acquisitions
est largement dédiée aux transactions horizontales, entre concurrents directs sur un même
marché. Cette thèse suivra cette tendance et étudiera exclusivement les concentrations
horizontales, qui représentent par ailleurs la plupart4 des opérations soumises au contrôle
des autorités de concurrence, ceci en raison de leurs conséquences.
En eﬀet, selon un récent rapport établi pour le Directorat Général Concurrence de la
Commission Européenne5, si elle ne génère pas de réductions de coût, une fusion horizon-
tale conduit à une hausse du pouvoir de marché de toutes les firmes de l’industrie, ce qui
se solde par des prix plus élevés et une production plus faible. En plus de cet eﬀet "uni-
latéral", une concentration horizontale peut aussi menacer la concurrence en favorisant la
collusion (tacite ou explicite) entre les firmes restant sur le marché (voir Selten (1977) par
exemple pour l’eﬀet collusif d’une réduction du nombre d’acteurs sur un marché).
Cette thèse examinera exclusivement les eﬀets unilatéraux des concentrations et les
réponses qui leur sont apportées par les autorités de concurrence.
Premièrement, ceci permettra d’étudier les incitations privées à fusionner indépendam-
ment de la possibilité de réaliser ensuite un profit de collusion. De plus, l’analyse des eﬀets
anti-concurrentiels unilatéraux des concentrations permet de se concentrer sur les gains
d’eﬃcience, qui sont au cœur même du bilan concurrentiel établi par les autorités de con-
currence lors de l’analyse d’une fusion (Motta (2004, p.271). La littérature économique
avait détaillé l’impact des gains d’eﬃcience sur le pouvoir de marché, la tarification et
même l’existence d’un équilibre collusif sur le marché, ce qui a justifié par la suite leur
prise en compte également dans la pratique. Ainsi, selon le Règlement CE N◦ 139/2004
4Selon le rapport Merger appraisal in oligopolistic markets préparé en 1999 pour Oﬃce of Fair Trading
britannique, les concetrations horizontales représentaient 93% des transactions étudiées (97% en valeur).
5 "The Economics of Unilateral Eﬀects", M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright et J. Tirole, Interim
Report for DG Competition, 2003
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du 20 janvier 2004 sur les concentrations, paragraphe 29, "Pour déterminer l’eﬀet d’une
concentration sur la structure de la concurrence dans le marché commun, il convient de
tenir compte des gains d’eﬃcacité probables démontrés par les entreprises concernées. Il
est possible que les gains d’eﬃcacité résultant de la concentration contrebalancent les eﬀets
sur la concurrence, et notamment le préjudice potentiel pour les consommateurs...".
Finalement, du point de vue de l’analyse du contrôle des concentrations, le choix
d’examiner les conséquences unilatérales des fusions s’accompagne nécessairement d’une
étude des mesures correctives imposées dans de tels cas. Cette thèse se concentre ainsi sur
l’analyse des mesures correctives comme principal instrument de la politique de la concur-
rence appliquée aux concentrations horizontales. Par exemple, si à la fin des années 1980
les mesures correctives étaient utilisées seulement dans 23% des cas de fusion examinés
par les autorités de concurrence américaines, elles le sont actuellement à hauteur de 60%
(Parker et Balto (2000)). Au delà de ce constat, leur étude paraît également justifié par
l’absence d’une "théorie" des mesures correctives, à la diﬀérence de la "théorie" des eﬀets
unilatéraux des concentrations, comme le fait remarquer le rapport "Merger appraisal in
oligopolistic markets" établi en 1999 pour l’Oﬃce of Fair Trading britannique. Il convient
d’approfondir l’étude théorique des eﬀets et de l’application optimale des mesures correc-
tives, étant donné le flou théorique et juridique qui concerne leur application (Blumenthal
(2001)). Par ailleurs, les rapports établis pour les autorités de concurrence américaine
et européenne (antérieurement cités) sur les résultats des mesures correctives témoignent
de leur l’intérêt manifeste pour ce qui constitue actuellement leur plus grand défi dans le
domaine du contrôle des concentrations (Parker et Balto (2000)).
Pour résumer, les analyses (positives ou normatives) proposées dans cette thèse sont
centrées autour des eﬀets unilatéraux des concentrations horizontales, parmi lesquels les
gains d’eﬃcience recevront une attention particulière, ainsi qu’autour des mesures correc-
tives en tant que principal instrument de contrôle des concentrations par les autorités de
la concurrence.
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PREMIÈRE PARTIE:
STRATÉGIES DES ENTREPRISES
La première partie de cette thèse se concentre sur l’analyse en cadre spatial et d’un
point de vue positif des motivations et des conséquences des fusions acquisitions.
Chapitre 1
Le premier chapitre se propose d’argumenter l’idée qu’une analyse spatiale des concen-
trations horizontales permet d’avoir plus d’éclairage à la fois sur les motivations privées
et les stratégies de fusion des entreprises, et sur la possible réponse des autorités de la
concurrence.
Parmi les conséquences les plus visibles des fusions horizontales on compte les change-
ments dans la gamme de produits oﬀerts par les partenaires, ou bien le repositionnement
géographique de filiales ou de points de vente dans le réseau de distribution. Ainsi, suite à
l’acquisition en septembre 2005 de Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà (RAS) S.p.A., le groupe
d’assurance Allianz AG se propose de réorganiser son activité européenne, à commencer
par la réduction numérique et la redistribution géographique de ses unités administra-
tive allemandes à l’horizon 2008, ce qui devrait générer entre 500 et 600 million d’euros
d’économies pour les clients et les actionnaires6. Mais un tel repositionnement spatial après
une fusion horizontale peut également se manifester à travers la diﬀérentiation horizontale
des produits. Berry et Waldfogel (2001) ont évalué les données de panel disponibles sur
243 marchés locaux américains des programmes radio avant et après la vague de concen-
trations déclenchée par la dérégulation du secteur en 1996. Leurs résultats montrent que
les fusions entre les stations radio ont plutot bloqué l’entrée sur ce marché, mais la diver-
sité des programmes proposés a augmenté. Cette conclusion en termes de diﬀérentiation
des produits a permis à Berry et Waldfogel (2001) d’insister sur la prise en compte des
changements dans la gamme de produits oﬀerts pour les éventuelles décisions des autorités
de concurrence concernant les fusions horizontales impliquant des biens diﬀérentiés.
L’espace, au sens géographique ou bien au sens de la gamme de produits, crée la
diﬀérentiation. Les modèles de concurrence spatiale permettent de mieux appréhender les
6Source: http://www/allianz.com
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conséquences des concentrations, dans la mesure où ils rendent possible la modélisation
plus réaliste des changements structurels induits par la concentration dans la gamme des
variétés ou du point de vue purement géographique. De la même façon, le cadre spatial est
utile à l’analyse des stratégies de fusions déterminées soit par le degré de diﬀérentiation
des produits oﬀerts par les partenaires, soit par la géographie de leurs réseaux respectifs
de distribution ou de production. Par ailleurs, la pertinence des analyses spatiales des
fusions est reconnue par les autorités de concurrence, puisque toute évaluation des eﬀets
concurrentiels d’une concentration commence par l’identification du marché pertinent,
soit-il géographique ou défini par l’ensemble des variétés de biens concernés.
A travers une revue de la littérature théorique portant sur les concentrations hori-
zontales dans un cadre spatial, ce premier chapitre résumera aussi bien l’impact de la
localisation sur les stratégies de fusions des entreprises, que celui de la concentration hor-
izontale sur les choix de positionnement des entreprises dans l’espace géographique ou
bien celui des produits. Mais qu’il s’agisse de décrire l’équilibre spatial initial qui incite
à la fusion, ou bien la configuration spatiale qui résulte de l’équilibre post-fusion, notre
analyse critique des modèles de concentration spatiale a nécessité d’abord une synthèse
des principaux résultats de la théorie de la localisation stratégique en oligopole7.
En discutant d’abord les modèles de fusions horizontales à localisation donnée, ce
chapitre a souligné que leur motivation principale a été de vérifier la robustesse en cadre
spatial des résultats obtenus sans la prise en compte de l’espace, en particulier le "para-
doxe" de profitabilité et la possibilité de monopoliser le marché. En cadre non spatial, les
contributions de Salant et al. (1983) et Szidaraovsky et Yakovitz (1982) ont formalisé le
7On peut résumer les principaux résultats des modèles de localisation stratégique en oligopole de la
manière suivante: la localisation optimale d’une entreprise est déterminée par son choix de tarification,
la forme de la fonction de demande, les coûts de production et transport, la distribution spatiale des
consommateurs, et l’intensité de la concurrence. De manière générale, les prédictions des modèles de
localisations stratégiques sont fortement sensibles à des modifications d’hypothèses sous-jacentes, mais
néanmoins, la localisation optimale sera toujours le résultat d’un arbitrage entre les forces d’agglomération
(eﬀet taille de marché, existence d’un point central, externalités positives entre entreprises) et les forces
de dispersion (concurrence accrue, substituabilité stratégique entre les variétés proposées). Pour résumer,
le choix optimal de localisation exige la minimisation des coûts de transport, puisque l’entreprise choisit
la distance qui la sépare des consommateurs de manière à maximiser son profit.
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constat empirique d’une baisse du profit joint pour les entreprises fusionnantes dans le cas
d’une concurrence à la Cournot avec bien homogène, sous des hypothèses habituelles de
linéarité des coûts et de la demande, et en absence de gains d’eﬃcience (voir également
Deneckere et Davidson (1985) pour le cas contraire, profitable, d’une fusion avec concur-
rence en prix). De plus, qu’il s’agisse d’une concurrence en quantités ou en prix, les firmes
extérieures à la fusion y gagnent plus que les participants (Stigler (1950)), ce qui soulève la
question de la rationalité même de la concentration, surtout dans le cas de la concurrence
en quantités8. Par ailleurs, la prise en compte de cet eﬀet de "passager clandestin" de
la part des entreprises non participantes a permis de mettre en évidence l’impossibilité
de monopoliser le marché dès lors que la décision de fusionner est endogénéisée (l’eﬀet de
"hold-up" en littérature - voir Kamien et Zang (1991) et Kamien et Zang (1993)).
En raison de l’équivalence entre la diﬀérentiation horizontale des produits et la dif-
férentiation au sens spatial, les analyses en cadre spatial des fusions horizontales avec
concurrence à la Bertrand ont pu retrouver la conclusion de profitabilité (Levy et Reitzes
(1992)), mais ont également montré que l’eﬀet de "hold-up" est aﬀaibli ou disparaît quand
la concurrence est localisée et ne concerne que les entreprises voisines (Reitzes and Levy
(1995), Brito (2003), Giraud-Héraud et al. (2002)). Du point de vue de l’application du
contrôle des concentrations, ces modèles ont permis de rappeler l’importance de la défi-
nition du marché pertinent, puisque dans le cas d’une concurrence spatiale localisée, les
mesures de concentration du marché ne fournissent que peu d’information par rapport à
la prise en compte des marchés locaux, puisque les fusions entre des substituts proches
augmentent nécessairement le pouvoir de marché et donc l’indice de concentration9.
Bien que le cadre spatial introduise la diﬀérentiation des produits dans les modèles de
8Plus précisément, puisque les prix sont des compléments stratégiques, la hausse du prix suite à la
concentration incite les concurrents à augmenter leurs prix en réponse (voir Gaudet et Salant (1992) pour
l’importance de la complémentarité stratégique), tandis que les quantités étant des substituts stratégiques,
la contraction de l’output joint des partenaires induit une expansion de celle des concurrents, ce qui limite
la hausse du prix sur le marché et in fine rend la fusion non profitable.
9Ceci a constitué un des points importants de révision des Merger Guidelines américaines en 1984, qui
ont conclu que les vendeurs ne se retrouvent en concurrence directe qu’avec certains de leurs concurrents
quand les produits sont diﬀérentiés ou bien quand les vendeurs sont dispersés dans l’espace.
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fusions horizontales avec concurrence en quantités et localisations données, le "paradoxe"
de profitabilité n’est pas résolu, puisque l’hypothèse de discrimination spatiale qui car-
actérise les modèles à la Cournot conduit à la segmentation des marchés locaux, et par
conséquent chaque point dans l’espace (ou marché local) se retrouve soumis au paradoxe
de profitabilité de manière identique au cadre non-spatial (McAfee et al. (1992), Norman
et Pepall (1998, 2000), Matsushima (2001,b)).
Cette conclusion a motivé en partie l’approche alternative à l’égard de l’analyse des con-
centrations en cadre spatial, à travers la prise en compte des décisions de (re)localisation
(ou choix de produit).
La littérature spatiale qui endogénèise la décision de localisation permet en eﬀet de tirer
des conclusions sur l’impact de la décision de fusion sur le comportement des entreprises,
qu’il soit antérieur ou postérieur à la concentration.
De manière générale, le choix de localisation, spatiale ou dans la gamme des produits,
en anticipation d’une fusion horizontale, obéit à une logique stratégique de réduction de
l’eﬀet "passager clandestin" (Rotshchild et al. (2000), Heywood et al. (2001)), ou alors de
maintien d’un prix élevé après la fusion (Gupta et al. (1997), Ecer (2005)). Par ailleurs,
ce timing (localisation optimale avant la fusion10 conduit à une perte d’eﬃcience dans la
mesure où la diﬀérentiation (spatiale, ou en termes de produits) qui en résulte ne minimise
pas les coûts de transport (ou la désutilité) des consommateurs.
Ceci constitue une diﬀérence essentielle par rapport aux modèles de fusions horizontales
avec choix de localisation ex-post, qui par définition obéit à l’objectif de maximisation du
profit joint des partenaires et donc de minimisation du coût de transport.
De ce point de vue, endogénéiser la décision de localisation après la concentration
permet de modéliser des gains d’eﬃcience endogènes, ce qui suggère une possible solution
au paradoxe de profitabilité des fusions à la Cournot. En eﬀet, Norman et Pepall (2000)
ont pu montrer que sur le marché linéaire à la Hotelling, la possibilité pour les partenaires
de se rélocaliser ex-post permet d’aboutir à une fusion profitable, même si les rivaux
10Ceci est pertinent quand le choix de localisation est équivalent par exemple à celui d’investissement,
habituellement pris avant une fusion, et qui se trouve modifié en raison de la concentration qui s’ensuit
(voir Gatsios et Karp (1992) par exemple).
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continuent à gagner davantage.
De plus, ce cadre d’analyse permet une étude plus réaliste des concentrations horizon-
tales, dans la mesure où il nécessite la modélisation des entreprises multi-produit ou multi-
filiale11, qui maximisent leur profit global en prenant en compte l’intéraction stratégique
entre leurs composantes (substituabilité ou distance géographique plus ou moins impor-
tante — voir Sarkar et al. (1997), mais aussi Martinez-Giralt et Neven (1988) et Janssen
et al. (2003)).
En passant en revue les contributions théoriques sur ces thèmes, ce chapitre s’est pro-
posé d’argumenter l’intérêt d’utiliser un cadre spatial pour l’analyse des concentrations
horizontales, et a permis en même temps de présenter et de délimiter la problématique des
chapitres 2 et 3. Ainsi, le chapitre 2 vérifie la robustesse de la solution "spatiale" proposée
par Norman et Pepall (2000) au paradoxe de profitabilité des fusions dans le cas de la
concurrence en quantités, tandis que le chapitre 3 étudie la stratégie optimale de concen-
tration horizontale quand sont possibles non seulement l’acquisition et la relocalisation
optimale des filiales, mais également leur cession stratégique vers des concurrents.
Ces deux chapitres traitant du choix optimal de localisation après fusion partagent
une même formalisation de base, à savoir un modèle de concurrence en quantités avec
discrimination spatiale où les entreprises prennent en charge la livraison de leur produit
jusqu’à la localisation des consommateurs. D’un côté, ceci constitue une approche réaliste
puisqu’elle permet de retrouver des eﬀets constatés tels que la segmentation des marchés
(Brander et Krugman (1983)), l’agglomération spatiale des points de vente/production
appartenant à des entreprises rivales (Pal et Sarkar (2002)), ou bien le chevauchement
de leurs aires commerciales (Phlips (1983), McBride (1983)). De l’autre, ce cadre de
modélisation reproduit le principe des systèmes de production flexibles (Eaton et Schmitt
(1994)) où la firme ajuste le produit de base (ici, sa localisation), moyennant un certain
coût pour l’adapter au mieux aux préférences d’un consommateur (ici, le coût de transport
pour la livraison à la localisation du consommateur final).
11Ce qui est cohérent avec la réalité de tous les jours, compte tenu de fonctionnement de nombreuses
entreprises d’hotellerie, restauration, grande distribution, chaînes de stations services, etc.
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Chapitre 2
Dans ce chapitre, la question de la localisation optimale post-fusion a été étudiée dans
un modèle d’oligopole de Cournot dans la ville circulaire, dans le but de tester la validité
de la solution spatiale qui avait été proposée au paradoxe de profitabilité des fusions
horizontales. Dans un cadre non-spatial, on a pu expliquer ce manque de profitabilité par
l’incapacité des partenaires de la fusion à assurer un output suﬃsant post-fusion, dû à la
fois à la substituabilité stratégique impliquée par la concurrence en quantités (Salant et
al. (1983)), par le manque d’avantage comparatif en termes de coûts de production de
la nouvelle entité (Perry et Porter (1985)) et la simultanéité des décisions de production
(Daughety (1990) ayant montré que le comportement de meneur de Stackelberg après
fusion suﬃt à la rendre profitable).
Le cadre spatial, et plus précisément la ville linéaire a apparemment résolu le problème
pour des niveaux suﬃsamment élevés de concentration (au plus huit firmes sur le marché),
pourvu que les entreprises qui fusionnent aient la possibilité de se relocaliser après la fusion
(Norman et Pepall (2000)). Ceci donne l’opportunité non seulement d’économiser les coûts
de transport et de rationaliser la production entre les filiales, mais également de justifier de
manière endogène une réduction du coût de livraison pour certains marchés locaux (ceux
situés vers les extrémités du segment), ce qui constitue un avantage comparatif spatial
par rapport aux concurrents. Pour citer Norman et Pepall (2000, p.668), "la localisation
est un facteur clé pour expliquer le fait que la fusion peut conduire à une entreprise plus
grande et plus eﬃcace", avec l’idée de fond que la possibilité pour l’entreprise résultant de
la fusion de repositionner ses variétés dans l’espace des produits (ou bien ses filiales dans
l’espace géographique) serait une condition suﬃsante pour garantir la profitabilité de la
concentration.
En considérant, en contraste, le cas de la ville circulaire, ce chapitre démontre que
la possibilité de relocalisation ne constitue pas à elle seule la solution au paradoxe de
profitabilité, mais que ce sont les caractéristiques de marché linéaire qui permettaient
cette conclusion.
Plus précisément, la fusion accompagnée de relocalisation s’avère profitable sur le
marché linéaire en raison de l’existence des extrémités exogènes et des eﬀets de bord
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qui en découlent, qui font que la stratégie dominante de localisation des rivaux, des firmes
mono-filiales, soit la même qu’avant la fusion, au centre du segment (Anderson et Neven
(1991), Pal et Sarkar (2002)). Par conséquent et suite à la relocalisation plus proche des
extrémités du segment, les deux partenaires retrouvent un avantage de coût de livraison
sur ces marchés plus éloignés des rivaux mais plus proches maintenant de leurs propres
localisations.
En contraste, le cas de la ville circulaire correspond à un espace parfaitement ho-
mogène, où les diﬀérents marchés locaux ne sont pas diﬀérentiés par leur distance vis-à-vis
des extrémités (inexistantes), et où il n’y a pas de localisation universellement préférée
qui minimiserait le coût de transport, telle le milieu du segment. Sur un tel marché cir-
culaire, l’équilibre initial avant une fusion horizontale est ainsi plus ou moins dispersé
(l’agglomération totale des entreprises n’est pas un équilibre de localisation sur le cercle -
voir Pal (1998), Matsushima (2001,a) et Shimizu et Matsumura (2003)), car l’entreprise
n’a pas de stratégie dominante de localisation, tout dépend de la localisation des rivaux.
Par conséquent, les profits individuels réalisés avant la fusion sont plus élévés que dans le
cas du marché linéaire, ce qui rend plus diﬃcile à satisfaire la condition de profitabilité
de la concentration. En eﬀet, la relocalisation post-fusion ne peut assurer une demande
captive que dans le cas bien particulier de la fusion vers duopole, où les deux partenaires
font face à un seul rival, et donc peuvent livrer leur output à un coût plus faible aux
localisations diamétralement situées par rapport à celle du rival.
La deuxième étape de notre démonstration consiste en l’analyse du cas de fusion bi-
latérale vers triopole. Puisque ex-post l’entité fusionnée aﬀronte deux rivaux, l’équilibre
de relocalisation après fusion ne lui permet plus de s’aménager une demande captive entre
les localisations de ses filiales, car chacune se retrouve symétriquement encadrée par les
deux concurrents.
En d’autres termes, on montre qu’un marché dépourvu de niches à exploiter, dont la
ville circulaire constitue une approximation, n’assure la profitabilité des fusions horizon-
tales que pour des niveaux de concentration très élevés (monopole ou duopole)12. Malgré
12Cette intuition reste une conjecture pour le cas général, à n firmes, mais étant donné que la profitabilité
des fusions augmente avec le niveau de concentration sur le marché, il est diﬃcile d’imaginer l’intuition
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la réduction de coût conférée par la relocalisation, sur un tel marché il n’y a pas la pos-
sibilité de s’assurer une demande captive, ce qui explique le manque de profitabilité de la
fusion.
Ainsi, le premier résultat de ce chapitre est de montrer que l’hypothèse sur la forme
de l’espace est déterminante pour l’analyse de profitabilité des fusions horizontales entre
entreprises se livrant à une concurrence spatiale en quantités. Par ailleurs, notre test de
robustesse de la solution spatiale proposée par Norman et Pepall (2000) constitue une
confirmation d’un corollaire de l’analyse de Deneckere et Davidson (1985), selon lequel
la profitabilité et les incitations à fusionner sont plus faibles dans le cas des marchés où
l’intensité de la concurrence est plus symétrique, tel le marché circulaire.
En plus de ce résultat principal, ce chapitre en propose également deux autres. D’un
coté, notre analyse rappelle l’importance pour l’étude des concentrations de la définition
du marché pertinent, puisque les conclusions dépendent de la forme de l’espace retenue
comme hypothèse de travail. Il convient en eﬀet de ramarquer que les deux représentations
spatiales, linéaire et circulaire, correspondent chacune à des situations réelles. Ainsi,
le marché linéaire correspond de manière générale à la diﬀérentiation des produits qui
permet d’avoir un consommateur médian unique. Il n’existe pas de telle analogie pour
le marché circulaire, qui correspond en retour au cas où une même variété représente la
variété idéale d’un consommateur et en même temps la variété la moins aimée par un
autre (Horstmann et Slivinski (1985)). Par ailleurs, d’autres situations sont formalisées à
travers le marché circulaire, telles que les centre-villes encombrés par des embouteillages
qui forcent les consommateurs - acheteurs à les contourner plutôt que de les traverser, ou
bien des compagnies aériennes ou des chaînes média (radio ou télévision) qui choisissent
les horaires des vols ou de leurs programmes sur le cadran horaire.
Par ailleurs, ce chapitre contribue à l’analyse de l’équilibre de localisation sur le marché
circulaire dans le cas de la concurrence entre entreprises multi-produit/filiale, qui reste à
présent largement non résolu13. On montre que la propriété d’équilibres de localisation
pour justifier la profitabilité des fusions pour des marchés bien moins concentré que le triopole.
13En eﬀet, si sur le marché linéaire, Pal et Sarkar (2002) ont exhaustivement résolu ce problème, pour
le marché circulaire seulement le cas du duopole symétrique bi-filiale avait été étudié par Chamorro-Rivas
(2000).
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multiples de l’espace circulaire, déjà vérifiée dans le cas de la concurrence entre firmes
mono-filiale (Gupta et al. (2004)), reste valide dans le cas des entreprises multi-filiales,
car la fusion horizontale donne naissance à une telle entreprise, et pour les deux cas étudiés
(fusions vers duopole et vers triopole), des équilibres doubles ont été obtenus post-fusion.
Chapitre 3
Si la théorie conclue que, souvent, les incitations à fusionner sont plutôt faibles, les
constats empiriques sont nombreux à confirmer le manque de profitabilité de beaucoup de
fusions acquisitions (Banerjee et Eckard (1998) par exemple). Ceci a soulevé au niveau
théorique le défi d’expliquer pourquoi la concentration sur les marchés se poursuit, malgré
la probabilité de contracter un "mariage décevant" selon les mots de Meeks (1977).
Les premières pistes théoriques ont été fournies par des modèles qui ont fait l’hypothèse
que les actionnaires manquent de moyens pour discipliner les managers qui surestiment
leur capacités (Roll (1986)), ou bien qui privilégient un objectif de taille de l’entreprise à la
place de la maximisation du profit (Shleifer et Vishny (1986)). Plus récemment, Fridolfsson
et Stennek (2002) en cadre non spatial et Brito (2003) sur le marché circulaire de Salop
ont mis en évidence une justification défensive pour les concentrations non profitables. En
endogénéisant la décision de fusionner, et compte tenu du fait que les rivaux ne profitent
pas tous de l’eﬀet de "passager clandestin", ils ont pu montrer que la fusion horizontale,
même si non profitable, est préférée à l’alternative, pire du point de vue du profit ex-post,
de se retrouver dans la situation du rival qui ne profite pas (ou qui profite le moins) de la
concentration.
Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse s’inscrit dans cette problématique dans la mesure
ou nos résultats suggèrent une explication alternative. A travers un exemple de fusion
horizontale en cadre spatial, ce chapitre montre la rationalité d’entreprendre une con-
centration, même non profitable, pourvu qu’elle soit une étape dans une stratégie plus
complexe de hausse de la profitabilité14. Plus précisément, on s’intéresse à la stratégie op-
timale d’intégration horizontale quand l’acquisition des filiales mais également leur cession
14Weston (2001) remarquait qu’il est bien restrictif de supposer que les stratégies de restructuration
des corporations se réduisent à des fusions acquisitions, alors que les cessions d’actifs et les scissions en
divisions indépendantes sont également possibles.
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sont des actions possibles.
Pour ce faire, on construit un exemple sur le marché linéaire où la fusion horizontale
et la création de divisions indépendantes permet d’obtenir un profit plus élevé que la
seule fusion, à condition que la relocalisation optimale ex-post soit possible. Ce chapitre
examine ainsi en cadre spatial avec choix de localisation la relation entre l’intégration des
filiales suite à la fusion et leur gestion décentralisée sous la forme d’une scission en divisions
indépendantes, en tant qu’étapes successives d’un processus de restructuration profitable.
D’un point de vue empirique, les vagues de fusions sont suivies d’une activité accrue
de création de franchises ou de transferts de filiales entre entreprises rivales, comme ont
pu conclure Maksimovic et Phillips (2001) ou Mulherin et Boone (2000). Néanmoins, d’un
point de vue théorique, les stratégies d’intégration horizontale et de cession des filiales
sont non seulement opposées par leur contenu même, mais aussi non profitables simul-
tanément pour des entreprises se faisant concurrence en quantités. En eﬀet, si l’incapacité
de maintenir un output élevé (due à la substituabilité stratégique) rend la fusion non prof-
itable, la scission en divisions indépendantes est équivalente au comportement de meneur
de Stackelberg, et sur un marché à la Cournot une entreprise aura intérêt à créer des
franchises tant que la stratégie de fusion n’est pas profitable (sous des hypothèses usuelles
de linéarité des coût et de la demande — voir Polasky (1992), Baye et al. (1996)).
En utilisant le cadre spatial, ce chapitre contredit cette opposition. Notre analyse prend
comme point de départ un triopole de Cournot dans la ville linéaire, sous des hypothèses
habituelles de discrimination spatiale et de coût de livraison à la charge des entreprises.
Dans notre exemple, la fusion bilatérale conduira à une entité disposant de quatre filiales.
Dans un premier temps, on identifie l’équilibre de relocalisation post-fusion et on étudie
la profitabilité de la concentration, en comparant les profits avant et après15.
Ensuite, en comparant du point de vue de l’équilibre de localisation et des profits
correspondants les stratégies de gestion complètement indépendante ou seulement par-
tiellement centralisée des filiales, on démontre que la cession d’actifs suivant une fusion
15Compte tenu des étapes choix de localisation - choix de quantités qu’on considère avant et après la
fusion, mais aussi après la scission en division indépendantes, il s’agit à chaque fois de résoudre d’abord le
sous-jeu en quantités, de manière ensuite à maximiser par rapport à la localisation choisie le profit total
réalisé sur l’ensemble des marchés locaux représenté par le segment.
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horizontale peut augmenter la profitabilité de celle-ci. Plus précisément, on montre que le
profit post-fusion est le plus élevé dans le cas où l’entité fusionnée se scinde en deux divi-
sions indépendantes, chacune gérant de manière centralisée la production et la localisation
de ses deux filiales.
Ce résultat principal de notre papier est dû au cadre spatial retenu, puisque la séquence
de stratégies permet d’optimiser les gains d’eﬃcacité disponibles à travers la relocalisa-
tion (économies de coût de transport et rationalisation de la production entre filiales).
En eﬀet, la relocalisation optimale post-fusion des quatre filiales génère des économies de
coût, mais l’eﬀet de réduction d’output est toujours présent sur chaque marché local, en
raison de la substituabilité stratégique. Par conséquent, en procédant à la scission en divi-
sions indépendantes mais multi-filiales, l’entreprise fusionnée adopte un comportement de
Stackelberg et s’engage de manière crédible à maintenir un output élevé, tout en profitant
de l’avantage de localisation conféré par le choix optimal de localisation au sein de chaque
division16.
Par ailleurs, ce résultat de complémentarité entre la concentration et la scission en
divisions indépendantes reste valable dans le cas où la fusion initiale n’est pas profitable,
ce qui revient à dire que les entreprises peuvent avoir intérêt à fusionner et subir une baisse
initiale du profit joint juste pour mieux décentraliser ensuite et augmenter finalement leur
profit17.
Le cadre d’analyse de la ville linéaire permet également une autre interprétation de
ce résultat. En eﬀet, l’équilibre spatial obtenu après la scission de l’entreprise fusionnée
coïncide avec le résultat d’une injonction de cession d’actifs vers un nouvel entrant, imposée
par l’autorité de la concurrence en raison des eﬀets négatifs de la fusion initiale sur les
consommateurs de la ville linéaire (hausse du prix)18. En d’autres termes, notre résultat
16Notre exemple correspond en réalité aux pratiques de franchise, où la firme-parent (holding) garde le
droit exclusif d’établir de filiales, mais les décisions de production et de choix de produit (localisation, ici)
sont décentralisées au niveau de celles-ci.
17Notre intuition est robuste à un changement du nombre de filiales de l’entreprise rivale restant sur
le marché, comme le montre le deuxième exemple développé dans l’annexe B qui aboutit aux mêmes
conclusions.
18Pour justifier une telle intervention, dans ce chapitre on fournit également la comparaison des prix entre
la situation initiale, l’intégration totale des filiales par la fusion et leur gestion partiellement décentralisée
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sur la stratégie la plus profitable d’intégration horizontale a un corollaire relatif à l’eﬀet
des mesures correctives sur la profitabilité de la concentration. Notre exemple montre que
les remèdes structurels des fusions (les cessions obligatoires d’actifs) ne sont pas forcément
coûteux pour les firmes qui fusionnent et les subissent, même lorsqu’ils remplissent leur
rôle correcteur quant aux eﬀets anticoncurrentiels de la fusion (ce qui est le cas dans notre
modèle19).
Pour résumer, grâce au cadre spatial retenu, ce chapitre explique l’incitation à fusion-
ner par l’opportunité de mieux décentraliser ou transférer des actifs et ainsi augmenter
la profitabilité de la fusion, ce qui suggère finalement une justification pour les fusions
apparemment non-profitables qui sont observées de manière récurrente. En même temps,
l’analyse proposée ouvre une piste de réflexion sur les eﬀets réels de cet instrument de
la politique de la concurrence que sont les mesures correctives, étant donné la possibilité
qu’ils améliorent plutôt qu’ils pénalisent le résultat d’une concentration.
DEUXIÈME PARTIE:
STRATÉGIES DES AUTORITÉS DE CONCURRENCE
La deuxième partie de la thèse est consacrée à ‘analyse normative des stratégies des
autorités de concurrence, afin d’étudier le profil optimal du contrôle des concentrations.
Chapitre 4
Ce chapitre constitue l’introduction à la problématique de l’analyse normative des
fusions horizontales. Pour cette raison, ce chapitre se propose de dresser la synthèse des
fondements théoriques du contrôle des concentrations mais aussi le bilan des résultats
obtenus en pratique par les autorités de concurrence.
La politique de la concurrence relative aux concentrations horizontales vise à éviter la
hausse du pouvoir de marché suite à une fusion, qui serait préjudiciable au déroulement de
la concurrence et aux intérêts des consommateurs. Compte tenu du fait que les incitations
privées à fusionner ne correspondent pas nécessairement à des stratégies d’amélioration
suite à la scission. Cette mesure corrective est justifiée, puisque sans elle le prix augmente, et elle est
eﬃcace, car elle fait diminuer le prix.
19Voir Cabral (2003) pour un modèle spatial où les mesures correctives ne sont pas eﬃcaces.
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du bien-être des consommateurs sur des marchés en situation d’oligopole, le contrôle des
concentrations a été instauré de manière à limiter au mieux les conséquences négatives
pour la concurrence des concentrations qui ont eﬀectivement lieu. Ainsi, les autorités en
charge du contrôle des concentrations, telles la Commission Européenne ou le Département
de Justice et la Federal Trade Commission aux Etats-Unis doivent apporter des réponses
à deux questions centrales pour la politique de la concurrence, à savoir est-ce que la
concentration soulève un problème de concurrence, et quels sont les meilleurs moyens
pour le résoudre.
Pour répondre à la première question, les autorités de la concurrence procèdent à une
évaluation des concentrations. Celle-ci prend la forme d’un bilan concurrentiel, au terme
duquel la fusion est soit déclarée concurrentielle, c’est-à-dire compatible avec le jeu de la
concurrence sur le marché, ou bien anti-concurrentielle, dans quel cas elle sera soit interdite
soit soumise à des injonctions visant à réduire ses eﬀets négatifs pour la concurrence et
les consommateurs, sous la forme de mesures correctives. Compte tenu de l’importance
grandissante des analyses économiques du contrôle légal des concentrations, à la fois pour
leur bilan concurrentiel et pour le choix des mesures correctives, ce chapitre se concentre
sur les fondements théoriques qui ont inspirés les pratiques actuelles des autorités de la
concurrence, en mettant en évidence le rôle central des aspects informationnels et incitatifs
pour l’applicabilité et le succès des procédures en pratique.
Une information essentielle pour le bilan concurrentiel d’une concentration concerne
les gains d’eﬃcacité potentiels générés par la mise en commun des actifs et méthodes de
fonctionnement des partenaires20. Ces gains d’eﬃcacité se matérialisant sous la forme de
réductions de coût, et leur connaissance permet de mieux évaluer l’eﬀet concurrentiel net
de la fusion. Celui-ci est le résultat de l’arbitrage entre la hausse du pouvoir de marché par
20Voir le Règlement CE N◦ 139/2004 du Conseil relatif au contrôle des concentrations entre entreprises,
Journal Oﬃciel de l’Union européenne L24/1:
"Le présent règlement prévoit [. . . ] que toute concentration qui entraverait de manière significative
une concurrence eﬀective [. . . ] devrait être déclarée incompatible avec le marché commun [. . . ] ce qui
devrait être interprété au-delà du concept de dominance" (paragraphe 25) et "Pour déterminer l’eﬀet
d’une concentration sur la structure de la concurrence dans le marché commun, il convient de tenir compte
des gains d’eﬃcacité probables démontrés par les entreprises concernées." (paragraphe 29).
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la réduction du nombre d’entreprises sur le marché et ces réductions potentielles du coût
avec lequel opérera la nouvelle entité, comme l’avait montré l’analyse de Williamson (1968)
en termes d’eﬃcacité productive et ineﬃcacité allocative d’une concentration horizontale.
Néanmoins, ce rapprochement entre la théorie et la pratique du contrôle des con-
centrations soulève certains problèmes concrets, étant donné la nature immatérielle au
moment du bilan concurrentiel des gains d’eﬃcacité argumentés par les entreprises con-
cernées. Selon Ilzkovitz et Meiklejohn (2001), ces problèmes concernent le choix du critère
de bien-être pour la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité, le calcul du seuil minimal que
ces gains devraient satisfaire pour aboutir à un eﬀet pro-concurrentiel de la concentration,
les procédures d’évaluation eﬀective, la charge de la preuve de leur existence et finalement
la vérification de leur matérialisation après la fusion.
En ce qui concerne le critère utilisé pour le bilan concurrentiel, la pratique retient
le bien-être des consommateurs, puisque pour être déclarée acceptable une fusion doit
conduire à des gains d’eﬃcacité et donc réductions de coût suﬃsant(e)s pour garantir que
le surplus des consommateurs ne diminuera pas. Ce choix a été formellement argumenté
par des analyses économiques qui montrent que ce faisant, le contrôle des concentrations
permet d’atteindre un niveau plus élevé de bien-être global. Ceci est expliqué par une
vue dynamique qui anticipe les fusions plus eﬃcaces qui seraient autrement découragées
(Lyons (2002)), ou bien par l’existence d’une asymétrie d’information entre l’autorité de
concurrence et les entreprises qui fusionnent, qui crée un biais en faveur des profits des
firmes qui serait atténué par le critère favorable aux consommateurs (Besanko et Spulber
(1993)21).
En termes de gains d’eﬃcacité acceptables, la théorie économique a montré la nécessité
de distinguer entre les réductions de coût marginal de production, qui se répercutent sur
le prix final et donc sur le bien-être des consommateurs, et les économies de coûts fixes,
qui ne devraient donc pas faire partie des gains d’eﬃcacité admissibles. Théoriquement,
ceci a été argumenté par l’analyse de Farrell et Shapiro (1990,a), qui dans le modèle usuel
de concurrence en quantités ont pu montrer que seules les réductions de coût marginal de
21Voir également les analyses de Neven et Röller (2005) et Farrell (2003) qui conduisent à la même
conclusion.
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type synergies entre les partenaires permettent d’éviter une hausse du prix sur le marché
post-fusion. Néanmoins, des contributions théoriques plus récentes ont permis de nuancer
cette conclusion. En eﬀet, une fusion horizontale sans synergies peut améliorer ex-post
le bien-être des consommateurs pourvu que l’analyse prenne en compte l’encombrement
du marché (Häckner et Razo (2004)), ou bien l’avantage du partage de l’information
pertinente sur les coûts par les partenaires lors de la fusion (Stennek (2001)), ou même le
seul aspect stratégique de l’annonce de fusion en tant que signal pour les firmes rivales,
celui d’une entité possiblement plus eﬃcace et agressive, face à laquelle il convient de
réduire sa propre production (Amir et al. (2004)).
Quoi qu’il en soit, la pratique du contrôle des concentrations suit les recommandations
théoriques également en ce qui concerne la charge de la preuve de ces gains d’eﬃcacité,
qui revient aux entreprises qui fusionnent (Gonzalez (2004)). Par ailleurs, ceci est ap-
puyé par la reconnaissance du fait que les partenaires ont une meilleure information sur
les caractéristiques de leur fusion, ce qui renvoie aux problèmes soulevés par l’asymétrie
d’information entre l’autorité de la concurrence et les entreprises qui fusionnent en ce qui
concerne les gains d’eﬃcacité et donc l’eﬀet concurrentiel de la concentration.
Pour commencer, ce problème informationnel peut inciter l’autorité de la concur-
rence à un contrôle ‘trop’ strict des concentrations, dans le but de minimiser la possi-
bilité d’accepter à tort des fusions. Mais ceci peut également décourager certaines fu-
sions eﬃcaces à l’avenir, comme le montre les analyses de Motta et Vasconcelos (2003)
ou Razo (2004) qui considèrent le point de vue dynamique du contrôle des concentra-
tions. Par ailleurs, l’asymétrie d’information mentionnée engendre des coûts substantiels
de procédure lors du bilan concurrentiel de la fusion, en termes d’évaluation eﬀective ou
de transmission crédible d’une information fiable, ce qui peut éventuellement questionner
la rationalité même de la de la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité (Lagerlöf et Heidhues
(2005)).
Néanmoins, ce même problème informationnel incite aussi à l’étude, au moins théorique,
des modalités possibles pour résoudre cette asymétrie d’information, avec des propositions
de mécanismes de révélation inspirés par la théorie des contrats (voir Faulli-Oller et Cor-
chon (1999), Röller et al. (2001), Gonzalez (2003), ou bien l’analyse proposée dans le
RÉSUMÉ DE LA THÈSE EN FRANÇAIS xxvii
chapitre 6 de cette thèse). En pratique, de tels mécanismes n’ont pas (encore) été explorés,
même s’il a été suggéré par exemple de procéder à une vérification ex-post des annonces de
gains d’eﬃcacité des entreprises, ce qui revient à rendre des décisions d’acceptation tem-
poraires des fusions (Scherer (1991)). Cela est considéré comme prohibitif, compte tenu
des coûts d’audit engendrés, de l’impossibilité vraisemblable de défaire ex-post une fusion
consommée, ou bien des conséquences qui résultent de l’application d’une réglementation
instable et incertaine. Il convient pourtant de reconnaître que l’utilisation des mécanismes
de révélation aurait entre autres l’avantage de conduire à l’application de mesures correc-
tives plus appropriées. En eﬀet, sans une évaluation correcte du dommage concurrentiel
de la concentration, qui nécessite la connaissance de l’ampleur exacte des gains d’eﬃcacité
potentiels, les mesures correctives censées réparer ce dommage ont moins de chances de
succès.
A l’issue du bilan concurrentiel, une fusion sera soit acceptée, soit rejetée, soit ap-
prouvée sous conditions, ce qui revient à lui imposer certaines mesures correctives sous
la forme de transferts obligatoires d’actifs (mesures structurelles) ou bien sous la forme
de contraintes sur son comportement futur (injonctions comportementales). De manière
générale, les mesures correctives sont des "engagements" de la part des entreprises qui fu-
sionnent et qui permettront de résoudre le problème de concurrence soulevé par la fusion
dans sa forme initiale. Mais la possibilité qui en découle pour les autorités de concur-
rence de modifier la structure de marché post-fusion en exigeant des mesures correctives
rapproche le contrôle des concentrations de la réglementation (voir Rey (2003, p.130), ou
Motta et al. (2003)).
Actuellement, les mesures correctives constituent l’instrument de prédilection des au-
torités de concurrence en général. Ceci s’accompagne d’un nombre de principes globale-
ment acceptés pour l’application des mesures correctives, qui ont été résumé par le rapport
OCDE 2004 sur les mesures correctives. Ainsi, lors du recours aux mesures correctives,
le dommage pour la concurrence doit être certain et incontestable, les mesures correctives
doivent représenter le moyen le moins contraignant pour restaurer la concurrence à son
niveau initial, et n’ont pas à répondre à des objectifs de politique industrielle ou autres
non reliés au problème de concurrence soulevé par la fusion.
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En pratique, l’interprétation donnée à ces principes est la suivante. Pour commencer,
les mesures correctives doivent êtres nécessaires, ce qui impose à l’autorité de la concur-
rence la charge de la preuve du dommage concurrentiel provoqué par la fusion. Par la suite,
lors de l’analyse des mesures correctives proposées par les entreprises concernées, l’autorité
de contrôle s’intéressera à leur eﬃcacité et aux coûts d’implémentation associés, mais aussi
à leur proportionnalité par rapport à l’ampleur du dommage concurrentiel, de manière à
ne pas aller au-delà de l’objectif de réparation dans la modification imposée au marché
post-fusion22. De plus, étant donné le souci de minimiser les coûts d’implémentation
des mesures correctives, en pratique les autorités de concurrence montrent une préférence
incontestable pour les remèdes structurels des fusions horizontales, sous la forme de trans-
ferts obligatoires d’actifs, qui ne nécessitent pas d’audit ex-post comme dans le cas des
engagements de comportement.
Mais, comme pour toute intervention ex-ante sur un marché, l’impact final des remèdes
des fusions est toujours incertain dans une certaine mesure. Ex-post, l’évaluation des
mesures correctives en termes de réussites ou échec reste encore à parfaire, compte tenu
du nombre très limité d’études ex-post sur le sujet. En eﬀet, la première initiative dans
cette direction est l’étude réalisée en 1999 par la Federal Trade Commission américaine
sur la base d’entretiens avec les acheteurs des actifs transférés dans des cas de fusions avec
mesures correctives structurelles entre 1993 et 1997. Les données indiquent qu’environ
75% des remèdes appliqués ont été eﬃcaces. Une conclusion comparable est obtenue par
l’étude similaire réalisée par le Directorat Concurrence de la Commission Européenne en
2003, sur la base d’un échantillon plus ample mais suivant la même méthodologie que
l’étude américaine. Sur les 96 cas de fusions acceptées avec conditions entre 1996 et 2000,
57% ont été considérés comme eﬃcaces. Compte tenu de la similarité de ces deux seules
études qualitatives, il serait intéressant de pouvoir comparer leurs résultats avec ceux
d’études quantitatives. Pourtant, il n’existe pas d’analyses économétriques systématiques
sur la réussite ou l’échec des mesures correctives.
22De ce point de vue, le Règlement Européen de 2004 relatif au contrôle des concentrations est clair :
"Ces engagements devraient être proportionnels au problème de concurrence et le résoudre entièrement"
(paragraphe 30).
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En théorie, les transferts d’actifs de la part des partenaires à destination d’autres firmes
de l’industrie ou de nouveaux entrants peuvent ramener la concurrence sur le marché
à un niveau comparable à celui d’avant la fusion (voir Farrell et Shapiro (1990,b) ou
Medvedev (2004,a)). Néanmoins, de tels transferts d’actifs au sein d’une industrie peuvent
également avoir des eﬀets moins désirables, encourageant par exemple la collusion par la
symétrie accrue de la structure de marché à laquelle ils conduisent (Compte et al. (2002),
Vasconcelos (2005,a)).
Par ailleurs, il convient de tenir compte aussi des diverses incitations qui accompag-
nent nécessairement l’application des mesures correctives. Du point de vue des autorités
de la concurrence, les remèdes des fusions procurent l’occasion d’agir directement sur la
structure (et aussi sur le comportement) des entreprises, d’où une possible incitation à
utiliser les mesures correctives pour améliorer la performance du marché en question, au
lieu de simplement corriger les eﬀets négatifs de la concentration (Farrell (2003), Vascon-
celos (2005,b)). Du point de vue des entreprises qui fusionnent, et compte tenu de leur
information privée concernant l’eﬀet concurrentiel réel de leur fusion, il existe une inci-
tation à utiliser de manière stratégique cette information privée pour pouvoir éviter des
mesures correctives qui leur seraient coûteuses.
D’un côté, ceci renvoie à l’opportunité de mettre en évidence des mécanismes de révéla-
tion qui permettrait d’extraire l’information privée des partenaires, de manière à assurer
un meilleur cadre d’application des mesures correctives. Le chapitre 6 de cette thèse
identifie et étudie un tel mécanisme de révélation.
De l’autre côté, il convient d’explorer davantage les conséquences de l’application des
remèdes des fusions en termes d’incitations. Par exemple, il est important de réaliser que
l’acheteur, aussi bien que le vendeur des actifs transférés n’ont pas réellement d’intérêt
à retrouver une concurrence accrue sur le marché post-fusion (Farrell (2003)). De plus,
de tels transferts obligatoires d’actifs contribuent à atténuer l’eﬀet de passager clandestin
dont bénéficient généralement les rivaux d’une entité fusionnée, en transférant une part
de leur richesse vers les participants à la fusion (voir Fridolfsson et Stennek (2005,a)).
Par conséquent, les mesures correctives peuvent encourager des fusions à avoir lieu. Ces
concentrations, qui plus est, ne seront pas nécessairement concurrentielles, compte tenu
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du fait que les mesures correctives signalent un contrôle des concentrations moins strict,
puisque l’autorité de la concurrence préfère modifier plutôt qu’interdire les fusions prob-
lématiques (voir Neven et al. (1993) et Seldeslachts et al. (2006)). Le chapitre 5 de cette
thèse se propose d’ailleurs de contribuer à l’analyse économique des mesures correctives
sur la base d’un cadre formel où leurs eﬀets incitatifs sont explicitement pris en compte.
Pour résumer, ce quatrième chapitre passé en revue de manière synthétique les con-
tributions théoriques analysant les procédures de prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité
potentiels et l’application de mesures correctives dans le cadre du processus de contrôle
des concentrations. Ce faisant, ce chapitre a présenté la problématique des analyses origi-
nales proposées dans les chapitres 5 et 6, à savoir l’étude de l’interaction stratégique entre
les autorités de concurrence et les entreprises qui fusionnent.
Chapitre 523
Suivant l’analyse de Williamson (1968), qui a formalisé l’arbitrage entre l’ineﬃcacité al-
locative d’une fusion horizontale et son éventuelle eﬃcacité productive, la prise en compte
des gains d’eﬃcacité potentiels d’une concentration pour son bilan concurrentiel n’a cessé
de gagner en importance, en confirmation du fait que les possibles réductions de coût
peuvent profiter aux consommateurs et contribuer à l’amélioration du bien-être global.
Néanmoins, le fait que la pratique du contrôle des concentrations suive ainsi des recom-
mandations théoriques s’accompagne de l’appréhension que la politique de la concurrence
devient (trop) laxiste envers les opérations de concentrations, compte tenu de l’information
privée dont disposent les entreprises qui fusionnent quant à l’eﬀet concurrentiel réel de leur
concentration.
Pour limiter le risque qui en découle d’accepter à tort des fusions anti-concurrentielles,
les autorités de la concurrence font largement appel à l’utilisation de mesures correctives
(plus qu’à des interdictions catégoriques), qui sont destinées à réduire le pouvoir de marché
des partenaires qui fusionnent et donc à restaurer la concurrence sur le marché post-fusion
à un niveau comparable à celui d’avant.
Le point essentiel réside pourtant dans le caractère particulier du contrôle des con-
centrations, en tant que branche de la politique de la concurrence qui, au contraire de
23 Issu de la collaboration avec Jean-Philippe Tropéano.
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la répression des cartels ou des abus de position dominante par exemple, doit anticiper
les conséquences d’un changement de la structure de marché (la fusion) avant même que
celui-ci ait lieu, et aussi corriger ex-ante ses éventuels eﬀets négatifs à travers la mise en
place de mesures correctives (Motta (2004)). Par définition donc, le contrôle des concen-
trations se retrouve soumis à des erreurs de type I et II, qui font que le vrai défi pour les
autorités de la concurrence est d’en minimiser les conséquences.
Ce chapitre étudie le profile optimal du contrôle des concentrations du point de vue
précisément du besoin de limiter l’incidence des deux types d’erreurs. L’analyse formelle
que l’on propose cherche à d’identifier la combinaison optimale entre la prise en compte
des gains d’eﬃcacité de la concentration pour son bilan concurrentiel et l’application des
mesures correctives, dans un cadre où les deux types d’erreur sont possibles en raison de
l’information privée des partenaires. En plus de la modélisation du contrôle des concentra-
tions en situation d’asymétrie d’information, ce chapitre se propose de souligner les eﬀets
incitatifs des procédures du contrôle des concentrations, qui devraient être davantage pris
en considération lors du bilan de l’action des autorités de la concurrence.
Il convient en eﬀet de tenir compte du fait que sans la reconnaissance des gains
d’eﬃcacité potentiels, les entreprises ont moins d’incitations à rechercher des projets de
fusion qui génèrent de tels gains. En réalité, planifier et matérialiser l’intégration de deux
entreprises est coûteuse, et d’autant plus que les partenaires chercheraient la manière la
plus eﬃcace d’y parvenir. Par conséquent, sans cette incitation à un eﬀort de planification,
les autorités de la concurrence risquent d’aggraver le coût social des erreurs du contrôle
des concentrations.
En mettant en évidence cet eﬀet incitatif ex-ante de la prise en compte des gains
d’eﬃcacité lors du bilan concurrentiel d’une concentration, notre analyse insiste sur le fait
que la hausse des coûts de procédure que ce bilan plus complet impose aux autorités de
la concurrence n’est pas le seul aspect à considérer pour conclure sur la rationalité de la
démarche (voir de ce point de vue l’analyse de Lagerlöﬀ et Heidhues (2005)). De plus, ce
chapitre suggère que la manière dont la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité sera réalisée
est tout aussi importante, étant donné l’utilisation généralisée des mesures correctives.
En eﬀet, l’acceptation de certaines concentrations sous conditions ne peut qu’élargir
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l’ensemble des fusions compatibles avec les critères établis par les autorités de la concur-
rence. Mais en termes d’incitations ex-ante ainsi fournies aux entreprises qui envisagent la
possibilité de s’engager dans des opérations de concentrations, ceci signale un contrôle des
concentrations moins sévère, puisqu’au pire, les partenaires devront s’accommoder d’une
mesure corrective et non pas d’une interdiction de leur fusion (Seldeslachts et al. (2006)).
Le cas contraire est tout aussi envisageable (Farrell (2003)), puisque le coût privé des
mesures correctives pour les partenaires pourraient les dissuader de rechercher des projets
de fusions plus eﬃcaces, car leur bénéfice privé en serait réduit.
Au-delà de la formalisation cohérente tous ses aspects incitatifs du contrôle des con-
centrations dans un cadre d’asymétrie d’information, l’analyse que l’on propose dans ce
chapitre se distingue des autres contributions théoriques qui traitent du contrôle des con-
centrations, par l’étude explicite de l’interaction du point de vue incitatif entre la prise en
compte des gains d’eﬃcacité et l’application des mesures correctives.
En eﬀet, le nombre et les caractéristiques des projets de fusions qui sont soumis pour
examination aux autorités de la concurrence sont influencés par la sévérité de celui-ci,
comme l’ont signalé Neven et al. (1993), Aaronson (1992), Besanko et Spulber (1993) ou
Seldeslachts et al. (2006).
Par exemple, et de manière moins intuitive, Persson (2004) montre qu’un contrôle
des concentrations plus stricte augmente les incitations de prédation sur le marché, alors
qu’Ecer (2005) signale que les entreprises réagissent à un durcissement de la politique de
la concurrence en développant des stratégies leur permettant de le contourner, de manière
à pouvoir provoquer une hausse du prix post-fusion malgré l’action des autorités de la
concurrence.
En même temps, malgré le signal de réglementation plus permissive envoyé par l’application
des mesures correctives, celles-ci donnent l’occasion aux autorités de la concurrence de
modifier implicitement la structure de marché, ce qui peut décourager la planification plus
eﬃcace des projets de fusion.
Le point de départ de notre formalisation est la caractérisation des gains d’eﬃcacité
potentiels générés par une fusion. En eﬀet, ces gains d’eﬃcacité ne peuvent se matérialiser
qu’une fois la concentration elle-même a eu lieu, mais notre hypothèse centrale est qu’ils
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sont aussi le résultat d’un eﬀort ex-ante de planification de la part des partenaires24, qui
leur est coûteux et dont l’aboutissement n’est pas certain.
On considère de plus que les firmes qui fusionnent sont les seules à connaître le résultat
de cet eﬀort (s’il a été entrepris) au moment où le projet de fusion est soumis à l’autorité
de la concurrence.
De plus, celle-ci n’observera qu’un signal public (et binaire) mais imparfait sur le résul-
tat de l’eﬀort (si eﬀort il y a). Dans ce cadre avec asymétrie d’information, la formalisation
retenue pour la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité sera que l’autorité de la concurrence
s’engage à accepter une fusion dont les partenaires font valoir des arguments d’eﬃcacité
seulement si le signal public indique l’existence de tels gains. Ceci revient à modéliser un
contrôle des concentrations soumis aux deux types d’erreurs, puisqu’un "bon" signal peut
conduire à l’acceptation à tort des fusions, tandis qu’un "mauvais" signal peut justifier le
rejet à tort des fusions.
Une autre règle de décision possible pour l’autorité de la concurrence est d’accepter
toute concentration pour laquelle les participants ont proposé des mesures correctives.
Notre hypothèse est que les remèdes proposés sont eﬃcaces, donc tout risque de fusion
anti-concurrentielle devient nul, mais en même temps les partenaires subissent un coût
privé qui élimine complètement l’incitation à réaliser l’eﬀort coûteux de planification ex-
ante. En d’autres termes, l’acceptation des fusions avec mesures correctives assurent que
le critère de bien-être retenu par l’autorité de concurrence sera satisfait25, mais au coût
d’une moindre incitation à entreprendre des fusions plus eﬃcaces.
Dans ce cadre, la première étape de notre analyse est de déterminer le mécanisme
justifiant la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité pour la décision d’accepter ou non une
fusion. Cela arrive seulement pour une qualité suﬃsante du signal observé par l’autorité
de la concurrence. L’intuition est que la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité est justifiée
par le choix des partenaires à entreprendre l’eﬀort coûteux de planification ex-ante (qui
dépend lui-même de la qualité suﬃsante du signal), mais aussi par le fait que du point de
24Voir aussi Fabrizi et Lippert (2005) et Cabolis et al. (2005) pour d’autres modélisations de concentra-
tion avec gains d’eﬃcacité endogènes.
25Quel qu’il soit, surplus des consommateurs ou bien-être total, notre analyse qualitative est robuste au
choix de critère de bien-être.
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vue du critère de bien-être retenu, cet eﬀort conduit en espérance à un niveau plus élevé de
surplus par rapport à la situation initiale. En d’autres termes, l’engagement de l’autorité
de contrôle est rationnel tant que le coût en bien-être des deux types d’erreur de juge-
ment possibles n’est pas trop élevé. Ceci permet une interprétation équivalente, à savoir
que l’opportunité de la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité pour accepter ou non une
fusion résulte d’un arbitrage entre l’incitation fournie aux entreprises à proposer des con-
centrations plus eﬃcaces, et le risque d’acceptation à tort des fusion anti-concurrentielles,
compte tenu de l’information asymétrique dont dispose l’autorité de la concurrence.
L’étape suivante de notre analyse consiste à évaluer l’opportunité de la prise en compte
des gains d’eﬃcacité lorsque les entreprises ont la possibilité de proposer elles-mêmes des
mesures correctives comme partie de leur projet de fusion. Ceci nous permettra d’étudier
la combinaison optimale entre ces deux procédures du contrôle des concentrations.
2tant donné qu’une fusion sera acceptée soit parce que le "bon" signal a été observé,
soit parce que les partenaires ont proposé dès le départ des mesures correctives, on montre
que l’application de celles-ci modifie l’arbitrage mis en évidence auparavant.
D’un côté, les mesures correctives diminuent l’incitation à l’eﬀort ex-ante fournie par la
prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité, puisqu’elles réduisent le coût d’opportunité de faire
valoir cet argument pour faire acceptér la fusion. En eﬀet, au lieu de risquer de voir leur
projet rejeté, les partenaires peuvent toujours en proposer un moins eﬃcace mais moins
coûteux, assorti de mesures correctives, ce qui garantit son acceptation. De l’autre côté,
du point de vue de l’autorité de concurrence les mesures correctives présentent l’avantage
d’éliminer complètement le risque d’accepter à tort une fusion anti-concurrentielle.
Finalement, du point de vue des entreprises qui fusionnent, la possibilité d’avoir recours
ou non à des mesures correctives lors de la soumission de leur projet de concentration leur
permet de signaler les caractéristiques de leur fusion. En eﬀet, on montre qu’en fonction
de la qualité du signal, les partenaires ayant réussi leur eﬀort de planification peuvent
avoir intérêt à se signaler en ne proposant pas de mesures correctives avec leur projet
de fusion, tandis que les partenaires dont l’eﬀort a échoué peuvent également le signaler
en proposant des mesures correctives26. En d’autres termes, celles-ci présentent pour
26 Intuitivement, une meilleure qualité du signal augmente les chances pour une fusion eﬃcace d’être
RÉSUMÉ DE LA THÈSE EN FRANÇAIS xxxv
l’autorité de la concurrence l’avantage supplémentaire de permettre un allègement de sa
contrainte informationnelle.
Par conséquent, si le bénéfice attendu d’une fusion plus eﬃcace est très important, il
est préférable de privilégier l’eﬀet incitatif de la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité, et
donc de renoncer à l’application simultanée des mesures correctives. Par contre, si le coût
social d’accepter à tort une fusion est très élevé, il devient plus important de se prémunir
contre cette possibilité, et par conséquent la prise en compte des gains d’eﬃcacité devra
toujours s’accompagner de l’application de mesures correctives.
Ainsi, on identifie la combinaison optimale des deux procédures compte tenu de l’ampleur
relative des deux types d’erreurs possible dans le cadre d’un contrôle des concentrations
en situation d’asymétrie d’information.
De plus, ce résultat s’ajoute à la discussion de l’opportunité pour le Règlement CE
de janvier 2004 d’imoser la prise en compte les gains d’eﬃcacité potentiels pour le bilan
concurrentiel des concentrations, en raison des coûts engendrés par les problèmes informa-
tionnels. Notre analyse rappelle la pertinence de la prise en compte des eﬀets incitatifs du
contrôle des concentrations, qui ne devrait pas être négligés, compte tenu de l’interaction
réciproque entre la politique de la concurrence et le comportement des agents économiques.
Chapitre 627
L’objectif du modèle développé dans ce chapitre est de contribuer à l’analyse économique
des mesures correctives en considérant le rôle des gains d’eﬃcacité potentiels pour la déter-
mination des mesures correctives optimales.
Plus précisément, on formalise le lien entre le niveau de gains d’eﬃcacité générés par la
fusion et l’ampleur du transfert d’actifs qui sera nécessaire pour rendre la fusion compati-
ble avec l’objectif de l’autorité de la concurrence, à savoir d’empêcher toute hausse du prix
post-fusion. En pratique, l’application des mesures correctives doit obéir à un tel objectif
de proportionnalité par rapport au dommage concurrentiel causé par la concentration,
puisque il est recommandé que les mesures correctives soient telles que ce dommage soit
correctement reconnue comme telle, ce qui explique ces incitations contraires pour les partenaires ayant
réussi ou non l’eﬀort coûteux de planification ex-ante.
27 Issu de la collaboration avec Jean-Philippe Tropéano.
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complètement réparé, mais que leur intervention distorssive sur la structure de marché ne
soit pas excessive. Selon le Règlement Européen de 2004 relatif au contrôle des concen-
trations, "Ces engagements devraient être proportionnels au problème de concurrence et
le résoudre entièrement" (paragraphe 30).
Par conséquent, et compte tenu de cet objectif de proportionnalité, les autorités de
la concurrence devraient exiger des mesures correctives plus substantielles de la part des
projets de fusions moins concurrentielles, et au contraire, accepter des concentrations peu
problématiques sous peu de conditions. Il convient donc de remarquer que pour pouvoir
envisager des mesures correctives optimales, les autorités de la concurrence ont besoin de
connaître les gains d’eﬃcacité potentiels de la concentration, ce qui est vraisemblablement
une information privée des entreprises qui fusionnent (Yao et Dahdouh (1993)).
Ainsi, le second objectif de l’analyse de ce chapitre est d’identifier un moyen d’extraire
cette information privée afin de permettre l’application de mesures correctives adaptées
au dommage concurrentiel eﬀectif de la concentration.
Un tel mécanisme de révélation serait incontestablement utile aux autorités de concur-
rence, compte tenu de l’asymétrie d’information dans laquelle se déroule le contrôle des
concentrations. Röller et al. (2001) suggéraient ainsi la possibilité d’utiliser des vraies
licences à fusionner, qui donneraient ce droit aux partenaires potentiels en échange d’un
transfert monétaire vers le budget de l’Etat, mais une telle procédure reste purement
théorique pour l’instant.
Le mécanisme de révélation que l’on propose de considérer dans ce chapitre n’implique
pas de paiement vers l’autorité de contrôle, même si le principe de base est toujours celui
d’une taxe ou d’une licence à fusionner. Notre proposition repose sur la combinaison d’un
transfert d’actifs et d’un certain prix de vente obtenu en retour de la part de l’acheteur
des actifs, ce qui revient à implémenter une vente réglementée d’actifs. Ceci renvoie
à l’opportunité d’utiliser les mesures correctives comme moyen d’extraire l’information
privée qui est pertinente pour leur détermination optimale. Malgré la réticence actuelle
des autorités de concurrence à s’impliquer dans la fixation du prix de vente des transferts
d’actifs requis comme mesure corrective, notre analyse signale plutôt l’intérêt qu’il y a
à exploiter toute l’information pertinente, à savoir celle qui est transmise par le prix du
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transfert d’actifs lors de la négociation entre le vendeur et l’acheteur.
En eﬀet, notre analyse permet d’aboutir à cette interprétation en termes de signal,
puisque les entreprises qui participent à une fusion plus eﬃcace pourront transférer moins
d’actifs, mains en échange d’un prix de vente réduit, ce qui les distingue des partenaires
à une fusion moins eﬃcace, qui auront intérêt au contraire de récupérer le prix maximum
pour un transfert d’actifs plus substantiel28.
Bien que la littérature économique ait reconnu les conséquences de la contrainte infor-
mationnelle qui pèse sur le contrôle des concentrations, il n’y a pas beaucoup de proposi-
tions de modalités pour extraire l’information privée des entreprises qui fusionnent. Faulli-
Oller et Corchon (1999) montrent que implémentation en stratégies dominantes des fusions
pro-concurentielles n’est possible que sous des conditions très restrictives, et de plus, leur
analyse ne prend pas en compte la possibilité d’avoir recours à des mesures correctives.
Celles-ci n’ont été que récemment considérées comme instrument de révélation, suivant
la remarque de Rey (2000) d’utiliser les transferts ou les quasi-transferts pour résoudre
l’asymétrie d’information. Gonzalez (2003) et puis Féral (2006) ont suivi cette remarque,
mais à la diﬀérence de ces contributions, notre mécanisme de révélation est à la fois eﬃcace
du point de vue de l’extraction de l’information mais aussi non distorssif, autrement dit il
permet d’implémenter des mesures correctives proportionnelles au dommage concurrentiel
de la concentration.
Il convient de remarquer à cet égard que notre formalisation se distingue non seulement
par le choix particulier de l’instrument de révélation secondaire, le prix de vente des actifs,
mais aussi par le cadre de formalisation retenu, fondé sur les contraintes de capacité. Celui-
ci nous permet d’étudier l’impact des mesures correctives sur les contraintes de capacité
des entreprises qui fusionnent ou de leurs rivaux. Ce faisant, ce chapitre insiste sur la
condition nécessaire pour que des mesures correctives structurelles s’avèrent eﬃcaces, à
28La fusion avortée entre Staples et Oﬃce Depot semble exemplifier une telle situation, puisque Staples
avait proposé de renoncer à 140 millions de dollars lors de la cession d’actifs vers le rival Oﬃce Max exigée
comme mesure corrective, pour montrer à quel point la fusion avec Oﬃce Depot serait bénéfique et pro-
concurrentielle. Pourtant, ce signal envoyé en direction de la Federal Trade Commission américaine n’a
pas été bien reçu, la fusion étant finalement interdite par l’intervention d’une Court de justice. (Source :
le Washington Post du 13 mars 1997.)
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savoir que l’acheteur des actifs transférés les utilise réellement. En d’autres termes, il faut
que les actifs cédés servent à desserrer sa contrainte de capacité, autrement l’acheteur se
retrouvera avec une capacité excédentaire oisive dont il profitera pour maintenir un prix
élevé sur le marché post-fusion29.
Plus préciséement, dans un triopole symétrique de Cournot avec contraintes de capac-
ité, on considère une fusion bilatérale exogène qui peut générer des réductions de coût
grâce à des gains d’eﬃcacité obtenus par les partenaires. Pourtant, si la réduction de
coût est faible, elle n’empêchera pas la contraction de la production jointe des partenaires
post-fusion, car une partie de la capacité totale sera inutilisée. Dans ce cas, l’autorité de
la concurrence exigera un transfert d’actifs vers le rival restant sur le marché, de manière à
resserrer la contrainte des capacité des partenaires et à diriger l’industrie vers un équilibre
post-fusion sans capacité oisive, ce qui assure dans ce cadre que le prix n’augmentera pas.
La première étape de notre analyse est d’identifier le transfert d’actifs optimal, qui
permettra de garder le prix constant. On montre que cette mesure corrective dépend
du montant de la réduction de coût obtenue par les partenaires, donc de leurs gains
d’eﬃcacité. Plus précisément, une entreprise fusionnée moins eﬃcace devra transférer
plus d’actifs qu’une autre dont le coût marginal est inférieur, car une réduction de coût
plus faible génère plus de capacité oisive qui devra être transférée à la firme rivale pour
garder le prix constant sur le marché.
Pour résumer, la situation de référence avec information symétrique entre les entre-
prises qui fusionnent et l’autorité de la concurrence permet de retrouver le principe de
proportionnalité entre la cession d’actifs et le dommage concurrentiel de la fusion.
L’étape suivante de notre analyse est d’étudier le cas de l’information asymétrique.
Il convient de remarquer ici que l’information privée des partenaires concernant les gains
d’eﬃcacité réels de leur fusion les incite à l’exploiter de manière stratégique, afin de pouvoir
éviter une cession d’actifs plus grande qui serait exigée par l’autorité de contrôle. En eﬀet,
29Les conséquences des transferts d’actifs entre des entreprises rivales ont fait l’objet d’autres contribu-
tions théoriques. Farrell et Shapiro (1990,b) ont ainsi examiné les conséquences sur les profits de l’industrie
et le bien-être global, alors que Compte et al. (2002) et Vasconcelos (2005,a) ont pu montrer que les ces-
sions d’actifs comme mesures correctives peuvent encourager la collusion sur le marché post-fusion (en
rendant plus symétrique la distribution des parts de marché entre les concurrents).
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le transfert d’actifs représente un coût pour les partenaires, en réduisant leur capacité
et profit post-fusion. Par conséquent, on peut montrer que seul, le transfert d’actifs de
premier rang (avec information symétrique) ne permettra pas de garder constant le prix en
cas d’asymétrie d’information. En résumé, un instrument supplémentaire sera nécessaire
pour extraire l’information privée.
Ce deuxième instrument que l’on associera au transfert d’actifs dans un mécanisme de
révélation inspiré de la théorie des contrats sera le prix de vente des actifs. Formellement,
l’asymétrie d’information rend nécessaires des contraintes d’incitation, spécifiant le prix
de vente pour le transfert d’actifs destiné à chaque type d’entreprise fusionnée, en fonction
donc de sa réduction de coût.
Il convient de noter pourtant qu’en utilisant cet instrument supplémentaire de révéla-
tion, on se distingue du cadre standard principal-agent, puisque ce prix de vente n’est pas
un paiement des entreprises vert l’autorité de contrôle, mais un transfert forfaitaire entre
des firmes rivales. En évitant l’implication de l’autorité de la concurrence en tant que «
régulateur », on évite également de modifier le profit total de l’industrie, puisque seule
sa distribution interne change. De manière équivalente, l’utilisation d’un tel instrument
conduit à réconcilier les intérêts divergents des entreprises qui fusionnent et leurs rivaux
en ce qui concerne les réductions de coût obtenues par la fusion, pour ainsi assurer la
participation de l’acheteur et du vendeur des actifs au partage du profit total.
Pour aboutir à l’objectif de révélation de l’information privée, notre analyse met
d’abord en évidence la condition de "single crossing" qui permet de séparer les entités
fusionnées en fonction de leurs réductions de coût. Cette condition indique que les parte-
naires à une fusion plus eﬃcace profitent davantage de leur capacité jointe que ceux d’une
fusion moins eﬃcace, car leur réduction de coût plus substantielle leur permet d’atteindre
un profit supérieur avec une même capacité totale que les autres. Par conséquent, un
même transfert d’actifs sera plus coûteux pour les partenaires plus eﬃcaces, et donc leur
disponibilité à céder des actifs sera plus faible, tout comme leur disponibilité à recevoir de
l’argent en retour.
Cette condition permet d’aboutir au résultat suivant. Le menu de contrats proposé
aux deux types d’entreprises fusionnées que l’on considère comprendra un transfert d’actifs
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réduit en échange d’un prix de vente plus faible, tandis que le prix de vente du transfert
d’actifs plus grand correspondra à la disponibilité maximale à payer de l’acheteur. Compte
tenu de la condition d’intersection unique, les partenaires plus eﬃcaces choisiront le pre-
mier contrat de cession d’actifs, alors que les partenaires moins eﬃcaces choisiront le
second.
Puisque ce menu de contrats permet de retrouver les transferts d’actifs optimaux de
premier rang, il est eﬃcace. De plus, seuls les prix de vente peuvent être distordus, mais
cet instrument n’est pas coûteux pour l’autorité de la concurrence en tant que "principal"
et pour l’objectif de prix constant. Ce mécanisme est donc également peu distorsif.
Il convient de remarquer que ce menu de contrats revient à implémenter une licence à
fusionner avec un prix moyen non linéaire. Surtout, il faut souligner que le "paiement" ne
se réalise pas vers l’autorité de la concurrence. Plus précisément, la "licence" à fusionner
consiste soit en l’acceptation d’un transfert d’actifs plus grand pour un prix de vente
maximum, soit en l’acceptation d’un prix de vente inférieur à la disponibilité à payer de
l’acheteur, mais pour un transfert d’actifs réduit.
Cela suggère qu’en pratique, même sans intervenir dans la négociation qui aboutit au
prix de vente des actifs transférés, l’autorité de la concurrence peut extraire de l’information
de la combinaison cession d’actifs — prix de vente sur laquelle le vendeur et l’acheteur
tombent d’accord.
De plus, l’analyse proposée dans ce chapitre relève aussi du choix optimal des instru-
ments à utiliser pour contrôler les eﬀets anti-concurrentiels des concentrations, compte
tenu de la contrainte informationnelle spécifique. Alors que la fixation des prix représente
habituellement une distorsion importante, dans le contexte du contrôle des concentrations
le prix de vente des actifs comme instrument de révélation de l’information privée s’avère
moins distorsif que le transfert d’actif lui-même, car il ne modifie pas la structure de
marché, ni les choix de production des entreprises.
Conclusion
Pour résumer, l’objectif de cette thèse était de contribuer à l’analyse théorique des
motivations, des conséquences et des réponses réglementaires relatives aux concentrations
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horizontales. D’abord, notre analyse a mis en évidence l’importance de la prise en compte
du comportement post-fusion pour l’analyse positive des concentrations, que ce soit dans le
sens d’un repositionnement (spatial ou dans la gamme des produits), ou dans le sens d’une
gestion centralisée ou pas de l’entreprise fusionnée. Ceci reste pertinent du point de vue
normatif, puisque le comportement tout autant que la nouvelle structure de marché préoc-
cupe les autorités de concurrence. Mais compte tenu des contraintes informationnelles et
incitatives spécifiques au contrôle des concentrations, il paraît souhaitable d’élargir la boîte
à outils des autorités de concurrence.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
CLOSE -UP ON MERGERS...
On June 30, 2006, the Financial Times estimated in one of its articles ("M&As fever
surpasses dotcom era") that merger and acquisition (M&A) activity worldwide was set to
reach $1,930bn for the first half of the year 2006, marking the highest half-year volume
on record and surpassing even the days of the dotcom boom, despite the expectations of
many who thought that they never would again reach the record 2000-2001 levels.
Merger and acquisitions are known to be contagious. The past century witnessed
several great merger waves - after the one at its beginning, other occurred at the ends of
the 20s, 60s, 80s and 90s. Although the earlier waves were rather confined to the US and
UK, the most recent ones qualified as global, and according to some30, the current biggest
acquisition panic is actually happening in Continental Europe. This is most visible for
the European energy industry, which is currently consolidating at a rapid pace. Since the
beginning of the year 2006, the Spanish company Gas Natural made a $26 billion hostile
bid for the Spanish utility company Endesa, in an attempt to combine the no1 electric and
gas companies in Spain. Then, in reaction, the German E.On soon made a $35 billion oﬀer
for Endesa, which, if successful, would make the world’s largest utility company. Then
Italy’s Enel SpA (no1 electrical supplier in Italy) announced it was considering making a
hostile bid for the French utility Suez SA, which owns electricity, gas, water, and waste
30See Oligopoly Watch dated February 26, 2006.
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assets. Almost immediately, the French government announced that Suez and gas utility
Gaz de France would merge.
In general, merger waves occur in response to some type of shock, such as a new
production technology, a new organizational advance or new form of corporate governance,
industry deregulation or privatization, as well as changes in the merger policy (more or less
restrictive). For instance, the megamergers in media, banking and finance or entertainment
in the late 90s reflect both the deregulation shock (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)) as well
as the technology shock of the digital revolution (Andrade et al. (2001)).
...AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
If the fact that mergers tend to come in waves represents a stylized fact, so do some
confirmed conclusions on merger performance and market eﬀects. In short, the profitable
acquisitions are not too frequent (see Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) for one of the earliest,
but far-reaching, analyses, or Tichy (2001) for a summary of about 80 empirical merger
studies). Actually, based on an international comparison, Gugler et al. (2003) find that at
best half of acquisitions appear to increase profits for the partners, with great variability
in overall merger performance. One can easily recall famous ’disastrous’ M&As, including
AOL-Time-Warner, Chrysler and Daimler Benz, and HP with Compaq, consistent with
the remark that "Big Mergers Have a Long History of Failure and Trouble" (see the
New York Times, January 15, 2004), yet other big deals have done fine, like Verizon and
Comcast, or Mobil and Exxon.
In addition, it appears that about half of these profitable mergers are contractionary
in terms of output, so they increase prices, as a result of which consumers actually benefit
from no more than a quarter of the mergers. Consider the following example31 (by no
means unique) on the various bank mergers and acquisitions which took place in the
US between 2000 and 2006. In January 2004, no4 Chase/JPMorgan acquired no3 Bank
One, to become no2 right behind Citigroup. In July 2005, no5 BOA bought no2 MBNA
to become the top credit-card company, with Citigroup becoming no2 and Chase/Bank
One becoming no3. Basically, the top 6 merged into the top 3 in 6 years or less, with a
31Source: Latefee Avoidance website by attorney Carl E. Person, available at
http://www.lawmall.com/latefees/marketshare/php
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total market share apparently between 65% and 70% by now. Yet, evidence shows "that
increased concentration in the banking industry has not benefitted bank customers.[...] In
addition, large interbank mergers reduce competition in ATM network markets as well as
in credit card markets.[...] Larger banks charge higher fees,[...] and bank mergers have an
adverse eﬀect on consumer deposit pricing"32.
In the words of (and based on the regressions of) Gugler et al. (2003), "if one cate-
gorizes mergers that increase market power, or that reduce eﬃciency, as welfare reducing,
then a majority of the mergers taking place around the world over the last 15 years appear
to be welfare reducing".
This is consequential. The fact that unprofitable mergers occur may be costly for
shareholders, but the fact that they reduce welfare, mostly by increasing prices, is no
trifling matter for consumers in general. If the (un)profitability is to be explained, the
role of competition authorities controlling mergers and of merger policy in general needs
to be accounted for as well.
CLOSE-UP ON MERGER POLICY
Merger control is important because by means of prohibitions or corrective measures
it can prevent the creation of anti-competitive market structures, besides deterring anti-
competitive mergers from forming in the first place. At least, this is the purpose and
desired outcome of merger control, if eﬀective, but this is not always the case.
Based on a sample of 100 mergers reviewed in Europe according to the European Com-
munity Merger Regulation, Neven and Röller (2002) establish a rather low frequency of
type I errors, i.e. pro-competitive mergers that were prohibited by the European Commis-
sion, but a rather high frequency of type II errors, i.e. situations where the Commission
failed to block or to remedy anti-competitive mergers. In their turn, based on a sample
of 164 EU merger control decisions, Duso et al. (2003) equally study whether the EU
merger procedures are prone to systematic errors, and find type I errors in 28% of cases
32Testimony of Craig Collette at the Hearing of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco on Planned Merger of Nationsbank and Bank of America, July 10, 1998 - available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publicmeeting/19980709/Panel19.pdf
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and type II errors in 23% of them. As far as the US merger policy is concerned, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission published in 1999 a study33 examining the outcome of structural
merger remedies, i.e. asset divestitures, ordered from 1990 to 1994 for the explicit purpose
of preventing the anti-competitive eﬀects of mergers identified as welfare-reducing. The
study concluded that about three quarters of divestitures had succeeded in creating viable
operations in the relevant market, and that both parties involved in the asset transfer
transaction acted according to their own respective interests, quite diﬀerent from those of
the competition authority. In other words, it obtained that about 25% of applied remedies
did not achieve relief for the competitive concerns raised by the merger, that firms behave
strategically, and that the Federal Trade Commission had not been able to prevent the
failure of these remedial measures, since the incriminated divestitures had been approved.
A similar study was published in 2005 by the European Commission’s Directorate General
Competition (EC DG Comp Remedy Study34), with a similar reported outcome: in only
57% of merger cases the requested remedies could undoubtedly be considered eﬀective.
THE RESEARCH PROJECT OF THE DISSERTATION
Such stylized facts raise questions for the economic research: why do mergers fail to
increase profits or welfare? And since they do, why are they so many to take place? And
what should the merger policy do about it, and moreover what can it really do? The ratio-
nale, market consequences and antitrust treatment of mergers represent topical issues for
economic research. The essays in this dissertation aim to provide further insight into these
questions, from a purely theoretical point of view. The first part of the thesis will examine
the individual private incentives to merge and some of the welfare consequences of such a
decision. The second part of the dissertation will focus instead on the strategic interaction
between the merging firms and the competition authorities so as to draw inference on the
design of merger control.
The type of merger on which antitrust agencies focus because most likely to raise
competition problems, and the type of merger which this dissertation will exclusively
33Available at www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf
34Available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/others/remedies_study.pdf
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concentrate on, is a merger between firms engaged in directly competing activities. These
mergers are classified as horizontal mergers, and account for a substantial bulk of mergers
qualifying for review by the competition authorities. For instance, in the 1999 report
"Merger appraisal in oligopolistic markets" prepared for the UK Oﬃce of Fair Trading,
horizontal concentrations accounted for 93% of all mergers and acquisitions reviewed (97%
by value), with diversifying mergers accounting for 5% (2%) and vertical mergers for just
2% (1%).
Horizontal mergers may threaten competition by eliminating the direct competitive
constraints which each of the merging parties formerly placed on each other. Actually,
"whether firms compete in prices or quantities (or capacities), a merger between com-
petitors increases the remaining firms’ market power (both for the merged firm and its
competitors), thereby leading (absent any eﬃciency gains) to higher prices and lower out-
put"35. Along with the unilateral market power increase, a merger may also threaten
competition if it creates an environment in which tacit or explicit collusion between those
firms left in the market becomes more likely36.
In this thesis we are going to overlook this co-ordinated eﬀect of a merger, and only
concentrate on the consequences of and the antitrust response to unilateral market power
increases. By so doing, we aim to further explore the individual incentives to merge,
independent from the possibility of subsequent profitable collusive behaviour. Moreover,
this enables us to build our diﬀerent analyses, both positive and normative, around the
topic of merger eﬃciencies, which are now recognized as an important positive, although
most often than not uncertain, unilateral eﬀect of concentrations. The impact of resulting
cost savings on market power, on welfare and even on coordinated behaviour has already
been pointed out in the literature. Basically, "economics strongly suggests that eﬃciencys
avings should be at the centre of the analysis of mergers (Motta (2004, p.271)), so the
relevance of merger eﬃciency gains for the outcome of a merger is now explicitly recognized
35See "The Economics of Unilateral Eﬀects", M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright
and J. Tirole, Interim Report for DG Competition, European Commission, 2003, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/review/the_economics_of_unilateral_eﬀects_en.pdf
36The impact of a reduced number of competitors is essential - see Selten’s (1973) "Four are few and six
are many".
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in legal texts - in the wording of the 2004 EC Merger Regulation (paragraph 29), "In order
to determine the impact of a concentration on competition [in the common market], it is
appropriate to take account of any substantiated and likely eﬃciencies put forward by
the undertakings concerned. It is possible that the eﬃciencies brought about by the
concentration counteract the eﬀects on competition, and in particular the potential harm
to consumers".
Furthermore, in terms of antitrust response, the unilateral competition concern are
often (to be) solved by merger remedies rather than downright prohibitions, and we are
going to focus on merger remedies as a merger control instrument in this dissertation.
We do so because competition authorities extensively rely on merger remedies to regulate
mergers. In the US, remedies constituted only 23% of US merger policy actions in the
late 1980s, but by the year 2000, remedies were employed in over 60% of US merger
cases requiring antitrust action (Parker and Balto (2000)). In addition, "unlike the issues
related to assessment of a merger’s competitive eﬀects, the lack of transparency on the
theory of remedies as well as the extraordinarily rare judicial oversight of remedies leaves
the issue of remedies as one where the antitrust agencies possess considerable discretion",
as noted by the 1999 report "Merger appraisal in oligopolistic markets" prepared for the
UK Oﬃce of Fair Trading. Indeed, despite increased reliance of merger laws on economic
theory principles37, "the fashioning of merger remedies is [yet] subject to standards that
are not well-defined or consistent" (Blumenthal (2001)), so further theoretical insight into
their consequences and optimal application cannot be redundant. Economic research on
merger remedies hardly needs further justification than the openly acknowledged interest
competition authority show with this respect - in the words of Parker and Balto (2000),
"Probably no single issue currently is receiving as much attention as the topic of relief in
merger cases. The question of whether there is a remedy to an anticompetitive merger
and what that remedy should be is perhaps the single most intriguing and complex issue
faced by the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission."
37As argued by the successive revisions (1992, 1997) of the US Merger Guidelines issued by the Federal
Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice, as well as by the recent (2004) reform of he EC
Merger Regulation, explicitly designed towards ’a more economic approach’.
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Actually, our analysis of merger remedies will concentrate on structural remedies, i.e.
asset transfers, also called divestitures, although certain conclusions we draw are more
general. This is consistent with our choice to deal with horizontal market concentration, to
the extent that the divestitures represent the preferred merger control instrument employed
by antitrust authorities for such mergers. The 2005 Remedy Study of the European
Commission DG Comp stresses that about 80% of the commitments required from the
merging parties address horizontal concerns, and that divestitures account for more than
60% of all remedies. They are preferred to behavioral merger remedies, because they
are final, and allow a one-shot interference with the market structure, since they change
the allocation of property rights within the industry. As such, they implicitly alter the
production decisions, and thereby the merger profitability and also the incentives to merge
in the first place.
The research area of this thesis will thus be confined to the unilateral eﬀects of and the
remedies applied to the horizontal mergers.
Accounting for firms’ strategies
The first part of the dissertation will deal with both topics, but in a spatial framework
and from a positive standpoint. More precisely, it proposes a spatial analysis of merger
decisions and of their consequences by taking into account the firms’ optimal location
decisions following the merger.
Space and location choice can refer to both geography and product range - to a greater
or lesser extent, virtually all markets involve some element of spatial diﬀerentiation, either
geographical or based on consumer preferences, so a merger analysis can only gain in
realism by taking into account the spatial feature. The spatial framework can be useful
for the positive analysis of mergers in order to examine the incentives to merge provided
by particular location patterns or degrees of product diﬀerentiation, or to account for such
merger consequences as product repositioning or geographical (re)shaping of a distribution
network38. As the 1999 report for the UK Oﬃce of Fair Trading stresses, "mergers do not
38Berry and Waldfogel (2001) find increased product variety following horizontal market concentration
in the US radio station industry, which they approximate by Hotelling’s linear city.
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take place in a vacuum...[but] cause structural change in the industry".
The first chapter will provide an introduction to the topic by reviewing the the-
oretical literature dealing with horizontal mergers in a spatial setting, with an intended
focus on the two-way relationship between firms’ locations (both in the geographical and
product range sense) and their behaviour. For this purpose, we first explore the incentives
conveyed by locations for firms’ merger and merger-related strategies, then go on to ad-
dress the impact of merger on location choices. By so doing, we illustrate to what extent
the theoretical literature on horizontal mergers has exploited location and space in general
for better seizing the motivations for and the outcome of horizontal market concentration.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide in their turn formal spatial analyses of horizontal mergers.
The two models proposed share the same approach, which is to examine the incentives
to merge by studying the strategies to which firms resort to make their merger (more)
profitable. They also share the same underlying spatial framework, namely the ship-
ping Cournot model of spatial price discrimination. As shown by the main findings from
location theory reviewed in the first chapter, this setting is consistent with everyday ob-
servations of overlapping market areas for rival firms, as well as with the spatial clustering
of rival firms or outlets (see Anderson and Neven (1991) and Pal and Sarkar (2002)). On
the other hand, the combination between the homogenous product quantity competition
and the shipping assumptions allows an easily tractable and practically relevant modelling
of product diﬀerentiation, to the extent that the framework corresponds to the mecha-
nism of flexible manufacturing described by Eaton and Schmitt (1994), where the basic
product (standing for the location of the firm) is customized at a certain cost (here, the
shipping cost) to better satisfy individual consumers preferences. Thus, by endogenizing
post-merger location choices in this framework, we will be able to further assess the impact
of product design changes and/or spatial relocation on merger profitability.
Chapter 2 focuses on the impact of location choice for merger profitability and as
such contributes to the literature examining the profitability of horizontal mergers. De-
spite the recurrent merger waves, the theoretical studies comfort the previously quoted
and empirical reports in their indication that often merging partners incur a profitability
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loss, while the profits of non-merged rivals increase, which can eventually question the very
incentives to merge (see Stigler (1950)). This latter part of the so-called merger profitabil-
ity paradox heavily depends on the underlying assumptions on market competition - in
short, the private rationality of horizontal mergers is much more debatable with quantity
than with price competition (see Salant et al. (1983), Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
and Gaudet and Salant (1992)). To restore Cournot merger profitability, cost savings or
Stackelberg leadership for the merging firms have been shown to be eﬀective in the non-
spatial setting39. The spatial literature equally forwarded a solution to the paradox, by
endogenizing the post-merger location choices of firms (Norman and Pepall (2000)40).
Chapter 2 in our dissertation basically checks the robustness of this solution. By ex-
amining post-merger location equilibria based on strictly the same assumptions, except
for the space linearity, the second chapter of this dissertation checks the relevance of the
intrinsic market characteristics for the (un)profitability result. More precisely, the analy-
sis in Chapter 2 questions the suﬃciency of the post-merger relocation assumption w.r.t.
merger profitability by focusing on the homogenous-location circular market case. In other
words, Chapter 2 verifies whether undertaking product design changes or outlet relocation
to save on post-merger costs can ensure merger profitability in absence of some market
asymmetry or niche to exploit. This incidentally comes down to checking the robustness
of a corollary of Deneckere and Davidson (1985), according to which in markets with
symmetric intensity of competition the incentives to profitably merge are considerably
lower.
Besides its main purpose of profitability check, Chapter 2 equally contributes to the
question of optimal location/product design choices of multi-store/product firms, such
as typically result from mergers. In contrast with the linear case, for which location
equilibria for multi-store firms have already been completely worked out (see Pal and
Sarkar (2002)), this analysis is yet incomplete for the circular markets. We contribute by
working out two particular cases. From a location theory viewpoint, they also enable us
to check whether the multiplicity property of the circular market paradigm extends from
39See Szidarovsky and Yakovitz (1982) and Daughety (1990).
40Without post-merger optimal relocation, Norman and Pepall (1998) show that spatial Cournot hori-
zontal mergers are subject to the same (un)profitability paradox.
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single-plant competition to the multi-plant case.
Chapter 3 deals instead with the optimal horizontal integration strategy in a spatial
model building on the linear city representation. Firms are generally thought to under-
take acquisitions when it is the most profitable means of enhancing capacity, or obtaining
new knowledge and skills, or entering new product or geographic areas, or reallocating
assets into the control of the most eﬀective managers (Pautler (2001)). However, Scheﬀ-
man (1993) argues that decisions to merge are part of a broader strategic plan aimed to
achieve some long-term goal. The empirical study by Mulherin and Boone (2000) obtains
significant time clustering in both acquisitions and divestitures, which is consistent with
the observation that mergers come in waves, but are followed by intensive industry re-
structuring by means of voluntary asset sales and spin-oﬀs. Yet, non-spatial theoretical
models obtain contrary incentives to merge and to divisionalize/spin-oﬀ, because the two
strategies cannot be simultaneously profitable (see Salant et al. (1983), Polasky (1992),
Baye et al. (1996)).
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to examine in a spatial setting the relationship between
merger (in the sense of consolidation, joint operation) and de-acquisition (in the sense of
divisionalization, spin-oﬀ). By considering a spatial model, we aim to provide a possible
rationale for this sequence of business moves - Porter (1987) finds for instance that 50% of
merged firms divest later on. This chapter checks whether post-merger de-acquisition (in
the sense of divisionalization) can possibly improve merger profitability, by allowing for
optimal location choices (and the ensuing cost savings) after both consolidation and de-
acquisition. We also check whether this possible complementarity between the two business
moves can hold when the merger itself is not profitable, which may suggest a motivation
for apparently unprofitable mergers (just a step in a complex corporate strategy to raise
profitability). Basically, the analysis in this chapter questions the merger ’optimality’,
whatever its profitability, by considering the merger as part of a global corporate strategy
including subsequent divisionalization. If anything, this chapter suggests that the analysis
of merger performance in isolation may be incomplete, since firms engage in complex
growth strategies involving a wider range of restructuring beyond the simple horizontal
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Furthermore, this profitability analysis of the merger-divisionalization strategy enables
a discussion of the impact of divestitures for merger profitability, given that divisionaliza-
tion or spin-oﬀ basically comes down to an asset transfer between firms. By identifying
the mandatory divestiture equivalent to the profitable spin-oﬀ strategy we consider, we
suggest the possibility for mergers, possibly unprofitable, to benefit from subsequent di-
vestiture injunctions. This may cast some doubt on the generality of the assumption that
merger remedies are costly for merger partners, and may also question whether the latter,
when complying with mandatory divestiture injunctions, may be actually motivated by
diﬀerent incentives than the competition authority would picture at first.
Designing merger control
The second part of this dissertation takes up where the first one left oﬀ, to the extent
that it will focus on merger remedies and merger eﬃciency gains, but from a normative
perspective. In this second part we will examine the strategic interaction between the merg-
ing firms and the competition authorities, in light of their respective individual incentives,
so as to draw conclusions and recommendations for the optimal profile of the merger policy.
Mergers involve the transfer of ownership of corporate assets. But buying and selling
companies is intrinsically highly risky and uncertain business, as Seabright (2000) argues,
because when one firm or corporation buys another, "it is really buying the tradeable assets
in the hope that the non-tradeable ones will come too". Value creation actually comes from
the non-tradeable assets (human and intangible assets), so a merger is always "a gamble
on untried circumstances" (Seabright (2000)). And yet, despite this intrinsic uncertainty,
mergers are to be reviewed, their market consequences assessed and eventually corrected
before they even take place. In short, merger control builds on reasonable predictions more
than on solid facts, and since the predictions concern not yet materialized circumstances,
it is naturally subject to an important information problem.
41Weston (2002, p.4) claims that in response to economic, political, and technological developments,
firms resort to many adjustment processes, and "it is myopic to view mergers and takeovers as the only,
or main, adjustment process".
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Still, it is generally agreed that merging partners have somewhat better information
than the competition authorities w.r.t. the characteristics of their merger - it was early
noted that "In merger review, the selective provision of information creates problems
for government antitrust oﬃcials because much relevant information is held privately by
merging parties" (Yao and Dahdouh (1993), p.24). The second part of this dissertation
will thus focus on some consequences of the information asymmetry between the merger
partners and the antitrust authority in terms of merger control.
This information asymmetry raises challenges both for the practice and the theory of
merger control, which, together with their proposed solutions and theoretical underpinnings,
will be reviewed in Chapter 4 as an the introduction to the topic of the second part of
the dissertation. This is so because basically, the information asymmetry mainly concerns
one essential point in merger control, the assessment of the merger potential eﬃciency
gains. The rationale for integrating this into the merger’s competitive assessment can be
traced back to Williamson (1968), who balanced the allocative ineﬃciency of increased
market power against what the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (as revised in 1997) call
". . . the primary benefit of mergers to the economy [which is] their potential to generate
. . . eﬃciencies". Eﬃciencies lead to cost savings and possibly to lower prices, as shown
by Farrell and Shapiro (1990,a), so they implicitly determine the net market eﬀect of the
merger and thereby the possible anti-competitive character of the merger under review.
But merger control is not only about the question ’does the merger pose a threat
to competition?’, it is also meant to find the best way to solve this eventual threat.
In terms of merger remedies, this requires that remedies as "commitments should be
proportionate to the competition problem and entirely eliminate it", as the new, 2004,
EC Merger Regulation clearly states (paragraph 30). On the one hand, the fact that the
merger eﬃciency assessment is subject to the above-mentioned information asymmetry can
explain the type I and II decision errors on behalf of competition authorities. On the other,
given that "much of the information relating to eﬃciencies is uniquely in the possession
of the merging firms", as the US Merger Guidelines acknowledge, these merging firms
have incentives to take advantage of their private information, which further explains the
diﬃculty for antitrust agencies to identify for instance the appropriate and proportionate
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merger remedy.
All in all, it becomes apparent (Chapter 4 aims at this) that the key factors to be
handled for the design of merger policy are the frequency and magnitude of decision errors
and the administrative procedure costs. From this point of view, which, we might add,
corresponds basically to the "error cost approach" developed in the economic analysis of
law to deal with the welfare eﬀects of legal rulemaking (see Ehrlich and Posner (1974)),
the essential challenge for the theory (and practice) is how to minimize the welfare loss due
to the two types of error and procedure costs. One possible answer is to optimally design
the information disclosure requirements applying to the interests merging parties (see
Gonzalez (2004) and Medvedev (2004,b) for theoretical propositions), which in practice
has prompted the use of standards of proof and qualitative criteria for the assessment
of alleged and allowable merger eﬃciency gains (see Röller et al. (2001) and Farrell and
Shapiro (1990a, 2001)). Another possibility is to focus on the very opportunity to assess
the eﬃciencies in terms of associate procedure costs (Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005)), or
to make a strategic choice in terms of welfare standard to be applied for this assessment
(consumers’ or total welfare) - see Neven and Röller (2005), Besanko and Spulber (1993)
or Farrell (2003).
Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation advance still diﬀerent ideas, such as accounting
for the ex ante incentives provided by merger control, or designing a mechanism for the
explicit extraction of the firms’ private information. In so doing, both chapters share the
common background of information asymmetry between the competition agency and the
merging firms, the latter’s vested interest to exploit it strategically, as well as the consis-
tent modelling of eﬃciencies, merger remedies and their interaction, which represents an
important diﬀerence (and novelty) with respect to the vast majority of theoretical contri-
butions on the topic.
The view that firms should be encouraged to seek out more eﬃcient methods of op-
eration - including by merger - has now generally been accepted as one of the benefits of
competition rather than a threat to it - this explains basically the explicit acknowledge-
ment in merger guidelines (both US and European) of the necessity to beneficially consider
eﬃciencies within the so-called ’eﬃciency defence’ (which incidentally makes clear that no
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’eﬃciency oﬀence’ is to be held against the eﬃciency claims). The analysis proposed in
Chapter 5 aims to signal the relevance of the method in which the ’eﬃciency defence’ is
performed, considering the impact of asymmetric information on its possible interaction
with the available remedial instruments of the competition authority.
Concerning merger remedies, conventional wisdom indicates that they enlarge the set
of acceptable mergers (obviously, as compared with the application of downright prohibi-
tions). In terms of their ex ante incentives, Seldeslachts et al. (2006) suggest for instance
that they remove the deterrence eﬀect of the merger policy towards anti-competitive con-
centrations, since firms will no longer hesitate before engaging in such mergers, feeling
confident that at worst, it will take a remedy to get the merger approved. However,
by the same token, an overly zealous enforcement policy could lead to eﬃcient mergers
being prevented or deterred - Farrell (2003) warns that remedies as costly commitments
for the merging firms "may confiscate the private rents from seeking out and pursuing
eﬃciently-oriented mergers".
Building on this idea of ex ante incentives of merger control, Chapter 5 examines how
the use of remedies impacts on the ex ante incentive eﬀect of the eﬃciency defence, as
well as the informational problem that the competition authority faces w.r.t. to the latter,
so as to conclude on the opportunity to apply both remedies and the eﬃciency defence
within an optimal merger control. Thereby, we provide an answer to what should be the
best merger policy, considering the relative importance of the two types of merger control
errors. In short, we check for the best merger policy for maximizing expected welfare when
the benefit expected from an eﬃcient merger is high, so that it would be welfare decreasing
to discourage such mergers, but also when an ineﬃcient merger without remedies is highly
harmful, so that preventing such mergers becomes very important.
The last chapter of this dissertation equally draws on the intuition of a link between the
merger eﬃciencies and merger remedies, yet not from the viewpoint of ex ante incentives,
but from that of the possibility to extract the merging firms’ private information. By
doing so, merger control can hope to optimally tailor merger remedies w.r.t. the merger’s
anti-competitive concern, and thereby minimize its corresponding welfare loss. Chapter
6 thus contributes to the economic analysis of structural merger remedies by taking into
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account the merger’s potential eﬃciency gains for their design, by modelling the relation
between the amount of eﬃciency gains that the merging partners can achieve and the
amount of assets they will have to divest for the merger to be accepted.
Furthermore, the original contribution of this chapter is to shed light on the design
of optimal divestiture contracts when merging firms are better informed than the CA with
respect to the merger eﬃciencies. More precisely, Chapter 6 proposes a revelation mech-
anism based on two instruments: the amount of assets to be transferred together with
their sale price. Our mechanism formalizes the possibility for divestitures, besides their
corrective role, to be used for screening purposes. From this point of view, the model we
propose draws on Rey’s (2000) intuition that "the competition authorities could try to
screen merger proposals using transfers or quasi-transfers in the form of concessions". The
novelty is that not only does our mechanism aim at (and obtain) information extraction,
but it also aims at explicitly accounting for the buyer’s strategic incentives regarding the
transferred capacity. For this purpose, we actually model the remedy enforcement within
merger control as a three-party negotiation, between the competition authority, the seller
and the purchaser of divested assets. Any merger remedy aﬀects third parties by its very
purpose, as it seeks to restore and maintain eﬀective competition in the market place.
This modelling choice is not only highly realistic w.r.t. the current unfolding of divesti-
ture deals, but also takes into account the parties’ respective vested interests in the merger
market outcome. By so doing, the analysis in this chapter is consistent with the treatment
of merger’s consequences as externalities, which was, basically, the suggestion advanced
by the Farrell and Shapiro (1990,a) as a seminal contribution to the analysis of horizontal
mergers in oligopolistic markets.
Part I
ACCOUNTING FOR FIRMS’
STRATEGIES
1
2This first part of the dissertation proposes a spatial analysis of merger decisions and
of their consequences. Chapter 1 will provide an introduction into the topic by reviewing
the literature dealing with horizontal mergers in a spatial setting. Chapters 2 and 3
present in turn formal profitability analyses of spatial horizontal mergers. Chapter 2
concentrates on the impact of location choice for the profitability and rationale of Cournot
horizontal mergers. Chapter 3 extends the spatial profitability analysis by considering a
wider corporate strategy, allowing for both merger and de-acquisition.
Chapter 1
Horizontal market concentration:
Insights from the spatial models
"What does it mean to refer to the ’market’ when the geographic extent of the
market is a single point and all firms in the market produce a homogenous
good?"
(McAfee et al. (1992) - p.350)
3
CHAPTER 1 Horizontal concentration in spatial models 4
1.1 Introduction
Quoting the Allianz AG investor relations news1 dated September 11, 2005, "...the
full acquisition of RAS (Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà (RAS) S.p.A) will enable Allianz
in the future to reorganize its Italian activities and to directly reallocate the holdings of
operations to Allianz Holding in key European markets[...] Furthermore, the management
board of Allianz AG decided to consolidate the insurance activities of the Allianz Group
in Germany under one German holding company to be newly created."
This merger arguably opened opportunities to reduce the complexity of the entire
Group, as became clear earlier this year. According to the investor relations news from
June 22, 2006, "Allianz plans to introduce a new operating model and merge locations
within Germany[...] to make its insurance business even more client-focused, to operate
more eﬃciently and achieve growth. By 2008 the group intends to have introduced a
new business model which will include an updated concept for geographical locations[...]
there will be cost savings of between 500 to 600 million euros from which both clients and
shareholders will profit[...]Allianz is planning to cut back the number of administrative
locations in Germany from the current twenty one to ten."
Post-merger spatial repositioning is only one of the topics concerning horizontal mar-
ket concentration looked at in this introductory chapter. It is a most common business
strategy, although not necessarily in its geographical sense. Berry and Waldfogel (2001)
study the consequences of a major radio station consolidation wave in the US prompted
by the natural experiment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which substantially re-
laxed previous ownership restrictions in the industry. Using a panel data set on 243 US
radio broadcast markets before and after the Act (in 1993 and 1997), they find that con-
centration reduces station entry, but, holding the number of stations constant, increases
product variety. In addition, their regressions show that jointly owned stations are more
likely to broadcast in similar formats than independent unrelated ones. In other words,
mergers trigger product specification changes, and the study recommends that "antitrust
authorities considering radio mergers might want to take such eﬀects into account when
1For details see the Allianz AG website: www...
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they try to anticipate the eﬀect of mergers on overall welfare".
A spatial analysis of mergers brings further insight into the merger consequences, and
for the possible reply of competition authorities in terms of merger control. This chapter
attempts to argue these statements. While doing so, it frames the original theoretical
contributions of chapters 2 and 3.
1.1.1 Relevance and purpose
Distance, either in its geographic or product specification meaning, gives rise to diﬀer-
entiation. Branded consumer products, where each brand of pens, or bread, or computer
software, or cereal, is distinct, are easy examples of diﬀerentiation within the product
range. Physical facilities that distribute or deliver goods or services, such as supermar-
kets, department stores, branch banks, or hospitals, give rise to diﬀerentiation based on
location. Even in a classic homogeneous-goods market (such as the market for an agri-
cultural commodity or for a specific chemical compound) producers do diﬀerentiate them-
selves spatially. To a greater or lesser degree, virtually all markets involve some element
of product diﬀerentiation.
From a positive standpoint therefore, the economic analysis of mergers in oligopolistic
markets needs to take into account such product repositioning or geographical (re)shaping
of a distribution network following horizontal market concentration, as mentioned in the
above examples and made relevant by the diﬀerentiation (spatial or product range). To
address such consequences of mergers, a spatial framework is thus necessary. But the spa-
tial setting can equally provide a consistent framework to examine firm behaviour induced
by a given spatial setting. More precisely, particular location patterns for production or
distribution outlets of merger partners, or various degrees of product diﬀerentiation within
their product range, provide diﬀerent incentives to merge, to monopolize the market, to
free-ride on a merger between rivals, or to prevent the market entry of rivals after merger.
And since mergers do trigger location choices, as the above examples remind, spatial mod-
els are helpful in predicting whether more or less geographical agglomeration (or if more
or less diversity) is (are) to be expected. Furthermore, a spatial analysis can assess the
spatial repositioning/product design choices made by firm in anticipation of mergers, and
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as such may contribute to the antitrust market surveillance.
From a normative point of view, the insight provided by a spatial merger analysis can
only improve the outcome of merger control. To put it short, mergers lead to structural
changes in a market, and the equilibrium which emerges following a merger is likely to
be diﬀerent from that which prevailed before. The purpose of merger control is to assess
the nature of the likely post-merger equilibrium and to make a welfare comparison be-
tween this expected outcome and the pre-merger situation. In making such a comparison,
the main variable of interest is likely to be the level of post-merger price(s) compared to
pre-merger one(s), given the current focus of merger control on consumer welfare. This
typically involves answering three questions. Would prices be expected to rise significantly
if there were no cost savings from the merger and there were to be no new entry or product
repositioning by rivals? Will entry or product repositioning thwart any attempt to raise
prices? What is the likely impact of the merger on costs? Spatial models can arguably
provide answers to all these questions, and not only. Even before weighing the possible
cost savings and other consequences from relocation/repositioning, the very antitrust as-
sessment of the merger’s eﬀects actually begins by defining the relevant geographic and/or
product market.
In all cases, firm behaviour and "location" appear to be related and important for the
economic analysis of horizontal mergers, both from a positive and a normative point of
view. This chapter will review the theoretical literature dealing with horizontal mergers in
a spatial setting by focusing on the two-way relationship between firms’ locations and their
behaviour. We shall first explore the incentives conveyed by locations for firms’ merger and
merger-related strategies, then go on to address the impact of merger on location choices.
However, before doing so, the underlying formal background will be discussed in the
following subsection. The various modelling assumptions having diﬀerent implications for
the ultimate outcome of the spatial analysis, presenting them first is useful for pinning
down later on the origin of the location and/or behaviour eﬀects that are dealt with in
the merger literature.
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1.1.2 Modeling framework for horizontal mergers in a spatial setting
The literature on horizontal mergers in a spatial setting relies on oligopoly as well
as location theory models, both whose predictions are highly sensitive to the assumptions
underlying them. It would be inappropriate to take a single model of oligopoly behaviour in
a given spatial paradigm and attempt to interpret market behaviour or draw generalized
policy conclusions from it. To better grasp the various characteristics of the diﬀerent
analytical models used to perform a spatial analysis of horizontal mergers, the following
paragraphs briefly list their main ingredients.
Spatial representation of the market
Any spatial model of mergers necessarily builds on a given pre-merger location equilib-
rium, which most often than not is examined either on a linear or a circular market. These
geometric analogies are the most frequent and tractable ways to model spatial diﬀerenti-
ation, be it geographical or within a product range. Hotelling’s (1929) ice-cream sellers
moving along a linear beach recall that a spatial representation such as the segment allows
for diﬀerentiation through location. A set of consumers with preferences defined over a set
of goods can also be formalized by such a location model, as long as it is possible to order
the diﬀerent brands (from left to right, for instance , much as beer varieties naturally
range from dark to light in a linear manner). In such a case, consumers’ disutility in
putting up with less than their ideal variety will be basically modeled as a transport or
tariﬀ cost.
Interestingly enough, the linear market assumption turns up more frequently because
locations are a priori heterogenous on the segment, which makes it interesting to determine
location patterns arising from various market characteristics. It is recognized however,
that the circular framework is more appropriate for certain real-life situations. Typical
examples are circular towns spreading around lakes, for which consumers cannot generally
aﬀord to cross the lake when going shopping, and therefore department stores take up their
locations around the lake. More generally speaking, this basically occurs for every traﬃc-
jammed city - large shopping malls are located on the outskirts, on the circular belt-way,
so as to avoid consumers the downtown traﬃc. Furthermore, the dial of a clock is basically
a circle, so the circular market can be used for competing television networks choosing
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time slots for their shows, or airlines choosing arrival and departure times for their flights.
Still, in terms of product specification, the linear representation is often preferred because
it applies to single-peaked consumer’s preferences, whereas no such analogy is available
for the circular model. In all cases, choosing one spatial representation over the other is
justified by the particulars of the situation at hand.
Market interaction
Such a conclusion equally holds when deciding to model price rather than quantity
competition. The choice is important for the merger analysis, and we shall dwell on its
importance later on, but basically it depends on the nature of the product considered.
From a theoretical point of view, as indicated by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in a
non-spatial framework, the Cournot equilibrium obtains is equivalent to the outcome of a
two-stage game where firms set quantities first and then compete in prices. Conseqeuntly,
Cournot competition is relevant when the quantity (or capacity) decision of the first stage
is inflexible, meaning basically when fixing prices is easier than modifying capacities or
adjusting quantities2.
In a spatial context, firms often decide on their aggregate output but also on the
quantity to allocate to diﬀerent submarkets. Following the above reasoning, the Cournot
assumption appears reasonable when both total capacity and the spatial allocation of
output are relatively inflexible. Typically, such a rigid spatial distribution of the firm’s
sales is consistent with the setting where firms ship/deliver output from a production plant
to various outlets/consumer locations. In turn, if a product’s price is heavily advertised
(like catalog stores), changing the price involves a substantial cost for the firms. Prices are
the relevant choice variable in this case, so Bertrand competition is more realistic. This
makes price competition quite popular with consumption goods and the related shopping
behaviour on behalf of consumers. Still, the Cournot assumption is relevant on a larger
scale than the above examples imply. From a theoretical point of view, Cournot spatial
models have attractive features in their predictions: whereas Bertrand competition yields
2This makes it particularly appropriate for modelling heavy industry - typical examples are the markets
for oil, natural gas, cement and ready-mixed concrete - see Salant (1982) for a study of the world electricity
market and McBride (1983) for the American cement market.
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exclusive sales territories for firms3 (consumers at each location being served only by
the most cost-eﬃcient firm there), Cournot competition exhibits market overlapping with
intra-industry trade, which often does fit reality better - see Phlips (1983) and McBride
(1983). In any case, the intensity of the oligopolistic rivalry, Bertrand and Cournot, will
prove essential for the ultimate spatial pattern characterizing the merger equilibrium.
The spatial pattern generally depends also on the spatial pricing policy. A major
contribution of the literature on strategic location in oligopoly was precisely to show that
a connection necessarily exists between the location market equilibrium and firms’ pricing
policies. Two alternatives are basically possible, either spatial price discrimination4 or
nondiscriminatory pricing. The latter occurs whenever two varieties of a product are sold
by the seller to diﬀerent buyers at the same net price, which is the price paid by a buyer
corrected for the product diﬀerentiating cost (Phlips (1983), p.6)). Consequently, the
only nondiscriminatory spatial pricing is the mill f.o.b. (free-on-board) pricing, which has
all consumers pay the same mill price and then pay the full transport cost to their own
consuming locations. In turn, spatial price discrimination can occur under two equivalent
forms: either through the charging of diﬀerent mill prices to buyers at diﬀerent locations,
or through delivered prices at which the product will be supplied at the various local
markets.
The spatial literature combines these assumptions on intensity of competition and
spatial pricing policies in two principal alternative paradigms, the so-called shopping and
3Price competition with homogenous product in spatial markets always implies non-overlapping market
areas for competitors, and this is true for both mill and spatial discriminatory pricing, as shown by
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and Lederer and Hurter (1986).
4Price discrimination occurs when the price diﬀerences do not result from generalized (i.e. accounting
for transport) production cost diﬀerentials. According to the standard microeconomic theory, a firm may
discriminate in price if it can separate its overall market into several distinct submarkets between which
demand elasticity varies. ’Space’ is the most natural criterion to separate consumer markets, with ’dis-
tance’ standing for tariﬀ costs, or waiting time, or storage costs, or product diﬀerentiation. In addition,
distance costs generate varying demand elasticities between spatially separated markets, even if demands
are identical everywhere. As a result, as long as firms control the means of market separation, in ab-
sence of institutional or legislative constraints, spatial price discrimination may naturally arise instead of
nondiscriminatory pricing.
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shipping models. Assuming mill pricing and letting consumers in charge of the trans-
port cost represent the basic assumptions of the former, more often than not associated
with Bertrand competition. In turn, modelling firms that transport goods to observable
consumer locations and thereby spatially discriminating customers corresponds to the
shipping model, which is usually combined with Cournot competition. The choice of one
framework over the other depends on whichever fits better the situation examined.
For instance, market segmentation as resulting from discriminatory delivered pricing
in the shipping framework enables profit maximization behaviour to be considered sepa-
rately for each local market, which is particularly relevant for the international location
case, where arbitrage costs between locations are likely to be high. This framework was
extensively used in international trade theory, see for instance Brander and Krugman
(1983). Fujita and Thisse (1997) explicitly draw attention to the fact that the distinction
between the shopping and shipping frameworks in location models corresponds to that
between integrated and segmented markets in international trade models. In turn, the
shopping mill pricing model is realistic when consumer’s location/most preferred variety
not easily identifiable. A shipping model can furthermore approximate the mechanism of
flexible manufacturing described by Eaton and Schmitt (1994), where the basic product
(standing for the location of the firm) is customized at a certain cost (here, the shipping
cost) to make it available to consumers.
In other words, both frameworks are practically relevant, and correspond to particular
interpretations of the spatial setting. However, our survey of the theoretical literature
dealing with horizontal mergers in a spatial setting will purposely dwell more upon the
implications of the Cournot shipping framework, so as to better introduce the original
contributions of chapters 2 and 3, building precisely on this setting.
1.2 Impact of location on behaviour
1.2.1 Basic insights from strategic location theory
A major contribution of the strategic location theory was to establish that a firm’s
optimal location is generally determined by its pricing strategy, the shape of the indi-
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vidual demand, the form of the delivery cost functions, the conjectural variations of the
competitors, the particular distribution of consumers, and the degree of competition in
the industry. The abundant literature on strategic location gradually studied the impact
of all these factors on the ultimate spatial equilibrium, with one conclusion being soon
obvious, namely that results are quite sensitive to assumptions. Still, a firm’s location
decision always results from the same general trade-oﬀ, between agglomeration and dis-
persion forces. Intense competition typically generates dispersion, but ’be where demand
is’ gives common incentives to cluster, just like possible positive strategic interactions
(such as positive externalities among firms, or the existence of a market center). At any
rate, strategic location models are always concerned with minimizing overall transport
costs, and the trade-oﬀ between agglomeration and dispersion is settled by firms choosing
their distance to each consumer’s location so as to maximize profits.
A pioneering contribution to the location theory was made by Hotelling (1929) w.r.t.
the Bertrand mill pricing shopping model on the linear city. With linear transport cost
and uniform consumer distribution on the unit line, he obtained for the duopoly sequen-
tial location-price game the principle of minimum diﬀerentiation or, equivalently, central
agglomeration, with firms locating back to back at the market center. Yet, a closer look
at the demand and profit functions reveals they are both discontinuous for close enough
locations, and profits are not quasi-concave due to the possibility of price undercutting.
The price competition stage is actually not well behaved, and eventually d’Aspremont et
al. (1979) show that if firms are located near the segment mid-point, a pure-strategy price
equilibrium fails to exist5.
However, with quadratic transport cost the location-price problem becomes tractable
again, and maximum diﬀerentiation obtains instead, with firms locating at the market
endpoints (see d’Aspremont et al. (1979)). Basically, this result stems from the need
for firms to locate as far as possible from each other so as to avoid triggering a price
undercut from the rival and thus soften the intense price competition. Still, the product
homogeneity can be questioned, and a supplementary product diﬀerentiation dimension
5Hotelling’s central clustering result remains valid as long as prices are fixed and identical for both firms,
because the incentive to diﬀerentiate products decreases when firms do not actually compete in prices.
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is enough to mitigate the extreme dispersion outcome6. Shopping models with Bertand
competition on the linear market restore the minimum diﬀerentiation result, provided
transport costs are not too high and products suﬃciently diﬀerentiated along some other
dimension7. By the same token, the pricing policy assumption8 was questioned, as well as
the possibility of rational undercutting without fear of retaliation9. Moreover, the existence
of endpoints on the bounded linear market gives rise to some diﬃculties concerning the
existence of pure-strategy equilibrium, especially when more than two firms compete in
the market10. This prompted the use of the alternative circular space assumption. The
circular city was pioneered by Vickrey (1964) in its modern version11, yet made popular
by Salop (1979) through his analysis of free market entry equilibrium and socially optimal
degree of diﬀerentiation. His model postulated the symmetric equidistant location by
oligopolists on the circular market, which, although highly intuitive, was only shown to be
an equilibrium later. Economides (1989) provides existence and uniqueness results in the
circular location-then-price model with quadratic transportation costs, while Kats (1995)
obtains the equidistant location pattern as a location-price equilibrium for a duopoly with
linear transport cost, and finally De Frutos et al. (1999) establishes the equidistant pattern
as an equilibrium for a larger class of transport cost functions.
Although price competition occurs on a large scale, the alternative quantity compe-
tition assumption is equally realistic. Given the empirically confirmed relevance of the
6The nonspatial price competition model allows nonzero equilibrium profits if products are diﬀerenti-
ated. The resulting lower intensity of competition gives more weight in a spatial setting to transport cost
minimization, and firms can agglomerate to better serve demand.
7See Irmen and Thisse (1998), de Palma et al.(1985), Anderson and de Palma (1988) and Ben-Akiva et
al. (1989) for models with a supplementary product diﬀerentiation dimension.
8By considering spatial discriminatory pricing and reverting to linear transport costs, Lederer and
Hurter (1986) show that duopolists locate at the market quartiles
9Novshek (1980) suggested to look for equilibrium in the simultaneous location-price game under the
assumption of no-mill-price-undcercutting whenever linear transport cost are used. The problem raised
by these is that consumers care as much for the price they have to pay as for the distance they have
to travel, so firms basically perceive price and location as strategic substitutes, hence the opportunity of
undercutting for too close locations.
10See for instance Economides (1993) for a nonexistence result for more than three firms in the sequential
location-price model on Hotelling’s line.
11An earlier version is due to Lerner and Singer (1937).
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Cournot assumption12, an increasing bulk of the location theory literature has built on it.
Salant (1986) examined perfect equilibrium existence in a shopping model on the segment
market by allowing firms to enter and choose locations one at a time, before competing in
quantities13. The spatial pattern thus obtained does not have firms equally spaced, nor
making equal profits, although symmetry w.r.t. the mid-point may apply. More impor-
tantly, Salant (1986) equally shows that the equilibrium may fail to exist when simultane-
ous location-quantity choices14 are considered instead, much as in the price model, due to
the profit function discontinuity. As a result, the location pattern for spatial Cournot com-
petition has typically been studied in the sequential location-then-quantity competition
framework15.
Assuming linear transport costs and identical linear inverse demands for consumers
uniformly distributed on the unit segment, Hamilton et al. (1989) obtain the existence of
a unique equilibrium pattern of central agglomeration for a two stage location-quantity
duopoly game. The result is extended to convex transport costs and moreover, generalized
to n firms in the case of linear transport costs by Anderson and Neven (1991), which
has virtually become since the building framework16 of the mainstream spatial Cournot
analysis. It should be noted that besides providing theoretical foundation for the common
observation that firms selling similar products frequently agglomerate in space, Hamilton
12See Salant (1982) for the world electricity market and McBride (1983) for the American cement market.
13The sequence of moves and the Cournot assumption guarantee the continuity and (quasi)concavity of
profits, and thereby equilibrium existence.
14There are cases where changing the firm’s position in the product range (typically, the colour, or
Hotelling’s example of cider sweatness) is virtually costless, so location and output choices are basically
simultaneous.
15 In spatial models, when dealing with the choice of physical locations, it is not out of place to sup-
pose that that a firm must settle on a location before deciding on the level of output. Similarly, when a
firm’s location decision represents the choice of a position in a product space, it is frequent that location
(i.e. product design) must be chosen before prices and/or output levels be selected. For many diﬀerenti-
ated product oligopolistic industries where durable and product specific inputs must be acquired prior to
production, location decisions naturally precede quantity choices.
16Their paper draws attention to the relevance of (inverse) demand assumptions leading to this outcome:
the linearity and a suﬃciently high reservation price. The former ensures profit quasiconcavity, and hence
equilibrium existence, while the latter rules out local monopolies.
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et al. (1989) and Anderson and Neven (1991) incidentally claim that an alternative way
of modelling inter-firm rivalry than price competition can per se provide a reason for
agglomeration.
Much of the subsequent literature on spatial Cournot competition tested the robust-
ness of this result. Hamilton et al. (1994) study the same duopoly location-Cournot game
on the segment, but with mill f.o.b. pricing and shopping behaviour instead of spatial price
discrimination, only to revive a well-known equilibrium existence problem (as a result, the
perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game yields almost (but not exactly) central agglom-
eration). Besides the pricing policy, demand and cost factors equally challenge the central
clustering result. Gupta et al. (1997) consider diﬀerent types of demand distribution and
prove that a necessary condition for agglomeration to occur at a given point in space is
that the density of demand be suﬃciently high at that location17. Mayer (2000) reminds
that strategic location requires minimizing total delivered costs to consumer locations,
and that production costs are part of that total delivered cost. Instead of normalizing the
constant marginal production cost to zero as it has always been done before, he reintro-
duces it into the duopoly game, to show that transport and production costs do not weigh
equally within the location choice decision. Mayer (2000) gives the two alternative neces-
sary conditions that enable central agglomeration: either the production cost distribution
be uniform, or such that production cost be minimized at the middle of the segment. As
a result, Anderson and Neven’s (1991) result is also explained by the fact that production
costs are identical at all locations. Finally, Anderson and Neven’s (1991) uniqueness re-
sult is to be put down to the particular assumption concerning the shape of the spatial
market. With constant marginal delivery cost, a necessary condition for a given location
to be optimal is to satisfy the quantity-median property, meaning that for that location,
total quantity supplied to the left must equal that supplied to the right18. Clearly, for
a location equilibrium pattern, all firms must be located at their quantity-median point,
and since the segment market is exogenously bounded, the quantity-median location is
17Hence, the central agglomeration outcome is explained by the symmetry of the uniform distribution
initially assumed, whereas a multi-modal distribution could sustain several distinct clusters on the segment.
18A firm’s profit is proportional to the square of the quantity supplied on the market, so this is merely a
translation of a firm’s First Order Condition on its total profit over the set of spatially segmented markets.
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identical and unique for all firms.
A growing body of articles choose instead to model the circular city, with two main
findings: multiple equilibria obtain generally, none involving complete agglomeration. Pal
(1998) was the first to point out the latter for the symmetric duopoly on the circular
city. He finds that firms disperse at the opposite ends of a diameter, and therefore that
the shipping Cournot model can be consistent with the maximum diﬀerentiation princi-
ple. Matsushima (2001,a) increased the number of firms on the market to obtain instead
partial agglomeration-dispersion, with firms dividing into two equidistant clusters located
at the opposite ends of a diameter. Shimizu and Matsumura (2002) completely general-
ize the framework, to show that complete agglomeration cannot possibly be sustained in
equilibrium on the circle, and identify other equilibrium location patterns19.
The circular model is thus consistent with an appealing partial clustering result, given
the common observation of firms agglomerating in several major business areas, each
involving a diﬀerent number of competitors. However, the multiple equilibria property
raises questions as to the model’s predictive powers, all the more so that not all equilibria
have yet been characterized. Still, the circular model unravels one further important
insight into the origin of the initial agglomeration result obtained by Anderson and Neven
(1991). Complete agglomeration cannot be obtained on the circle due to the product
homogeneity assumption, which implies strategic substitutability for quantity competition,
and makes agglomeration reduce output for every firm in the cluster. Spatial Cournot
competitors would naturally disperse to maximize profits, but this is not possible on the
segment, where the exogenous borders impose the same most-preferred transport cost
minimizing location to all competitors. Without this dominant intrinsic agglomeration
force, Cournot firms selling a homogenous product can and do disperse on the circle20.
19Gupta et al. (2004) further confirm and extend the multiple equilibria property, by showing that
firms tend to locate pair-wise on the circle in various spatial patterns, partially agglomerating at distinct
locations, often in a non-equidistant equilibrium, and possibly in a continuum of location equilibria.
20The point was definitely settled by Shimizu (2002) and Yu and Lai (2003), who allow for product
diﬀerentiation (each firm shipping one variety) within the original Cournot duopoly on the circular market.
With perfect substitutes, Pal’s (1998) equidistant result is confirmed, but in the case of complements, which
imply that a firm sells more at the rival’s location, firms necessarily cluster.
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To sum up the theoretical results reviewed so far, the spatial equilibrium necessarily
consists of dispersion if firms compete in prices, and may involve complete agglomera-
tion, partial clustering or even complete dispersion if instead firms compete in quantities,
depending on the market’s characteristics.
1.2.2 Merger analysis and some antitrust insights
The main findings from location theory reviewed in the previous paragraphs are rel-
evant for a spatial merger analysis to the extent that they can be used to characterize
the initial pre-merger spatial market equilibrium, and this would be the first step of an
explicit merger assessment. We turn now to the literature focusing on mergers in a spatial
setting, and examine the behaviour incentives induced by a given spatial pattern.
When studying the incentives for (and, equally, the consequences of) market power in-
creases in a spatial setting, considering fixed locations provides basic insight, besides being
the simplest modeling framework available. In a sense, the fixed-location merger models
were the initial extension of the nonspatial analyses, and the earliest spatial contributions
to the horizontal merger literature basically checked for and extended results obtained in
nonspatial models.
One of the main findings of the latter, and possibly the most quoted, is the so-called
merger profitability paradox. Despite the recurrent merger waves, both theoretical and
empirical studies indicate that often merging partners incur a profitability loss, whereas
outsider firms experience a profitability raise following the merger. This is disturbing,
all the more so that for insiders the profitability loss can be so high as to question the
very incentive to merge in the first place. The theoretical literature pointed out that
the intensity of the paradox actually depends on the underlying assumption on market
competition, to the extent that in nonspatial models, Salant et al. (1983) concluded on
the lack of private incentives to merge for identical Cournot firms producing a homogenous
good with constant unit production cost21, unless their market shares amount to at least
80%, whereas Deneckere and Davidson (1985) revealed that a merger is always internally
21Also, absent market entry and without cost savings - for a more general Cournot model see Szidarovsky
and Yakovitz (1982).
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profitable for Bertrand producers of diﬀerentiated goods, at least if entry is not an issue. In
the first model, since quantities are strategic substitutes, an output contraction by insiders
triggers an output expansion by rivals, while in the latter case, prices being strategic
complements, the insiders’ price raise is matched by a similar price increase on behalf of
the outsiders22. In both cases, as signalled by Stigler (1950), outsiders benefit more than
the insiders from the merger, and this free-riding eﬀect may eventually prevent the merger
if the decision to merge is endogenized.
As already mentioned, spatial diﬀerentiation is substitutable to product diﬀerentiation,
so it should not come as a surprise that horizontal Bertrand mergers in spatial models
basically yield the same results. Levy and Reitzes (1992) consider bilateral (profitable, of
course) horizontal mergers between neighbouring Bertrand competitors in Salop’s (1979)
model and check that outsiders make lower profits than insiders, except for the two adja-
cent firms, whose profits increase. This is due to the assumptions of shopping behaviour
and nondiscriminatory mill pricing, which imply together that competition is asymmetric
and strongly localized. In this model, a firm only competes directly with its two neigh-
bours23, so it gives up merging only if it anticipates that any of its neighbours will merge,
because the free-riding eﬀect is restricted to the two closest neighbouring firms. Reitzes
and Levy (1995) show instead that if firms can spatially price discriminate, this free-rider
problem vanishes. Within a shipping model with symmetric Bertrand competitors that
spatially price discriminate, they find that the equilibrium prices of outsiders are not af-
fected by a merger (of course, profitable) between neighbouring firms, but they increase
for consumers located between the insiders. This is due to the fact that in markets with
spatial discrimination, a firm’s price is dictated by the delivered cost of its adjacent rivals,
so only mergers between neighbouring firms influence price24.
This idea that the pricing strategy of a product line over a geographic area largely
22The importance of the strategic complementarity for the existence of the paradox was equally signalled
by Gaudet and Salant (1992).
23 In contrast, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) assume that varieties are imperfect substitutes and each
firm competes symmetrically with all rivals.
24The ability to discriminate is compatible with the localized asymmetric competition, inasmuch as
insiders choose delivered prices so as to prevent any free-riding from their neighbours.
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depends on the intensity of local competition that each individual firm, store or brand
faces, basically suggests that it can be strategically advantageous for a multiproduct firm
(resulting from a horizontal merger typically) to base its pricing policy on the degree of
substitutability between own brands and those oﬀered by rivals. Using the standard (i.e.
shopping behaviour with quadratic transport cost) circular model of product diﬀerentiation
with Bertrand competition, Giraud-Héraud et al. (2002) consider mergers between a multi-
product firm selling a group of connected brands and one single-store/product competitor.
Assuming fixed symmetric equidistant locations for all brands around the circle, they find
that the merger with an adjacent competitor is increasingly profitable as the number of
brands controlled by the group grows larger and larger. Moreover, due to the asymmetric
pricing policy devised by the group, closely-substitutable target brands experience a profit
increase, so the free-riding problem is absent for the group’s closest neighbours. Giraud-
Héraud et al. (2002) stress that profits vary among the group’s brands, depending on
the exposure to competition from fringe competitors, and equally suggest that the latter
may more or less benefit from the free-riding eﬀect in case of merger. This suggestion is
exploited by Brito (2003), who reminds that often outsiders abandon the passive free-rider
behaviour to try to prevent the merger. This might appear puzzling, but it is explained
by the fact that firms may engage in preemptive mergers to avoid becoming profit-loosing
outsiders of alternative mergers. Brito (2003) obtains this result by endogenizing the
decision to merge in Levy and Reitzes’s (1992) model, and thereby actually unveils a
possible rationale for unprofitable mergers to occur.
Matsushima (2001,b) equally investigates endogenous sequential mergers, but between
four identical firms in the circular-city shipping Cournot model. Although the main mo-
tivation of the paper is to study merger waves, it also obtains that a merger between
neighbouring Cournot competitors is unprofitable. This amounts to extending the merger
paradox in spatial Cournot models, despite the added feature of spatial product diﬀeren-
tiation. Indeed, with Cournot competition and spatial discrimination, each point in space
is an independent local market supplied by all firms, proportionally to the distance from
their own locations. To get rid of overlapping market areas, and to minimize transport
costs, one of the insiders stops supplying at those locations where it does not have the
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lowest marginal delivered cost, hence an output contraction for the merged entity. Thus
the nonspatial model basically obtains at each local market, as first pointed out by Nor-
man and Pepall (1998). Their paper is a reply to McAfee et al. (1992), who alleged
that Cournot horizontal concentration would prove profitable in the spatial setting simply
because the merged entity is ’larger’ than the outsiders: indeed, it continues to operate
two distinct outlets, contrary to the Salant et al. (1983) symmetric nonspatial model,
where it is shrinks to the size of an outsider. Norman and Pepall (1998) provide actually
a necessary condition for a horizontal merger to be internally profitable, namely suﬃcient
marginal delivery cost heterogeneity between insiders25.
Matsushima’s (2001,b) primary purpose was to study merger waves, and from this
point of view, the paper finds that if the transportation cost per length is suﬃciently
large to market size, then a wave of profitable mergers occurs, leading to the market being
eventually monopolized. Giraud-Héraud et al (2002) also hint at this, since for the group
of brands, acquiring an adjacent single-product firm is all the more profitable that its
number of brands is large. This reminds that it takes a strong free-riding eﬀect on behalf
of the outsiders to contain the monopolization incentive.
Hold-up of procompetitive and welfare enhancing mergers is of course not desirable.
However, as many mergers are on the contrary anticompetitive, the free-riding can actu-
ally save time and money for competition authorities. Thus, in the model considered by
Levy and Reitzes (1992), the outsiders’ free-riding can discourage price-increasing merg-
ers due to the localized nature of competition. The latter explains the anticompetitive
eﬀect of the merger, and underlines the importance from a competition policy point of
view of the definition of the relevant market for merger analysis. Indeed, with localized
competition, the ability to exercise market power is concentrated among nearby firms (the
25Note that this is the ’spatial’ translation of the merger paradox solution suggested by Perry and Porter
(1985) in the nonspatual framework, i.e. a cost asymmetry between merger partners.
Matsushima (2001) basically confirms this idea, to the extent that for very high transport cost per
distance, and given the equidistant locations fixed in the beginning of the game, a merger of opposite
competitors can be profitable, provided though a subsequent merger is anticipated. For a merger between
diamterically located firs, the cost asymmetry is highest, so the ensuing cost savings in terms of transport
cost minimization and output reallocation between aﬃliates are largest.
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post-merger price increases after a merger between close substitutes). In this case, the an-
titrust market is necessarily highly concentrated, so focusing on market concentration may
be irrelevant in markets with localized competition - instead, the ’closeness’ of competition
and ’submarkets’ can prove more appropriate for the antitrust analysis.
This represented one of the important revision points of the US Merger Guidelines
in 1984, in acknowledgement of the fact that: "When products in a relevant market are
diﬀerentiated or sellers are spatially dispersed, individual sellers usually compete more
directly with some rivals than with others" (Revised Merger Guidelines §49, 1984, US
Department of Justice). More precisely, depending on the current focus of the merger
assessment, i.e. either unilateral or co-ordinated eﬀects, either a localized competition
criterion or a market shares measure appears more reliable26.
The idea that with spatial settings a particular market definition might be more ap-
propriate is really more general than the Levy and Reitzes (1992) localized competition
model implied. McAfee et al. (1992) suggested the same, but in a Cournot shipping model
where firms price discriminate. In such a model27, at every local market a firm competes
against all others, so the intensity of rivalry is symmetric and not localized. Instead of
the two-step market assessment procedure of the US Merger Guidelines28, McAfee et al.
26According to the "Merger appraisal in oligopolistic markets" report prepared in November 1999 for the
UK Oﬃce of Fair Trading, in markets in which products are diﬀerentiated, market shares can provide an
unreliable guide to the possible extent of any unilateral eﬀects. (Unilateral eﬀects arise when two closely
competing products are brought under common ownership. The term unilateral eﬀect refers to the fact
that the post-merger firm has an incentive to raise price even if the merger has no eﬀect on the behaviour
of competing firms.) In cases such as this, it is often more informative to directly assess the proportion
of each of the merging firms’ customers who would have switched to the other merging firm’s products
following a price rise.
In markets in which products are undiﬀerentiated, market shares are much more likely to give a reason-
able indication of the possible extent of post-merger price increases. In homogeneous product markets, the
most important concern may not be that the merged firm will engage in unilateral price rises, but that the
entire market will become tacitly or explicitly collusive after the merger. Post-merger eﬀects that rely on
the behaviour of the merged firm’s rivals are termed co-ordinated eﬀects.
27 Incidentally, attention is drawn to the fact that applying the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index to assess
market concentration is not an equilibrium criterion, because insiders reallocate output between them after
merger so as to minimize total delivery cost and eliminate overlapping sales territories.
28The relevant market is first defined by means of the ’hypothetical monopolist’ paradigm, then market
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(1992) proposes a one-step evaluation based on the estimate of increase in the equilibrium
post-merger delivered prices. This suggests a diﬀerent notion for the relevant antitrust
geographic market: unlike that provided by the Merger Guidelines, a larger area with this
definition causes higher concern, since it indicates that a larger number of consumers will
be adversely aﬀected by the merger.
Besides an appropriate market definition, the competition authority could (and should?)
consider also alternative mergers in order to achieve a proper evaluation of the merger’s
negative eﬀect. In the circular model of Levy and Reitzes (1992), modified to allow for
production cost reductions through asset ownership à la Perry and Porter (1985), Brito
(2005) shows by means of a revealed preference argument that the comparison, in terms
of prices, between a profitable merger between neighbouring firms and the most profitable
alternative merger between nonneighbouring firms, establishes an upper bound on the
amount of cost savings that can be obtained through the concentration. Checking this
threshold against the minimum eﬃciency gains necessary for a merger to avoid a price
increase allows a better assessment of the merger’s likely (anti)competitive eﬀect.
The expected competitive change following the merger is equally related to the possi-
bility of product/store relocation and/or market entry. Fixed-location spatial models are
of course somewhat restrictive in this respect, yet they do provide some basic intuitions.
In their Bertrand competition framework, Reitzes and Levy (1995) point out that the
lack of free-rider benefits from merger removes for outsiders the post-merger incentives
to relocate or for potential entrants to enter the market, and since it is the spatial price
discrimination that restrains free-riding in their model, it follows that price discrimination
can facilitate entry deterrence in spatial markets. The issue of entry is also examined by
Deck (2001), in a Hotelling-type mill pricing shopping model with fixed costs allowing for
both firm and outlet operation choice. The main purpose of the paper is to stress that
a spatial framework may better seize the consumer adverse eﬀects of a merger. Follow-
ing a bilateral merger within a triopoly, firms decide to operate or not all outlets before
concentration is assessed by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. If firms can price discriminate, the 1992
US Merger Guidelines state that "...the Agency will consider additional geographic markets consisting of
particular locations of buyers in which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably and separately impose
at least a ’small but significant and nontransitory’ increase in price."
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competing in prices. Any mergers is profitable, thanks to fixed cost reductions, but for a
non-contiguous merger between distant firms, it is even more profitable to shutter one of
the outlets. This actually hurts consumers in two ways: higher prices and increased travel
cost. Indeed, in a spatial framework, where outlet location stands for product brand, a
merger equally modifies welfare through the number of outlets operating afterwards, be-
cause this determines the total transport cost/disutility incurred by consumers. A possible
antitrust response to such an anticompetitive merger is to require that both aﬃliates be
kept open after the merger. The same result in terms of outlet-operating strategy obtains
for a merger between neighbours, yet the above antitrust remedy is ineﬀective in this case,
since prices will still be higher than before merger. Deck (2001) also checks that the threat
of entry gives the same incentives as the antitrust remedy in the case of a non-contiguous
merger, which basically conforms with the (nonspatial) idea that entry and merger remedy
are substitutable29.
The same is claimed by Cabral (2003), but with a diﬀerent antitrust moral, in a Salop-
type standard shopping model where the possibility of entry is considered both before and
after a merger to monopoly. Depending on the comparison between the reservation price
and the sunk fixed cost per location, the market is deemed either small or large. In the
former case, entry is unprofitable both before and after merger, so consumers only buy
from two diametrically-opposite stores, and the price goes up following the concentration.
In larger markets, however, the merger can trigger entry by a third firm, which locates its
store half-way between the insiders, and thus makes both prices and consumer transport
costs fall. The paper argues that in this case insiders may anticipate post-merger entry
and strategically react by proposing to divest one outlet in order to have their merger
more easily accepted. By doing so, they succeed in ’buying oﬀ’ the third firm, which
would not open another store besides the one already acquired as a means for entering
the market. This ultimately restores the symmetric one-store duopoly, which from the
consumers’ point of view is worse than an asymmetric three-store duopoly that might
have obtained otherwise. The main point is that voluntary asset sale chosen and designed
29The 1992 US Merger Guidelines §3 state that "in markets where entry is ...easy,...the merger raises no
antitrust concern and ordinarily requires no further analysis".
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by insiders can actually block entry, as compared with a divestiture injunction optimally
designed by the competition authority, on account of the insiders’ incentive to strategically
anticipate both rivals’ action and merger control procedures.
This conclusion can only strengthen our point developed in the next section, dealing
with the location incentives conveyed by mergers. After all, it is increasingly acknowledged
that the merger antitrust assessment ought to deal with the expected post-merger situation
by taking into account store/firm relocation and/or brand repositioning for the assessment
of merger eﬀects on industry performance and consumers’ welfare.
1.3 Impact of behaviour on location
If merger analysis with fixed locations yielded conclusions on the eﬀect of locations
for merger incentives and merger-related strategies (such as outsider free-riding or entry
pre-emption), the converse can be studied in terms of the impact of exogenous mergers on
endogenous locations. Allowing for location choice when dealing with mergers in spatial
settings represents an equilibrium approach, to the extent that it allows the assessment of
strategies such as post-merger relocation or pre-merger location choice with foresight of
merger. Both are empirically relevant, the former in the sense of product range reposition-
ing or geographical reshaping of a distribution network for instance, the latter whenever
location represents an investment decision, because this is often made before engaging
in take-overs30. Furthermore, from a spatial point of view, endogenizing location choice
provides insight for the relation between market concentration and spatial agglomeration
or dispersion on the one hand, or product diversity on the other.
The literature on this topic is not vast, and most of it falls into two analytical frame-
works. Most often than not, spatial price competition is assumed when dealing with
pre-merger optimal location choice, whereas optimal post-merger relocation is studied
in a spatial Cournot framework. A short reminder explains these two diﬀerent strands.
Internal profitability is hardly questioned under price competition, thanks to strategic
30Outside the spatial context, the potential of mergers to alter investment choices is recognized - Gatsios
and Karp (1992) consider a duopoly and show that the levels of investment chosen with anticipation of
merger are diﬀerent from those chosen without.
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complementarity, so location choices in anticipation of merger aim to further increase
merger profitability by reducing the outsiders’ free-riding. In contrast, post-merger relo-
cation generating suﬃcient cost diﬀerentials appears as a necessary condition for Cournot
competitors to enable merger profitability in the first place.
1.3.1 Location choice in anticipation of merger
The idea that location choice before merger may increase merger profitability by re-
ducing free-riding was tackled by Rothschild et al. (2000) and Heywood et al. (2001) for
Bertrand spatial competitors within a triopoly and then in the general case respectively.
Rothschild et al. (2000) obtain that depending on the sharing rule w.r.t. the post-merger
profit, insiders can gain more than the outsider by moving farther away from the latter,
so as to reduce free-riding. The paper reminds however that in order to be profitable,
a merger must involve adjacent firms, therefore in this triopoly framework the outsider
necessarily holds the ’border’ position. The n-firm oligopoly considered by Heywood et al.
(2001) allows in contrast to consider ’interior’ mergers, i.e. facing outsiders on both sides,
who may not all equally benefit from the merger externality. Outsiders may experience
a fall in their profits only after a ’corner’ merger31 (as in the triopoly case), while they
always benefit from an ’interior’ one, which can actually be either internally profitable or
hurting rivals, but never both simultaneously.
A second important point concerning models dealing with location chosen in antic-
ipation of merger is that the spatial pattern thus obtained is actually not eﬃcient, i.e.
transport cost are not minimized. In contrast, when the location decision follows the
merger, the insiders always locate so as to minimize transport cost, because this strategy
maximizes joint profit. This second point incidentally reminds that mergers in spatial
markets exhibit other adverse consumer and welfare eﬀects than just price increases.
The first paper to have explicitly allowed for pre-merger location choice in anticipation
of merger within a spatial price discrimination model is Gupta et al. (1997), who consid-
31Quite intuitively, this is the only case where a future insider can move on one side without losing
market shares to the excluded rivals, but this ’corner’ case is relevant only for markets well approximated
by the linear space representation.
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ered a duopoly on Hotelling’s unit market. Without foresight of merger, firms locate at
the quartiles32, which no longer holds when a firm anticipates taking over its rival: as the
probability that a particular firm will be the acquiring one increases, it locates ever closer
to the center of the market, whereas its target may move towards the market border for
high enough probabilities (the symmetry is preserved if firms anticipate the take-over with
equal probability). In any case, the resulting locations do not minimize transport costs
for consumers33. The same incentive to optimally react beforehand in anticipation of the
changes brought by the merger is present in a diﬀerent though related spatial framework -
Ecer (2005) showed in a Hotelling-type shopping model that when anticipating a stricter
control of their merger, duopolists increase product diﬀerentiation not through location
choices, but by the choice of transport cost per distance. This eventually allows firms to
sustain higher equilibrium prices, and therefore decreases consumer surplus both directly
and indirectly.
1.3.2 Post-merger repositioning
Choosing locations after merger necessarily improves locational eﬃciency, and thereby
possibly the merger profitability. To explore the incentive for repositioning/relocation
and its consequences in terms of merger assessment, we review next the spatial literature
dealing with the assumption of multi-store/-product competition. This is so because a
merger gives rise a priori to a multi-unit entity, operating from several locations or oﬀering
several jointly-owned brands.
Further insights from location theory: multi-store/product competition
The now vast literature on spatial competition with location choice mainly assumes
that each firms can set up only one store, which is presumably done to avoid supplementary
analytical complexity. Yet, the theory of spatial competition gains in relevance whenever
addressing multi-store/product competition, since it is common practice for firms in the
32Following Hurter and Lederer (1985), spatial price discrimination with simultaneous market entry and
no opportunity for merger yields the symmetric equally-spaced transport minimizing locations along the
segment.
33This was also true for Rothschild et al. (2000) and Heywood et al. (2001).
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real world to open several retail shops in a given neighbourhood34. Similarly, in terms of
diﬀerentiated products, by selling several products in the same market, firms can tailor
them to diﬀerent horizontal segments of the market, and accordingly charge higher prices.
Furthermore, this technical simplification is often made at the cost of implying that re-
sults extend over from the single-store case, which need not necessarily be true. Except
for divisionalization (i.e. setting up independent divisions) which rules out centralized
decision-making, when a firm has several stores (or, equivalently, product brands), each
store’s behaviour aﬀects the decisions of all other stores on the market, including those
owned by the same firm. Therefore each store cannot be simply viewed as an independent
single-store entity, and results obtained with multi-store/product firms are likely to diﬀer
from those obtained without35.
Despite compelling every day observations, the literature dealing with strategic loca-
tion choice in the multi-store/product framework is not vast, possibly on account of the
earliest theoretical results obtained. In the context of Hotelling’s model with linear trans-
port cost, Teitz (1968) points out that a Nash location equilibrium is not consistent with
multi-store competition. The nonexistence problem is as usual related to the linearity of
transport cost combined with mill f.o.b. pricing, but even with quadratic transport cost,
a similarly puzzling finding is obtained by Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988), who study
in this setting the two-stage location-price game between two-store duopolists, both on
the linear and the circular markets. They find that in equilibrium both firms cluster own
aﬃliates at a unique location. The incentive to segment the market and improve consumer
surplus extraction by diﬀerentiating own products actually intensifies price competition,
so in equilibrium firms do not proliferate. Janssen et al. (2003) revisit the mill-pricing
location-price duopoly game on the circular city, with general consumer distribution and
transport cost functions. By adding a second product diﬀerentiation dimension under
34Retail companies such as fast-food restaurants, supermarkets, gasoline stations, clothing shops, de-
partment stores, hotels, travel agencies or bookstores generally operate a chain of outlets.
35 In the context of retailing, Ghosh and McLaﬀerty (1987, Chapter 6) argue that the traditional methods
of site selection with single-outlet firms are inadequate to analyze location decisions of multi-outlet retail
firms. They claim that the analysis of multi-outlet retailers requires systematic evaluation of the impact
of each store on the entire network.
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the form of heterogenous consumer preferences across chains of stores, they show that a
pure-strategy equilibrium with distinct outlets does exist. Their result is however striking,
to the extent that the location decisions of multi-store firms are entirely independent of
each other (they are in dominant strategies), and are basically function of consumer dis-
tribution only. Stores (rival or not) never agglomerate, and their number has no influence
on the pricing decision36. To sum up, under standard Bertrand mill pricing competition,
both on the linear and circular markets, each firm clusters own stores and rival outlets
never agglomerate, so as to relax competition.
Under Cournot spatial competition, the outcome of spatial dispersion of own aﬃliates
obtains instead. Within a shipping homogenous-product model, when a firm opens several
facilities, they necessarily operate from distinct locations due to the intra-firm strategic
substitutability eﬀect, and total profit is maximized by serving each local market only
from that outlet which has the lowest unit delivered cost at that market. However, rival
outlet agglomeration is possible in such a framework.
Sarkar et al. (1997) obtained, in the case of spatially separated markets in a discontin-
uous space (a network), possible partial agglomeration of rival outlets at discrete points in
space, which are always some vertices of the network and never intermediary locations. For
the continuous space case (contiguous markets), the location equilibrium for an arbitrary
number of firms and stores was thoroughly worked out for the linear bounded market by
Pal and Sarkar (2002). The model shows that the problem is less complex than expected,
since it can be approximated by a lot simpler one, in which a firm behaves as a monopolist
when locating its stores. A firm’s equilibrium locations converge to the monopoly pattern
as demand grows larger, and when firms have the same number of stores, rival outlets
cluster at finitely many discrete points which coincide with a firm’s monopoly locations.
The location equilibrium is always unique and symmetric with respect to the market cen-
ter. Both are due to the border eﬀect on the segment market, which imposes for each
individual store a unique quantity-median location, basically determined with respect to
36This may seem counterintuitive, but is explained by the fact that in a mill pricing model, competition
is localized: not all outlets compete with each other, but actually only with neighbouring outlets of the
competing chain.
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other stores’ respective locations and the exogenous market borders.
Given that the quantity-median is double37 for each store, the circular city framework
greatly complicates the location choice for Cournot multi-store firms. It does not come as a
surprise that only simple particular cases have been worked out, and the general framework
with an arbitrary number of firms and stores is considered yet intractable. Chamorro-
Rivas (2000) studied the two-plant duopoly, and found that all stores are evenly spaced
with aﬃliates paired and rival outlets interlacing on the circumference. Since product
homogeneity implies maximum dispersion for a firm’s stores, by the same token inter-firm
substitutability induces rival stores’ dispersion. Still, the equilibrium may not be unique
on the circle market, and Cosnita (2005) made the point that the equal number of stores for
the two competitors plays an important role. Indeed, competition between one single-store
firm and one two-store firm yields two equilibrium patterns: either the single-plant firm
clusters with one of the aﬃliate diametrically opposite to the other aﬃliate, or the former
locates mid-distance between the two rival outlets. Similarly, the equilibrium for one two-
store firm facing two single-store firms involves two diametrical pairs: either equidistantly
in complete dispersion, or collapsing at the opposite ends of the same diameter.
At any rate, the location patterns obtained under spatial quantity competition are
clearly consistent not only with commonly observed firm/store clustering, but also with
the basic intuitions that a store’s location should take into account the location of rival
firms/stores. From a more general standpoint, spatial models in their multi-plant or
multi-product versions exhibit at least the convenient advantage of modelling post-merger
competition in a more realistic way, given that any merger leads to a multi-store/product
entity. The spatial framework can therefore be used to consistently answer questions such
as: between which brands in a market a merger is most likely to occur, which are the
likely changes in terms of product choice/design following the merger, which, if any of the
aﬃliate stores/products is likely to be shut down afterwards, or where a plant might be
relocated after the merger.
37On the circle, if a given location satisfies the quantity-median property for a store, so does its diamet-
rically opposite location.
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Merger analysis and antitrust issues with post-merger repositioning
As already mentioned, choosing locations after merger improves locational eﬃciency.
Gandhi et al. (2005) study mergers between firms competing in a Hotelling-type framework
by simultaneously choosing prices and locations. They find that the merged firm moves
its two products away from each other to reduce cannibalization, whereas outsiders move
theirs in between the insiders’ brands. Gandhi et al. (2005) conclude that post-merger
repositioning increases product variety38. This benefits consumers, since by decreasing
substitutability between merging varieties the post-merger price increase is mitigated.
However, price competition is generally softened throughout the market, since all varieties
are more dispersed.
The outcomes of relocation such as improved locational eﬃciency, and lower product
substitutability (increased variety) or, equivalently, less spatial agglomeration following
the merger, are equally obtained in the case of Cournot shipping model. The important
diﬀerence from the spatial Bertrand mergers is that relocation can solve the profitability
paradox of Cournot mergers, for which the issue of merger rationale is consequently more
challenging.
With fixed locations, Norman and Pepall (1998) proved that the merger paradox still
occurs at each separate local market, and that a suﬃcient cost heterogeneity between
partners is a necessary condition to achieve internal profitability. Endogenizing post-
merger location choice took the analysis one step further, to the extent that supplementary
cost savings can obtain in this case. The nonspatial studies have put down the sources of
the paradox to the combination of strategic substitutability and the inability of insiders
to credibly commit to exploiting the potential bigger size of their association, and have
suggested various possible solutions. Besides the strategic complementarity, eﬃciency
gains from cost savings or a credible commitment not to decrease output after merger39
have been thus suggested. The latter have been explicitly assumed in the standard shipping
38See Berry and Waldfogel (2001) for an econometrical analysis supporting the outcome of increased
product variety due to merger on the linear market.
39See Daughety (1990), who changes the insiders’ behaviour to Stackelberg leadership to show that
commitment is essential for merger profitability.
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Cournot linear model retained by Norman and Pepall (2000), who argue that location can
be a key factor allowing the merger to lead to a bigger and better firm: competitors have
diﬀerent location advantages in serving the set of spatially separated markets, hence a
bilateral merger does not shut down one of the outlets, but instead can coordinate their
location decisions, so as to become a bigger entity, better adjusted to consumer locations.
The pre-merger market equilibrium has all firms clustered at the market center, as shown
by Anderson and Neven (1991). After merger, the two insiders are assumed to act as
Stackelberg leaders in location choice: whereas rivals still optimally cluster at the segment
mid-point, aﬃliates migrate symmetrically towards the market borders due to intra-firm
strategic substitutability, thus minimizing total transport cost and acquiring a comparative
locational advantage over rivals w.r.t. the distant demand located at the segment ends.
The market shares gained over this ’captive’ demand oﬀset the loss of market shares over
central locations, and the merger is shown to be profitable provided that the initial market
contain less than nine firms.
It would appear therefore that the behavioural asymmetry gives rise to enough cost
savings through relocation40 to allow mergers to become profitable. The result is ques-
tioned though by Cosnita (2005), and shown instead to crucially depend on the linear
space assumption and the ensuing border eﬀects.
Norman and Pepall (2000) acknowledge that the post-merger equilibrium with insiders
acting as a Stackelberg leader in location choice is strictly equivalent to the simultaneous
location game where the merged entity makes a centralized location decision for its two
outlets. This approach is applied by Cosnita (2005) based on unchanged assumptions save
one, the linear space. As a result, bilateral Cournot mergers in the circular city are shown
to be unprofitable if the initial market contains at least four competitors. In contrast
to the linear model, the analysis is complicated by the fact that the post-merger spatial
equilibrium is not unique. The profitability of the merger to duopoly is explained by the
fact that the two insiders face competition on one side only: some captive demand is still
40 In their opposite context, Rothschild et al. (2000) claim that the profitability paradox does not arise
in ’spatial’ markets with delivered prices competition, because by committing to their locations in advance
and retaining them after merger, firms are able to ensure an output level which makes the merger profitable.
CHAPTER 1 Horizontal concentration in spatial models 31
available at locations between their respective positions. In turn, if the merged entity
competes against two outsiders, both resulting location equilibria have each aﬃliate face
competitors on both sides. To put it short, even though relocation does yield delivery
cost savings for the merged entity, the circular framework symmetry no longer aﬀords the
opportunity of capturing some captive demand, so the insiders can no longer put to profit
this locational advantage. This is actually consistent with a corollary of Deneckere and
Davidson (1985), according to which in markets with symmetric intensity of competition
the incentives to profitably merge are considerably lower.
Besides the improved location eﬃciency, the bilateral Cournot mergers on the linear
city studied by Norman and Pepall (2000) necessarily increase market concentration and
reduce competitive pressure at each local market, with the result that prices rise for most
consumers (actually, the only consumes for which prices fall are those located towards the
market borders, closest to the two aﬃliates, but overall consumer surplus falls). Yet, and
in contrast to nonspatial analyses, the increased profit for both insiders and outsiders,
together with the improved locational eﬃciency, are almost always suﬃcient to oﬀset the
consumer surplus-reducing eﬀect and increase overall welfare (the only exception occurs
for the triopoly case, where market concentration is already so high before merger that
the competition-reducing eﬀect can only be overwhelming).
To prevent and contain such competition-adverse eﬀects, merger control authorities
may resort to remedial measures - typically, in the case of horizontal mergers, under
the form of divestiture injunctions (mandatory asset sales) - meant to restore market
competition and prevent a price raise. Cosnita (2006) proposes an equilibrium analysis41
w.r.t. spatial mergers, divestitures and their competitive eﬀects
The first purpose of the Cosnita (2006) is to compare the incentives for merger and
divisionalization in a linear shipping Cournot setting (the same as Norman and Pepall
(2000) actually). Basic insight from the nonspatial analyses was that spinning oﬀ is prof-
itable when merging is not42, so they are viewed as mutually exclusive business strategies.
Cosnita (2006) argues instead that although merger is profitable, subsequent division-
41Meaning based on location equilibria both before and after merger and/or divestiture.
42See Polasky (1992) and Baye et al. (1996) for explicit analyses of divisionalization incentives
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alization can be even more, provided it only involves partial spin-oﬀ (i.e. establishing
multi-store aﬃliates). In the linear framework retained, this sequence of strategies makes
the best of both: the merger yields transport cost eﬃciency gains and a locational advan-
tage, whereas by divisionalization the merged entity credibly commits to maintaining a
high output. This overall profitability comparison still holds even if the initial merger is
not profitable, which incidentally suggest a possible rationale for apparently unprofitable
mergers (merge so as to better divisionalize afterwards and increase profits). The merger
control insight in terms of divestiture eﬀects is provided by a possible interpretation of the
spatial outcome obtained after merger and divisionalization. Cosnita (2006) shows that
the ultimate location pattern coincides with that following a mandatory asset sale to a
new entrant. Such a measure is rendered necessary by the merger’s adverse price eﬀect,
and is eﬀective, inasmuch as the overall consumer surplus increases after divestiture. In
this model, the credit of the spatial setting is finally threefold: to provide a consistent
framework for an equilibrium analysis of both merger and divisionalization, to identify
the markets where the adverse price eﬀects occur through the equilibrium spatial analysis,
and lastly, to illustrate a situation where despite being eﬀective, a post-merger divestiture
can increase merger profitability.
1.4 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this review of the literature dealing with horizontal mergers in a spatial
framework was to stress that location, and space in general, are important for better
seizing the motivations for and the outcome of market concentration. The following two
chapters attempt to contribute to this topic - they are motivated by the profitability issue
of horizontal mergers in a spatial setting. Chapter 2 presents in detail the model and
results of Cosnita (2005), so in short it proposes a complementary profitability analysis
to that performed by Norman and Pepall (2000). Chapter 3, containing the analysis in
Cosnita (2006), examines in turn merger profitability in relation with another widely-used
corporate strategy, divisionalization.
Chapter 2
Horizontal mergers in the circular
city: Location properties and
profitability analysis
Straight lines are quite matter-of-fact
If you know how to add and subtract.
But when it’s circles in question
I have a suggestion:
Try not to forget the diameters.
(Anonymous)
This chapter builds on Cosnita (2005) "Horizontal mergers in the circular city: a note." Eco-
nomics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 7 p. 1-10.
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2.1 Introduction
As the recurrent merger waves recall, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are extensively
common as corporate strategies. Arguably, they are motivated by the higher expected
returns they yield as compared with alternative strategies. To put it short (as a rather
recent Wall Street Journal article does1), acquiring a new company is a lot easier than
improving operations at your own. It is far easier and cheaper to acquire existing brand
and outlets than to build new units from scratch. Exploiting a product that someone else
has made by means of marketing, sales, and distribution eﬀorts is a lot less painful than
finding ways to make serious and eﬀective internal changes. After all, traditional brands
have already captured the loyalty (and mind space) of consumers in a target market.
So most companies would rather just buy another one, which is an ego-gratifying and
relatively straightforward business move.
And so most companies would do, if it were not for antitrust regulations. The latter
were (sooner or later) adopted world-wide, in acknowledgement of the fact that private and
social incentives for market concentration need not and often do not coincide, and for the
explicit purpose of preventing the anticompetitive M&As and their negative consequences.
To do so, merger control has gradually taken a ’more economic approach’, which means
increasing reliance on quantitative methods of analysis as well industrial economics models.
The problem with the theory of horizontal mergers is that it can make some puzzling
predictions in terms of merger performance: according to both Cournot and Bertrand
models, in the absence of market entry outsider firms benefit more from the merger than
the merging partners2 (which, incidentally, raises the question of why rivals protest to
competition authorities against mergers). This is just part of the so-called merger prof-
itability paradox - depending on the underlying assumption on market competition, the
merger itself may prove utterly unprofitable 3.
1 "Bosses Prefer Buying Businesses To Building Them", February 17, 2005
2This free-riding eﬀect was pinned down by Stigler (1950).
3This questions the internal rationality of mergers that occur despite their apparent unprofitability -
see Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Banerjee and Eckard (1998) for empirical studies concluding on
the poor performance of M&As. Diﬀerent explanations were proposed to this puzzle, and the next chapter
will dwell on this literature and to a certain extent will attempt to contribute to it.
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2.1.1 Related literature
The profitability paradox of Cournot horizontal mergers is particularly associated with
the work of Salant et al. (1983)4. For the linear, symmetric, homogenous good, simultane-
ous game, they show that mergers are not profitable unless they concentrate at least 80%
of the market. The explanation lies with the combination of three assumptions: identical
constant marginal costs, strategic substitutability and simultaneous output decisions. The
merger creates a coalition between the insiders, who henceforth coordinate output deci-
sions to maximize joint profit. To do so, the combined production of partners falls (so as
to push up the market price). Given the constant marginal cost assumption, the merged
entity shrinks to end up looking like any other firm in the industry. Finally, quantities
being strategic substitutes, this triggers an output expansion on behalf of rivals. Still,
overall production falls, and price goes up, but not enough to compensate the decrease in
the combined market share of insiders. As a result, the latter experience a profit loss.
Merger profitability is restored by replacing the assumptions causing the paradox.
Price competition with diﬀerentiated products ensures strategic complementarity5, so a
price increase by the insiders is matched by a ’soft’ reply on behalf of the outsiders, i.e.
a similar price increase. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show thus that mergers are
profitable within a Bertrand industry producing symmetrically diﬀerentiated varieties,
and Levy and Reitzes (1992) and Reitzes and Levy (1995) make use of the spatial setting
(both models use the circular city representation for the spatial diﬀerentiation) to show
that this holds equally with asymmetric product diﬀerentiation. Nevertheless, strategic
substitutability would be less troublesome if the insiders’ profit maximization strategy
were to increase output. This would be the case if the merger gave rise to cost savings6, so
that the merging partners could benefit from a low enough post-merger unit product cost
to guarantee them a market share increase7. By the same token, if the output decisions
4See also Szidarovsky and Yakowitz (1982) and Davidson and Deneckere (1985).
5Gaudet and Salant (1992) signal the importance of strategic complementarity for the paradox.
6The merger may be profitable provided the unit cost depend on a "tangible asset that the merged firm
acquires[...]which increases the output it can produce at a given average cost" - Perry and Porter (1985,
p.226).
7Farrell and Shapiro (1990,a) coined the term ’synergy’ for such substantial eﬃciency gains that take
CHAPTER 2 Horizontal mergers in the circular city 36
were actually not simultaneous, but instead the insiders enjoyed a first-mover advantage,
then this Stackelberg leadership would ensure an output increase and thereby merger
profitability (Daughety (1990)).
The problem with these two last solutions of the paradox is that the frameworks con-
sidered should some way or another account for the origin of those synergies (endogenous?)
or the change of behaviour (the precise mechanism by which any firm acquires the lead-
ership is not really specified). The spatial setting appeared likely to fit these conditions.
As Norman and Pepall (2000, p.668) put it, "location is a key factor underlying why a
merger can lead to a bigger and better firm".
To start with, McAﬀee et al. (1992) made the point that in a standard8 shipping
Cournot model, the distance induces a marginal delivery cost asymmetry between the
diﬀerent firms at any location/sale point in the market. This cost diﬀerential allows the
merged firm to keep open both outlets (in contrast with the non spatial model, where
it shrinks to the size of an independent rival), so as to serve each market only from the
closest plant. They argue that this eﬃcient output reallocation allows the merged firm to
potentially benefit from its bigger size. Between the lines one could read that the mere
introduction of space in the model solved the paradox by creating cost diﬀerences between
the merger partners. Nevertheless, Norman and Pepall (1998) show that this is not enough
to restore internal profitability, because spatial markets are segmented in a standard linear
shipping model with quantity competition. Without arbitrage on behalf of consumers,
independent Cournot equilibria obtain at each local market due to local constant returns
to scale, and therefore the merger paradox is present on each of these spatially separated
markets. Marginal delivery cost asymmetry is not suﬃcient to reverse the unprofitability
result, and simple output reallocation between aﬃliates does not generate a suﬃcient cost
advantage to the merged entity.
In turn, if post-merger relocation is allowed for, the delivery cost asymmetry can
endogenously increase. After all, repositioning own brands or geographically reshaping
the combined cost function to lower levels than any of the pre-merger stand-alone costs.
8That is, simultaneous-move game with homogenous good and identical constant unit production and
transport costs.
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one’s distribution network9 are common business strategies. Norman and Pepall (2000)
claim that Cournot horizontal mergers in shipping spatial linear models with homogeneous
good can prove profitable if firms relocate. More precisely, they show that the endogenous
location in the post-merger game can make a merger profitable if the segment market is
suﬃciently concentrated (no more than eight firms initially), provided that the insiders
enjoy a first-mover advantage in location. The article actually argues that besides the
endogenous location, it is the behavioral asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders
at this stage of the game that makes the merger profitable. To eliminate the incapacity of
the merged entity to commit to a higher level of output in the post-merger game, Norman
and Pepall (2000) model a Stackelberg-in-location stage before the quantity stage. The
location first-mover advantage leads to a bigger and better firm, in as much as it enjoys
a net absolute delivery cost advantage over its competitors w.r.t. a certain group of
consumers who become its captive demand. Indeed, in their setting, the merger allows
the two stores to coordinate their relocation choices in order to better adjust them to
consumer locations. Given the initial spatial equilibrium, with all firms agglomerating
at the market center (as shown by Anderson and Neven (1991)), the two aﬃliates move
outwards toward the segment borders, and since the outsiders’ optimal reply requires them
to keep the central location, the merged entity will supply all consumers located between
an outlet location and the segment endpoints with a lower delivery cost than the outsiders.
However, it turns out that this Stackelberg-in-location outcome can be replicated by
a simultaneous relocation stage, on condition that the merged entity chooses two distinct
locations for its aﬃliates10 so as to prevent overlapping of their respective market areas. To
sum up, the outcomes of the simultaneous location game and the sequential one coincide,
despite the appealing interpretation of the location first-mover advantage as resulting from
being ’bigger and better’. We conclude then that the location sequentiality assumption is
9The Wall Street Journal dated September 15, 2004, reminds that retailers can shape the (American)
landscape in a ’positive’ way, by adding new stores at top locations, but sometimes the opposite happens -
according to the article ("Wal-Mart’s Surge Leaves Dead Stores Behind"), Wal-Mart is known for dropping
its ’big box’ stores in order to open even bigger superstores elsewhere.
10Actually, the outcome of the simultaneous location subgame is basically a particular case of the general
n-firm and m-store framework on the linear market, studied by Pal and Sarkar (2002).
CHAPTER 2 Horizontal mergers in the circular city 38
not essential for the profitability result, and go on to look for an alternative explanation.
2.1.2 Purpose and relevance
In this chapter we examine whether the scope for profitable spatial horizontal mergers
depends on the type of the underlying market shape assumption. Our work builds on the
framework of Norman and Pepall (2000), up to the space circularity. We argue that the
shape of the space is a supplementary yet essential condition to be taken into account,
because the profitability result on the segment is due to the border eﬀect present on
such an exogenously bounded market, and not to the behavioral asymmetry assumption.
Basically, since the merger profitability comes from the endogenous cost savings obtained
through relocation, we argue that the extent to which these potential locational eﬃciency
gains are put to profit by the merged entity depends entirely on the shape of the market.
We show in this chapter that mergers are more profitable and hence the merger incen-
tives are higher in the linear city than in the circular one, and put this down to the fact
that the segment is an asymmetric location structure as compared with the circle, where
locations are homogenous.
More precisely, the existence of (exogenous) endpoints on the linear market makes it
a continuum of heterogenous locations, to the extent that locations are ’diﬀerentiated’ by
the distance to the endpoints, which eventually makes the segment mid-point everybody’s
most preferred location. Indeed, Anderson and Neven (1991) show that (when firms are
single-store and deliver throughout the segment market) the quantity-median location is
the same and unique for all firms on the segment, its center, which explains the central
agglomeration (minimum diﬀerentiation) outcome that prevails before merger. As a result,
merger and relocation give the opportunity to reach at lower cost the distant demand,
besides lowering the competitive pressure on the mid-segment location. By moving away
from the centre of the segment, the two merged aﬃliates minimize total transport and enjoy
locational eﬃciency gains, besides optimally reallocating output between them. These
cost advantages are put to profit precisely because they apply to ’distant’ demand, which
remains ’distant’ for all other firms in the industry, since the latter are still located at the
market centre. To sum up, relocation makes merger profitable because outsiders’ central
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agglomeration is a dominant strategy on the linear market, with or without merger.
In turn, the circular market is a continuum of homogenous locations, there is no single
median point (or median consumer, as Horstmann and Slivinski (1985) put it). All loca-
tions are a priori alike, and they can all potentially satisfy the quantity median property,
it all depends on competitors’ locations. Lack of a unique most-preferred location makes
the competition eﬀect dominant, and firms never agglomerate at the same location on the
circle so as to reduce competitive pressure11, as was shown by Shimizu and Matsumura
(2003). Starting from such a spatial pattern, we show that merger and relocation actu-
ally reduce spatial dispersion of outlets, so basically post-merger competition is keener as
compared with the segment market. As a result, it would take a larger increase in market
power to make the merger profitable, which actually happens only when firms merge to
form a duopoly. In this case, insiders can benefit from the captive demand at the local
markets between their respective locations, to the extent that these markets are ’distant’
and ’isolated’ with respect to the (unique) outsider. In contrast, a merger to triopoly has
both aﬃliates facing outsiders competition on both sides, without any captive demand
available whatsoever, because in the subsequent relocation stage outsiders do not cluster
together as on the segment market, but on the contrary disperse. This is basically the
crux of the problem, and the essential diﬀerence w.r.t. the linear case: insiders’ (eﬃcient,
though) relocation no longer guarantees captive demand, because the lack of exogenous
market borders allows rivals to spread out and cover all local markets at competitive
delivery costs.
In short, we show that despite relocation, mergers on the circle become unprofitable
much earlier, i.e. starting with four firms on the market. Our model examines the cases of
merger to duopoly and triopoly in detail, to stress that a certain degree of asymmetry or
heterogeneity on the market (of which merged firms may take advantage of) is necessary
to have suﬃcient incentives to merge.
Incidentally, this recalls the importance of the particular assumption on market shape
underlying the basic model and its conclusions. Spatial models are particularly known for
their sensibility to assumption changes - for instance, complete agglomeration under spatial
11Strategic substitutability is important for this dispersion result - see chapter 1 for details.
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Cournot competition relies on the market shape and product diﬀerentiation assumptions12.
We bring forward the possibility for the profitability of spatial mergers to depend likewise
on an assumption underlying the spatial framework used.
After all, even if a substantial bulk of the literature on spatial competition builds
on the linear market hypothesis, certain situations are better mirrored by the circular
city framework. For instance, firms locating on the circle approximate department stores
in circular towns spreading around lakes, or shopping malls within suburban belt-ways
circling traﬃc-jammed cities, as well as television networks choosing time slots for their
programmes around the dial clock, or rival airlines choosing the arrival and departure
times for their flights. On the other hand, the circular city paradigm can equally repre-
sent a given set of consumers with particular preferences defined over a set of goods in an
abstract characteristics space. If the linear representation applies to single-peaked con-
sumer’s preferences (see Black (1948) for this well-known result in social choice literature),
no such analogy is available for preferences represented by the circular model. Actually,
the linear paradigm is characterized by the presence of a unique median consumer, which
does not hold on the circle13. Horstmann and Slivinski (1985) also note that consumer
preference restrictions imply in the case of the circular representation that products which
are no individual’s least preferred good simply do not exist (they would be located inside
the circumference), whereas they abound in the linearly representable structure. In other
words, all varieties on the circle are someone’s most preferred commodity and someone
else’s least preferred commodity (which is not the case for varieties on the segment). One
might therefore venture to conclude as follows on the choice between the circular and the
linear models: the former, circular paradigm, seems more appropriate for global markets,
12To obtain spatial clustering, the agglomeration force(s) must dominate the competition-driven dis-
persion force. The exogenous market borders in the linear case push firms together, basically through a
market size eﬀect, because the central location guarantees the profit-maximizing spatial pattern for sales.
Product diﬀerentiation can act either as an agglomeration or a dispersion force: product substitutability
(complementarity) implies that own delivered output is lower (higher) at a rival’s location.
13Given any pair of goods over which consumers’ preferences are defined, on the circle there are always two
such median consumers indiﬀerent between the two commodities, whose preference orderings are exactly
opposite one another. See Horstmann and Slivinski (1985) for more details on this median consumer and
consumers’ preferences represented by location models.
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where border eﬀects are virtually inexistent, and where diﬀerent varieties may more easily
satisfy the above condition that each of them is simultaneously a most preferred and least
preferred brand. The latter, linear case, can approximate regional or national markets,
where border eﬀects may be more powerful. Finally, and in line with the main point of
our merger analysis, if the existence of the market border eﬀect is interpreted as giving
rise to opportunities for obtaining some captive demand (exploiting commercial niches, for
instance), then the circular framework might be more useful for modelling steady, mature
(even declining) markets, where such opportunities have disappeared, whereas the linear
setting would represent expanding markets, where such niches still exist.
We go on next to our analysis of horizontal mergers in the circular city. The chapter
is organized as follows: the basic model is presented before discussing mergers to duopoly
and triopoly. Each time location equilibria before merger are examined first, then the post-
merger spatial pattern is identified, and finally the profitability analysis is performed. The
(quite extensive) technical computations are summarized and grouped in Appendix A.
2.2 Model
The model we use is from Norman and Pepall (2000), except for the shape of the
market.
There is a circular market of length 1 where infinitely many consumers lie uniformly.
Identical single-store firms, equally located in [0, 1] , produce a homogeneous good with
the same technology characterized by constant marginal costs, normalized to zero. Firm’s
i location is denoted by xi. At any consumer location x on the circle, demand is given
by p(x) = a − Q(x), a > 0, where p(x) is the product price at that location and Q(x) is
the total output supplied at x. Firms incur transport costs t |x− xi|, linear in distance
and quantity, in order to ship output to consumers. t is a positive constant, and since the
transport cost parameter enters as a multiple in the profits expression, for our profitability
analysis we will assume t = 1 without loss of generality14. Equivalently, let a be the
14The consumer reservation price is the central parameter for the profitability of a merger and it cannot
be further normalized - see Norman and Peppal (2000).
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transport-cost adjusted reservation price15. The norm stands for the shorter distance of
the two possible ways to ship goods along the circumference from the firm’s location xi
to the consumer market located at x. Consumers have a prohibitive costly transport cost,
preventing arbitrage, so firms can and will price discriminate across the set of spatially
diﬀerentiated markets.
Starting from an initial location equilibrium, two firms merge (an exogenous decision).
The firms engage in the following post-merger location-quantity competition. Following
Norman and Pepall (1998, 2000), we remind that relocation is a necessary (though not
suﬃcient, as we show in this chapter) condition for Cournot horizontal concentration to be
profitable. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously decides where on the perimeter to
locate. After observing the rivals’ locations, in the second stage each firm simultaneously
chooses its output level at every point (market) in the continuum [0, 1] as to maximize its
profit. There are no set-up or (re)location costs16, and there is neither entry on nor exit
from the market (each firm supplies a positive quantity at every local market).
To examine merger profitability, this two-stage post-merger game needs to be solved.
This is done by backward induction, and the equilibrium concept used is subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. Thus the second-stage subgames and the local Cournot competition
are examined first.
General resolution of the spatial Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Since marginal production cost is constant and arbitrage among the consumers is not
feasible, quantities set at diﬀerent points by the same firm are strategically independent.
Therefore, the second stage Cournot equilibrium can be characterized by a set of indepen-
dent Cournot equilibria, one for each market x ∈ [0, 1].
Generally denoting by xi a firm’s location, xi ∈ [0, 1], and by qi(x) its output at a
given location x, under the above assumptions, at each point x ∈ [0, 1] firm i, i = 1, n
15 In the product-diﬀerentiation analogy of this model, a can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the
extent to which consumer tastes are strongly localized.
16We make this assumption (a standard one in the literature on strategic location in Cournot oligopoly)
for the sake of a straightforward comparison with the results of Norman and Pepall (2000), who equally
assume costless (re)location.
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makes profit given by
πi(qi(x), q−i(x);x) =

a− t |xi − x|− qi(x)−
n−1X
j 6=i
qj(x)

 qi(x) (2.1)
Taking first order conditions to solve for the unique Cournot equilibrium yields
q∗i (x) =
1
n+ 1

a+
n−1X
j 6=i
t |xj − x|− nt |xi − x|

 (2.2)
Taking into account that aggregate supply at x writes Q∗(x) = 1
n+1 (na−
Pn
1 t |xj − x|),
the individual profit function at x can be rewritten as
π∗i (x) = [q
∗
i (x)]
2 (2.3)
which is standard Cournot outcome given the assumptions made. Finally, firm’s i total
(i.e. over the whole set of spatial markets) profit function is
Πi(xi, x−i) =
Z 1
0
π∗i (xi, x−i;x)dx (2.4)
At the first stage, each firm maximizes its own total profit function in own location. The
outcome of this simultaneous subgame in locations represents the spatial equilibrium.
2.2.1 Merger to duopoly
The initial spatial competition on the circle market involves three single-store firms.
Two among the three firms merge. In the resulting duopoly market the two-store merged
entity faces a single-store outsider. In contrast with the linear market, the merger to
duopoly on the circle exhibits a lower profitability range and multiple location equilibria.
Pre-merger equilibrium
The profitability analysis necessarily begins by establishing the pre-merger global profit
for merging firms. And since the starting point of the merger game is also a location
equilibrium, the pre-merger profit results from the latter.
We do not need to explicitly solve the pre-merger location-quantity game in order to
identify the pre-merger spatial equilibrium. Instead, we can (simply) make use of the
analysis of Shimizu and Matsumura (2003).
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The first important point stems from Proposition 1 in Shimizu and Matsumura (2003),
stating that complete agglomeration cannot be an equilibrium on the circular market,
given all the above assumptions. Consequently, the spatial equilibrium for three firms
necessarily involves either a spatial pattern with three distinct locations, or one with only
two distinct locations.
According to Proposition 3 in Shimizu and Matsumura (2003), for an odd number of
firms competing on the circular market, the situation where half plus one firms locate at 0
and the others at 1/2 (going clockwise on the circumference) is an equilibrium. Therefore,
a first pre-merger equilibrium involves two firms clustering at 0 and the third at 1/2. We
call this the ’diametrical’ pattern.
Finally, Proposition 4 in Shimizu and Matsumura (2003) basically implies that the
equidistant spatial pattern is always an equilibrium, and Gupta et al. (2004) give the gen-
eral formulation for this result. Consequently, the second pre-merger spatial equilibrium
involves one firm locating at 0, the second at 1/3 and the third at 2/3. We call this the
’equidistant’ pattern.
The following diagram presents the two alternative pre-merger spatial equilibria
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Figure 2.1: Location equilibria before merger to duopoly
Due to the perfect symmetry, in the equidistant pattern the three firms make the same
profit, which writes:
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Π(3) [equid] =
1
16



R 1/6
0 [a+ (1/3 + x) + (1/3− x)− 3(x− 0)]
2
dx+R 1/3
1/6 [a+ (2/3− x) + (1/3− x)− 3(x− 0)]
2
dx+R 2/3
1/2 [a+ (2/3− x) + (x− 1/3)− 3(1− x)]
2
dx+R 5/6
2/3 [a+ (x− 2/3) + (x− 1/3)− 3(1− x)]
2
dx+R 1
5/6 [a+ (x− 2/3) + (1− x+ 1/3)− 3(1− x)]
2
dx



=
1
16
a2− 1
32
a+
127
5184
(2.5)
where the superscript number between brackets reminds the number of firms on the
market.
In turn, the diametrical pattern yields diﬀerent individual profits, depending whether
the firm we consider locates at 0 (i.e. together with a rival) or at 1/2 (i.e. alone). The
profit of a firm at 0/1 writes:
Π(3) [diam; 0/1] =
1
16



R 1/2
0 [a+ (1/2− x) + (x− 0)− 3(x− 0)]
2
dx+R 1
1/2 [a+ (x− 1/2) + (1− x)− 3(1− x)]
2
dx


 =
1
16
a2− 1
32
a+
1
64
(2.6)
whereas the profit of the (unique) firm locating at 1/2 writes:
Π(3) [diam; 1/2] =
1
16



R 1/2
0 [a+ 2(x− 0)− 3(1/2− x)]
2
dx+R 1
1/2 [a+ 2(1− x)− 3(x− 1/2)]
2
dx


 =
1
16
a2 − 1
32
a+
7
192
(2.7)
Basically, the two location equilibria before merger are not equivalent; we can order the
profits: Π(3) [diam; 0/1] < Π(3) [equid] < Π(3) [diam; 1/2]. In the diametrical case, the firm
at 1/2 performs better than the other two firms, thanks to a lower degree of competition
at its own location.
Post-merger equilibrium
Following the merger, the two-store merged entity faces a single-store outsider. In order
to compute the optimal locations after merger, denote by z, z ∈ [0, 1/2], the location of
the single-store firm, and by d and 1 − d those of the two aﬃliates17, where d ∈ [0, 1/2].
17Following Pal and Sarkar (2002), we know that the two aﬃliates will never share the same
location. Moreover, on each side of an aﬃliate, its market area extends up to the midpoint
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The equilibrium profits for the merged entity and the outsider, denoted by Π(2)merged and
Π(2) [z] respectively, (following the same superscript notation pattern as before merger)
write as follows:
Π
(2)
merged =
1
9
(Z 1/2
0
[a+ |z − x|− 2 |d− x|]2 dx+
Z 1
1/2
[a+ |z − x|− 2 |1− d− x|]2 dx
)
(2.8)
Π(2) [z] =
1
9
(Z 1/2
0
[a+ |d− x|− 2 |z − x|]2 dx+
Z 1
1/2
[a+ |1− d− x|− 2 |z − x|]2 dx
)
(2.9)
Depending on the relative position of the single-store outsider firm w.r.t. the two
aﬃliates, the above profit expressions can take slightly diﬀerent forms, because of the
corresponding expressions of transport costs, therefore the discussion is divided in several
cases:
case 1 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ 1
case 2 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1
case 3 0 ≤ d ≤ z ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1
The optimal locations result from the profits’ maximization w.r.t. d and z respec-
tively. Every time the First Order Conditions (FOCs) are taken on the explicit profit
expressions, then the candidate locations are checked against the Second Order Condi-
tions (SOCs). Appendix A presents the detailed computations, but the solutions obtained
are the following:
case 1 z = 0, d = 12 − a+
1
4
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2)
case 2 z = 1/4, d = 1/4
case 3 z = 1/2, d = a− 14
p
(16a2 + 2− 8a)
Note that cases 1 and 3 yield strictly the same outcome, up to a half-circle rotation. In
other words, (only) two equilibrium patterns turn up. Both cases 1 and 3 yield a spatial
between itself and the other aﬃliate. There is no market area overlapping, and basically each
outlet supplies on half a circle. We can always denote the two midpoints by 0 and 1/2, for ease of
computation and exposition, and without any loss of generality.
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outcome as a degenerate segment, with the outsider at mid-distance between the two
insiders18. We call this Type 1 equilibrium. In turn, case 2 yields a location equilibrium
that could have been obtained on the linear market, with the two the aﬃliates locating as
a two-store monopoly (i.e. diametrically), but with the outsider and one of the insiders
sharing the same location. We call this Type 2 equilibrium. The following diagram
presents these two patterns:
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Figure 2.2: Location equilibria after merger to duopoly
Profitability analysis
Similarly to the pre-merger situation, the post-merger patterns are not equivalent in
terms of profits firms make, with the merged firm performing better on the so-called
degenerate segment. More precisely, evaluating the profit expression for the identified
solutions of the location stage, the following obtains (see details in Appendix A):
Type 1 pattern Π(2)merged [type 1] =
1
9

 −
3
2a+
1
4 + 5a
2 + 16
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2)−
2
3a
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2) + 43a2
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2)− 163 a3


Type 2 pattern Π(2)merged [type 2] =
1
9
¡
a2 + 124
¢
The last step of the profitability analysis is to compare these expression with those
of the pre-merger profit, so as to be able to pin down the profitability range for the
18We make this parallel with the segment case because we actually obtain the very same result as that
of Norman and Pepall (2000, p.672): their optimal location d at which an aﬃliate locates (measuring from
0 as the left-hand endpoint) is d = 14 +
u
4v−1
4(n−2)
2
+ 116 −
4v−1
4(n−2) . Evaluating this for v = a, and n = 3,
one obtains
t
1
8 (8a
2 − 4a+ 1)− a+ 12 =
1
4
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− a+ 12 , q.e.d.
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merger to duopoly. This is defined in terms of the demand parameter19, so following
Norman and Pepall (2000), we look for the range of maximum reservation price a such
that all firms supply positive quantities throughout the set of local markets20, and ensuring
merger profitability. Table 2.1 summarizes this profit comparison, where ∆Π = Π(2)merged−P
Πbefore, and Appendix A details the corresponding computations.
Table 2.1: Profit comparison for merger to duopoly
∆Π = a∈( ] such that ∆Π ≥ 0
Π
(2)
merged [type 1]−
P
Π equidistant firms a∈(1.5, 3.6]
Π
(2)
merged [type 2]−
P
Π equidistant firms a∈(1.5, 3.61]
Π
(2)
merged [type 1]−
P
Π diametrical firms (firms at 0 and 1/2) a∈(1.5, 3.57]
Π
(2)
merged [type 2]−
P
Π diametrical firms (firms at 0 and 1/2) a∈(1.5, 3.53]
Π
(2)
merged [type 1]−
P
Π common location firms (firms at 0) a∈(1.5, 4.01]
Π
(2)
merged [type 2]−
P
Π common location firms (firms at 0) a∈(1.5, 4.023]
It is important to note that the profitability range is smaller on the circle as compared
with the linear case21 discussed by Norman and Pepall (2000), regardless of the case we
look at.
The merger to duopoly is less profitable on the circle, because starting from less rivalry
before, the merger leads to more competition afterwards, due to the location pattern
that results from post-merger relocation. This is the opposite outcome to the linear
case. The unique initial equilibrium on the segment had all firms in the middle (see
Anderson and Neven (1991)), whereas on the circle, at most two firms share the same
19There is always an upper bound for spatial merger profitability, because as demand grows larger,
firms tend to locate as a monopoly (see Pal and Sarkar (2002)), therefore the possible spatial eﬃciency
gains obtained through merger and relocation become increasingly irrelevant, thereby making the merger
unprofitable.
20This is a ≥ n·t
2
for circular markets, therefore here the lower bound for a is 1.5. The above general
condition merely states that local market demand is suﬃciently large w.r.t. to total delivery cost at that
point to guarantee for all (n) firms positive delivered outputs. The maximum distance a firms rationally
covers on the circle is 1
2
, and in our particular case n = 3 and t = 1.
21On the segment market, the (unique) profitability interval for the merger to duopoly was (1.5, 4.4089]
- see Norman and Pepall (2000, p.675).
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location before merger, so initial individual profits are higher than on the segment22. By
post-merger relocation on the linear market, the merged entity symmetrically moves its
aﬃliates towards the endpoints, thus reducing competitive pressure at the center. In turn,
on the circular market the merged firm either shares a location (and hence its location
advantage) with the rival, or the latter is located half-distance between its stores. This is
the pattern which allows a higher merger profitability, nevertheless the profitability range
is smaller than on the segment, because of the lower captive demand. On the segment, the
merged entity enjoys some captive demand between its stores and the endpoints, since the
outsider remains located at the middle, and the exogenous market borders prevent any
risk of cannibalization between the two aﬃliates. The captive demand eﬀect still exists
on the circle in the segment-like case, but is weaker precisely because the frontier between
the market areas of the two aﬃliates is now endogenous, no longer fixed by endpoints.
The two stores both face the outsider on one side of their market areas, but on the other
they are in open competition with each other. This negative eﬀect of owning two outlets
was absent on the linear market, therefore merger profitability was higher.
2.2.2 Merger to triopoly
The next step of our proof that Cournot mergers are less profitable on the circle than
on the segment market is to examine profitability of mergers to triopoly. We start again
with the pre-merger location analysis and go on to determine the location post-merger
equilibrium, so as to be able to compare profits before and after merger. This merger
turns out to be unprofitable.
Pre-merger equilibrium
As in the previous section, to determine the pre-merger spatial market equilibrium
there is no need to explicitly solve out for the equilibrium locations of four firms competing
on the circular market. A qualitative analysis of the pre-merger situation is enough to
22This is straightforward: on the segment, the pre-merger individual profit of a firm in triopoly amounts
to 2 · U 1/2
0

a−(1/2−x)
4
2
dx = 116a
2 − 132a+
1
192 . On the circle, the lowest pre-merger profit a firm makes is
Π0/1= 116a
2 − 132a+
1
64 ,which is obviously higher.
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establish all initial location equilibria.
Given that total agglomeration cannot be an equilibrium, the four-firm spatial pattern
may a priori exhibit two, three or four distinct locations. Following Matsushima (2001,a),
the even number of firms on the pre-merger market allows for a two-distinct-location
equilibrium, with firms paired at the ends of a diameter. On the other hand, firms pairing
at the ends of two distinct diameters is equally an equilibrium, as shown by Gupta et al.
(2004).
Finally, it is straightforward to see that there can be no equilibrium involving three
distinct locations. Due to the quantity-median property, with three firms dispersed on the
circle, the fourth necessarily either clusters with, or locates diametrically opposite to one of
them. In the first case, the two other firms have incentives to deviate to the diametrically
opposite point, on account of the strategic substitutability, which eventually yields the
two-distinct-location pattern. In the second case, as shown by Gupta et al. (2004), the
best that two firms can do when the others are paired at the ends of a diameter is to
equally pair up diametrically.
To sum up, a three-location pattern is unstable, hence is not an equilibrium, and there
are (only) two pre-merger equilibrium patterns: two firms at 0 and the other two at 1/2,
and each time a firm at the end of a diameter. The following figure presents them:
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Figure 2.3: Location equilibria before merger to triopoly
From the firms’ profits point of view, it is straightforward to show that both equilibria
(with two and four distinct locations) are strictly equivalent - for ease of computation (so
as to simplify to the maximum the transport cost expressions) we shall nevertheless use
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two perpendicular diameters, without any loss of generality whatsoever.
The profit expression for any firm in the equidistant pattern is:
Π(4) [equid] =
1
25



R 1/4
0 [a+ (1/4− x) + (1/2− x) + (x+ 1/4)− 4x]
2
dx+R 1/2
1/4 [a+ (x− 1/4) + (1/2− x) + (3/4− x)− 4x]
2
dx+R 3/4
1/2 [a+ (x− 1/4) + (x− 1/2) + (3/4− x)− 4(1− x)]
2
dx+R 1
3/4 [a+ (1 + 1/4− x) + (x− 1/2) + (x− 3/4)− 4(1− x)]
2
dx



=
7
12 −
1
2a+ a
2
25
(2.10)
whereas the profit for any firm in the alternative, all-paired pattern writes:
Π(4) [paired] =
1
25



R 1/2
0 [a+ x+ 2(1/2− x)− 4x]
2
dx+R 1
1/2 [a+ 1− x+ 2(x− 1/2)− 4(1− x)]
2
dx


 =
7
12 −
1
2a+ a
2
25
(2.11)
Post-merger equilibrium
For the post-merger spatial pattern, involving one two-store merged entity and two
single-store outsiders, no such qualitative analysis is available. To compute the post-
merger equilibrium locations, denote again by d and 1−d the locations of the two aﬃliates,
where d ∈ (0, 1/2), and by z and y those of the two outsiders. The profits to be maximized
in locations write as follows:
Π
(3)
merged =
1
16



R 1/2
0 [a+ |y − x|+ |z − x|− 3 |d− x|]2 dx
+
R 1
1/2 [a+ |y − x|+ |z − x|− 3 |1− d− x|]2 dx


 (2.12)
Π(3) [z] =
1
16



R 1/2
0 [a+ |y − x|+ |d− x|− 3 |z − x|]2 dx
+
R 1
1/2 [a+ |y − x|+ |1− d− x|− 3 |z − x|]2 dx


 (2.13)
Π(3) [y] =
1
16



R 1/2
0 [a+ |z − x|+ |d− x|− 3 |y − x|]2 dx
+
R 1
1/2 [a+ |z − x|+ |1− d− x|− 3 |y − x|]2 dx


 (2.14)
where Π(3)merged denotes the profit of the merged firm in triopoly.
The candidates to optimal locations are obtained by solving the simultaneous system
formed by the FOCs in d, z and y respectively on the above profits. Checking for the second
order conditions gives us the equilibrium locations. In terms of explicit computations,
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twelve cases need to be discussed, depending on the relative positions of the two single-
store competitors w.r.t. the two aﬃliates. Appendix A presents all the technical details,
but we list next the twelve cases as well as the corresponding conditions defining them
and the ultimate outcome of the maximization problem for each case respectively:
case 1 0 6 z 6 y 6 d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ 1 no solution
case 2 0 ≤ z ≤ y ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 6 y + 1/2 6 1 no solution
case 3 0 ≤ d 6 z 6 y 6 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1 no solution
case 4 0 ≤ z ≤ y ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1 no solution
case 5 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ y ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1 no rational solution
case 6 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ y ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1 z = 0, y = 1/2, d = 1/4
case 7 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ y ≤ 1 z = 1/4, y = 3/4, d = 1/4
case 8 0 ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ d ≤ z ≤ 1/2 ≤ y ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1 z = 1/4, y = 3/4, d = 1/4
case 9 0 ≤ z ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y ≤ 1 z = 1/4, y = 3/4, d = 1/4
case 10 0 ≤ z ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y ≤ 1− d ≤ 1 z = 0, y = 1/2, d = 1/4
case 11 0 ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ y ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1 no rational solution
case 12 0 ≤ z ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ y ≤ 1 no solution
The bottom line is that both the two aﬃliates and the two outsiders locate diametri-
cally. Basically, either the two aﬃliates locate at 1/4 and 3/4 and the two outsiders locate
either at 0 and 1/2 respectively, or the latter share each the location of an aﬃliate, namely
1/4 and 3/4. Therefore the post-merger equilibria look as follows:
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Figure 2.4: Location equilibria after merger to triopoly
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Profitability analysis
Once the post-merger spatial patterns have been pinned down, the profitability analysis
is actually straightforward, because the two post-merger equilibria are thoroughly equiv-
alent in terms of profits.
When the outsiders and the aﬃliates locate equidistantly (cases 6 and 10 above), the
profit of the merged entity writes:
Π
(3)
merged =
1
16



R 1/4
0 [a+ x+ (1/2− x)− 3(1/4− x)]
2
dx+R 1/2
1/4
[a+ x+ (1/2− x)− 3(x− 1/4)]2 dx+R 3/4
1/2 [a+ (1− x) + (x− 1/2)− 3(3/4− x)]
2
dx+R 1
3/4 [a+ (1− x) + (x− 1/2)− 3(x− 3/4)]
2
dx



=
1
4a+ a
2 + 116
16
(2.15)
whereas is the outsiders share the diametrical locations of the aﬃliates (cases 7,8 and 9),
the profit of the merged entity writes:
Π
(3)
merged =
1
16



R 1/4
0 [a+ (1/4− x) + (1/4 + x)− 3(1/4− x)]
2
dx+R 1/2
1/4 [a+ (x− 1/4) + (3/4− x)− 3(x− 1/4)]
2
dx+R 3/4
1/2
[a+ (x− 1/4) + (3/4− x)− 3(3/4− x)]2 dx+R 1
3/4 [a+ (1− x+ 1/4) + (x− 3/4)− 3(x− 3/4)]
2
dx



=
1
4a+ a
2 + 116
16
(2.16)
Given the thorough profit equivalence of the location equilibria both before and after the
merger to triopoly, the profit comparison necessary for the profitability assessment is quite
simple:
Π
(3)
merged −
P
Πbefore =
1
4
a+a2+ 1
16
16 − 2
³ 7
12
−1
2
a+a2
25
´
= 891600a−
7
400a
2 − 82119 200 < 0, ∀a ≥ 2
where the latter condition ensures that all firms supply positive quantities throughout
the set of local markets.
The conclusion is unambiguous: the merger to triopoly is not profitable. Note that
this time there is no captive demand available at all, since in both post-merger equilibrium
patterns, each aﬃliate faces an outsider on each side. Basically, despite relocation, the
merged entity cannot isolate itself from outsiders’ competition. As a consequence, the
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spatial eﬃciency gains obtained through relocation cannot be put to profitable use due to
the lack of captive demand to supply at lower cost.
Another way to justify the lack of profitability for mergers to triopoly is to notice that
the post-merger equidistant spatial pattern perfectly replicates the equidistant pre-merger
spatial equilibrium, provided that diametrically opposite outlets merge. In other words,
and given the proven profit equivalence between the spatial patterns, the merger to triopoly
does not actually trigger relocation for the merged entity. But, without eﬀective relocation,
mere output reallocation cannot ensure merger profitability (Norman and Pepall (1998,
2000)), therefore the merger to triopoly cannot be profitable, q.e.d.
2.3 Conclusion
We show here by two examples that on the circular market, horizontal Cournot mergers
with endogenous location become unprofitable much earlier than on the segment. On the
circle, a merger to triopoly is not profitable, whereas on the segment the profitability result
was valid up to initially eight firms. This suggests that the circular market is much more
subject to the merger paradox than the segment, and that for more than four firms in
the market mergers are not profitable. This conjecture still wants formal proof for the
time being, but the technical complexity of the general case is by now acknowledged to be
prohibitive. Nevertheless, we venture to remark that since horizontal merger profitability
generally increases with market concentration, it is highly unlikely that mergers turn out
to be profitable for more than four firms on the market.
In terms of economic insights that this chapter proposes, we basically stress the intu-
ition that the incentives to merge are higher when there is some form of market asymmetry
that firms may benefit from, which consistent with a corollary of Deneckere and David-
son (1985), according to which in markets with symmetric intensity of competition the
incentives to profitably merge are considerably lower.
Second of all, this paper contributes to the question of location choices of multi-store
firms. On the linear market, location equilibria for multi-store firms have already been
completely worked out - Pal and Sarkar (2002) exhaustively analyze competition between
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multi-store firms on the segment and prove that the complex problem of determining
equilibrium store locations can be approximated by a lot simpler one. Note that this is
also entirely possible thanks to the existence of endpoints. On the circle, where all locations
are a priori homogeneous, Chamorro-Rivas (2000) chooses a certain perfectly symmetric
framework, i.e. a two-plant duopoly, to obtain the ’equidistance result’. However, more
results are necessary on spatial competition between multi-store firms, since on the circle,
this analysis is yet incomplete. So far, completely asymmetric firms in their number of
aﬃliates (more than one) have not been considered. We contribute by working out two
particular cases, the location equilibria between a two-plant firm and one or two single-
plant competitors23. The ’equidistance result’ can be obtained only in the latter case,
and multiple equilibria24 obtain in both cases. We argue that the number of plants of the
merged firm, as well as the number of single-store competitors are important parameters,
in presence of the circularity assumption. From a more general viewpoint, this suggest
that despite the multi-plant assumption, multiplicity still characterizes location equilibria
on the circular market, as compared to the linear one.
23To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to date dealing with an asymmetric number of stores across
firms.
24Given the multiple equilibria we obtain for both pre- and post-merger situations, both in the duopoly
and triopoly cases, it has been suggested that such (re)location costs might be useful to select a unique
spatial pattern. But on the one hand, checking the property of multiple equilibria of the circular city in
the case of multi-plant competition is a secondary purpose of this chapter. On the other hand, equilibrium
selection would not apply for the merger to triopoly case, because even without such (re)location costs,
it is shown to be unprofitable, regardless of the precise spatial pattern obtaining. Finally, a discussion of
the assumptions allowing to select a unique spatial equilibrium would be needed, because the multiplicity
problem is basically due to both the location homogeneity on the circular market, but as well to the
transport cost linearity. Convex or concave transport costs w.r.t. distance would most likely prevent
multiple spatial equilibria. Matsumura et al. (2005) examine the impact of transport cost non-linearity,
and find that only the quidistant pattern (for single-plant competition on the circle) is robust to it.
Chapter 3
Merger, spin-oﬀ and divestiture:
Profitability insights from a
spatial model
"First they buy, and then they sell... many companies now resemble equity
firms in their strategies...buying and selling enterprises are the whole point,
not selling products or services".
(Oligopoly Watch, November 13, 2005)
This chapter is based on Cosnita (2006) "Merger, spin-oﬀ and divestiture: insights
from a spatial model." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 9 p. 1-9
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3.1 Introduction
A most puzzling and debated issue concerns the performance of mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&As). If the theory warns that the merger may lower profits (see Chapter 2),
a substantial bulk of empirical studies (either "event studies"1 or belonging to the "em-
pirical IO literature"2) agree in their turn that the emerging picture is pessimistic for
merger profitability. For instance, Gügler et al. (2003) use a large panel data set in order
to analyze the eﬀects of mergers internationally and over time. By comparing merging
firms’ profits and sales before and after the merge, they find that many mergers decrease
profits and eﬃciency, (although there do exist mergers that increase profits), and these
results are similar across diﬀerent countries and sectors, as well as between domestic and
cross-border mergers. Earlier "outcome studies", which investigate the firms’ economic
performance and balance sheets before and after the acquisition, equally found that far
from creating value, M&As are often unprofitable for participants, a "disappointing mar-
riage" to put it short (see Meeks (1977)). Even summarizing about 80 empirical studies,
the same disappointing aftertaste is obtained by Tichy (2001).
It is diﬃcult to skim through all this evidence without concluding that many firms
are too optimistic about mergers, and/or that hubris is a major cause of mergers. In-
deed, the academic interest for merger performance advanced explanations which rely on
the assumption that shareholders lack the instruments to discipline their managers, who
overestimate their abilities (Roll (1986)), or that the managers pursue other motives than
value maximization, such as the size of their organization (Shleifer and Vishny (1988)).
Such hubris or empire-building explanations suggest the failure of the disciplining power
of the capital market on the internal eﬃciency of firms, since the latter can acquire assets
which they do not run eﬃciently.
An alternative3 (less troublesome?) explanation depicts profit flows reductions as a
1They investigate how the stock market values the merger when the latter is publicly announced, by
comparing share prices a few weeks before and after the announcement/event - see Banerjee and Eckard
(1998) for instance.
2The M&A performance is tested by comparing profit flows a few years before and after the transaction
- see Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) for instance.
3By no means unique - Banal-Estanol and Seldeslachts (2006) propose an explanation as to why some
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consequence of competitive forces at on the product market - Fridolfsson and Stennek
(2005,b) point out a defensive motivation for mergers. In their pre-emptive merger mech-
anism, an unprofitable merger may occur if mergers generate strong negative externalities
on external firms, so that being an outsider is even more unprofitable than taking part in a
merger. As a result, firms may merge even if this lowers their profit, in order to pre-empt
their partner from merging with someone else, which would confine them to the least-
profitable outsider position. In contrast to the exogenous merger literature, which implies
that per se profitability is the relevant criterion for the study of mergers, the mechanism
of Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005,b) relies on the fact that the relevant alternative for the
merger assessment is not the status-quo, but another merger.
The spatial setting provides further insight (and supplementary robustness) for such
a pre-emptive mechanism. Space diﬀerentiates outsiders inasmuch as they suﬀer more or
less from a given merger, depending on their distance w.r.t. the merger partners. The
model devised by Brito (2003) exploits this outsider heterogeneity in terms of incentives to
pre-empt the merger. By endogenizing the decision to merge in Levy and Reitzes’s (1992)
price competition circular model, he obtains that the incentive to merge is highest for the
most distant outsider (the one who benefit the least from a merger between neighbouring
firms, due to the asymmetric product diﬀerentiation). As a result, firms prefer to merge
rather than free-ride on others’ mergers. Brito (2003) reminds that such a behaviour
appears consistent with the occasional real-life attitude of outsider firms facing a merger
announcement, namely to try and prevent it by proposing to acquire one of the insiders4.
Note however that due to the localized competition in Brito’s (2003) model (as in Levy
and Reitzes (1992)), the closest outsiders gain more than the insiders from the merger.
mergers fail based on the interaction between the pre-merger gathering of information and the post-merger
integration processes. They show that a firm may optimally agree to merge and abstain from exerting any
integration eﬀort, relying on the partner to the necessary eﬀorts. If both partners do this, the merger goes
ahead but fails.
4The article quotes the case of the planned friendly merger between Paribas and Societe Generale.
Following the public annoucement in February 1999, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), France’s largest
bank, decided to try and acquire both banks. Since cost synergies were not presented as the main driver
of the merger, market power and market interaction must have been at the origin of this reaction, which
was moreover interpreted as due to the fear of being left outside the merger.
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Therefore, even if a pre-emptive merger ensures a higher profit w.r.t. the situation of a
most distant outsider, and moreover, despite merger internal profitability, to merge is not
the most profitable strategy - being (spatially) next to the merged firms is.
3.1.1 Purpose and relevance
Sticking with the spatial framework, this chapter deals with acquisition and de-acquisition
and builds on the two ideas mentioned so far. By means of a simple model, we show that
post-merger de-acquisition (in the sense of divisionalization) can improve pre-merger prof-
its more than the merger alone can. On the one hand, this holds when the merger itself
is not profitable, which suggests a motivation for apparently unprofitable mergers (just a
step in a complex corporate move to raise profitability). On the other hand, this holds
also when the merger is profitable in the first place, so in a way we discuss the ’optimality’
of merger (in the sense of best alternative) in relation with its internal (un)profitability5.
With this respect, we show that the merger can be ’optimal’, whatever its profitability,
provided it is part of a global corporate strategy including subsequent divisionalization.
If anything, this chapter argues that the analysis of merger performance in isolation may
be incomplete, since firms engage in complex growth strategies involving a wider range of
restructuring, beyond mergers.
The contribution of this chapter is to examine in a spatial setting the relationship
between merger (in the sense of consolidation, joint operation) and de-acquisition (in the
sense of divisionalization, spin-oﬀ). They are, by definition, opposite business strategies,
but firms use them both to enhance value.
Weston (2001) recalls that in response to economic, political, and technological de-
velopments, firms resort to many adjustment processes, and it is myopic to view mergers
and takeovers as the only, or main, adjustment process6. For business strategists it is
particularly relevant to identify the potential for adding value through acquisitions and
5 In the Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005,b) model, the merger is optimal although not internally profitable,
because it is even less profitable to become an outsider. In the Brito (2003) model, the merger is not optimal
although internally profitable.
6Restructuring and reorganization strategies include divestitures, equity carve-outs, spin-oﬀs, split-ups,
which are all value based management processes, meant to lower costs and improve revenue growth.
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de-acquisitions, especially considering the evidence that complex and acquisition-intensive
firms often fail to add value, and are even reckoned to be more ’valuable’ if broken-up
into their constituent parts7. In view of this, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) not surpris-
ingly found, based on a sample of plant-level data from 1974 to 1992, that the market
for individual plants and divisions is extensive, with an annual average rate of realloca-
tion of 3.89%. Moreover, the combined eﬀects of acquisitions and divestitures comfort
the wealth-creation hypothesis, as illustrates the empirical study by Mulherin and Boone
(2000) of a sample of 1305 firms from 59 industries, spanning over the 1990-1999 period.
Their data equally show significant time clustering in both acquisitions and divestitures,
which is consistent with the observation that mergers come in waves, followed by intensive
industry restructuring by means of voluntary asset sales and spin-oﬀs.
The point we wish to make in this chapter is precisely that the sequence of merger
and divisionalization is a profit-enhancing strategy for firms. From the theoretical point
of view, they are not only opposite strategies, but also mutually exclusive for Cournot
competitors from the profitability viewpoint, at least as long as the linearity assumptions
on demand and cost functions are maintained. With constant identical marginal costs and
product homogeneity, Cournot merging partners acting jointly necessarily contract output
and thus provide a double positive externality for outsiders, which benefit from both the
price and their output raise. The insiders’ output contraction and the ultimately lower
than planned price increase may well lower the profit of the merged firms below what
they earned pre-merger. Salant et al. (1983) show that with linear demand and identical
constant costs, the merger is internally unprofitable, unless at least 80% of the industry
firms take part in it. This result basically mirrors the bargaining paradox revealed by
Harsany (1977): among n players bargaining over the division of a pie, if two players form
a coalition and act as one, they only get 1
n−1 , whereas acting independently each would
7For instance, Stadler, Campbell and Koch (1997) calculate that there was (at the time) one trillion
dollars worth of shareholder value locked up waiting to be released by the breakup of multi-business
corporations in the United States and the UK. They quoted prominent giants, keen on serial acquisitions,
as General Motors or Ford, as being in need of breaking up. They claimed that breaking up these firms
into far more focused businesses will create enormous improvements in company performance and, along
with it, vastly increased shareholder wealth.
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obtain 1
n
. This suggests that on the contrary, firms have opposite incentives to split up
into independent units and thus capture more of the pie.
3.1.2 Related literature
This intuition is exploited by the literature on divisionalization in a Cournot industry,
which established that firms have unilateral incentives to form independent competing
units under certain conditions. Basically, by creating a new division the overall industry
profit diminishes due to increased competition, but the market share of the firm is higher,
as well as its share in the total profit. Polasky (1992) shows, under the same linearity
assumptions as Salant et al. (1983), the profitability of divisionalization for a set of firms
that would find merger unprofitable. This is so because dividing into multiple independent
firms allows to not coordinate the output decisions within the entire group in the subse-
quent quantity stage. In other words, and contrary to the case of merger, divisionalization
represents a credible commitment to increase total output. From this viewpoint, spin-oﬀ
and adopting the Stackelberg behaviour are equivalent8. Polasky (1992) notes however
that it may prove more costly to operate as independent divisions rather than a single uni-
fied firm because of economies of scale, or the diﬃculty of splitting assets. The subsequent
contributions on the topic allowed rival firms to resort to divisionalization. With linear de-
mand, constant returns to scale and homogenous commodity, Corchon (1991)9 and Baye
et al. (1996) both agree that Cournot divisionalization tends to increase social welfare
and reduce firm profits, basically converging to perfect competition10. Gonzalez-Maestre
(2001) extends this result to the case of heterogenous goods and price competition, in a
spatial diﬀerentiation model à la Salop (1979). This incidentally highlights the robustness
of the incentive to divisionalize as a "top dog" strategy (i.e. commitment to an aggressive
8More precisely, Polsaky (1992) shows that the two-stage divisionalization-quantity game and the Stack-
elberg game with one leader and n followers yield the same equilibrium outcome under the linear demand
and constant identical cost assumptions.
9Later generalized by Corchon and Gonzalez-Maestre (2000) to other forms of demand functions.
10This is obtained by the former by assuming costless divisionalization but an upper limit on the per-
missible number of divisions per firms, and by the latter by assuming a fixed cost per division.
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behaviour)11.
In this chapter, we also make use of the spatial setting, but to address the opposition
between merger and divisionalization. By means of a very simple spatial Cournot model,
we question the optimality of complete integration of aﬃliates through merger, despite
the profitability of this strategy12. We find that the highest post-merger profit is actually
obtained by only partially integrating aﬃliates. This partial divisionalization behaviour
is consistent with general business practices in franchising, with franchisees usually not
being allowed to sell franchises themselves. Our framework basically corresponds to the
organizational setup where the parent firm functions as a holding company, allowing its
subsidiaries to manage independently, but retaining the authority to establish subdivisions.
In a non-spatial model with heterogenous constant marginal costs, Tombak (2002)
discusses the decision to consolidate or not following a take-over. Merger profitability is
restored if aﬃliates are run separately as independent divisions. This is made possible in
his framework by cost diﬀerentials, which ultimately enable profitable technology transfers
between aﬃliates. The paper also studies the link between integration and opportunity to
monopolize a market13, and concludes that consolidation of aﬃliates is optimal only for a
merger to monopoly, or, in the limit case, for a firm prevented from further acquisitions
by the anti-trust agency.
Our very simple framework conforms with this conclusion, in as much as the merged
entity fares better by running independent divisions. However, we contradict the optimal-
ity of total divisionalization (i.e. single-store divisions), because by running independent
11However, it may equally correspond to a "fat cat" attitude, as shown by Tan and Yuan (2003). This
paper models price-competing conglomerates with complementary product lines and products across the
groups being imperfect substitutes. Such rivals have incentives to spin-oﬀ their complementary product
lines, because by doing so a firm commits to not coordinate the pricing of its divisions, which will soften
the second-stage price competition. The symmetrical incentives to divest eventually increase all product
prices, as well as parent firms’ profits, but also lower total welfare.
12We remind that by creating delivery cost diﬀerentials, the spatial framework allows merging firms
to profitably coordinate output decisions, provided though they relocate (see McAﬀe et al. (1992) and
Norman and Pepall (1998, 2000)). Chapter 2 details the resolution of merger profitability paradox in the
spatial setting.
13See also Kamien and Zang (1990,1993)
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multi-store divisions, the merged firms makes the most of the respective advantages of
both merger and divisionalization. In a spatial Cournot setting, the ownership of several
plants by the merged entity prompts relocation, and thereby locational eﬃciency gains.
These ensure merger profitability, because the merged entity serves distant demand at a
strictly lower delivery cost than its rival. Nevertheless, the benefit extracted from the
optimal relocation of its several plants is actually enhanced if the group spins oﬀ instead
into multi-plant divisions. This preserves its net cost advantage over the distant demand,
but equally allows it to credibly maintain a high output at every local market. To sum
up, our model illustrates the possible complementarity in a spatial setting between merger
and subsequent divisionalization within a two-step profit-enhancing business strategy14.
On the other hand, given that divisionalization or spin-oﬀ basically comes down to an
asset transfer between firms, our framework lends itself to an interesting and alternative
interpretation in terms of mandatory divestitures required by a competition authority.
The outcome of the example we device in this chapter is identical to that following the
divestiture of a multi-plant division to a new entrant. Therefore our profitability analysis
of the merger-divisionalization strategy allows us to discuss the impact of divestitures for
merger profitability. And since the spin-oﬀ we consider is profitable even when the initial
merger is not, the same holds for the equivalent mandatory divestiture. This may be
interpreted as a rationale for unprofitable mergers, which may be submitted so as to entail
profitable divestitures afterwards. We equally provide the price comparison justifying the
application of such a structural remedy to the merged firms, as well as the ultimate market
price outcome of the divestiture. We find that although it improves merger performance,
the divestiture is nevertheless eﬀective, to the extent that it fulfills its corrective role to
lower the post-merger price.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the
model. Then the post-merger market equilibrium is established, and the profitability of
14As compared with Tombak (2002), where the incentive to hold separate after merger was motivated
in the cost asymmetry and subsequent cost-minimizing technological transfer between aﬃliates, here we
suggest that decentralization is opportune at the division level, provided that relocation decisions are
optimally taken within divisions, so as to obtain locational eﬃciency gains.
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merger (in the sense of consolidation) is discussed. Partial divisionalization (in the sense
of multi-plant spin-oﬀ) is considered next, and again we establish first the corresponding
market equilibrium so as to discuss its profitability consequences. We interpret the out-
come in terms of impact of mandatory divestiture on merger profitability, and conclude
by examining the price consequences of the divestiture.
3.2 Model
The framework we consider is the simplest possible, given our objective to account
for both merger and multi-plant divisionalization in a consistent manner. So as to avoid
merger to monopoly, we consider a triopoly market. And since we intend to discuss partial,
i.e. multi-plant divisionalization for the resulting merged group, the lowest number of
divisions allowing to do so is two, and the minimum number of plants/stores per division
is also two. As a result, the post-merger situation will consist of one outsider and four
insider plants. At the same time, to perform a consistent comparison between the pre-
and post-merger patterns, the former should not exhibit two two-store symmetric merging
firms, and the only other ownership distribution between the future four aﬃliate plants is
to have a three-plant insider on the one hand, and one single-plant insider on the other.
To sum up, the framework we retain is the simplest possible that can consistently capture
the various situations we wish to study, and consists of a bilateral merger between the
three-store firms and one of its single-store rivals15.
With respect to the spatial setting, we build our merger analysis on the linear shipping
model of Norman and Pepall (2000) and Pal and Sarkar (2002) - the only change concern
basically the particular number of firms and plants we retain. Using the same notations
introduced in the second chapter, let the spatial triopoly above-mentioned Cournot tri-
opoly serve a linear market of unit length. Without loss of generality, the interval [0, 1]
represents the linear market. An infinite number of consumers are distributed uniformly
over this unit segment. At any consumer location x on the segment, x ∈ [0; 1], demand
15This particular bilateral merger also lends itself well to our final divestiture interpretation, simply
because discussing divestitures cannot possibly be relevant when two single-store firms merge (divesting
one of the two plants implies that the merger should not have occured in the first place).
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is given by p(x) = a − Q(x), a > 0, where p(x) is the product price at that location
and Q(x) is the total output supplied at x. Here x is the distance measured from the
left endpoint of the market. The three Cournot firms equally locate their stores in [0, 1].
They produce a homogeneous good with the same technology exhibiting constant mar-
ginal costs, normalized to zero. The firms also have identical transport technologies, and
pay a transport cost (t |x− xi|), linear in distance and quantity, in order to ship output
to consumers located at x from a plant located at xi, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. For ease of
exposition, let stores 1, 2 and 3 be jointly owned, whereas plants 4 and 5 be individually
run. t is a positive constant, but since the transport cost parameter enters as a multiple
in the profits expression, for our profitability analysis let t = 1 without loss of generality,
or, equivalently, let a be the transport-cost adjusted reservation price. Arbitrage among
the consumers is assumed to be infeasible due to high transaction costs (equivalently, con-
sumers are assumed to have a prohibitive costly transport cost, preventing arbitrage), so
by delivering the product firms can and will price discriminate among consumers across
the set of spatially diﬀerentiated markets. There are no set-up or (re)location costs, nor
merging or spinning-oﬀ costs. Let a > 1.5, so that each firm supplies a positive quantity at
every local market16. We consider a simple two-period post-merger game: firms relocate
simultaneously and then simultaneously play Cournot. The equilibrium concept is the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The discussion is organized as follows: based on the post-merger equilibrium with
centralized decision-making, we check corresponding merger profitability17. Then we show
that partial spin-oﬀ (involving equilibrium relocation) increases the merged entity’s profit,
and interpret this in terms of a divestiture-based outcome.
16The general condition ensuring on the segment that all firms cover in equilibrium the whole market
is a > n·t
2
(see Norman and Pepall (2000) - basically, this is the requirement for an interior Cournot
equilibrium, i.e. a suﬃcient high reservation price w.r.t. costs). With n = 3 and t = 1, we obtain the
condition in the text.
17Norman and Pepall (2000) made clear that Cournot spatial mergers involving centralized decisions can
only be profitable if stores relocate.
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3.2.1 Merger: profitability of consolidation
To discuss merger profitability, we identify first the location equilibria before and after
merger. To do so, each time the location-Cournot game needs to be solved. This is done by
backward induction, and the local Cournot competition is examined first. Since marginal
production cost is constant and arbitrage among the consumers is not feasible, quantities
set at diﬀerent points by the same firm are strategically independent. Therefore, the second
stage Cournot equilibrium is characterized by a set of independent Cournot equilibria, one
for each market point x. Generally denoting by xj a firm’s location, xj ∈ [0, 1], and by
qj(x) its output at a given location x, we remind that under the above assumptions, at
each point x ∈ [0, 1] firm j makes profit given by
πj(qj(x), q−j(x);x) =

a− t |xj − x|− qj(x)−
2X
k 6=j
qk(x)

 qj(x) (3.1)
Taking first order conditions to solve for the unique Cournot equilibrium yields
q∗j (x) =
1
4

a+
2X
k 6=j
t |xk − x|− 3t |xj − x|

 (3.2)
Taking into account that aggregate supply at x writes Q∗(x) = 14
h
3a−
P3
1 t |xk − x|
i
, the
individual profit function at x can be rewritten as
π∗j (x) =
£
q∗j (x)
¤2 (3.3)
which is standard Cournot outcome given the assumptions made. Finally, firm’s j total
(i.e. over the whole set of spatial markets) profit function is
Πj(xj , x6=j) =
Z 1
0
π∗j (xj , x6=j ;x)dx (3.4)
At the first stage, each firm maximizes its own total profit function in own location.
The outcome of this simultaneous subgame in locations represents the pre-merger spatial
equilibrium.
Pre-merger market equilibrium
In order to determine it, we rely heavily on the general location results for multi-plant
Cournot competition on the linear market obtained by Pal and Sarkar (2002), instead of
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laboriously solving out for the simultaneous location equilibrium involving three firms and
five outlets. Directly applying the analysis of Pal and Sarkar (2002) to our case, meaning
triopoly with two single-store firms and one three-store firm, yields that both single-
store firms locate at the market center, together with one of the 3-store firm’s outlets,
whereas its remaining two stores are symmetrically located around the segment midpoint,
on account of both the symmetry w.r.t. the latter and the quantity-median property. To
complete the identification of the pre-merger spatial equilibrium, we need only determine
the equilibrium locations of the two stores that the three-outlet firms locates each within
a distinct half-market.
Denote 1 and 2 these two outlets, whose locations are denoted x1 and x2 respectively.
Basically, the pre-merger spatial pattern looks as follows:
1 
1/2 
3,4,5
0 1 
1/4 3/4 
2
1+2+3 
4 
5 
Figure 3.1: Pre-merger spatial equilibrium
The locations of the two ’exterior’ stores satisfy x2 = 1−x1 due to the spatial symmetry,
and will be determined as the solutions of the location-maximization problem on the 3-
store firm’s profit18, which is by the same token defined symmetrically w.r.t. the segment
middle. Therefore it writes
Π1,2,3 = 2


R x1
0
³
a−3(x1−x)+2(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx+
R x1+1/2
2
x1
³
a−3(x−x1)+2(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx
+
R 1/2
x1+1/2
2
³
a−3(1/2−x)+2(1/2−x)
4
´2

(3.5)
=
1
64
a+
9
128
x1 +
3
16
ax1 +
1
16
a2 − 33
64
x21 +
23
32
x31 −
9
16
ax21 +
7
768
Due to symmetry, only one First Order Condition (FOC) is needed:
∂
∂x1
Π1,2,3 = 0⇔
3
16
a− 33
32
x1 −
9
8
ax1 +
69
32
x21 +
9
128
= 0
18Remember that each firm serves a market point by incurring the lowest possible transport cost, hence
from the store which is nearest to the market point. Consequently, two stores of the same firm never
coincide, and each store serves a contiguous market around itself. Also, on each side, a store’s market
extends up to the midpoint between itself and the next store owned by the same firm.
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Checking against the Second Order Condition (SOC) on the above profit expression:
∂2
∂x21
Π1,2,3 ≤ 0⇔
3
32
(46d− 12a− 11) ≤ 0
the optimal location x∗1 is
x∗1 =
6
23
a− 1
23
p
20a+ 36a2 + 13 +
11
46
(3.6)
In order to be able to compute the initial global profit of the future merger partners,
we need first the expression of the single-store firm participating to the merger. Index by
4 this firm, whose profit writes (due to symmetry)
Π4 = 2


R x1
0
³
a−3(1/2−x)+(x1−x)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx
+
R x1+1/2
2
x1
³
a−3(1/2−x)+(x1−x)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx
+
R 1/2
x1+1/2
2
³
a−3(1/2−x)+2(1/2−x)
4
´2


(3.7)
=
5
128
x1 −
3
64
a− 1
16
ax1 +
1
16
a2 − 13
64
x21 +
17
96
x31 +
3
16
ax21 +
11
768
To compute the pre-merger global profit of the merging partners it is enough to evaluate
[Π1,2,3 +Π4] in x∗1 =
6
23a −
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146 . See Appendix B for computation
details. Finally, the profit values that will be used for the profitability comparison are
obtained for diﬀerent levels of the demand parameter a, and are entered into Table 3.1
below:
Table 3.1: Pre-merger profits
a 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 6
x1 0.14628 0.15062 0.15345 0.15544 0.15691 0.15804 0.15894 0.15967 0.16078
1,2,3  4 0.27663 0.48481 0.75554 1.0888 1.4846 1.9429 2.4637 3.0470 4.4011
Post-merger market equilibrium
After merger, the remaining duopoly involves a single-store firm (whose outlet was
denoted 5) and a four-store merged entity. The spatial Cournot competition between
the two firms implies, as shown by Pal and Sarkar (2002), that the single-outlet outsider
does not relocate from the segment midpoint, whereas the merged entity locates two
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stores within each half-segment, symmetrically around the mid-point. The spatial pattern
basically looks now as follows:
1 
1/2 
50 1 
1/4 3/4 
42 3 1+2+3+4 
5 
Figure 3.2: Post-merger spatial equilibrium
To determine the post-merger spatial equilibrium, we need to identify the profit-
maximizing locations for the four outlets of the merged entity. To do so, as before, we
must first write the merged firm’s profit. Taking into account the symmetry w.r.t. the
segment middle point, only the notations xM1 and x
M
2 for the left-hand side locations are
necessary, and the profit expression consequently writes:
ΠM1,2,3,4 = 2


R xM1
0
³
a−2(xM1 −x)+(
1
2
−x)
3
´2
dx+
R xM1 +xM2
2
xM1
³
a−2(x−xM1 )+(
1
2
−x)
3
´2
dx
+
R xM2
xM1 +x2
2
³
a−2(xM2 −x)+(
1
2
−x)
3
´2
dx+
R 1/2
xM2
³
a−2(x−xM2 )+(
1
2
−x)
3
´2
dx


=
4
9
a
¡
xM2
¢
− 1
9
¡
xM2
¢
− 1
18
a+
2
9
¡
xM1
¢ ¡
xM2
¢
+
4
9
a
¡
xM1
¢ ¡
xM2
¢
+
1
9
a2− 1
3
¡
xM1
¢2
+
13
27
¡
xM1
¢3
+
1
9
¡
xM2
¢2
+
1
27
¡
xM2
¢3 − 2
3
a
¡
xM1
¢2 − 2
3
a
¡
xM2
¢2 − 1
3
¡
xM1
¢ ¡
xM2
¢2
+
1
9
¡
xM2
¢ ¡
xM1
¢2
+
1
36
To find the optimal locations
¡
xM1
¢∗
and
¡
xM2
¢∗
which maximize this profit, the si-
multaneous system of FOCs needs to be solved, then the candidates locations are checked
against the SOCs. The First Order Conditions’ system is the following:



∂
∂xM1
ΠM1,2,3,4 =
2
9x
M
2 − 23xM1 −
4
3ax
M
1 +
4
9ax
M
2 +
2
9x
M
1 x
M
2 +
13
9
¡
xM1
¢2 − 13 ¡xM2 ¢2 = 0 and
∂
∂xM2
ΠM1,2,3,4 =
4
9a+
2
9x
M
1 +
2
9x
M
2 +
4
9ax
M
1 − 43axM2 −
2
3x
M
1 x
M
2 +
1
9
¡
xM1
¢2
+ 19
¡
xM2
¢2 − 19 = 0
This system yields no explicit general solutions, but we computed solutions for par-
ticular values of the demand parameter. Appendix B presents the method employed and
the corresponding computations. Table 3.2 below presents these solutions, as well as the
corresponding values for the merged entity’s profit, obtained by plugging the solutions
obtained into the above profit expression.
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Table 3.2: Post-merger profit
a 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 6
x1M 0.11535 0.11764 0.11905 0.1200 0.12069 0.12121 0.12162 0.121951 0.122449
x2M 0.36354 0.36663 0.36840 0.36956 0.37036 0.37096 0.37143 0.371793 0.372339
1,2,3,4M 0.29644 0.50474 0.76861 1.088 1.463 1.8936 2.3797 2.9213 4.17113
Merger profitability
Table 3.3 below summarizes the profit comparison between the pre- and post-merger
situations, for the diﬀerent values retained for the demand parameter:
Table 3.3: Merger profitability
a 1,2,3  4 1,2,3,4M 1,2,3,4M  1,2,3  4
1.5 0.27663 0.29644 0
2 0.48481 0.50474 0
2.5 0.75554 0.76861 0
3 1.0888 1.088  0
3.5 1.4846 1.463 0
4 1.9429 1.8936 0
4.5 2.4637 2.3797 0
5 3.0470 2.9213 0
6 4.4011 4.17113 0
We find that the merger is profitable for low enough values of the reservation price:
1.5 < a ≤ 3. The explanation is provided by the merger location eﬀects: the merged
entity will supply each local market from the closest store only, so as to prevent market
area overlapping between stores. This output reallocation is enhanced by outlet relocation:
the four aﬃliates spread out towards the market borders so as to minimize total transport
costs. Consequently, the merger entity captures demand at the distant, extreme, consumer
locations, which it can serve with a lower marginal delivery cost than the outsider. For this
captive demand to be suﬃcient to guarantee merger profitability, the demand parameter
itself needs to be low enough, otherwise, the market shares gained on demand located at
the market borders do not compensate for the market shares lost throughout the segment
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through output contraction19.
To put it short, there is always an upper bound for Cournot spatial merger profitability
in terms of maximum reservation price. This is so because profits are always increasing in
the consumer willingness to pay a. However, a higher reservation price (larger demand)
makes distance less of an issue, and the locational advantage less important, therefore
a merger enabling such an advantage is less and less interesting (read: profitable) as a
increases20. As a result, we can safely state that our (un)profitability conclusions are
perfectly reliable, although we have restrained the comparison symmetrically around the
critical level of demand parameter.
3.2.2 Subsequent spin-oﬀ : profitability of multi-plant divisionalization
In a non-spatial context, Cournot firms have incentives to increase their profits by
means of spin-oﬀs, i.e. acting aggressively in a credible manner, by committing to produce
more (Polasky (1992), Baye et al. (1996)). On the other hand, as long as the market is not
monopolized, the merger profit is enhanced if the acquired stores are run independently,
provided their marginal costs diﬀer (Tombak (2002)). In a spatial context, when locations
are endogenously determined, consolidating or not production among aﬃliates is related to
the co-ordination of location decision between them. Therefore the decision to centralize
decision making, and to what extent, should take into account the potential endogenous
marginal cost diﬀerences available through equilibrium relocation. We argue here that the
spatial framework can also provides incentives to divisionalize, incentives related to the
merger’s location eﬀects.
On the linear market, centralized decision making within the merged entity implies,
from the spatial point of view, outlet relocation towards the market endpoints. Strategic
substitutability requires the four stores to take up distinct locations, so as to avoid market
area overlapping, so they basically spread up along the segment, two of them being each
19At each local market, there were three competitors pre-merger, whereas post-merger only two are left,
one of which is a merged entity’s plant.
20Furthermore, an important corollary of Pal and Sarkar (2002) indicates that when demand grows large,
firms’ (and plants’) equilibrium locations tend to their monopoly ones. Basically, with a suﬃciently large
demand parameter, every firm replicates its monopoly behaviour, so a merger cannot be profitable.
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close to an endpoints. This spatial pattern generates eﬃciency gains for the merged entity,
by reducing transport cost and by allowing it to capture distant demand. Consequently,
centralized decision making implies on the other hand not only the ’standard’ output
contraction at every local market x ∈ [0, 1], but also a locational disadvantage w.r.t. some
local markets, as compared with the remaining rival. Indeed, the merged entity does
capture the distant demand located close to the market borders, but at the same time its
optimal relocation pattern abandons the local markets around the segment middle point
to the outsider. The latter, optimally keeping its central location after merger, enjoys now
a net marginal delivery cost advantage w.r.t. the local markets around 1/2.
Keeping in mind our above remarks on the spatial incentives to divisionalize, we pro-
pose to look at the following scenario. Partial divisionalization, meaning spinning oﬀ into
two independent divisions, each owning two outlets, might mitigate the market share loss
at the mid-segment locations, while still allowing to capture demand at distant ones.
To check this conjecture, we examine next the profitability of multi-store division-
alization and compare with the merger/consolidation performance. We also compare it
with that of complete (single-store) divisionalization, so as to better seize the relative
consequences of the three possible corporate strategies following merger: consolidation,
complete divisionalization, partial divisionalization21.
21A most recent example (August 2006) of large-scale spin-oﬀ into multi-outlet divisions is provided by
the Cendant travel group. Founded in 1996, Cendant grew rapidly through scores of acquisitions, and now
splits up. Cendant goes from being a semi-conglomerate holding a number of travel and tourism related
brands to being four sharply focused companies. In short, it has spun oﬀ its real estate brands (Century
21, Coldwell Banker Era, and Sotheby’s International Realty) as a new firm called Realogy, it has spun
oﬀ its hotel/motel brands (Wyndham, Ramada, Howard Johnson, Travelodge, Days Inn and Super8) as a
new firm called the Wyndham Group, and it will sell oﬀ its Travelport travel booking unit to an aﬃliate of
equity firm Blackstone Group (brands include Orbitz, Galileo, CheapTickets, GTA). By the end of August
2006, the company will have become a new firm, named Avis Budget, after its two rent-a-car (multi-outlet)
franchises, which were the latest on the group’s list of acquisitions (Cendant bought Avis in 2001, and
Budget Rent-A-Car in 2002).
Source: Oligopoly Watch, August 7, 2006.
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Partial divisionalization equilibrium
Consider thus the merged entity spinning oﬀ into two independent two-store divisions
competing against the single-store outsider. More precisely, output and location decisions
are independent between divisions, but are centralized within them. Let the first division
comprise stores denoted 1 and 2, and similarly stores 3 and 4 belong to the second division.
Then Π1,2 and Π3,4 denote the divisions’ profits respectively.
As before, to examine the profitability of this strategy, the location equilibrium pattern
needs to be determined first. From the analysis of Pal and Sarkar (2002), applied to the
particular case of a triopoly with two two-store firms and one single-store firm, we know
that each division will locate both outlets symmetrically around 1/2, with rival stores
sharing symmetric locations, whereas the outsider will keep its central location. The
resulting spatial pattern looks as follows:
1 
1/2 
50 
1,3 
1/4 3/4 
(1+2) 
(3+4) 
5 
2,4
Figure 3.3: Partial (multi-store) divisionalization
To determine the equilibrium locations shared by stores 1 and 3, and 2 and 4, let rival
stores 1 and 3 locate at z ∈ (0, 1/2), whereas 2 and 4 at 1 − z, through symmetry. The
optimal location z∗ maximizes a division’s profit, which writes:
Π1,2 = 2


R z
0
³
a−2(z−x)+( 1
2
−x)
4
´2
dx
+
R 1
2
z
³
a−2(x−z)+( 1
2
−x)
4
´2
dx

 (3.8)
=
1
4
az − 1
16
z − 1
32
a+
1
16
a2 +
1
6
z3 − 1
2
az2 +
1
64
because at each local market there is a triopoly competition, between the single-store
outsider, an outlet of the 1, 2 division and an outlet of the 3, 4 division. The FOC on the
above expression requires
∂Π1,2
∂z
= 0⇔ 1
4
a− az + 1
2
z2 − 1
16
= 0
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and checking against the SOC leads to
z∗ = a− 1
4
p
16a2 − 8a+ 2 (3.9)
To conclude on the profitability of partial integration with respect to that of total
integration, we need to compute the diﬀerence between the profit of the group of two
independent 2-store divisions with that of the merged entity with centralized decision
making. Taking into account the expression of the optimal location z∗, the profit of the
group is
Π1,2 +Π3,4 = 2Π1,2 =
= 58a
2− 316a−
2
3a
3+ 148
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 112a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1+16a2
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1+
1
32 .
Since in the previous section we already computed the profit of the integrated 4-store
merged firm for diﬀerent values of the demand parameter, to compare merger and partial
divisionalization profitability we only need now to evaluate the 2-division group profit for
the same parameter values. The resulting profit levels are summarized in Table 3.4 below:
Table 3.4: Partial divisionalization profit
a 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 6
1,2  3,4 0.28718 0.50576 0.78689 1.1306 1.5368 2.0055 2.5367 3.1304 4.5054
Before commenting on the profitability of partial divisionalization, we consider next
the case of complete spin-oﬀ.
Complete divisionalization equilibrium
By complete divisionalization we mean the scenario where the merged entity runs
independently its four stores. From the production decision point of view, this means that
at each local market competition occurs between five firms. From the location decision
viewpoint, this requires to determine the equilibrium in locations between five single-outlet
firms. The resulting spatial pattern was computed by Anderson and Neven (1991) to be
central agglomeration by all firms on the segment, as in the following diagram:
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Figure 3.4: Complete (single-store) divisionalization
Let Πind be the profit of a single-store division. Given the above, the merged groups’
profit writes now
4Πind = 4
Ã
2 ·
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dx
!
=
1
9
a2 − 1
18
a+
1
108
(3.10)
This expression is evaluated for the same demand parameter values as before, and the
results are reported in Table 3.5 below:
Table 3.5: Complete divisionalization profit
a 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 6
4ind 0.17593 0.34259 0.56481 0.84259 1.1759 1.5648 2.0093 2.5093 3.6759
Optimality of partial divisionalization
At this point we compare the profitability of partial and complete divisionalization, as
well as that of consolidation (merger). Table 3.6 below presents this comparison for the
above-retained values of the demand parameter:
Table 3.6: Profitability comparison between:
consolidation, partial and total divisionalization
a 1,2  3,4 1,2,3,4M 4 ind
1.5 0.28718  0.29644  0.17593
2 0.50576  0.50474  0.34259
2.5 0.78689  0.76861  0.56481
3 1.1306  1.088  0.84259
3.5 1.5368  1.463  1.1759
4 2.0055  1.8936  1.5648
4.5 2.5367  2.3797  2.0093
5 3.1304  2.9213  2.5093
6 4.5054  4.17113  3.6759
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In other words, we find that (Π1,2 +Π3,4) > ΠM1,2,3,4 for any a > 1.5. The comparison
is unambiguous: for all but the lowest values of the demand parameter, partial integration
is more profitable than centralized decision-making. The partial divisionalization equally
turns out to be always more profitable than total divisionalization: (Π1,2 +Π3,4) > 4Πind.
Moreover, comparing the profit for the group from running independently the four aﬃli-
ates, 4Πind, with that following consolidation, ΠM1,2,3,4, we obtain that the complete spin-oﬀ
is actually not profitable here: ΠM1,2,3,4 > 4Πind always.
To sum up, partial integration is more profitable than both total integration and total
divisionalization. The intuition is based on the idea that the partial integration strikes a
balance between two opposing profit-oriented strategies for the merged firm.
From the production decision point of view, by running independent divisions, the
merged entity is able to reduce the business stealing eﬀect induced at every location x by
the strategic substitutability, because it credibly commits to not contracting its output.
But due to the spatial setting, total divisionalization cannot be optimal, since it would
waste any eﬃciency gains from relocation, given that each independent aﬃliate would
locate at the market center, just like the outsider. On the other hand, consolidation of
outlets was shown to be profitable, precisely because the locational advantage it provides
w.r.t. the distant demand located at the endpoints, and this despite the output contraction
it implies throughout the set of local markets. However, the resulting spatial pattern allows
the outsider to enjoy a net location advantage at the market center. To put it diﬀerently,
having too many consolidated outlets per half-segment can spoil the location advantage.
We find that having only one store on each side of the market center is better, to
the extent that this still ensures a lower marginal delivery cost at the market borders,
but the outlet location closer to the market center also reduces the outsider’s marginal
delivery cost advantage for middle locations. This positive relocation eﬀect enhances the
reduction of business stealing, and justifies the optimality of this partial spin-oﬀ, which
allows the merged entity to benefit from the advantages of both strategies. This is the
intuition behind the optimality of partial divisionalization22, i.e. running two independent
22 In a nonspatial model with diﬀerentiated products ans Cournot competition, Yuan (1999) finds that
parent firms have a unilateral incentive to restrict their divisions from further spin-oﬀs, because this would
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two-store divisions, in our spatial setting.
The only exception occurs for the lowest values of the demand parameter (a in the
neighbourhood of 1.5). For such a very low demand, the location advantage of having a
store very close to the market border is overwhelming, thus justifying the profitability of
the integration strategy. However, this is always the case with spatial Cournot mergers,
which become less and less profitable when the demand parameter increases23.
A closer look at the comparison between the total pre-merger profit of the merging part-
ners and the group’s profit with partial divisionalization reveals that the subsequent partial
spin-oﬀ is always profitable for the two initial merger participants, even when merger is
not, namely for the higher values of the demand parameter (a > 3) - see Table 3.7 below:
Table 3.7: Comparison between pre-merger and partial divisionalization profits
a 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 6
1,2,3  4 0.27663 0.48481 0.75554 1.0888 1.4846 1.9429 2.4637 3.0470 4.4011
1,2  3,4 0.28718 0.50576 0.78689 1.1306 1.5368 2.0055 2.5367 3.1304 4.5054
In other words, it can be profitable for firms to merge unprofitably but spin oﬀ after-
wards and thereby increase their profits. Given the profitability doubts raised by mergers,
this suggests that unprofitable mergers may occur because they provide firms with the
opportunity to (more) profitably spin oﬀ or divest afterwards.
Remark: The example constructed to argue this idea is not unique. Appendix B shows
that the same results obtain if we allow for the case where the remaining rival (the outsider)
operates two stores instead of a single one.
3.2.3 Divestiture
Spin-oﬀs are basically transfers of property rights on the firm’s assets, just like struc-
tural merger remedies. Our framework lends itself therefore to an interpretation in terms
of divestitures. Given the above results of the profitability comparison between merger
ultimately lead to total profit dissipation within the perfectly competitive equilibrium.
23When a increases, the gain of market shares at distant locations becomes relatively less important,
whereas the loss of market shares at the other locations weighs more and more. More generally, the
profitability of horizontal takeovers in a Cournot setting with cost asymmetries decreases with market size
- see Fauli-Oller (2000).
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and spin-oﬀ/divestiture, our framework illustrates a situation where mandatory asset sales
might actually improve merger profitability instead of reducing it, even when they fulfill
their corrective role.
Price analysis
To support this idea, we briefly discuss the price eﬀect of the merger. Rather extensive
computations are necessary, and are summarized in Appendix B, but the outline of the
comparison is the following.
Since independent Cournot equilibria obtain for each local market x ∈ [0, 1], basically
at each point on the segment an equilibrium price obtains, function of the aggregate
output delivered at that point. Because firms deliver individual output within their own
market area, intervals of local markets can be defined over which the same firms deliver
output. For a given set of firms supplying over a given interval on the segment, the price
expression is uniquely defined. Therefore, in order to assess the price changes, first we
need to identify these diﬀerent subsets of local markets (intervals within the segment)
to which the same price expression corresponds. For that, the market areas24 for all
stores need to be determined, for every spatial equilibrium considered (before merger,
after centralizing merger, and after partial divisionalization/divestiture). To obtain the
price change prompted by the switch from one spatial market equilibrium to another,
attention must be paid to the appropriate subset of local markets over which the price
(either before or after the change) is defined by the same expression25.
A first price comparison at every local market on the segment reveals that the merger
to duopoly is everywhere anticompetitive, i.e. it leads to a price increase throughout the
set of spatial markets. This motivates the use of asset sales as a merger remedy, because
in such cases, merger control authorities typically require an asset transfer to remedy the
competitive harm. Divestitures are meant to make the market structure more symmetric,
and thus enhance competitive pressure exerted on the merged entity, preventing therefore
24For a single-store firm, the market area covers the segment, and is centered around the midpoint. For
an outlet belonging to a multi-store firm, the market area spans on each side halfway to the next outlet
owned by the same firm.
25See Appendix B for the details on price computations.
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the price-raise eﬀect of the merger.
In our framework, the market entry through the take over of the two divested aﬃliates
yields the same market structure and spatial pattern as the partial spin-oﬀ. In other
words, the partial divisionalization and the take-over by a new entrant of two stores are
equivalent from the point of view of market outcome. Comparing the market price after
such a take-over with that following the merger, we obtain that the divestiture lowers the
price at every local market on the segment. It would therefore be declared successful by the
merger control authority26. Nevertheless, we have seen that at the same time it improves
merger profitability, through the revenue from the sale of the two aﬃliates27.
Interestingly enough, this comes down to illustrating a case for an eﬀective merger
remedy being designed and proposed by the merging firms28. More importantly though,
our theoretical example draws attention to the extent to which remedies may prove costly
(or rather not) to merging firms.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the issue of profitable spin-oﬀ following a horizontal merger in
a spatial Cournot framework. Merging and spin-oﬀ are opposite strategies for firms, and
under standard linearity hypotheses they are not simultaneously profitable. Here, merging
and completely integrating aﬃliates is indeed profitable, thanks to eﬃciency gains from
26Moreover, the price comparison between the market structure before merger and the one after divesti-
ture equally shows that the latter reduces the average price. To be precise, the only markets where price
goes up after divestiture are those in the close neighborhood of 1/2. Nevertheless, further computation
reveals that the total positive eﬀect on all other consumers exceeds the consumer loss for these central
markets, so the divestiture has a net positive overall eﬀect. Actually, this means that the divestiture is
’overfixing’, i.e. it goes beyond its corrective purpose, by raising consumer surplus as compared with the
pre-merger situation.
27Note however that the implicit assumption is that the merged entity cashes in the maximum willingness
to pay of the new entrant, but this is rather a standard assumption, which can be justified by the fact that
the divestiture represents an opportunity to enter the market for the external firm, therefore the bargaining
power lies with the incumbent.
28 In contrast, Cabral (2003) devised a spatial competition model à la Salop in which consumer welfare
is lower when asset sales, as chosen by the merging parties, take place.
CHAPTER 3 Merger, spin-oﬀ and divestiture in a spatial model 80
relocation. Nevertheless, the subsequent spin-oﬀ is even more profitable. However, that
does not mean operating completely independent outlets, but just partially divisionaliz-
ing into multi-store divisions. This still allows the group to benefit from the relocation
advantage, but also represents a commitment to increase output at every local market.
To a certain extent, the spatial framework allows here the identification of a possible
rationale for mergers (regardless of their internal profitability), namely the opportunity
to profitably divisionalize afterwards. Finally, since the market outcome is actually the
same as after a divestiture to a new entrant, our example illustrates a particular impact
of structural remedies on merger profitability. Divestitures, even when they do restore
competition, may actually increase merger profitability. The eﬀect is all the more out-
standing when the merger is not only anticompetitive (so the remedy is necessary), but
also unprofitable in the beginning.
Part II
DESIGNING MERGER
CONTROL
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This second part of the dissertation will concentrate on the strategic interaction be-
tween the merging partners and the competition authorities in light of their respective
individual incentives concerning the merger consequences and merger control outcome.
Chapter 4 will introduce the topic by reviewing the challenges facing both the practice
and the theory of merger control on account of this interaction. Chapters 5 and 6 provide
formal models of merger control in a context of asymmetric information with respect to
the merger’s competitive eﬀect. Chapter 5 examines in this framework the optimal merger
control given the application of merger remedies to regulate mergers and that of the ’ef-
ficiency defence’ to assess them. Chapter 6 studies the design of divestiture contracts in
this setting and proposes a revelation mechanism within merger control to eliminate the
asymmetric information problem.
Chapter 4
A Critical Appraisal of the Theory
and Practice of the Assessment of
Merger Eﬃciencies and of the
Application of Merger Remedies
The monopolist needed a sedative,
The trust-busters’ cries were repetitive:
’Your market share rose
When you bought all your foes;
In a word, you are anticompetitive!’
(Anticompetitive, by Tim Alborn)
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4.1 Introduction
"In giving an unconditional green light to Whirlpool’s takeover of Maytag, US antitrust
authorities have basically said that no deal, whatever the market share combined, will
henceforth be forced to make even minor concessions. The $1.7 billion deal between the
two appliances makers will create not only the biggest company in its segment worldwide,
it will also control around 70% of the US market for washer and dryers." (Oligopoly Watch,
March 30, 2006).
In discussing the decision, the Financial Times ("Whirlpool takeover of Maytag ap-
proved", March 30, 2006) quotes Thomas Barnett, the head of the antitrust division, who
did however say that "the deal would not ’substantially’ reduce competition, was ’not
likely’ to harm consumer welfare, and was ’not likely’ to give the merged entity market
power in the sale of any of its products."
This goes against the view according to which the current merger wave is expected
to raise important anti-competitive concerns, higher than the last one did. A last year
editorial in Business Week ("Here Comes the Year of the Deal", October 10, 2005) observed
that not only is there increased pricing power in fewer hands, but there is also a slowdown in
entrepreneurship, so there is no oﬀsetting movement from up-from-nowhere companies. As
the Business Week article puts it: "The downside of consolidation was less apparent during
the mergers and acquisitions boom of the 1990s, since acquisitions and consolidations were
balanced out by an equal amount of business formation. New companies such as Yahoo!
Inc. and eBay Inc. became formidable competitors to existing businesses. This time,
however, there’s no sign of a similar surge of startups leavening the economy."
In other words, without some countervailing force, horizontal concentration leads to
increased market power in fewer hands, which is what antitrust basically tries to avoid. It
has been long recognized that in an unregulated market, social and individual incentives
to merge can widely diﬀer. This is why certain mergers have to be first checked by
independent bodies, such as the Federal Trade Commission in the US, or the Commission
in the European Union. They are in charge of ’merger control’, which fundamentally
consists of answering two questions: does the merger pose a threat for competition? and
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if so, how can that threat be best eliminated?
The answer to the former is the merger assessment process, which requires to process all
available information for the purpose of establishing the competitive eﬀect of the merger.
To answer the latter question, competition agencies can resort either to downright prohi-
bitions (scarcely ever, though), or to merger remedies. The acknowledgment of a merger’s
potential eﬃciencies and the generalized use of remedies to control the final market out-
come have become central to this two-stage process, due to the more economics-inspired
turn gradually taken by most merger policies. This chapter will provide a critical analysis
of both the application and the theoretical underpinnings of these two practices. Constant
focus will be kept on information asymmetry and conflicting incentives as the main origins
of the problems raised in practice, as well as in theory, by the assessment and regulation
of mergers.
To do so, we discuss next the merger assessment process. First we present its unfolding
in practice, so as to pin down the problems aﬀecting the eﬃciencies’ treatment, and to
take stock of the practical manner of dealing with it. We examine then the theoretical jus-
tifications for the latter, and go on to look into the merger control enforcement. We review
the policy and practice of merger remedies as the main merger control instrument, and
check against the available evidence and the recommendations of the theoretical models
on the design and implementation of merger control.
4.2 Scope and unfolding of merger control
Merger control can be defined as the ability by the state to block or modify a merger
that is considered undesirable according to some (legal) criterion. More generally, it is part
of the competition policy, which in its turn represents a “set of policies and laws which
ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to reduce
economic welfare” (Motta (2004, p.30)). Actually, merger control represents a particular
antitrust area, inasmuch as it requires the assessment of future market structure and
behaviour, instead of sanctioning past conduct (see for instance Encaoua and Guesnerie
(2006, p. 93)) and as such, it is the competition policy branch closest to regulation.
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The US merger regulation preceded the other countries’. The Sherman Act of 1890 only
covered price fixing and market sharing agreements between independent firms as anti-
trust violations, so in 1914 the Clayton Act was passed to extend anti-trust legislation
to mergers likely to reduce competition. It was later several times amended, last by the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, which granted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
the Department of Justice (DoJ) the power to investigate mergers above a certain size
threshold. These two agencies share in the US the responsibility of anti-trust, and thereby
that of merger control enforcement (at the federal level). The merger control policy and
procedure are given in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (jointly issued April 2, 1992 and
revised April 8, 1997).
The European Community Merger Regulation (ECMR) was first adopted under the
form of the Council Regulation 4046/89 of December 1989, and came into force on Sep-
tember 21, 1990, providing within the European Community law a legal framework for
the systematic review of mergers and other forms of market concentrations. The ECMR
was amended in 1997 and thoroughly revised in 2004, and builds on four fundamental
principles: the exclusive competence of the Commission to review concentrations of Com-
munity dimension, the mandatory notification of such concentrations, the application of
market-oriented, competition-based criteria, and the provision of legal certainty through
rapid decision-making. Similarly, Horizontal Guidelines were issued in Europe for the
assessment of mergers1.
Actually, whatever the relevant jurisdiction applying to a specific merger, the unfolding
of the merger policy is basically the same. There are always four stages in its application,
which Lyons (2004) lists as follows: (1) the decision whether to review/investigate the
merger, (2) the merger review/assessment, (3) the decision to accept, prohibit or require
remedies, and (4) the appeal.
In the US, stages 1 and 2 are concentrated in the hands of the two relevant competition
agencies, the FTC and the DoJ. At stage 3 they submit their analysis to a court of justice
for a preliminary injunction. In turn, in the EU stages 1, 2 and 3 are concentrated in the
1Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, Oﬃcial Journal (2004) C 31/5.
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hands of the Directorate General Competition (DG Comp). The role of the courts in Eu-
rope has been typically limited to a formal and not substantial control of the commission’s
decision2.
Once a given merger qualifies, due to the size criterion (sales, basically), for investi-
gation by the relevant competition agency, the ensuing merger assessment to determine
the market power impact begins with the delineation of the relevant market in both prod-
uct and geographic terms - in short, the set of products and geographical areas to which
the products of the merging firms belong. Central to the product market definition is
the SSNIP test3 ("small but significant non-transitory increase in price"), implemented
through price elasticities and price correlation analyses. Eventually, the seasonal, mul-
tiple or secondary markets may be considered, as the case may be. Similarly, for the
geographic market delineation, the agency needs to also take into account transportation
costs, importations, or the existence of submarkets.
Based on the market definition thus established, the initial screens applied to deter-
mine the potential antitrust concern involve some numerical thresholds as to the levels
of concentration and increases in such concentration that raise potential competitive con-
cerns. These thresholds build on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which, together
with the market shares, are used as market concentration measures to assess whether
the merger gives rise to unilateral anti-competitive eﬀects4. The check-list for the latter
2However, in the last years some very controversial cases (both prohibitions - the three cases con-
cerned were Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel, and acceptance cases - the
Sony/BMG case), were overturned by the Court of First Instance and, in second instance, by the European
Court of Justice.
3 Introduced by the US DoJ, and currently used by anti-trust authoritites worldwide; also called the
Hypothetical Monopolist test. See the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
4The motivation for this is actually based on the static Cournot model, and was rationalized for instance
by Dansby and Willig (1979), who establish that the Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squares
of firms’ market shares, is related to the average industry mark-up and possibly to total welfare (provided
marginal costs are constant). Farrell and Shapiro (1990,a) and Levin (1990) derive suﬃcient conditions
for a merger to increase welfare based on firms’ market shares. The latter supply relevant information
to the extent that in Cournot markets they are negatively correlated with marginal costs. Although this
does not take into account the fact that market shares cannot be used to predict the post-merger market
equilibrium, nor the firms’ possibly strategic behaviour after the merger clearance decisions, the Herfindahl
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equally comprises the evaluation of mitigating or countervailing forces, such as the buyer
power, the timeliness, likelihood, and suﬃciency of entry5, the failing firm defence6 and
the merger’s eﬃciency gains. At the same time, a merger might have pro-collusive eﬀects,
so another check-list, for co-ordinated merger eﬀects, needs to be taken into account7.
4.3 "Does the merger pose a threat to competition?" - The
assessment of eﬃciencies
The US Merger Guidelines state that antitrust agencies "will not challenge a merger if
cognizable eﬃciencies are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely
to be anticompetitive in any relevant market. To make the requisite determination, the
agency considers whether cognizable eﬃciencies likely would be suﬃcient to reverse the
merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g. by preventing price
increases in that market" (US Merger Guidelines, revised April 8, 1997, §4). In other
words, the merger’s potential eﬃciency gains are recognized as a possible countervailing
factor w.r.t. the merger’s competitive damage. This explicit ’eﬃciency defence’, together
with the substantive test for declaring a merger anti-competitive, represented until 2004
the fundamental diﬀerence between the US and European merger policies. As Motta
(2004) remarks, despite the amended version of 1997, the ECMR was, until 2004, "at
odds with economic principles", because the ECMR substantive criterion of dominance did
index is explicitly employed by both the US and the European Merger Guidelines.
5The rationale for the mitigating eﬀect of market entry stems in the theory of contestable markets (see
Baumol et al. (1998)), which argued that firms’ behaviour on a concentrated oligopoly market may be
disciplined by potential competitors (i.e. potential new entrants). However, Werden and Froeb (1998)
raises doubts as to the possibility of market entry to reduce or eliminate the anti-competitive eﬀects of
mergers, and Spector (2003) shows that as long as Cournot competition is relevant, if marginal costs are
non-decreasing, then any profitable merger which fails to generate ’synergies’ (defined as in Farrell and
Shapiro (1990,a) will raise price, irrespective of entry conditions.
6Accordingly, a merger increasing market power may be allowed if it is the only means to preserve
within the industry the assets of one of the partners which would otherwise exit the market.
7The factors aﬀecting collusion typically include symmetric market shares, growing demand, price
transparency, symmetric cost structures, product homogeneity, excess capacity and its distribution across
the market, multi-market contact, and demand volatility.
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not prohibit the welfare-decreasing mergers that did not create or strengthen a dominant
position, and on the other hand, there was no room for evaluating eﬃciency gains, while
a merger’s economic assessment heavily depends on them8.
Empirically, this was signalled by Neven and Röller (2002), in a paper on apparent
discrepancies between EU merger decisions and stock market’s anticipations of the anti-
competitive consequences of these concentrations. Based on a sample of 100 mergers,
some of the factors that may account for such discrepancies were examined. Overall, the
study finds a low frequency of type I discrepancies (instances where the Commission had
prohibited a merger that the market had anticipated as being pro-competitive), but a high
frequency of type II discrepancies (situations where the Commission failed to block or to
impose remedies on mergers that the market had anticipated to be anti-competitive)9.
According to this analysis, the errors would have been explained by the scope of the domi-
nance criterion, the lack of an explicit eﬃciency defence or the political economy of merger
control (the Commission pursuing other objectives than those it had been assigned).
All in all, the thorough revision of the ECMR replaced the former market dominance
prohibition criterion with a ”significant impediment to eﬀective competition“ substantive
test, and fully acknowledges now the necessity to take into account merger eﬃciencies.
This enabled a substantial harmonization of European merger policy with the US one10,
but also with the economic principles11.
8Actually, the Commission interpreted the Art.2.1.(b) of the old ECMR (under which "it may take
account of the development of technical and economic progress only to the extent that it is to consumers’
advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition") as allowing no practical scope for an eﬃciency
defence once a dominant position was reckoned to be created or strengthened: "The creation of a dominant
position in the relevant markets identified above means that the eﬃciencies argument put forward by the
parties cannot be taken into account in the assessment of the present merger."
9Duso et al. (2003) equally study whether the EU merger procedures are prone to systematic errors,
and find in turn (based on a sample of 164 EU merger control decisions) type I errors in 28% of cases and
type II errors in 23% of them.
10For which the substantive prohibition criterion is the "substantial lessening of competition".
11Although the above-mentioned check-list elements are typically ordered in the presentations of merger
policy by the various competition agencies, the merger review actually follows an integrated approach.
Competition authorities do not apply their respective guidelines as a linear, step-by-step progression, that
invariably starts with market definition and ends with eﬃciencies or failing firm defence. The analysis of
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4.3.1 Treatment of eﬃciencies in practice
Before dealing with the insights provided by economic theory, we first present the
way eﬃciency gains are accounted for in practice, so as to highlight the challenges facing
competition authorities.
The evidence on whether mergers really generate eﬃciency gains is not direct but
rather deductive, as such gains are quite controversial (besides being diﬃcult to estimate).
While many studies (starting with Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) for instance) find little
support for a positive relationship between mergers and eﬃciencies, Gügler et al. (2003)
conclude that 29.1% of the mergers examined generated eﬃciency gains (as suggested by
the finding that they experienced an increase in both profits and sales). Actually, there
appears mostly to be a consensus, reached from both case studies and casual observation,
that although some mergers were indeed successful in securing substantial synergies, this
outcome is subject to an important variability12.
Given this foggy picture of eﬃciencies obtained through mergers, the problems raised
by their actual assessment in practice cannot be surprising. According to Ilzkovitz and
Meiklejohn (2001), these problems cluster around the following points: the choice of the
relevant welfare standard, the calculation of the minimum required eﬃciency gains, the
measurement of eﬃciencies, the burden of proof and finally their verification.
To start with, under both the EU and US merger laws, competition agencies only
consider consumers’ welfare when it comes to the assessment of eﬃciency gains. In the
next section we provide some economic motivations for this choice, but it should be noted
that it is essentially a political one. Basically, the consumer welfare criterion is favoured
when it is believed that competition authorities should avoid trading oﬀ the welfare of one
group of agents against that of another (consumers and firms, share-holding consumers and
consumers not possessing shares). Under this criterion, the eﬃciency defence is accepted
eﬃciencies, in particular, does not occur “after” the (anti)competitive eﬀects assessment, but at the same
time. The assessment of eﬃciencies is not sequential, because all factors are to be considered and balanced
before a decision is made whether the merger significantly impedes competition.
12See Röller et al. (2001) for a review of the empirical studies on mergers and their consequences. The
article does note that the number of empirical studies of the eﬀects of mergers on prices through eventual
eﬃciency gains is surprisingly small.
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only where the nature and size of the eﬃciency gains are such that, even with reduced
competition in the market, the consumer will be no worse oﬀ than before the merger13.
Based on the consumer welfare standard, the minimum required eﬃciencies are those
that just compensate the consumer welfare loss due to the merger’s anti-competitive eﬀects.
Implicitly, the size of the eﬃciency gains needed to justify such a merger depends on the
size of the anti-competitive eﬀects. To assess the required eﬃciency gains, in practice a
simulation analysis is performed, which needs to specify not only the appropriate mode and
intensity of competition both before and after merger (so as to evaluate the competitive
damage), but also the so-called pass-on rate, which gives the proportion of cost-savings
which will be passed on to consumers given the prevailing market structure and price-
elasticity of demand. Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn (2001) note that any application of the
eﬃciency defence based on the consumer welfare standard requires a simulation analysis
allowing to estimate simultaneously the price increase in the absence of eﬃciencies and
the degree of pass-on14.
To estimate eﬃciencies, one must first identify them. To properly define the relevant
eﬃciencies, it is important to note that not all kind of cost savings equally enhance com-
petition, nor improve consumer welfare. From an economic point of view, it is necessary
to distinguish between eﬃciencies that lower marginal costs, and eﬃciencies that reduce
fixed costs, because only the former can have an impact on consumer welfare15. Further-
more, among the marginal cost savings, Farrell and Shapiro (2000) claim that ’synergies’
are those truly relevant for the eﬃciency defence16. They cannot be achieved by one
firm unilaterally without the merger, and require the "integration of the parties’ unique,
hard-to-trade assets...[as well as ] the cooperation and coordination of the two firms’ as-
13Nevertheless, a trade-oﬀ might still occur, typically if the merger aﬀects more than one market. Thus,
if the anti-competitive eﬀects and the eﬃciencies are distributed diﬀerently between the markets, this can
raise the question whether benefits to one set of consumers should be weighed against harm to another set
of consumers.
14See Werden and Froeb (1996) for such a technique, and Röller et al. (2001) for the suggestion to assess
the price increase absent any eﬃciency gains, in a so-called ’worst case scenario’.
15Röller et al. (2001, p.42-49) provide a very detailed typology of merger eﬃciency gains
16Farrell and Shapiro (1990,a) show in the widely used Cournot framework that synergies benefit con-
sumers, in contrast with other cost reductions.
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sets that allow production on a superior production function, as distinct from causing
diﬀerent choices (such as scale) on a fixed production function. In other words, synergies
allow output/cost configurations that would not be feasible otherwise"17. Implicitly, this
highlights the additional requirement of merger-specificity, according to which the relevant
eﬃciencies to be taken into account cannot be obtained without the merger, through other
(less anti-competitive) business strategies. This merger specificity requirement within the
eﬃciency defence (basically, the need to answer ’Why this deal? Why not another?’) is
not merely a supplementary constraint laid against the merging parties, but is actually
meant to provide the competition authority with insight into the very business rationale
for the transaction under review.
Still, it is up to the merging firms to demonstrate the merger-specificity of the claimed
eﬃciencies. Merger regulation clearly acknowledge that "Eﬃciencies are diﬃcult to verify,
in part because much of the information relating to eﬃciencies is uniquely in the possession
of the merging firms" (US DoJ and FTC, Revision to Merger Guidelines 1997, §4). On
account of this information asymmetry, the burden of proof falls to the lot of the merging
firms. Typically, merging firms are expected to be able to explain how, when, and at what
cost the eﬃciencies will be achieved, why they are merger-specific, the likelihood and
magnitude of claimed eﬃciencies likely to result from the merger, and how the eﬃciencies
will aﬀect the merged firm’s ability or incentive to compete. Nevertheless, this raises
further problems, such as the standard of proof to require, how to check the validity of
the firm’s assertions, whether and how to check ex post if the eﬃciency gains announced
by the merging firms have really been achieved and whether they have been passed on to
consumers. It has been argued for instance that since the ex-ante assessment is subject
to so much uncertainty, the antitrust authority should carry out an ex-post audit to
determine whether eﬃciencies have really materialized and been passed on to consumers,
and if this is not the case, the authority should obtain appropriate remedies to restore
competitive conditions (Brodley (1996)). Röller et al. (2001) quote this proposition for
17 In contrast, a no-synergies merger is one in which the merged entity’s outputs, prices and total costs
were feasible for the parties pre-merger, with diﬀerent competitive behavior but without deep changes in
production. Therefore, it is not generally a synergy to achieve economies of scale, because firms could
unilaterally expand to do so.
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the record, but note that approving mergers only on a temporary basis, as Scherer (1991)
had already suggested before, would most likely involve prohibitive costs18. Nevertheless,
a related, and quite eﬀective approach, though by not means generalized, has actually
been ’experimented’ in the US. Brodley (1996) quotes a hospital merger case19 where the
consent decree negotiated between the parties and the Attorney General provided that
the merging parties pay to the Treasury the shortfall from the alleged eﬃciencies, if the
latter do not materialize and benefit patients within five years. The merits of such a
bonding procedure lie with the explicit consideration of both the merger’s external eﬀect
on consumers and the information asymmetry between the agency and the parties with
this respect. The moral is that it would be helpful to devise some revelation mechanism
to screen eﬃciency claims. The next section takes stock on the theoretical propositions
available, and more generally on the contributions to the economic analysis of eﬃciency
gains.
4.3.2 The economic analysis of merger eﬃciencies
To start with, the theory explains the rationale for taking into account the eﬃciency
gains from mergers. This can be traced back to Williamson (1968), who balanced the
allocative ineﬃciency of increased market power against what the US Merger Guidelines
(as revised in 1997) call ". . . the primary benefit of mergers to the economy [which is]
their potential to generate . . . eﬃciencies".
However, Williamson’s market power vs. eﬃciencies trade-oﬀ was set in a total welfare
framework, in which the loss of consumer surplus due to higher prices can be (more
than) compensated by an increase in producer profits, whereas currently competition
18Although this idea draws attention to the fact that firms may lack the incentives to undertake the
thorough restructuring needed to achieve the alleged eﬃciencies once the authority’s approval has been
secured, it is not always possible to implement ex-post remedies (under the European law, the Commission
cannot break up a company), and it might be downright impossible to ’unscramble’ the firms’ assets years
after the merger, not to mention the cost of it, especially if merging involved sunk costs in the first place.
The business uncertainty caused by such measures goes against the acknowledged objective of competition
authoritities to provide a stable and certain legal environment for merger regulation.
19The case Pennsylvania vs. Providence Health Sys., Inc., quoted by O’Connor (1995).
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authorities focus on the merger’s impact on consumers’ surplus in order to assess the
necessary eﬃciencies for the merger to be cleared. This has been justified in several ways.
In a price-setting spatial product diﬀerentiation model, Lyons (2002) finds that there
are situations where the consumer surplus standard leads to a higher total welfare than the
direct application of the total welfare standard. Basically, under the less demanding total
welfare standard, an acceptable merger actually prevents future eﬃciency-driven takeovers,
and thereby thwarts more competitive future market structures. Besanko and Spulber
(1993) equally found that the optimal decision rule for merger approval should be biased
in favour of consumer surplus, in a model with regulatory failure due to the asymmetric
information advantage of merging parties vis-à-vis the agency w.r.t. the merger’s cost
savings. Again, the outcome in terms of expected social welfare is actually higher when the
challenge decision is made under the stricter criterion. Neven and Röller (2005) compare
the performance of the two standards in the presence of regulatory failures due to lobbying
on behalf of merging parties and their rivals. This model finds that under the total welfare
standard, lobbying leads to type II errors, whereas under the consumer surplus standard, it
reduces the occurrence of type I errors (more likely under this stricter criterion), although
at a cost in terms of real resources. Thus placing more weight on consumer surplus is
rationalized in presence of lobbying activities. Farrell (2003) also obtains that even if
total surplus is the true regulatory goal, the agency should focus on consumer surplus,
but on account of the presence of litigation/negotiation costs within the merger control
process. Farrell (2003) notes that in the bargaining, merging firms already represent their
own eﬃciency interests in their profits, therefore to avoid the double-weighing of firms’
interest in the merger eﬃciency claims, diﬀerent from those ’required’ for consumers, the
agency should focus on the latter’s welfare.
Doing so means to conduct a merger assessment based on ’half’ of its external eﬀect,
given that non merged firms are equally aﬀected by the concentration. Farrell and Shapiro
(1990,a) provided a pioneering contribution from this point of view, but showed as well
that for a Cournot merger to benefit consumers through lower prices, the eﬃciency gains
need to materialize as synergies. This rather strict requirement is somewhat disproved by
Häckner and Razo (2004) by considering price-competition markets facing congestion. In
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such cases, horizontal mergers may induce firms to use capacity more eﬃciently, which
may put considerable competitive pressure on the industry resulting in price reductions.
Incidentally, this means that in congested markets agencies should focus less on ’synergies’,
lest they should prevent consumer surplus improvements. The synergy requirement is
further relaxed by Stennek (2001), by taking into account the asymmetric information
issue. Since oligopolistic competition on concentrated markets does not induce a cost-
minimizing allocation of production among firms, mergers can generate eﬃciency gains
associated with the pooling of private information on own costs, thereby allowing an
eﬃcient production rationalization (although without synergies à la Farrell and Shapiro
(1990,a)). Consumers stand to gain both from a lower price and a lower price variability.
Amir et al. (2004) equally exploit the information asymmetry between the industry firms
w.r.t. the ability of merging firms to achieve the eﬃciency gains. At the Bayesian Cournot
equilibrium of this model, the merger is profitable and can even increase consumer surplus
as long as non-merged rivals believe with a suﬃcient probability that the new entity will
generate high enough cost-savings, even if ex-post none actually materialize.
These models accounting for the information asymmetry among industry firms high-
light only part of the consequences due to the eﬃciencies’ uncertainty. To account for
the other part, the relationship between the regulator and the merging firms needs to be
considered.
Choné and Linnemer (2006) examine some consequences of the uncertainty about the
merger’s eﬃciency gains. They find that although the competition authority should be
cautious about random eﬃciencies, simply dismissing them from the merger assessment on
account of their uncertainty cannot be economically founded. Furthermore, the stand that
the agency should take regarding the eﬃciencies depends on the curvature of the social
objective function. More precisely, for the widely used case of linear demand, both con-
sumer surplus and industry firms’ profits are convex in eﬃciencies, making the competition
authority actually welcome the uncertainty in the merger assessment. Along a diﬀerent
line, Banal-Estanol et al. (2006) analyses the eﬀects of investment decisions and firms’
internal organization on the eﬃciency gains of horizontal mergers. In a framework with
endogenous eﬃciencies, the welfare results of the paper suggest that antitrust authorities
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may approve welfare-reducing mergers (type II error) and block welfare-enhancing merg-
ers (type I error) if they take for granted that potential eﬃciency gains will be eﬀectively
realized.
These conclusions are drawn from static models. Further insight is provided by a dy-
namic view of the regulatory relationship between the competition authority and the merg-
ing firms from the standpoint of eﬃciencies. Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) for instance
show that the ’eﬃciency oﬀence’ argument20 cannot be valid as long as the competition
authority adopts a forward looking behaviour. More precisely, a forward looking agency
anticipates the market structure that a given merger will lead to, and as such will not
block a merger triggering a subsequent eﬃciency-driven take-over. In contrast, a myopic
authority would ban the first concentration as soon as it threatens a rival with market
exit. As a result, outsiders neither exit the market, nor react by undertaking the subse-
quent eﬃcient merger, and thus the eventual consumer surplus improvement is actually
forgone. By the same token, Razo (2004) examines how the decision-making is aﬀected if
the agency takes into account alternative future mergers, and to start with, he confirms
that this cannot lower consumers’ welfare. He argues that the merger policy might be-
come stricter as compared with the case where future alternative mergers are overlooked,
because the competition authority requires higher eﬃciencies than simply those needed
to restore pre-merger consumers’ welfare. As a result, some price-reducing mergers will
be banned. In addition, the toughness of the merger policy depends on the agency’s be-
liefs w.r.t. the levels of eﬃciencies that can be achieved through mergers. If it believes
these eﬃciency gains to be high, then it might block welfare-increasing mergers which only
promises low eﬃciencies, in order to wait for one which will lead to higher eﬃciencies. As
a consequence, Razo (2004) finds that the more uncertain the synergies, the stricter the
merger policy will become, which incidentally goes against the static framework result of
Choné and Linnemer (2006).
In light of these consequences of the information asymmetry w.r.t. eﬃciency gains, one
20Basically, this states that the eﬃciency gains can turn out to be detrimental if they make the merged
entity so tough and agressive a competitor as to drive out rivals from the market, as a result of which
consumer surplus drops.
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could wonder what has been concluded on the ways either to alleviate or to completely
eliminate this information constraint.
In practice the assessment of eﬃciencies closely follows the theory as far as the burden of
proof of alleged eﬃciency gains goes. Gonzalez (2004) investigates how antitrust agencies
should structure the disclosing of information about eﬃciency gains from interested parties
(merging firms and competitors) in merger control. He obtains that the burden of proof
for eﬃciencies should fall to the lot of insiders, whereas the burden of proof for an eventual
eﬃciency oﬀence should fall to that of competitors.
At this point it must be recalled that arguing eﬃciency gains and assessing the validity
of these claims necessarily yields a substantial increase in administrative procedure costs
for both firms and competition agency (see Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn (2001) for a review of
the debate on the associated implementation costs). An important argument against the
eﬃciency defence is the possibly prohibitive cost of information acquisition due precisely
to the context of asymmetric information. Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005) explicitly deal
with this issue, and identify the conditions under which the cost trade-oﬀ does warrant the
taking into account of eﬃciency gains. Their results claim that the eﬃciency defence is
not worth while if it is too costly for society as a whole, through the evidence production
costs it entails on behalf of the merging firms. However, their model does not consider
the possibility of information manipulation or cheating on behalf of merging firms that
unrightfully argue eﬃciencies. Medvedev (2004,b) addresses this topic and explains the
presence of a fuzzy approval rule (i.e. approval probabilities varying between zero and one),
by means of a signalling game where the CA clears mergers with some positive probability,
based on its observation of both the evidence supporting the eﬃciencies claims, but also
of the way it is produced (i.e. the costly eﬀort to produce the evidence).
By explicitly taking into account the strategic behaviour around the eﬃciency gains
given the associated information asymmetry, in theory this problem could be eliminated.
This requires some revelation mechanism which would enable the screening of mergers
(or rather, of the eﬃciency claims). Faulli-Oller and Corchon (1999) explicitly study the
implementation of socially optimal mergers when merging firms have privileged informa-
tion on the potential eﬃciency gains, but find that standard tools of dominant strategy
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implementation (such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism) cannot apply.
A diﬀerent approach, making use of contract theory, is taken by Gonzalez (2003), who
proposes a revelation mechanism for screening mergers, based on two instruments: the
divestiture and the choice of the market on which it will take place. The mechanism is
inspired by the intuition that the merger remedies can be used as a utility transfer to
reveal the merger’s type within a standard menu of contracts. The same is implied by
the remark in Röller et al. (2001, p.116) that "a diﬀerent approach to screening mergers
would be to implement a revelation mechanism through the institution of merger licence
fees to be paid to the government". Chapter 6 of this dissertation proposes an alternative
screening mechanism, also based on merger remedy, but in which the revealing ’licence’
takes the form of the sale price the merging firms agree to receive from the asset buyer.
Although screening mechanisms are not yet applied in practice, such theoretical propo-
sitions do highlight the role of private incentives for the ultimate outcome of the eﬃciencies
assessment, as well as the close relationship between eﬃciency gains and the regulatory
response consisting of merger remedies.
4.4 "How can the competition threat be best eliminated?"
- An analysis of merger remedies
At the end of the merger review process/stage, the CA can make one of the following
three decisions: clear the merger, reject it, or accept it subject to conditions. This last
possibility involves the application of merger remedies, which comes down to enlarging
the toolbox available for merger regulation by granting competition authorities greater
latitude in making merger control decisions.
Merger remedies are generically defined as commitments, oﬀered by the merging firms
or possibly required by the CA, which address the competitive concern raised by the
merger, and are destined to restore market competition and prevent the merger’s negative
impact.
They generally fall into two broad categories, either structural or behavioural, but
sometimes a combination of the two is necessary to restore market competition. Be-
CHAPTER 4 Critical appraisal of the theory and practice of merger control 99
havioural remedies represent limitations of property rights, such as non-discrimination
provisions, vertical firewalls, or termination of existing business agreements. In contrast,
structural remedies involve the change in the allocation of property rights throughout the
industry, by means of asset transfers between the merging parties and some agreed-upon
buyer. The hybrid category of quasi-structural remedies comprises mandatory licenses or
access rights. Given this range of possible actions as merger remedies, one can and should
notice that they enable to a certain extent the ’fine-tuning’ of merger control in terms of
regulatory response to a proposed merged. Consequently, merger remedies have shifted
the focus of merger control closer to market regulation21. As such, their application is
subject to much the same design and implementation problems as pure regulation instru-
ments. To support this idea, in what follows we first take stock on the policy, practice
and outcome of merger remedies.
4.4.1 Taking stock on merger remedies
Anti-competitive mergers get rarely prohibited nowadays, as it appears that competi-
tion authorities are quite keen on clearing them subject to commitments. As a represen-
tative example, we give next suggestive statistics on the European merger control:
Table 4.1: European Commission merger remedy and prohibition decisions
(September 21, 1990 to September 30, 2006)
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 Total
Notifications 11 64 59 59 95 110 131 168 224 276 330 335 277 211 247 313 326 3171
Phase I remedies 0 3 4 0 2 3 0 2 12 16 26 11 10 11 12 15 9 138
Phase II remedies 0 3 3 2 2 3 3 7 4 7 12 9 5 6 4 3 4 77
Prohibitions 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 5 0 0 1 0 0 19
Source: European Commission, Directorate Competition22.
Taking into account the 73 phase I merger withdrawals and the 27 phase II ones,
one obtains that overall remedies get applied in 7% of notified cases, with only 0.62%
of concentrations being refused. Needless to stress, the seemingly weak proportion of
21Rey (2003, p.130) points out that "introducing the possibility of remedies...puts the merger cntrol
oﬃce in a position close to that of an industry-specific regulator". See also Motta et al. (2003).
22Available at http://ec.europa.eu/com/competition/mergers/cases/stats.html
CHAPTER 4 Critical appraisal of the theory and practice of merger control 100
remedied mergers actually concerns the most important (in terms of sales and scope)
concentrations23.
The policy and practice
Even though merger remedies are now extensively used, this has not always been
the case. As Baer and Redcay (2003) remind, merger remedies received little attention
before the American Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) in 1976. Without
mandatory pre-merger notification, US competition agencies learned about deals after
their closing, which was often too late to evaluate the antitrust problems and to negotiate
remedies. Only if the agency managed to obtain a preliminary injunction did it have time
to negotiate a divestiture before the merger partners ’scrambled the eggs’ between them.
The Congress recognized the need to prevent this in order to make divestitures an eﬀective
remedy. Thus, the HSR Act added to Section 7 of the Clayton Act provided US agencies
with the legal foundation to stop anticompetitive mergers and negotiate eﬀective remedies.
This legal framework was later supplemented by the FTC’s Remedies Guidelines and its
Best Practices for Merger Remedies, as well as by the DoJ’s Antitrust Divestiture Policy
Guide to Merger Remedies of 2004.
The practice of remedies in the EU (and in most of the member states) is more re-
cent, their policy emerging after the adoption of a merger policy itself. The European
Commission’s policy for merger remedies was first published in 2001 in the Commission’s
Remedies Notice, adopted on December 21, 2000, then the Directorate General Competi-
tion published in 2003 the Best Practice Guidelines on remedies. The ECMR (revised in
2004), the remedies notice, and the Best Practice Guidelines provide guidance to the busi-
ness and legal communities, and set out the general framework on the types of acceptable
remedies, the procedure for their submission to the Commission and the requirements for
their implementation.
Basically, all competition authorities implementing merger control have at one time
or another adopted some guidelines on the application of merger remedies. Beyond this
23Front-page remedy-cases were Air France/KLM, Lufthansa/Swiss, or Sanofi-Synthelabo/Aventis, to
quote just a few.
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policy similarity, there is a wide consensus w.r.t. several commonly accepted principles,
which the OECD 2004 report on merger remedies summarized as follows:
"When devising remedies in merger cases, competition authorities should be guided
by the following principles: (i) competition authorities should consider remedies only if
a threat to competition has been identified; (ii) remedies should be the least restric-
tive means to eﬀectively eliminate competition concerns; (iii) remedies should address
only competition concerns, and should not be used for industrial planning or other non-
competition purposes; and (iv) competition authorities should be flexible and creative in
devising remedies."
The general interpretation given to these principles is the following. To start with,
the application of remedies should be considered only if they are demonstrably necessary,
meaning that the competition authority has the burden to prove that the merger under
review is anti-competitive (in turn, merging parties have to come up with proposed solu-
tions to the competitive concerns raised by the deal). When deciding whether a proposed
remedy is appropriate, the CA will consider its likely eﬀectiveness and associated costs,
and will also take into account the principle of proportionality24. Yet, thorough eﬀective-
ness is not the only feature desired in a remedy. Competition authorities must also strive
for timely implementation at minimal cost in terms of institutional resources. While struc-
tural remedies usually have an edge over behavioural remedies when it comes to clarity
and simplicity, they have a still more obvious edge in lower post-merger monitoring and
enforcement costs. As presumed by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm25, there
is a strong causal relationship between the market structure, the firms’ conduct and eco-
nomic performance. Thus, decisions which would alter the market structure would permit
the emergence of market behaviours considered to be desirable, from a competition point
24The ECMR of 2004 (paragraph 30) is explicit on these points: "commitments should be proportionate
to the competition problem and entirely eliminate it."
25Developed by the "Harvard tradition" - see Tirole (1988, p.1).
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of view, without the necessity of incurring high monitoring costs26. All in all, structural
remedies, in particular divestitures, are strongly recommended, because by "creating the
conditions for the emergence of a new competitive entity or the strengthening of existing
ones"27, they are supposed to fully and timely solve the competitive harm caused by the
merger.
To restore competition, a divestiture should involve the sale of an appropriate asset
package to a suitable purchaser, through an eﬀective divestiture process. As for any ex-
ante market intervention, the impact of remedies is uncertain to some extent. Policy
recommendation take this into account, by addressing the possible risks to which divesti-
tures are subject. According to the 2004 consultation document for the UK Competition
Commission Guidelines on Divestiture Remedies, these risks fall into three broad cate-
gories: composition-, purchaser- and asset-related. The first concerns the scope of the
divestiture package, the second involves the identification of a suitable buyer, whereas
the third deals with the maintaining of the competitive potential of the divestiture pack-
age throughout the divestiture process. The nature of these possible risks requires the
application of certain protective measures.
Concerning the divestiture package, there is wide preference in favour of a demonstrably
autonomous on-going business unit of one of the merging parties, and against a ’mix-and-
match’ divestiture (i.e. a mixture of assets from both merging parties) - this preference for
“as is” divestitures is supported by the higher success rate of such divestitures reported
in the US FTC’s 1999 divestitures study. Furthermore, if the parties fail to divest the
original asset package, the agencies may resort to ’crown jewel’ provisions, which require
the divestiture of additional highly marketable assets. To minimize purchaser risks, the
choice of buyer should obey criteria such as independence from the merging firms and
capability (in terms of financial resources, business expertise and incentives). In addition,
the buyer’s choice is subject to approval of the competition authority. Actually, the
26Depending on the type of monitoring required, behavioural remedies may put the competition authority
in the position of being an ongoing regulator. This is especially true of remedies designed to ensure that
access to networks or other essential facilities is provided on terms attractive enough to encourage or
maintain competition at satisfactory levels.
27Mario Monti explaining in 2002 paragraph 13 of the EU Remedies Notice
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use of up-front buyers28 is recommended, allegedly as the “most vital tool in assuring a
successful divestiture"29 (Parker and Balto (2000)). Finally, from the point of view of the
actual implementation, monitoring and divestiture trustees are in charge of overseeing the
enforcement of the commitments30, so as to protect the divestiture package and ensure a
timely relief.
The evidence
The assessment of the success or failure of remedy policies is questionable, since there
are scarcely any public ex post studies on the eﬀective implementation of merger remedies.
While competition authorities have carried out some case-by-case analyses, the topic has
not yet been properly explored.
The pioneering work in this area was the study carried out by the US FTC and pub-
lished in 199931, which was based primarily on interviews with purchasers of divested
assets. The study examined the outcome of divestiture orders from 1990 to 1994, and
concluded that: (1) 75% of divestitures had succeeded in creating viable operations in
the relevant market; (2) purchasers and divesting parties often act according to their own
respective interests which are (too) frequently diﬀerent from those of the competition au-
thority; and (3) divestiture commitments need certain safeguards to ensure their proper
28The FTC makes use of this procedure in roughly 60% of the cases in which there is some form of
non-behavioural relief (Parker and Balto (2000)). The DoJ favours an analogue of the FTC’s up-front
buyer requirement, namely the ’fixe-it-first’ remedy, which is only diﬀerent to the extent that it does not
require government approval (i.e. a consent decree). For a summary comparison of the FTC and DoJ
merger remedies policies and practices, see Baer et al. (2004).
29Paragraph 20 of the European Commission’s Notice acknowledges this, by stating that in cases where
the viability of the remedy package depends to a large degree on the identity of the proposed buyer, an
up-front divestiture will be required.
30Monitoring trustees are responsible for monitoring four functions: (1) the carve-out of the divested
business; (2) overseeing the interim preservation of the divested assets; (3) the holding-separate of the
divested business from the parties’ retained business; and (4) the parties’ divestiture process, including an
assessment of the suitability of the purchaser. A divestiture trustee is appointed in case the parties fail
to divest on time or if a buyer has not been found. The trustee is then mandated to sell the asset at no
minimum price, provided the competition agency approves the final purchaser.
31Available at www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf
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implementation. In other words, it obtained that about 25% of applied remedies were
completely unsuccessful, that divesting firms behave strategically, and that the FTC basi-
cally had as poor an information as the buyers who could not prevent the failure of their
acquisitions, since the incriminated divestiture and sale agreements had been approved.
However, despite the study’s drawbacks32, mainly that only qualitative information
(voluntary answers to interviews and questionnaires) has been used to assess the eﬀects
of a limited number (35) of divestiture orders, it appears that the FTC learned its lesson,
and in 2003 it published its Best Practices statement for negotiating merger remedies,
which basically contains the very protective measures listed in the previous section for
determining which assets are to be divested, identifying an acceptable buyer, and the
provisions to include in a divestiture agreement. By the same token, the EU 2001 Remedies
Notice openly lists the same policy recommendations distilled from the results of the FTC’s
1999 study.
Interestingly enough, in spite of the latter’s limitations, the European Commission’s
DG Comp published in 2005 a very similar divestiture study33 to evaluate ex-post the
design and implementation of remedies. Moreover, based on the same methodology as the
FTC’s study but on larger data34, the DG Comp’s study showed that the EU divestiture
process experienced as many problems as the FTC in drafting appropriate orders, with
a rate of success roughly the same as that of the FTC. Overall eﬀectiveness evaluation
was possible in 85 of the 96 analyzed remedies, with the following reported outcome: 57%
were eﬀective, 24% only partially, 7% not at all, and the result was unclear for 12% of the
remedies. All ’ineﬀective’ and all ’partially eﬀective’ divestiture remedies suﬀered from
problems related to the inadequate scope of the divested business. Briefly stated, the DG
32See the FTC’s 2002 "Report to Congressional Requesteres to Assess the Eﬀects of Divestitures in Retail
Markets" for a comprehensive list of the (methodological and informational) limitations of the FTC’s 1999
remedy study.
33Available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/others/remedies_study.pdf
34 In total, 96 remedies were retained, representing 74% of all the remedies included in the 40 decisions
chosen and 42% of all 227 remedies included in the 91 conditional clearance decisions adopted during the
five year reference period from 1996 to 2000. This period was chosen because at the time it contained the
most recent set of cases for which the implementation of the remedies could be analysed ex post after a
reasonable interval, i.e. three years for the most recent cases.
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Comp’s 2005 study equally found that the divestitures were most likely to work if the sale
of a “stand alone” business was required, and that without this provision, it was frequently
necessary to also order technical assistance to establish the buyer as a viable competitor,
because buyers did not always know how to operate the business they were buying. It
should be recalled though that all selected cases were decided before the publication of
the Commission’s 2001 Remedies Notice and 2003 Best Practice Guidelines, so the study
can be interpreted as justifying ex-post the necessity of these policy statements.
Given the similarity of results and methodology, but also the time span separating the
actual policies analyzed by these two qualitative studies on merger remedies, one cannot
but wish to check their findings against the quantitative evidence.
The point is that there is no systematic econometric evidence on the question of
whether ordered remedies achieve what they are supposed to achieve, namely to assure
that proposed mergers do not lead to an increase in the firms’ market power.
For the European merger control such an econometric study has only recently become
available. Duso et al. (2006) looks at the eﬀects of remedies in a sample of 167 mergers
reviewed by the European Commission between 1990 and 2002. Based on an event study
methodology, the paper finds that remedies were not always appropriately imposed, i.e.
sometimes remedies were unduly imposed in mergers that were found to be eﬃciency in-
creasing (type I errors), while some other times remedies were not imposed in mergers
identified as increasing market power (type II errors). This latter result unfortunately ap-
pears to be robust both to the time period and the policy specifications. Elzinga (1969),
quoted by Duso et al. (2006) as possibly the first (and for long the only other) econometric
study trying to evaluate the ex post eﬀectiveness of ordered remedies in challenged merger
cases, analyzed the eﬀectiveness of remedies in the 50s under the antimerger statute con-
tained in Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Using a random sample of 39 antimerger cases, the
paper rated remedies using a four category ranking system: successful, suﬃcient, deficient,
or unsuccessful. The results suggest that only one out of ten cases could be classified as
successful or suﬃcient. Since the days of this study, the HSR Act was passed, but no
ex-post econometric analysis is currently available on the eﬀectiveness of the US remedy
policies.
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All in all, "it is remarkable that there are so few empirical studies on the eﬀects of
merger control and of merger remedies. Competition authorities have been very reluctant
to engage in systematic reviews of their merger decisions a few years after they have
been taken. Yet such systematic reviews could shed light both on the relevance of the
prospective analysis underlying their decisions and on the appropriateness of the merger
remedies they accepted" (Jenny (2003)).
4.4.2 The economics of merger remedies
The previous evidence section basically highlights the lack of a minimal quality control
of merger regulation mechanisms. This seems to be all the more necessary that the policy
of remedies appears to be the outcome rather than the starting point of the every-day
practice or merger remedies, with the various remedy guidelines and notices resulting
from a learning-by-doing process of active remedy application, instead of inspiring it in
the first place.
Arguably, designing eﬀective divestiture plans and avoiding the implementation of
those that are likely to fail is not an easy task. Still, despite their economic importance,
remedies are clearly an under-researched topic as far as their economic eﬀects are con-
cerned. In what follows, we are going to review the contributions to what could be called
"the economics of divestitures".
Horizontal mergers not only reduce the number of market participants, but equally
change the distribution of assets in the industry, thus modifying market performance
through both unilateral and co-ordinated eﬀects. By reshaping the asset allocation among
firms, divestitures do much the same. According to the policy, transferring overlapping
assets should satisfy the eﬀectiveness requirement of divestitures. Instead, the economic
theory suggests that the market outcome of asset transfers can be rather complex.
Based on the widely used Cournot model, Farrell and Shapiro (1990,b) examine the
voluntary sale of capital goods by one oligopolist to another, in terms of market price and
welfare. Their results comfort the traditional approach of merger policy, because smaller
firms are shown to have insuﬃcient incentives to increase the concentration of capital
ownership, and they should be encouraged to do so by combining with each other - or,
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rather, by taking over divested assets. Actually, with constant marginal costs, basic com-
parative statics on the quantity competition model obtains that the lowest price obtains
for a symmetric firms industry. Thus, in a model with constant marginal costs decreasing
and convex in capacity35, Medvedev (2004,a) exploits this result36 in order to compute the
optimal asset transfer that will satisfy the CA’s consumers’ surplus standard by inducing
a more symmetric capital distribution.
A few remarks are necessary at this point. To start with, Vergé (2006) aims to con-
tradict the optimistic message in terms of there always being an asset transfer to provide
competition relief, by claiming in the framework of Farrell and Shapiro (1990,a) that there
is no such divestiture for mergers without synergies. Furthermore, it has been convinc-
ingly argued that asset transfers may have pro-collusive eﬀects. As Motta et al. (2003)
remind, symmetry and multi-market contacts37 are two factors facilitating collusion, and
asset transfers may contribute to both. Vasconcelos (2005,a) examined the impact of asset
transfers on the sustainability of tacit collusion with quantity competition, and found that
the merger can actually hinder collusion by increasing the industry heterogeneity of asset
holdings. Divestitures would reverse this and thus lead to the opposite result. Compte et
al. (2002) show that this is a robust conclusion, by obtaining it in a price competition with
capacity constraints model, tailored to the high-profile Nestlè/Perrier case38. In light of
these arguments, Motta et al. (2003) could but recommend that the same double test that
the EC uses to assess mergers also apply for structural remedies, namely that both single
and joint dominance will not likely arise after divestiture (i.e. check for both unilateral
and co-ordinated eﬀects).
To put it diﬀerently, the theory reminds that besides the eﬀectiveness requirement
and in connection with it, competition agencies should make sure that divestitures do not
make things worse. This could be due to several reasons.
35Perry and Porter (1985) initially proposed this specification, rather extensively used since in the
theoretical Cournot literature.
36Basically, it is the underlying idea for the use of the HHI index.
37See Bernheim and Whinston (1990).
38Accordingly, "the proposed take-over of Perrier by Nestlè with the sale of Volvic to Nestlè was the
worst possible solution from the point of view of competition."
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To start with, the competition authority itself might be tempted to use the remedy
beyond its corrective purpose, in order to "improve" the deal and overall industry per-
formance. Farrell (2003) warns against the outcome of such an ’overfixing’ temptation to
engage in industrial policy, on account of the negative impact on the firms’ incentive to
seek and pursue merger opportunities39. In a perfect information model of merger control,
Vasconcelos (2005,b) explicitly looks at the agency’s incentive to implement by means of
divestitures its most preferred market structure and the ensuing possible hold-up eﬀect on
not yet submitted mergers. In chapter 5 of this dissertation, we address the possibility for
overfixing in an asymmetric information framework, and conclude that the agency should
refrain from applying remedies together with the eﬃciency defence if eﬃciency-driven
mergers are to be encouraged.
Along a diﬀerent but related line, the asymmetric information which is intrinsic to the
merger control framework could explain why divestitures can fail or make things worse.
Basically, the competition agency has imperfect information both w.r.t. the necessary
amount of assets to divest, and the parties’ (seller and buyer) incentives to accept and
employ the divestiture. More precisely, the asset transfer is supposed to address the
merger’s net anti-competitive eﬀect, but for that the agency should be able to assess the
merger’s potential eﬃciency gains. Parties have privileged information on this, hence Rey’s
(2000) intuition that "the competition authority could try to screen merger proposals using
transfers or quasi-transfers in the form of concessions...". First Gonzalez (2003) proposed
a revelation mechanism based on divestitures as a screening device. His menu of contracts
also contains the choice of the market where the divestiture will take place. In chapter 6
of this dissertation we propose an alternative, which allows remedies to be eﬀective on the
same market as the originating competitive damage. Our screening mechanism enables
information revelation by using divestitures and their sale price as screening devices within
a menu of contracts.
In a diﬀerent context, Farrell (2003) suggested that the sale price of divested assets
39The article also reminds that ’overfixing’ can equally be due to the overlapping of antitrust or geo-
graphic jurisdictions - see Bensaid et al. (1995) for a model of the former case and Neven and Röller (2000)
for a discussion of the latter.
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can convey private information on the interests and incentives of the industry firms. Com-
menting on the results of the 1999 FTC’s remedies study, Farrell (2003) remarked that
instead of directly putting down the remedy failure to the buyer’s lack of information,
expertise or bargaining power in securing a successful divestiture package, it might make
more sense to acknowledge instead that the buyer’s interest is simply opposed to that of
the agency. It is enough to consider a very simple Cournot setting to see this. Basically,
an anticompetitive horizontal merger gives the merged firm an incentive to reduce output,
so as to benefit from a market price increase. The final outcome is the same if, instead
of shutting down some production sites, these are transferred to an outsider firm which
is not capacity-constrained, so it will not react by expanding output as the agency might
hope for. Farrell (2003) actually points out that more generally, the purchaser of divested
assets lacks incentives to act in a competition-friendly way upon the asset transfer (neither
securing a package that truly preserves competition, nor demanding key assets enabling
keen rivalry), because this would "shrink the financial pie to be divided between the buyer
and the insiders". In short, both seller and buyer have a common interest in limiting their
competition. However, the traditional view taken only focuses on the ’anti-competitive’
incentives of merging firms to make sure that the purchaser will not turn into a tough
rival40.
Nevertheless, besides the information asymmetry and the opposing incentives, the
outcome of the divestiture could be diﬀerent from what the agency requires for still diﬀerent
reasons. Even if the divestiture is the necessary condition for the merger to be cleared,
merging firms may agree to divest for other reasons as well.
Firstly, assuming a “free entry" equilibrium both before and after the merger in a
spatially diﬀerentiated oligopoly, Cabral (2003) shows that by selling assets (stores) to po-
tential rivals (new entrants), merging firms "buy them oﬀ", in other words, dissuade them
40The competition authorities are aware of this side of the incentive problem, because it triggered
safeguards like the ’hold-separate’ procedure and appointment of divestiture trustees to ensure that the
seller does not diminish the value of the assest pending the sale. With this respect, Motta et al. (2003)
quote the example retained by Parker and Balto (2000) where the seller was eventually sued and fined for
having decreased on purpose the value of the divestiture package, but overall this was still more profitable
for him than putting up with a strong new entrant.
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from opening new stores, which may be detrimental to consumers through higher prices
and search costs. The crucial assumption is the "free-entry" assumption, which highlights
the importance of assessing the counterfactual to the remedy decision, i.e. would entry
occur in the absence of imposing (structural) remedies or not. Secondly, in a model of en-
dogenous mergers, Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005,a) examine the hold-up eﬀect due to the
outsiders’ free-riding on the industry externality generated by an anti-competitive merger.
The paper argues that when designing the merger policy, this obstacle to market monopo-
lization should be taken into account, precisely because the divestiture requirements that
apply to such anti-competitive mergers actually diminish the hold-up eﬀect. The intuition
is straightforward: the divestiture, through its sale price, introduces a channel for transfer-
ring wealth between the buying outsider and the merging firms, the latter extracting the
buyer’s willingness to pay for the externality generated by their merger. In other words,
by requiring a divestiture, the agency possibly lowers the hold-up eﬀect and encourages
the firms to merge41, so divestitures should not be taken for granted to represent a cost
for the merging firms. Finally, as suggested by Seldeschlachts et al. (2006), the systematic
use of remedy decisions is reckoned a signal of a ’soft’ merger policy, in which the agency
appears very keen to clear mergers if at all possible. According to Neven et al. (1993,
p.7) "lawyers in particular are aware that this may give them significant bargaining power
with the (European) Commission even in doubtful cases". This clearly goes against the
original expectation about the possibility of a remedial action - according to Baer and
Redcay (2003), the requirement to file a pre-merger notification and wait pending the
agency’s review was reckoned to increase the negotiation power of the agency, because an
eventual litigation over the remedy involved supplementary delay, so firms were expected
to become more inclined to accept the settlement terms requested by the agency.
4.5 Concluding remarks
If anything, more insight from economic theory is needed to seize the full implications
of the in-depth change brought to the market by the application of remedies, for in many
41Chapter 3 in this dissertation equally obtains this, in the case of an asset sale to a new entrant.
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academic contributions merger remedies are only incidentally looked at. We feel the same
holds for the very assessment of the merger’s eﬃciencies. The following two chapters of
this dissertation hopefully contribute to a consistent economic analysis of merger control,
by directly addressing both merger remedies and the eﬃciencies’ assessment.
First, to study the interaction between them as well as the opportunity of applying
together an eﬃciency defence and remedies, Chapter 5 presents an original model issued
from joint work with Jean-Philippe Tropéano. Basically, we provide an answer to what
should be the best merger policy, considering the relative importance of the two types of
merger control errors. Within the asymmetric information relationship between the regu-
lating agency and the merging firms, we find that if the benefit expected from an eﬃcient
merger is high, the best policy consists in applying an eﬃciency defence without allowing
remedies. Instead, should an ineﬃcient merger cleared without remedies be extremely
harmful, then the combination of remedies and eﬃciency defence is the most appropriate
for maximizing expected welfare.
In Chapter 6, equally issued from joint work with Jean-Philippe Tropéano, we take up
the intuition that merger remedies can be used as a screening device to extract the insid-
ers’ private information on the merger’s eﬃciencies. We propose a revelation mechanism
combining in a menu of contracts the amount of divested assets and their sale price. These
instruments allow eﬀective revelation with minimal distortion by reconciling the diverg-
ing interests of the three parties involved in the divestiture negotiation, the competition
authority, the insiders and the buyer of divested assets.
Chapter 5
Impact of Remedies on the
Eﬃciency Defence and
Consequences for Merger Control
To remedy or not to remedy, that is the question...
This chapter builds on joint work with Jean-Philippe Tropéano, available as Worknig Paper
"On the Eﬀective Design of the Eﬃciency Defence", Cahiers de la MSE n◦ 2006-30.
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5.1 Introduction
Merger control aims to screen concentrations, so as to identify and clear competitive
mergers, as well as prohibit or modify and thus make less harmful the anti-competitive
ones. Central to the merger assessment process are the potential eﬃciency gains that the
merger may generate, because they determine the net final eﬀect of the concentration,
and hence its (anti)competitive status from the merger control point of view. Merger
regulations acknowledge that in order to improve the outcome and performance of the
merger control, eﬃciencies need to be taken into account1. The theoretical rationale can be
traced back Williamson (1968), who developed the concept of a trade-oﬀ analysis between
losses in allocative eﬃciency and gains in productive eﬃciency as a result of a merger. In
all likelihood, this should prevent the prohibitions of eﬃcient mergers, although merger
control is feared to become thus too lenient, on account of the privileged information that
firms have w.r.t. the motivations and competitive potential of their merger.
To prevent this, competition authorities make use of remedies, which have become
(unlike prohibitions) the preferred reply to the issue of how best eliminate the competition
concern of a merger. Remedies are (structural or behavioural) ’commitments’ oﬀered by
the merging parties in order to secure the merger approval. The object of remedies is to
reduce the parties’ market power and restore conditions for eﬀective competition, lest the
merger be detrimental.
The key point is that, unlike other branches of antitrust, dealing with the ex-post
punitive control of illegal conduct, merger control is supposed to assess the merger’s con-
sequences, and to remedy them if necessary, before they even take place (Motta (2004)).
By definition therefore, due to the intrinsic uncertainty of this ex-ante evaluation, merger
control is always prone to type I and II errors. The true challenge for the merger policy
is then to minimize the consequences of the two types of errors, which is not necessarily
1According to the EC Merger Regulation (as revised in 2004): "In order to determine the impact of a
concentration on competition in the common market, it is appropriate to take account of any substantiated
and likely eﬃciencies put forward by the undertakings concerned" - see the Council Regulation (EC) No
139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, Oﬃcial Journal, L
24, 9/01/2004, p.1-22.
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focusing on a lower number of errors, but rather minimizing type II errors in those cases
where significant net harmful eﬀects are likely, and minimizing type I errors in those cases
where significant net beneficial eﬀects are likely.
To examine such optimal merger control, in this chapter we are going to follow the
’more subtle economic view’ advocated by Farrell (2003) and take the stand to account
for the ex ante incentives of merger control.
5.1.1 Purpose and relevance
One consequence from taking into account eﬃciencies for merger assessment is that
merging firms can bring forward the potential eﬃciency gains from merger as an argument
to increase the probability of merger acceptance, within the so called ’eﬃciency defence’.
We claim here that the latter can provide positive ex-ante incentives, and thereby reduce
the cost of type I errors by encouraging the submission of more eﬃcient mergers. Intu-
itively, if firms cannot benefit from their commitment to achieve these eﬃciency gains, they
have lower incentives to make the eﬀort of achieving them, because in practice, planning
and achieving an eﬃcient merger is costly:
"As a recent Financial Times article ("Clean teams banish acquisition uncertainty",
August 8, 2006) argues, an increasingly favoured approach to integrating two disparate
companies is "to use a ’clean team’, a group isolated from the operational management
of both companies, usually consisting of 10 or 20 people drawn from inside and outside
the companies. Clean teams collect and analyze data from both parties, which it then
uses to plan how the merger will work - and crucially, where the synergies and
cost savings will occur. Such a team starts it work well in advance of the completed
deal, setting out a strategy for realizing the claimed ’synergies’."2
2Further quoting Oligopoly Watch (August 12, 2006), "Such teams were used in the initial
combination of three firms that formed Arcelor in 2001. It was used by Hewlett-Packard in its
acquisition of Compaq in 2002. Cadbury Schweppes followed suit in its buyout of Adams Gum in
2003 from Pfizer. Because of the big expense, the approach is mainly used by big firms for big
(billion dollar plus) deals."
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The point we wish to make is twofold: besides arguing in favour of potential eﬃ-
ciencies being taken into account in merger control, (incidentally, without involving the
information-related evidence production costs à la Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005)), we add
that at least as relevant is rather how this is to be done, considering the asymmetric
information and the available remedial instruments of the competition authority.
Concerning merger remedies, conventional wisdom indicates that they enlarge the set
of acceptable mergers (obviously, as compared with the application of downright prohibi-
tions). In terms of their ex ante incentives, Seldeslachts et al. (2006) for instance argue
that they remove the deterrence eﬀect of the merger policy, since firms no longer avoid
proposing anticompetitive mergers, feeling confident that at worst, it will take a remedy
to get the merger approved. Instead, Farrel (2003) claims that remedies "may confiscate
the private rents from seeking out and pursuing eﬃciently-oriented mergers".
Taking on this idea, we are going to examine how the use of remedies aﬀects the ex ante
eﬀect of the eﬃciency defence, as well as the informational problem that the competition
authority faces w.r.t. the latter, so as to conclude on the opportunity to apply both remedies
and the eﬃciency defence within an optimal merger control.
5.1.2 Outline of model and results
The starting point of our model is the informational problem to which the assessment
of eﬃciencies is subject. To start with, they can only materialize after the merger is
completed and are therefore merely potential at the time of the review. Actually, we
assume here that the eﬃciency gains can only result from an ex ante designing eﬀort
undertaken by the merging firms. This eﬀort is costly and it does not always succeed, and
the insiders are privately informed on the result of this ex ante planning eﬀort. To account
for this information problem, in our framework we interpret the eﬃciency defence (ED
from now on) as a commitment on behalf of the competition authority (CA henceforth) to
take into account for the merger clearance decision some signal, which is only imperfectly
correlated with the merger’s eﬃciency gains. As a result, the two types of error are
possible, because a good signal can make the CA accept an ineﬃcient merger, whereas a
poor signal can induce the refusal of an eﬃcient merger. We call an ED decision rule this
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commitment of the CA to clear mergers based on the above-mentioned signal.
A possible alternative for merger clearance, and the one we consider here, is for the
CA to accept the merger only if firms adopt remedies. We model them in accordance with
the current policy, as commitments undertaken by firms, which imply a private cost for
them, to the extent that the profit thus obtained is lower than it would be without remedy.
Furthermore, a remedy will be eﬀective, and thus ensure a welfare improvement w.r.t. the
status-quo if applied to a anti-competitive merger, yet it will write oﬀ any private benefit
from eﬃciencies if undertaken by eﬃcient firms. The approval of mergers depending on
the submission of a remedy proposal will constitute an alternative decision rule for the
CA.
In this framework, the first objective is to determine the opportunity for the CA to
adopt the ED decision rule for merger clearance, rather than the remedy rule. We show
that the CA adopts the ED rule only if the quality of the signal is high enough. The
intuition is the following: applying the ED rule is justified as long as firms exert the costly
eﬀort and there are suﬃciently rare errors of both types, so as to obtain in the end a higher
expected welfare than with remedies only. Insiders will undertake the eﬀort only if the
probability to see the eﬃcient merger accepted is high enough. Similarly, from the CA’s
standpoint, the expected welfare with the ED is higher than the welfare with remedies if
the probability to accept an ineﬃcient merger is low enough. All in all, the application of
the ED is justified for the CA basically as long as the welfare loss due to both types of
error is not too important. It should be noted that the adoption of the ED rule stems from
the trade-oﬀ between the following two eﬀects. On the one hand, the benefit from the
ED is the provision of the incentive eﬀect, making firms exert the costly eﬀort to obtain
eﬃciencies, but on the other hand, the cost of the ED is the risk of type II error and the
ensuing welfare loss due to the imperfect signal.
The next step is to study the opportunity for the CA to adopt a decision rule that allows
both remedies and ED, meaning the commitment to clear a merger either if the signal
observed is positive or if firms undertake remedies. We show that when thus allowed for
together with the ED, merger remedies aﬀect the previously mentioned trade-oﬀ between
the incentive and type II error eﬀects. On the one hand, for a substantial range of quality
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of merger assessment, the remedies lower the ex ante eﬀort incentives of firms, because
they increase the opportunity cost of the ED for the merging firms - the latter can always
propose remedy instead, and have their merger cleared. On the other hand, accepting a
merger with remedy represents for the CA the opportunity of completely eliminating the
type II error. More precisely, when given the choice between applying for the ED and
proposing remedy, firms may actually self-select, depending on the error probability of the
merger assessment. Indeed, the higher the quality of the merger assessment (of the signal,
basically), the higher the cost to notify an ineﬃcient merger without remedies. Thus, an
ineﬃcient merger is induced to propose remedies and it is possible that firms truthfully
signal the characteristics of their merger through the notification ultimately made, thus
eliminating the information asymmetry.
This allows us to conclude that if the welfare cost of accepting an ineﬃcient merger
is quite high, the CA prefers to allow remedies in addition to the ED rather than an ED
decision rule without remedies, so as to make firms self-select according to their level of
eﬃciencies. In turn, if the CA can instead aﬀord to privilege the eﬀort incentive provision,
because the welfare loss of an ineﬃcient merger is not too prohibitive, then it will rather
apply the ED without allowing remedies. Basically, we provide an answer to what should
be the best merger policy, considering the relative importance of the two types of merger
control errors. We argue that if the benefit expected from an eﬃcient merger is high, the
best policy consists in applying an ED without allowing remedies. Instead, if an ineﬃcient
merger without remedies is highly harmful, the combination of remedies and ED is more
appropriate for maximizing expected welfare.
5.1.3 Related literature
The true novelty of our study is to examine the interaction between remedies and ED,
which together shape nowadays most merger regulations. To our knowledge no work has
been done on this topic, and this chapter contributes to filling the gap3.
3 Incidentally, part of our results are close to those obtained by Häckner and Razo (2004) for congested
markets, according to which the competition authority would better refrain from divestitures if it aims at
eﬃciencies and consumer surplus gains. Instead, we argue this intuition based on the ex ante respective
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However, the ex ante eﬀects of the merger policy in general have already been pointed
out in the literature. Neven et al. (1993) note that merger control may result in "mergers
that would otherwise be attractive to firms, but that they do not even try to undertake
because of fear that they will not be approved [...] or in transactions that may take
place in a form diﬀerent from that they would have taken in the absence of regulation",
which Aaronson (1992) sums up as a frequency-based deterrence eﬀect (merger plans being
forsaken) and a composition-based deterrence eﬀect (mergers being shaped diﬀerently).
Seldeslachts et al (2006) briefly review the literature suggesting that the merger policy
instruments do have ex ante eﬀects on firms’ merging projects, before testing for the
deterrence eﬀects of these instruments. Persson (2004) criticizes the tendency to enforce a
stricter merger policy, as he claims it may turn out to be counterproductive, because it can
increase the incentive for predation4. In his turn, Ecer (2005) shows that the tendency
to apply a stricter merger policy may be instead ineﬀective, since firms endowed with
rational expectations are able to bypass it. Basically, he argues that it does make sense
to assume that merging firms react to the existing merger control provisions by designing
merger projects accordingly, much in the vein of Besanko and Spulber (1993): "the size
and type of firms that contemplate mergers are determined not only by the anticipated
returns from the merger but also by antitrust merger enforcement"5.
Thus, the first point we make, concerning the positive ex ante eﬀect of the ED on
firms’ incentives to undertake more eﬃcient mergers, is quite recurrent actually. The
incentives of the eﬃciency defence and merger remedies.
4 In the field of patent law and innovation policy, Caillaud and Duchene (2004) similarly argue that a
stricter regulation is not optimal. The article addresses the overload problem faced by the US patent oﬃce,
and obtains that the optimal patent assessment process should be rather lenient and accept a number of
"bad" patents within a pooling equilibrium, because this encourages the up-stream R&D, so that more
"good" patents would eventually be granted.
5See also Barros (2003) for a study of the change in the design of cooperative agreements induced by
the shift from an ex ante notification regime to one of ex post control under the European Commission
reform of the Communitary competition policy. Accordingly, the ex-post control of agreements is shown to
induce the self-selection of more competitive projects, since partners face a higher opportunity cost than
in the case of the ex ante notification regime. See also Bergès-Sennou et al. (2004) on the same topic, but
from an opposite standpoint (i.e. identifying the optimal strategy in terms of competition policy).
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intuition is simple: industry firms have lower incentives to seek for more competitive deals
if the competition authority does not take into account their eﬀort to do so. According to
Jorde and Teece (1990) (see also Shapiro and Willig (1990)), the fact that in the 80s the
joint ventures were cleared in Europe after a global economic evaluation under the 85(3)
article was considered to give higher incentives for firms engaging in innovating cooperative
agreements. Typically, the argument of the parties in favour of their cooperation was
the prior costly investment undertaken to smooth technological transfer and to enhance
the complementarities between partners, and in the US it was feared that the stricter
antitrust control applied there deterred American joint ventures contemplating innovation.
Actually, the modelling intuition that we retain from these papers is their example of the
ex ante eﬀort argued by the joint venture partners - we build on it for modelling the
endogenous eﬃciency gains (see also Fabrizi and Lippert (2004) and Cabolis et al. (2005)
for models of endogenous eﬃciency gains obtained through mergers).
By the same token, the ex ante incentive properties of merger remedies have also been
more or less pointed out. Antitrust authorities have long now shown a keen tendency
to employ remedies to alleviate the anti-competitive eﬀect of proposed mergers instead
of engaging in preventions, which makes the use of remedies appear as a signal of a
"soft" merger policy6 (see Seldeslachts et al. (2006) for a recent test and confirmation
of this hypothesis). To a certain extent, we recall here a negative eﬀect of such ’soft’
merger control, where remedies may encourage firms to untruthfully claim eﬃciency gains
by softening the threat of blocking the merger. On the other hand, along with Farrell
(2003) and Vasconcelos (2005,b), we also quote the negative eﬀect of remedies of lowering
the incentives to look for (and eventually submit) a more eﬃcient merger. Vasconcelos
(2005,b) obtains this in a model where the competition authority makes use of divestitures
to implement its most preferred market structure (i.e. "overfix" the merger, by going
beyond the corrective purpose of the remedy), and thereby may actually discourage firms
6For instance, the European Commission (EC) has of late solely relied on structural and behavioral
remedies by blocking only one merger since 2001 (the ENI/EDP/GDP case in 2004). In the US, remedies
constituted only twenty-three percent of US merger policy actions in the late 1980s, but by the year 2000,
remedies were employed in over sixty percent of US merger cases requiring antitrust action (see Parker
and Balto (2000)).
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to undertake more eﬃcient mergers.
Finally, what distinguishes our contribution from others dealing with the ED as an in-
formation process - besides the fact that we consider a merger control framework allowing
for both remedies and ED - is that we do not focus on the implications of the information-
related evidence production costs associated with the information asymmetry between
merging firms and the CA. The ED is known to give rise to exacting information require-
ments, and Gonzalez (2004) examines the optimal information disclosing about eﬃciency
gains from interested parties (merging firms and competitors) to find that the insiders
should take on the burden of proof for eﬃciencies. Such burden of proof necessarily yields
a substantial increase in administrative costs for merger control, and the discussion of
its implications is important for the economic analysis of the ED. Not surprisingly, the
explicit acknowledgement of the ED in the ECMR was actually long debated because of
its associated implementation costs (see Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn (2001) for a review). An
important argument against the ED was the possibly prohibitive cost of information acqui-
sition due to the context of asymmetric information for the CA, because without perfect
information, the ED procedure necessarily raises the question of the costly verification of
those alleged eﬃciency gains. Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005) explicitly address this issue,
and conclude on the conditions necessary for the cost trade-oﬀ to warrant an ED. They
obtain that an ED is not worth while if it is too costly for society as a whole, through the
evidence production costs it entails on behalf of the merging firms. Still, this result does
not take into account the possibility for merging firms to manipulate information or cheat.
Medvedev (2004,b) considers this to explain the opportunity of a fuzzy approval rule (i.e.
approval probabilities between zero and one), by means of a signalling game where the
CA clears mergers with some positive probability, based on its observation of both the
evidence supporting the eﬃciencies claims, and the costly eﬀort to produce it.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Next we present the model,
then we establish a benchmark for our ED analysis, so as to go on then to explore the
interaction between ED and remedies. Last, we discuss the implications for merger control.
We conclude before presenting all technical proofs in a final section.
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5.2 A simple model of merger control with eﬃciency defence
Consider the following simple model of merger control between the CA on the one
hand and the merging firms (called insiders) on the other, the latter proposing to merge
on an oligopolistic market. We do not explicitly model the type of competition, because
our results simply do not depend on it. As a matter of fact, for the purpose of our model,
all that is important is that the merger has a twofold eﬀect: it will involve both a market
power increase and some potential eﬃciency gains (EG henceforth).
The latter can be either high or low, denoted e > e. The low EG are associated with a
merger for market power. In turn, to achieve the high EG, insiders need to undertake an
ex ante eﬀort, requiring a sunk cost F . This costly conception eﬀort to design beforehand
their association in a more eﬃcient manner yields an uncertain outcome for the insiders:
Pr(e/eﬀort) = q ∈ (0, 1], Pr(e/no eﬀort) = 0. If the eﬀort fails or is not made at all,
firms are left with the low EG e. Basically, this means that integrating two firms in the
most eﬀective and pro-competitive manner requires to spend costly resources designing
the merger project, and if the eﬀort fails, this may drain all the supposed benefits of the
deal.
We assume that whatever the level of these EG, insiders find it always profitable to
merge (thanks to the market power increase, basically). However, the joint profit increases
with the level of merger eﬃciency. In other words, Π(e) ≥ Π(e) ≥ Πi, where we denote by
Πi the insiders’ overall profit before merger.
To materialize their merger, insiders need the approval of the CA, which maximizes
"welfare" W , standing for either Consumers’ Surplus or Total Welfare - our qualitative
results are not sensitive to the explicit definition of the CA’s objective function7. All
that matters is that from the CA’s point of view the two possible merger types have
opposite welfare eﬀects: W (e) > Wi > W (e), where Wi denotes the initial, status-quo,
level of welfare. In other words, allowing a merger only increases welfare if the insiders
did succeed in their designing eﬀort, otherwise the CA would fare better by rejecting the
7The choice of welfare standard is irrelevant for our results, because our analysis is based on the impact
of remedy application on the adoption threshold for the ED. The precise level of this threshold does depend
on the welfare standard retained, but the mechanism behind the above-mentioned impact does not.
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merger.
We consider an asymmetric information framework for merger control, and assume
that the outcome of the eﬀort is private information of insiders. The CA only observes an
exogenous signal s, imperfectly correlated with the merger eﬃciency gains. s stands for all
the relevant hard information that the CA can use to make its decision, which is typically
obtained during the merger review process. In practice, the CA gathers information from
various sources, its own expertise, the insiders themselves, the outsiders, even consumers.
This information comes at a cost, it is certainly not exogenous 8, and parties are able to
manipulate it. Yet, for the purpose and outcome of our analysis, only the quality of this
information is relevant. Therefore we summarize all this data in an exogenous costless
signal (although in practice the CA does spend money and time to evaluate the merger),
to better highlight our choice not to focus on the evidence-production cost analysis. For
simplicity, denote the signal s ∈ {s, s}, with Pr(s/e) = Pr(s/e) = σ ∈ £12 , 1¤. Based on
this imperfect signal, the CA may very well reject eﬃcient mergers, or, on the contrary,
accept mergers that lower the welfare, hence the possibility for both type I and II errors.
However, the outcome of this imperfect merger control may improve if a second instru-
ment is used. More precisely, the possibility to clear an ineﬃcient merger is reduced if,
when submitting their merger, the insiders equally propose an eﬀective remedy. Merger
remedies are corrective measures under the shape of commitments of merging partners,
meant to prevent the negative market-power eﬀect of the merger, and typically involve
a private cost for the insiders. We model the remedy as such, and consequently assume
that Π(e) ≥ ΠR(e), e ∈ {e; e}, where ΠR(e) denotes the profit that insiders obtain when
their merger is subject to remedy. Still, despite this cost, eﬃcient insiders would make a
higher profit than ineﬃcient ones, ΠR(e) ≥ ΠR(e), if it had not been for the private cost
of eﬀort and its uncertain outcome: ΠR(e)−ΠR(e) < F
q
. In other words, we assume that
the remedy removes any incentive to exert eﬀort - otherwise, making eﬀort would always
be a dominant strategy, and there would be no incentive trade-oﬀ to discuss. Finally, as
far as the CA’s objective is concerned, we assume the remedy to be eﬀective, meaning
that when applied for an ineﬃcient merger, it will improve welfare: WR(e) ≥Wi.
8See Lagerlöﬀ and Heidhues (2005) for a model based on endogenous and costly signals.
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The timing of events is the following:
At the first stage, the CA chooses a decision rule for merger clearance, and credibly
commits to it by making it public under the form of merger guidelines, which become
binding from that moment on. We detail below the decision rules we consider.
At the second stage, insiders make their eﬀort decision and privately observe its
outcome.
At the third stage, insiders submit a merger proposal to the CA. Their merger sub-
mission may contain remedies, in accordance with the first stage merger policy provisions
(i.e. provided the decision rule retained allows for remedy).
At the fourth stage, the exogenous signal on eﬃciencies is generated and publicly
observed. The merger is then cleared or blocked, according to the decision rule chosen at
the first stage.
The decision rules basically specify under which terms the ED and the remedies apply.
Allowing an ED will be interpreted here as a decision rule for merger approval which takes
into account the exogenous signal received on the mergers’ eﬃciency gains. By the same
token, allowing remedies comes down to applying a decision rule according to which a
merger is accepted provided it has proposed remedy. More precisely, at the first stage of
the game, the CA makes its choice between the following three decision rules:
- a "remedy" decision rule, meaning "allow any merger iﬀ it has proposed remedy"
- a "strict ED" decision rule: "allow a merger iﬀ the signal s is observed"
- a "flexible ED" decision rule: "allow the merger if the signal s is observed or if it has
proposed remedy".
By assumption, whenever a merger is rejected, under either decision rule, the status-
quo is maintained. Based on these decision rules, we will be able to assess the consequences
of allowing remedy together with the ED. In other words, we begin by examining the
opportunity to allow the strict ED, then go on to check for the opportunity to allow the
flexible ED. Note that the diﬀerence between the two ED decision rules consists of the
possibility for firms to propose or not remedy when submitting their merger. In other
words, by examining the opportunity to allow one or another of the ED decision rules, we
will be able to conclude actually on the opportunity for the CA to commit to allowing
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remedy or not when applying an ED9.
5.2.1 The eﬃciency defence as an incentive device
We consider here a "benchmark" situation, where only the strict ED and the remedy
decision rule are available, but mutually exclusive. In other words, if the ED is adopted,
the remedy decision rule no longer applies, so merging firms cannot propose remedy when
submitting their merger. Equivalently, they do not have the possibility of choosing be-
tween attempting the ED and proposing remedy, only the first possibility being available
whenever the CA allows it. The benchmark situation thus defined is helpful to determine
the opportunity to allow for the strict ED.
Basically, the CA decides whether to allow or not the ED based on the expected
welfare, therefore the choice will depend on the quality of available information. The
following proposition deals with the opportunity of allowing the strict ED:
Proposition 5.1
The (strict) ED decision rule is chosen only for a suﬃcient quality of information:
there exists eσ such that for σ ≥ eσ the CA applies it.
See proof at the end of the chapter.
Basically, the ED is chosen only for a suﬃcient quality of information. This is so
because two conditions need to be fulfilled in order for the application of the ED to be
preferred to that of remedies, both requiring a suﬃcient quality of merger assessment. On
the one hand, firms would be led to exert eﬀort under this decision rule, and on the other
hand, the resulting expected welfare should be higher than without the ED.
The former condition will yield a certain threshold in terms of signal quality, because
firms’ incentives to exert eﬀort under the ED decision rule depend on the quality of the
subsequent merger assessment (basically, a private rationality condition). Explicitly, if the
signal is very poor, so that the EG are rarely recognized as such, then the eﬀort is not
9Note this is much in the spirit of Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005), who check for the opportunity to apply
an ED. We will be able to examine the opportunity of allowing remedy together with the ED, in addition
to establishing when the ED itself is desirable.
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worth while, since it is costly and its outcome uncertain. We denote by σ∗ this threshold
above which the firms are induced to exert eﬀort with the strict ED rule. From the CA’s
point of view, firms having exerted eﬀort is a necessary, but not suﬃcient condition to
allow the ED. Indeed, even if the insiders did succeed their costly eﬀort, the expected
welfare may still be inferior to that obtained without the ED, precisely if the quality of
information is too poor to ensure an accurate assessment of the EG, i.e. if the welfare loss
due to both type I and II errors is too important. These are unjustified approvals (type
II error, "false positive") and unjustified prohibitions (type I-error, "false negative"), and
in both cases the potentially achievable level of economic welfare is not attained. Thus
this second condition equally yields a threshold in terms of signal quality, such that the
welfare improves above this threshold. Proposition 5.1 fixes the relevant information
quality threshold eσ to be the maximum between the two critical levels thus identified, so
as to make sure that both conditions are fulfilled.
Note that the relevant threshold for the strict ED adoption depends directly on the
magnitude of the welfare levels corresponding to the two types, W (e) and W (e) respec-
tively. More precisely, the lower the welfare loss W (e), the higher the cost of type II error
and therefore the higher the threshold eσ. By the same token, the higher the welfare gain
W (e), the higher the opportunity cost of not allowing the ED, so the lower eσ.
Proposition 5.1 emphasizes that the higher the quality of information, the more likely
is the ED rule, meaning that the latter can be optimal despite the imperfect information
and the ensuing possibility to accept some ineﬃcient mergers. Note however that even
for extremely precise signals, which guarantee both eﬀort exertion and a higher expected
welfare than with remedy, the ED decision rule always leaves open the possibility of a
welfare loss. Instead, the remedy decision rule also guarantees a welfare improvement,
although potentially lower than the ED since it does not provide eﬀort incentives, but
prevents any type II errors. This basically highlights the trade-oﬀ for the CA’s choice to
apply the ED decision rule, between what we call an "incentive eﬀect" and a "type II error
eﬀect". On the one hand, by allowing the ED, the CA gives firms incentives to exert eﬀort
and thereby to propose an eﬃcient merger. This basically lowers the final cost of type I
errors, given the imperfect merger assessment, and represents the "incentive" eﬀect of the
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ED. On the other hand, by not allowing the ED and instead applying the remedy decision
rule, the CA prevents any type II error. This is the "type II error" eﬀect.
Keeping this in mind, the question we ask next concerns the way in which this basic
trade-oﬀ is aﬀected if remedies are allowed in addition to the ED rule, and the likely
consequences in terms of incentive and type II error eﬀect.
5.2.2 Merger control with remedies and eﬃciency defence
We begin by determining when the choice of the flexible ED decision rule is made rather
than the application of the remedy one. This comes down to finding when the CA chooses
whether to apply or an ED, knowing that in both cases the remedy is another possibility
to clear the merger. In other words, by examining the opportunity of the flexible ED, we
can assess the impact of remedy on the way the available information is exploited.
A backwards induction through the game is necessary, but since the last stage of the
game contains no strategic move, we begin our analysis at the merger notification stage.
At this stage, the essential change with respect to the benchmark situation is that the ED
and the remedy are no longer mutually exclusive. Since a merger is cleared either if the
signal s is observed, or if a remedy is proposed, insiders are basically given the opportunity
to choose their merger notification: it may either contain a remedy, thus guaranteeing its
acceptance, or it may not contain a remedy, in which case they run the risk of rejection.
The following result gives the impact on the outcome of the submission subgame of
the possibility to propose remedy:
Lemma 5.1
There exists two signal quality thresholds, σ and σ, σ < σ, such that the outcome of
the submission subgame is as follows:
(i) for low quality signals, σ < σ, only eﬃcient insiders ( e-mergers) propose to under-
take remedy;
(ii) for medium quality signals, σ < σ < σ, either all mergers are submitted with
remedy, or none;
(iii) for high quality signals, σ > σ, only ineﬃcient insiders ( e-mergers) propose to
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undertake remedy.
See proof at the end of the chapter.
We find that allowing the flexible ED gives insiders the opportunity to self-select by
means of the merger notification they make. This outcome of possible self-selection de-
pends on the probability of assessment error, or, equivalently, on the quality of available
information. More precisely, for very poor signals such that the probability for EG to be
recognized as such is very low, insiders which did obtain these EG do not run the risk of re-
jection with the ED, but propose instead remedy with their merger to ensure its approval.
In turn, for very good signals, such that the probability of detecting an ineﬃcient merger is
very high, ineﬃcient insiders will not run the risk of an ED and prefer to propose remedy.
Finally, for intermediate signal qualities, both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient insiders choose the
same type of notification, either with remedy or without, so no self-selection occurs, as in
the benchmark situation.
The intuition behind this result is simple. For very good signals, the probability of
detecting an ineﬃcient merger is very high, thus ineﬃcient insiders prefer to propose
remedy whereas eﬃcient ones propose the merger without remedy. Yet, if the information
quality is lower, the opportunity cost of an ineﬃcient firm to propose a merger with
remedy increases, because there are less chances for it to be rejected if it attempts the
ED. Thus, a lower signal quality gives incentives to ineﬃcient insiders to propose a merger
without remedy. As far as the eﬃcient insiders are concerned, the opposite occurs. If the
information quality is poor, the probability for a merger without remedy to be rejected is
high, so the opportunity cost to argue the ED, without remedy, increases. In short, for
low quality signals the eﬃcient insiders prefer to submit a merger with remedy.
At this point, it is worth pointing out that besides their corrective role, remedies can
possibly convey information on the level of merger eﬃciency gains. As a matter of fact, by
being given and making the choice to propose or not remedy, merger partners may signal
the type of their merger. Thus, for σ > σ, the choice to propose or not remedy allows the
eﬃcient insiders to signal themselves out and to self-select.
At the previous stage, when choosing the type of the merger by deciding to make eﬀort
or not, insiders anticipate the outcome of the notification subgame. Since the possibility
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to propose remedy gives the opportunity to self-select for certain signal quality ranges, it
implicitly aﬀects the firms’ expected payoﬀ from making eﬀort over these intervals. There-
fore, as compared with the benchmark case, we can see its impact on the eﬀort incentives
provided by the ED. This impact also depends on the quality of available information,
and is given by the following:
Lemma 5.2
Define σ∗R such that for σ ≥ σ∗R insiders undertake eﬀort under the "flexible" ED;
then σ∗R ≥ σ∗, where for σ ≥ σ∗ firms undertake eﬀort under the "strict" ED.
See proof at the end of the chapter.
As indicated in Proposition 5.1, individual rationality requires firms to make the costly
eﬀort only for suﬃciently accurate signals, because the assessment of eﬃciency gains is
subject to errors. The possibility of proposing remedy when the CA allows the ED has
an impact on the signal quality that is deemed suﬃcient for eﬀort to be made. With this
respect, Lemma 5.2 claims that under the "flexible" ED rule the ex ante eﬀort incentives
are lower than under the "strict" ED rule10. As a result, the information quality requisite
is higher than in the benchmark situation.
The result given in Lemma 5.2 is explained by the fact that the remedy basically
softens the threat of a merger rejection, and thereby modifies the opportunity cost of the
ED. More precisely, from the insiders’ point of view, the possibility to propose remedy
increases the opportunity cost of notifying a merger with the ED. To make their eﬀort
decision, firms take into account the expected payoﬀ, and implicitly therefore the outcome
of the relevant alternative. In the benchmark situation, making eﬀort was individually
rational as soon as the expected profit (increasing with the signal quality) outweighed the
status-quo profit, since proposing remedy was not available for firms under the "strict"
ED decision rule, so the relevant alternative was the payoﬀ in case of merger rejection. In
turn, when the decision rule takes into account the remedy submission, the eﬀort becomes
10This holds actually for suﬃciently accurate signals, σ ≥ σ. We show in the proof that even though
the remedy does enhance the eﬀort incentive for the lowest signals, σ < σ, this does not alter the firms’
ultimate eﬀort decision, which is not to make eﬀort. This is the reason why in the proof of Lemma 5.2 we
stress that σ∗ > σ.
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rational provided it yields a higher expected profit than the payoﬀ with remedy. Simply
because firms can always choose to propose remedy and thereby avoid the status-quo, the
payoﬀ with remedy becomes now the relevant payoﬀ alternative, and this is superior to
the status-quo payoﬀ. Insiders might be more easily content with this high alternative
payoﬀ, and therefore require a more accurate assessment of EG in order to give it up, and
instead run the risk of an uncertain eﬀort to submit afterwards a merger without remedy.
As a result, the relevant threshold for eﬀort exertion under the "flexible" ED decision rule
is superior to that under the "strict" one. And since the signal quality requisite is higher,
the eﬀort incentives are lower.
Thus, from the CA’s standpoint, simultaneously allowing for both the ED and remedies
leads to two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, the remedy reduces the ex ante eﬀort
incentive of the merger policy. On the other, it can provide a means for firms to self-
select, and hence it can dramatically improve the outcome of merger control, by removing
completely the possibility of a welfare loss, i.e. making a type II error and accepting
ineﬃcient mergers - this is actually the case whenever the quality information is above
the threshold σ. Therefore, the decision to allow or not simultaneously both remedy and
the ED (within the "flexible" ED decision rule) implies for the CA to choose between
minimizing type I errors, and completely avoiding type II errors.
We address next the choice of decision rule at the first stage of the game, for which we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 5.2
(i) If eσ < Max(σ∗R, σ), then:
- for σ < eσ, the CA does not allow an ED and only applies the remedy decision rule;
- for eσ < σ < Max(σ∗R, σ), the CA allows the strict ED ;
- for σ > Max(σ∗R, σ), the CA allows the flexible ED.
(ii) If eσ ≥Max(σ∗R, σ), then:
- for σ < Max(σ∗R, σ), the CA does not allow an ED and only applies the remedy
decision rule;
- for σ > Max(σ∗R, σ), the CA allows the flexible ED.
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Proposition 5.2 gives the optimal decision rule of the CA depending on the quality of
information available. This outcome results from the comparison of adoption thresholds
for the strict and respectively the flexible ED rules - see the details at the end of the
chapter.
Basically, two configurations may arise, depending on the relative position of these two
thresholds. The first one corresponds to a rather low welfare cost of the type II error, which
explains that the threshold eσ for the strict ED adoption is low itself: eσ < Max(σ∗R, σ). In
such a case, the possibility of remedy in addition to the ED does not aﬀect the opportunity
to allow an ED rule, because the information quality threshold above which the CA resorts
to an ED remains equal to eσ. In other words, there is a range of quality signals for which the
CA prefers to refrain from allowing remedies together with the ED. Nevertheless, for high
information quality (σ > Max(σ∗R, σ)), the CA turns to the flexible ED rule. The second
configuration corresponds to a high cost of the type II error, yielding a restrictive/low
threshold for the strict ED rule adoption: eσ ≥ Max(σ∗R, σ). In this case, the possibility
of remedies in addition to ED ’hastens’ the application of the ED, because the CA does
so (under the form of the flexible ED rule) as soon as the quality information exceeds
Max(σ∗R, σ), rather than eσ as in the case of a strict ED rule. In both configurations, for
the lowest quality signals, the CA will not allow an ED, but will only apply the remedy
decision rule.
To better seize the result given in Proposition 5.2, we remind that the choice between
an ED rule (either strict or flexible) and remedy gives rise to a trade-oﬀ between the
incentive eﬀect and the type II error eﬀect, whose result depends on the signal quality (the
benefit of an ED rule being to provide incentives to exert ex-ante the eﬀort, while its cost
being to lead the CA to accept an ineﬃcient merger because of the signal imperfection).
Furthermore, the comparison between the two ED rules given in Lemma 5.2 indicated that
while the strict ED rule provides higher eﬀort incentives than the flexible ED rule, the
latter can lead insiders to signal their merger type, thus possibly avoiding the approval
of ineﬃcient mergers. More precisely, the flexible ED rule induces this self-selection for
a suﬃcient signal quality (σ ≥ σ), thus providing both gives incentives and improved
expected welfare for an information quality above Max(σ∗R, σ). The result in Proposition
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5.2 can be explained based on these two eﬀects as follows.
If the cost of type II error is prohibitive (a very low level of W (e)), the threshold eσ is
high in itself, meaning that the quality of information required to make tolerable from the
welfare viewpoint the risk to accept an ineﬃcient merger is high. In that case, the flexible
ED rule is preferable to the strict ED because when applied, it induces insiders to signal
their merger type and thus it prevents the clearance of ineﬃcient mergers. That is why
whenever eσ ≥ Max(σ∗R, σ), by allowing the flexible ED rule as soon as σ ≥ Max(σ∗R, σ),
the CA actually widens up the interval of signal quality warranting the adoption of an
ED. This is strictly preferred by the CA, because throughout this extended ED adoption
range, maximizing welfare is obtained while eliminating the very costly type II error.
If instead eσ < Max(σ∗R, σ), then the incentive eﬀect of the ED dominates the type II
error eﬀect for the intermediary range of signal quality σ ∈ (eσ,Max(σ∗R, σ)). This is the
case whenever the potential negative welfare eﬀect W (e) is actually not too prohibitive
in itself (W (e) not much inferior to Wi). In this configuration the CA prefers to start
allowing the ED in the form of the the strict ED rule rather than the flexible one, since
the former makes firms exert eﬀort for lower information quality than the latter. Still,
when the information quality is so high that under the flexible ED insiders both exert
eﬀort as well as signal their type upon notification, i.e. for σ ≥ Max(σ∗R, σ), the type II
error eﬀect becomes dominant, and leads the CA to adopt the flexible ED rule. That is
why in both configurations, whenever σ is higher thanMax(σ∗R, σ), the CA always adopts
the flexible ED rule.
The adoption of an ED gives rise to errors, and the commitment to either allow or
prohibit remedies is likely to impact on both types of error. We obtain here that the
combined application of ED and remedy is relatively more valuable from the point of view of
the outcome of merger control when type II errors are particularly costly, whereas the policy
aimed at minimizing the cost of type I errors requires to refrain from remedies and adopt
a strict ED rule. Incidentally, this responds to the warning (Christiansen (2006)) that
the importance of type II errors will increase following the explicit ED acknowledgement
within the 2004 European Merger Regulation.
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5.3 Conclusion
This chapter draws attention to the likely consequences of the adoption of an ED
procedure, given the general current context of its application, i.e. asymmetric information
for the CA, and generalized use of merger remedies. The former point was actually invoked
to delay the European ED, by arguing costly implementation issues. We claim here that
a possible ex ante positive eﬀect, in the shape of incentives to encourage more eﬃcient
mergers, should equally be accounted for, despite the asymmetric information problem.
The second point is intimately related to the first, due to the interaction between remedy
and ED. The examination of this interplay is the original and more important contribution
of our paper. We study the impact of remedy on the incentive provided by and the outcome
of the ED, and conclude on the opportunity of combining the two, depending on the quality
of information underlying the merger assessment.
5.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5.1. When the strict ED is allowed, firms have incentives to
exert the costly eﬀort as long as
q (σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi)) + (1− q)((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)− F ≥ (1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)
Define σ∗ such that ((σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi))− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)) ≡ Fq .
The LHS term being increasing with σ, for σ ≥ σ∗ firms exert eﬀort under the strict
ED rule.
From the CA’s point of view, the strict ED decision rule yields a higher expected
welfare than the alternative, remedy decision rule, iﬀ
q(σW (e) + (1− σ)Wi) + (1− q)(σWi + (1− σ)W (e)) ≥WR(e)
Define bσ such that q(σW (e) + (1− σ)Wi) + (1− q)(σWi + (1− σ)W (e)) ≡WR(e)
The LHS term is increasing with σ, so for σ ≥ bσ, the strict ED decision yields a higher
expected welfare.
Define eσ = max (σ∗, bσ); for σ ≥ eσ the CA is better oﬀ allowing the strict ED; otherwise,
it prefers to stick to the remedy decision rule and does not allow the strict ED.
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Proof of Lemma 5.1. At the 3rd stage, insiders having succeeded the eﬀort to achieve
the EG will submit merger with remedy iﬀ
σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi < ΠR(e)⇔ σ <
ΠR(e)−Πi
Π(e)−Πi
= bσe
Insiders without EG will submit merger with remedy iﬀ
σΠi + (1− σ)Π(e) < ΠR(e)⇔ σ >
Π(e)−ΠR(e)
Π(e)−Πi
= bσ
Define σ such that σ = min (bσe; bσ) and σ such that σ = max (bσe; bσ)
For σ < σ, only the eﬃcient insiders propose remedy with their merger, whereas for
σ > σ only the ineﬃcient do so. For intermediate quality signals, either both types propose
remedies, or neither.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Eﬀort choice (Stage 2 decision)
Following Lemma 5.1, for σ < σ, only the eﬃcient insiders propose remedy with
their merger, therefore eﬀort is made iﬀ
qΠR(e) + (1− q)((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)− F ≥ ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)
⇔ q
¡
ΠR(e)− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)
¢
≥ F
For σ < σ < σ, either all mergers are submitted with remedy or none;
- if both types propose remedy, eﬀort is made whenever
qΠR(e) + (1− q)ΠR(e)− F ≥ ΠR(e)⇔ q
¡
ΠR(e)−ΠR(e)
¢
≥ F
but this contradicts the initial assumption, so eﬀort is never undertaken!
- if neither type proposes remedy, then eﬀort is made iﬀ
q (σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi)) + (1− q)((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)− F ≥ (1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)
⇔ q [((σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi))− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi))] ≥ F
Finally, for σ > σ only the ineﬃcient firms propose remedy (and thereby self-
select), so eﬀort is made iﬀ
q (σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi)) + (1− q)ΠR(e)− F ≥ ΠR(e)
⇔ q (σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi)−ΠR(e)) ≥ F
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Comparison of eﬀort incentives w.r.t. the benchmark situation, i.e. be-
tween the "flexible" and the "strict" ED:
The condition ensuring eﬀort if σ < σ is given by:


”flexible"⇒ q
¡
ΠR(e)− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)
¢
≥ F
”strict"⇒ q [(σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi)− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi))] ≥ F
⇒ the flexible regime yields higher eﬀort incentive than the strict one because the
corresponding condition is less strict, due to ΠR(e) > (σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi) for σ < bσ (see
Lemma 5.1). However, for σ < bσ , one equally has (1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi) > ΠR(e), therefore¡
ΠR(e)− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi)
¢
<
¡
ΠR(e)−ΠR(e)
¢
which in its turn < F
q
by assumption.
The bottom line is that eﬀort is never undertaken for σ < σ, and consequently we can
state that σ < σ∗, where σ∗ was defined as the threshold for eﬀort exertion under the
strict ED (see the proof of Proposition 5.1).
If σ < σ < σ, the condition ensuring eﬀort is


”flexible"⇒



either q
¡
ΠR(e)−ΠR(e)
¢
≥ F , if firms propose to remedy
or q [((σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi))− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi))] ≥ F , otherwise
”strict"⇒ q [(σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi)− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi))] ≥ F
⇒Since q
¡
ΠR(e)−ΠR(e)
¢
≥ F is impossible, so no eﬀort is made in this case, we
conclude that the two ED decision rules are equivalent in terms of incentives, provided
that under the flexible ED types do not pool on proposing remedy; otherwise, the strict
ED yields higher eﬀort incentives that the flexible one.
Finally, for σ > σ the conditions ensuring eﬀort exertion are respectively


”flexible"⇒ q (σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi)−ΠR(e)) ≥ F
”strict"⇒ q [((σΠ(e) + (1− σ)Πi))− ((1− σ)Π(e) + σΠi))] ≥ F
⇒Given that ΠR(e)>((1−σ)Π(e)+σΠi)) for σ > σ (see Lemma5.2 for the self-selection
eﬀect), we conclude that the flexible regime provides lower eﬀort incentives than the strict
one.
Conclusion: denoting by σ∗R the signal quality threshold such that for σ ≥ σ∗R insiders
undertake the eﬀort under the flexible ED, the outcome of the above incentive comparison
can be summarized as follows: σ∗R ≥ σ∗ throughout σ < σ < σ, and σ∗R > σ∗ for σ > σ.
To sum up, we obtain that σ∗R ≥ σ∗.
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Proof of Proposition 5.2. To conclude on the optimal decision rule to adopt, depending
on the quality of available information, we compare the expected welfare levels. Hence we
need first compare the relevant threshold for the adoption of the strict, and respectively
flexible, ED decision rules.
Following Proposition 5.1, the adoption threshold for the strict ED rule is eσ. By the
same token, the relevant threshold for the adoption of the flexible ED rule is Max(σ∗R, σ),
because under this rule firms exert eﬀort for σ∗R, (see Lemma 5.2), whereas for σ > σ
the self-selection eﬀect (see Lemma 5.1) guarantees that no ineﬃcient merger is accepted.
Therefore, for σ ≥ Max(σ∗R, σ) the flexible ED is optimal from the point of view of the
expected welfare, because it actually yields the highest possible expected welfare (thanks
to both eﬀort exertion and elimination of type II errors).
The adoption thresholds for the strict and respectively flexible ED rules are entirely
independent/unrelated, therefore two cases are possible and need to be considered: eithereσ < Max(σ∗R, σ), or eσ ≥Max(σ∗R, σ).
In terms of expected welfare, when the CA applies the remedy decision rule it obtains
WR(e). As soon as the strict ED rule is allowed, it yields an expected welfare of q(σW (e)+
(1− σ)Wi) + (1− q)(σWi + (1− σ)W (e), whereas the flexible ED improves the expected
welfare to q (σW (e) + (1− σ)Wi) + (1− q)WR(e) whenever adopted.
Chapter 6
Crafting and negotiating
divestiture contracts to reveal the
merger eﬃciency gains
Truth is the safest lie.
(Jewish proverb)
This chapter is based on "Merger Control with Asymmetric Information: What Remedies Can
and Cannot Achieve", Cahiers de la MSE n◦ 2005 - 47, co-authored with Jean-Philippe Tropéano.
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6.1 Introduction
When dealing with an anti-competitive merger, to answer the question "how can the
competition threat be best eliminated" the Competition Authority (CA) has basically the
choice between rejecting it or accepting it provided that corrective remedies are adopted.
The 2005 Remedy Study of the European Commission DG Comp1 counted no less than 190
concentrations cleared with commitments from a total of 2469 mergers since the introduc-
tion of the EC Merger Regulation in 1990. It might look like a small number, but a closer
look at the Commission’s statistics reveals that remedies typically apply to consequential
mergers2. Moreover, about 80% of those commitments address horizontal concerns. Di-
vestitures, i.e. structural remedies, are typically used to modify horizontal mergers, and
account for more than 60% of all remedies. They are preferred to behavioral ones, because
they change the allocation of property rights within the industry, and therefore need no
monitoring once implemented. Nevertheless, their application and eﬀects have often been
subject to questioning, because as Blumenthal (2001) puts it, "the fashioning of merger
remedies is not materially governed by case law [and therefore] is subject to standards
that are not well-defined or consistent".
6.1.1 Purpose and relevance
This chapter aims to contribute to the economic analysis of structural merger remedies
by taking into account the merger’s potential eﬃciency gains for their design. Our model
formalizes the intuition of a link between the amount of eﬃciency gains that the merging
partners can achieve and the amount of assets they will have to divest for the merger to
be accepted. Such an idea is in line with the current consensus among competition policy
practitioners, according to which the remedy should neither exceed the net competitive
harm caused by the merger, nor prove insuﬃcient to correct it (that is, both overfixing
1Merger Remedies Study, European Commission, DG Comp, October 2005, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html
2Examples for such mergers, cleared with commitments under the new European Merger Regulation
139/2004, are Pernod Ricard - Allied Domecq, Sanofi - Aventis, Alcan - Pechiney.
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and underfixing should be avoided3). According to this ’proportionality’ principle, the
remedies as "commitments should be proportionate to the competition problem and en-
tirely eliminate it " (the 2004 ECMR, paragraph 30). Taking into account the fact that
by balancing the potential eﬃciencies of the merger against its anticompetitive potential
CAs evaluate the net competition concern of the merger, the proportionality requires that
a larger divestiture be requested from a less eﬃcient merged entity than from a more
eﬃcient one, because the former raises a more important net competition concern. The
essential point is that in order to tailor the optimal remedy accordingly, the CA needs to
learn the eﬃciency gains generated by the merger, which are private information of the
merger partners.
Considering this, the second objective of this chapter is to shed light on the design of
optimal divestiture contracts when merging firms are better informed than the CA with
respect to the merger eﬃciencies. While the US Merger Guidelines do acknowledge that
"mergers have the potential to generate significant eﬃciencies", they warn at the same
time that "eﬃciencies are diﬃcult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the
information relating to eﬃciencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms"4.
Understandably, competition authorities are likely to try and extract this private in-
formation. Röller et al. (2001) suggested that a possible "approach in screening mergers
would be to implement a revelation mechanism through the institution of merger license
fees to be paid to the government", but they equally acknowledge that for the time being,
this is strictly theoretical5. In practice, the only revelation procedure implemented to
date concerns a bonding procedure based on an ex post verification of eﬃciency claims.
Thus, Brodley (1996) quotes it as a powerful way to extract private information on eﬃ-
ciency gains, whose eﬀectiveness was proved in the Pennsylvania versus Providence Health
Sys., Inc. case6, where the consent decree negotiated between the Pennsylvania Attorney
3See the Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, by the U.S. Department of Justice,
October 2004, and the Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No
4064/89 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98, Oﬃcial Journal C68, 2.3.2001.
4See the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/horiz_book/4.html
5Röller et al. (2001) report that small merger licence fees have been used in the UK, but not for
screening purposes - to our knowledge, this is the only stance were the use of licence fees is quoted.
6See more details in O’Connor, FTC Hearings, "Eﬃciencies: Should Current Antitrust Pol-
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General and the merging parties provided that if the alleged eﬃciencies did not translate
into net cost savings directly passed on to consumers five years later, the merging parties
engaged to pay to the Treasury the shortfall from the claimed eﬃciency gains.
We do not formalize here the implications of such a "put-up-or-shut-up" consent decree
based on ex post control. In turn, we model a competition authority extracting ex ante the
parties’ private information w.r.t. the eﬃciency gains so as to tailor the optimal structural
remedy. To do so, we propose a revelation mechanism combining the use of divestitures
with the regulation of their sale prices. Rather than asking "What role, if any, should a
competition authority play in the pricing of assets to be divested?"7, we examine here the
very rationale for interfering with the pricing of the divested assets, given the necessity to
identify a viable revelation mechanism.
For the time being, competition authorities do not tamper with the sale price of the
divested assets, although a complementary screening device in addition to divestitures
might prove necessary for an eﬀective revelation mechanism to screen merger proposals.
Their reluctance must be motivated by the fact that interfering with prices is basically
a regulator’s job8. Generally speaking, competition authorities resists becoming de facto
regulators because they typically lack the staﬀ, culture and set of instruments required of
such a role. Nevertheless, merger control is by definition a mixed area of antitrust and
regulation, where the CA is actually supposed to directly impact on the market structure
by rejecting anticompetitive mergers (see Motta et al. (2003) and Rey (2003)). One
might equally note that the scope of instruments employed has constantly increased, with
structural remedies themselves being actively and properly used as a merger policy tool as
late as 1976 with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act9. Furthermore, whenever the CA appoints a
divestiture trustee, merger control comes quite close to an indirect pricing of the divested
icy Be Changed?" November 7, 1995, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-
antitrust/eﬃciencies.pdf
7See the OECD report on Merger Remedies, DAF/COMP(2004)21, December 2004, p.33.
8 It is widely known for instance that competition authorities prefer structural remedies to behavioural
ones because the latter involve ex post monitoring, which they would rather avoid.
9See the Baer and Redcay (2003) comments on the implications of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976.
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assets: according to the ECMR10, a trustee is entitled to organize the sale of the divested
assets without a minimum price, subject though to the Commission’s approval. In related
fields, setting prices might equally be relevant, such as in punishing market power abuses
11, or to deal with intellectual property rights12.
The point we wish to make is that, notwithstanding competition laws do not currently
allow antitrust agencies to explicitly fix the price of divestitures, the latter might never-
theless reveal private information in the remedy negotiation process13. This idea would
provide an alternative, equivalent and appealing signaling-like interpretation for our rev-
elation mechanism, according to which a more eﬃcient merged entity will accept a lower
price for any given level of divestiture and it will successfully signal itself as such by doing
so, in contrast with a less eﬃcient entity. Our model argues in favour of the signalling
properties of a divestiture contract comprising the divested assets sale price, although to
do so we take a screening stand. We show the theoretical relevance of such an instrument,
although in practice, despite the apparent eagerness of merging parties to convey informa-
tion through the divestiture sale price, the competition agencies refrain from interpreting
it as a valid signal. After all, commenting on the proposed merger between Staples and
Oﬃce Depot including a divestiture oﬀer, the Washington Post dated March 13, 1997 did
note that "Because all three oﬃce product chains would benefit from the merger, and
with pressure from shareholders mounting, analysts said Staples agreed to accept about
$140 million less than it originally wanted from Oﬃce Max " (i.e. the proposed buyer of
divested assets), but still, the FTC challenged the merger and eventually gained in court.
10See the Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation, No 4064/89 and under
Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98, Oﬃcial Journal C 68, 02.03.2001
11According to the Wall Street Journal Europe, May 26, 2005, in the battle to force Microsoft to open
up the market for media-playing software, the European Commission would rather order a lower price for
Windows without Media Player
12Llobet et al. (2000) propose a "buy out" mechanism, where the price of the patent licence would be
set by the Patent Oﬃce.
13See Farrell (2003) for this intuition.
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6.1.2 Outline of model and results
Our model builds on a simple framework, which nevertheless allows for a consistent
formal treatment of both eﬃciency gains and structural remedies. We consider a Cournot
competition game with homogenous good, constant marginal costs and capacity con-
straints in a three-firm industry. Following a two-firm exogenous merger, the merged
entity may enjoy eﬃciency gains materializing as cost savings. Still, the merger may raise
an anticompetitive concern, therefore to fulfill its anti-trust relief objective, the CA will
require an asset transfers to the outsider. Divestitures alter the distribution of capital as-
sets between firms and thereby the capacity constraints and merger profitability for firms
in the industry. We look for the optimal transfer to implement according to the objective
of the CA: maximizing total welfare under the constraint that the Consumers’ Surplus
does not fall. We show that with symmetric information the optimal divestiture will be
proportional to the level of the competitive damage, meaning that less eﬃcient mergers
will need to divest more. But since the cost savings are private information for merging
partners (also called insiders), the latter are likely to cheat when declaring the amount of
eﬃciency gains generated by the merger, so as to avoid higher asset transfers. Thus the
divestiture alone will not be eﬀective as a screening device.
We argue here that a non linear tariﬀ for the divested assets can be successfully em-
ployed as a screening mechanism. Specifically, we use a two-type model, where the insiders
are either highly eﬃcient (low-cost) or poorly eﬃcient (high-cost). We show that the di-
vestiture deal that the CA proposes to the merged entity is a menu of two contracts. The
first contract consists of a lower divestiture for a lower average sale price than the second
one. The eﬃcient merged entity values its capacity more than the ineﬃcient one does,
therefore it is more reluctant to divest a large quantity of assets than the high-cost merged
entity, even though the corresponding monetary transfer is high. By the same token, since
assets have lower value for the ineﬃcient merged firm, the latter will find it profitable to
divest a large quantity of assets for a higher average price.
In other words, the CA clears the merger provided the merged entity pays a "licence
to merge", although not to the CA, we should stress, since the monetary transfer actually
takes place between the insiders and the buyer of divested assets. The optimal licence
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schedule proposed by the CA takes two forms. Firms ’pay’ either by divesting a large
quantity of assets in exchange of a high sale price, or by accepting a depreciated price
in exchange of a lower asset transfer. Hence the licence is essentially either a monetary
payment whenever few assets are divested at a low price, or an asset payment whenever a
large quantity of assets is divested. Facing these two possible types of licences to merge,
the more eﬃcient merged entity is induced to choose the least distorting form of payment,
the monetary one. Our model basically shows the eﬀectiveness of a screening contract
menu based on the sale price of divested assets, so it implicitly argues that such divestiture
contracts listing both the amount and price of divestiture could be used by merging firms to
successfully signal their eﬃciency claims. Notwithstanding the reluctance of competition
authorities to openly interfere with the pricing of the divested assets, close attention should
be paid to the asset prices as they result from the divestiture negotiation process, since
they may very well contribute to signalling the merger potential synergies.
6.1.3 Related literature
It was early noted that "In merger review, the selective provision of information creates
problems for government antitrust oﬃcials because much relevant information is held
privately by merging parties" (Yao and Dahdouh (1993, p.24)). Faulli-Oller and Corchon
(1999) examined for instance the possibility to implement socially optimal mergers, in spite
of this asymmetric information problem, based on standard tools in dominant strategy
implementation. They do obtain that this would not be successful, but without allowing
for one essential merger policy tool, namely remedies.
To our knowledge, few papers do so. Our model allows for divestitures, besides their
corrective role, to be used for screening purposes. Gonzalez (2003) was the first to propose
a formal setting for this intuition, in a model where the incentive mechanism combines
the obligation to divest assets with the choice of the market where the divestiture will
apply if accepted. As compared with Gonzalez (2003), our mechanism restricts the use
of divestiture to the same market on which the competitive harm occurs, and is also
thoroughly eﬀective - we obtain perfect revelation in addition to complete relief of the
competitive concern. In so doing, we basically formalize the intuition that the amount
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of asset transfer necessary to remedy the competitive harm depends on the amount of
eﬃciency gains generated by the merger, and thanks to the capacity constraint framework,
the distortion of asset transfers is not necessary to induce information revelation. Neither
of these are obtained for instance in the case of the screening mechanism proposed by
Féral (2006), combining the use of remedies with the payment of a tax on the divestiture
to the financial market supervising authority, although the starting intuition (i.e. a licence
to merge) is arguably the same as in our case.
At this point some remarks are necessary, to the extent that this chapter proposes the
first contribution to date which explicitly considers, for the analysis of a merger’s unilateral
eﬀects, the role of remedies in relation with the firms’ capacity constraints. By considering
capacity constraints, we underline the necessary condition for a divestiture to prove eﬀec-
tive, namely that the transferred assets should be really used by the purchaser to increase
output and thereby keep the market price low. If the asset buyer already holds slack ca-
pacity, the divestiture will only enhance the merger’s anti-competitive output-contraction
eﬀect. This cannot be accounted for in a model without capacity constraints. On the
other hand, our framework enables the modelling of remedies which do not undermine the
eﬃciencies that the transaction is designed to achieve. Indeed, if the asset holdings avail-
able to a firm entirely determine its marginal cost (which is, actually the main feature of
the widely used cost framework à la Perry and Porter (1985)), then requiring a remedy di-
vestiture from the merging firms will aﬀect any eﬃciency gains generated by the increased
amount of jointly-owned capital. Finally, this neutrality of the asset transfers w.r.t. the
eﬃciencies allows us to better highlight the particular nature of relevant merger eﬃcien-
cies (synergies are not mere capital-based cost savings). Note also that this dichotomy
between divestiture and eﬃciencies does not interfere with the proportionality between the
optimal necessary divestiture and the net competitive concern of the merger. In contrast,
both Medvedev (2004,a) and Féral (2006) explicitly assume substitutability between the
capital-based cost-savings and the merger synergies, as a result of which a more eﬃcient
merged entity will aﬀord to divest more - in Féral’s (2006) asymmetric information model,
this implies that rightful eﬃciency claims get signalled by the divestiture of more assets, so
the remedy goes beyond competitive relief and thereby generates productive ineﬃciency.
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Since it deals with structural remedies, the analysis proposed in this chapter also
belongs to a strand of literature analyzing the eﬀects of capital transfers between firms.
After Farrell and Shapiro (1990,b), which examined how capital transfers between Cournot
oligopolists aﬀect total industry profit or welfare, Compte et al. (2002) and Vasconcelos
(2005,a) looked into the eﬀects of asset transfers, but from a collusive industry point of
view. We completely rule out coordinated eﬀects, and focus only on the unilateral eﬀects
of the concentration. The same was done, but in a symmetric information framework,
by Medvedev (2004,a) and Vasconcelos (2005,b), who moreover share the same modeling
choice of marginal cost decreasing with capital holdings à la Perry and Porter (1985).
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. We present first the market
equilibria both before and after merger, taking simultaneously into account eﬃciency gains
as well as asset transfers. We then go on to present the game between industry firms and
the CA. For the design of optimal remedies, we define first the symmetric information
benchmark, then deal with the asymmetric information framework. Finally, we comment
our results and conclude on their relevance and limitations. Technical proofs are grouped
in the final section.
6.2 The model
We present first the pre-merger equilibrium as a benchmark and then the post-merger
framework.
6.2.1 Pre-merger market equilibrium
We consider as starting point a homogenous good, three-firm perfectly symmetric
industry. Demand is linear: P (Q) = 1 − Q, where Q is total output. Firms maximize
individual profit. We place ourselves in a situation where firms face capacity constraints
à la Dixit (1980). Explicitly, we assume that a two-stage capacity-quantity game took
place before merger, where firms acquire first capacity at a positive unit cost ck and then
compete in quantities with identical constant production marginal costs equal to c. The
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of such a game is given by capacity and output equal to
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1−c−ck
4 . We take this to be the operational capacity of a firm before merger and denote it
by k. Consequently, pre-merger equilibrium yields Q = 3k and P (3k) = 1−3k. We denote
Π the pre-merger individual profit, which writes Π = k(1− 3k − c). We assume that the
unit cost for the acquisition of additional capacity is prohibitive in the short-run (i.e. for
the duration of the merger game).
6.2.2 Post-merger market framework
Since we only deal with exogenous market concentration, and that initially the three
firms are identical, merger is assumed to take place between any two of them. We index
the merged entity, i.e. the insiders, by M , and the outsider by o respectively.
Following the merger, M ’s capacity constraint changes, since now it holds the double
of the pre-merger capacity. As far as the outsider is concerned, its capacity is unchanged,
as well as its marginal cost. The insiders in turn may benefit from merger-specific cost
savings14. More precisely, the marginal cost of the merged firm, denoted cM , satisfies the
following: cM = c− α, where α ∈ [0, c] measures the amount of cost savings. Our frame-
work is general enough to lend itself to diﬀerent interpretations of this parameter. For
instance, α stands for the synergies that arise from the merger, i.e. substantial eﬃciency
gains that would not have been obtained without it. More generally, α measures the pos-
itive eﬀect of an essential complementarity between the merger partners that allows them
to lower their common marginal cost15. Following Röller et al. (2000), these synergies
can typically be due to complementarity between technological or administrative capabil-
ities of firms. For example, firms may own complementary patents, which, if jointly used,
further improve the production process.
In the post-merger framework, firms play a standard Cournot game - we rule out in
our model any possibility for post-merger collusion. Firms obey the following capacity
constraints16: qM ≤ 2k and qo ≤ k. Taking into account the cost savings for the merged
14Our treatment of cost savings deals with the marginal cost, so as to consistently follow the current
CAs’ treatment of allowable merger eﬃciency gains.
15For an explicit example of modeling cost savings through the use of complementary assets by merger
partners see Bensaid et al. (1994)
16We consider here that in the short run firms cannot increase their production capacity. This result
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entity, firms’ Best Reply functions write BRM(qo) = min
³
1+α−c−qo
2 , 2k
´
and BRo(qM) =
min
³
1−c−qM
2 , k
´
respectively. It is straightforward to show that post-merger equilibrium
price is less or equal to P (3k) only if α ≥ 5k−1+c. In other words, a merger will increase
market price whenever its cost savings fail to exceed this minimum threshold.
In short, mergers have an ambiguous impact on the economy. On the one hand, if the
eﬃciency gains are suﬃciently important (see the above threshold), then the merged entity
is induced to use all its productive capacity and thus the price is unchanged with respect
to its pre-merger level. In turn, with lower eﬃciency gains, the insiders will hold slack
capacity and the price will be higher than its pre-merger level. In such a case, divestitures
might be used by the CA to modify the post-merger market equilibrium so as to prevent
any drop in Consumers’ Surplus. Such remedies would depend on the eﬃciency gains, and
their crafting is studied in the next section.
6.3 Remedies as a screening device
6.3.1 Objective of merger control and terms of divestiture
As far as the CA’s objective goes, we assume total welfare maximization under the
constraint of no drop in Consumers’ Surplus. The essential feature of the CA’s objective
is actually the second condition, which closely follows the current trend in merger control
in as much as CAs accept or reject mergers based on the price increase likelihood. To
put it short, a merger is approved if consumers will not be hurt, which is what we require
in our model. Note that thanks to the capacity constraint setting, this requirement is
strictly equivalent to maximizing Consumers’ Surplus, because the industry output can
never actually exceed the pre-merger level17. We go beyond and look for the welfare
maximizing divestiture so as to be able to identify the least distorting asset transfer from
the point of view of productive eﬃciency (i.e. the one that will prove the less harmful to
firms’ profits).
remains true as long as the unit cost of capacity acquisition ck is high enough, which is precisely our
assumption here.
17See Besanko and Spulber (1993), Neven and Röller (2005), and Lyons (2002) for theoretical contribu-
tions supporting the choice of a pure Consumers’ Surplus standard instead of the Total Welfare.
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In order to account for the possible anti-competitive merger eﬀects, we use a two-type
model, with the synergy parameter denoted α, α ∈ {α, α}, where α stands for the large
marginal cost reduction (high eﬃciency gains), and α for the small marginal cost savings
(low eﬃciency gains). Explicitly, α = c− cM and α = c− cM , where cM and cM are the
marginal costs of the low-cost merged firm and of the high-cost one respectively. Objective
probabilities for the two types are ρ and 1− ρ respectively.
In our setting, divestitures will consist in transfers of assets to the outsider, whom we
consider here to be the only possible buyer18. We make this hypothesis for the sake of
simplicity, but the framework lends itself well to the introduction of a new entrant on the
market19.
We go on next to determine first the optimal divestiture when information on the
merger type is symmetric, so as to examine afterwards the role of asymmetric information
for the design of the merger divestiture remedy.
6.3.2 Optimal divestitures with symmetric information
Given the screening stand we take in our model, the game we consider between the
firms and the CA is the following:
In the first stage, the merging firms learn their eﬃciency gains level α and submit
a merger proposal to the CA. When information is symmetric the parameter α is also
observed by the outsider and by the CA. (Later on we detail the information structure of
the game with asymmetric information).
In the second stage, the CA evaluates the consequences of the merger taking into
account its own merger control objective. It proposes a divestiture contract accordingly,
if such a contract exists; if not, it rejects the merger.
18The FTC’s 1999 Divestiture Study explicitly and on purpose quotes West Texas Transmission, L.P.
vs. Enron Corp. as confirming the FTC’s authority to choose the divestiture buyer.
19This would nevertheless go beyond the primary purpose of our model, since it would require the
specification of the entrants’ marginal cost and a detailed case discussion to determine then the optimal
asset buyer from the CA’s pont of view. Moreover, by not allowing entry on the market, we want to remind
that besides capacity, a certain know-how and experience of the market are necessary to guarantee actual
competition on behalf of the buyer of divested assets.
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In the third stage, the insiders accept or reject the divestiture. If they accept,
assets will be transferred to the outsider on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
In the fourth stage, the outsider decides whether to take over or not the divested
assets.
In the fifth stage, conditional on the divestiture contract being accepted, the
Cournot market equilibrium is determined taking into account the amount of asset transfer
required by the CA. If any of the parties rejects the contract, the merger project falls
through.
This last assumption is quite in line with the current unfolding of a divestiture ne-
gotiation process. Indeed, whenever a divestiture injunction is being settled upon, it has
previously gained approval of all involved parties: the divesting firms, the buyer, and the
CA. The failure of such a three-party negotiation typically results either in the appoint-
ment of a divestiture trustee20, or in the merger itself falling through21.
At the last stage of the game, firms play a standard Cournot game. Before the divesti-
ture requested by the CA, firms’ capacities amounted to 2k for M and k for o. Once an
amount ∆ of assets are transferred from M to o, firms will obey the following capacity
constraints: qM ≤ 2k − ∆ and qo ≤ k + ∆. Taking into account both the cost savings
and the required divestiture, the Best Reply functions of the Cournot game now write as
follows: BRM(qo) = min
³
1+α−c−qo
2 , 2k −∆
´
and BRo(qM) = min
³
1−c−qM
2 , k +∆
´
.
Profits are denoted ΠM (∆;α) and Πo (∆;α) respectively, and depend on the cost
savings parameter α and the amount of divestiture ∆. Therefore, for a given divestiture
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ (1− c)− 4k, i.e. not too high so as to have the outsider operate at full capacity,
20 "According to FTC staﬀ, as of June 30, 2002, [...]In Aventis, Docket C-3919, FTC required divestiture
of the alternate assets and appointed a trustee to accomplish the divestiture when the merging parties
failed to divest the original assets on time" - p.86 of the FTC’s 2002 "Study Needed to Assess the Eﬀects
of Recent Divestitures on Competition in Retail Markets".
21The European Commission DG Competition’s site provides statistics on the outcome of merger review
process: since 1990, 27 mergers were abandoned following a Phase II examination, i.e. when having to
cope with the commitments requested by the Competition Authority.
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profits write
ΠM (∆;α) =



¡
1+α−c−k−∆
2
¢2
, if α ≤ 5k −∆− (1− c)
(1− 3k − c+ α) (2k −∆), if α > 5k −∆− (1− c)
(6.1)
and Πo (∆;α) =



¡
1−α−c−k−∆
2
¢
(k +∆) , if α ≤ 5k −∆− (1− c)
(1− 3k − c) (k +∆), if α > 5k −∆− (1− c)
(6.2)
Clearly, when the eﬃciency gains are high enough ( i.e. α > 5k − ∆ − (1 − c)), the
merged firm is also led to employ all of its capacity. However, if the divestiture exceeds
the threshold above mentioned, regardless of the level of merger synergies, the outsider
will never operate to full capacity. Thus, for ∆ > (1− c)− 4k, profits write
ΠM (∆;α) =
µ
1 + 2α− c− 2k +∆
2
¶
(2k −∆) (6.3)
and Πo (∆;α) =
µ
1− c− 2k +∆
2
¶2
(6.4)
and in this case the market price will increase.
At stage four, as far as the outsider is concerned, the decision to accept to take over the
divested assets depends on his maximum willingness to pay for them, equal to Πo (∆;α)−
Π. We denote by P the price of divestitures proposed by the merged entity and observed
by the CA. The outsider accepts the divested assets iﬀ Πo (∆;α)− P ≥ Π.
At stage three, the insiders make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the outsider, therefore
they set a price equal to the outsider’s maximum willingness to pay: P = Πo (∆;α)−Π.
The insiders agree to divest iﬀ ΠM (∆;α) + P ≥ 2Π.
At the second stage, given that the CA observes the type of the merger submitted for
approval, it makes its decision based on the following programme:
max
∆≥0
W (∆;α) (S)
s.t.



CS(∆;α) ≥ CS0
ΠM (∆;α) + P ≥ 2Π
Πo (∆;α)−Π = P
where CS0 stands for the Consumers’ Surplus level before merger. With symmetric infor-
mation, the following result obtains:
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Lemma 6.1
Let ∆FB (α) be the solution of the programme (S), defined as follows:
(i) For k ∈
³
2(1−c)
9 ,
2−c
9
´
, there exists a threshold bα = 9k − 2(1 − c), bα ∈ [0, c], such
that:
- for any α ≥ bα, the merger is accepted with divestiture ∆FB(α), where ∆FB(α) =
max(0, 5k − α− (1− c)); also, ∆FB (α) < ∆FB (α).
- for any α < bα, the merger is rejected.
(ii) For k ≤ 2(1−c)9 , all mergers are accepted with ∆FB(α) = max(0, 5k − α− (1− c))
(iii) For k ≥ 2−c9 , all mergers are rejected.
Whenever the divestitures ∆FB (α) and ∆FB (α) exist, the assets are transferred to the
outsider at prices equal to PFB = (P (3k)−c)×∆FB(α) and PFB = (P (3k)−c)×∆FB(α)
respectively .
See proof in the final section of the chapter.
Basically, the First Best asset transfer, denoted ∆FB (α) , is the lowest positive asset
transfer that ensures production at full capacity on behalf of both industry firms. Given
that the market price increases whenever firms hold slack capacity, successful remedies in
our context are necessarily those that induce firms to produce up to their full capacity.
However, since total industry capacity is fixed, firms can never produce more than they
did before merger. (Consequently, in our framework, maximizing consumers’ surplus after
merger and keeping it constant are equivalent.) On the other hand, among all the asset
transfers inducing production to full capacity, the lowest represents the solution to the
above programme, because it yields the highest industry profit. Indeed, all divestitures
ensuring production to full capacity yield the same total output, but since the outsider
operates with a higher marginal cost, industry profit is highest for the lowest asset trans-
fer. In other words, the latter maximizes total surplus under the constraint of constant
consumers’ surplus. Incidentally, this is in accordance with the merger control guidelines
and practice, since merger remedies are to be the slightest modification possible that is
able to restore market competition. Finally, the positivity constraint of this programme
simply states that whenever there exists no such divestiture, the merger is rejected.
This lemma shows that our mechanism replicates the outcome of CAs’ behavior to the
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extent that merger control decisions obey threshold criteria. Here, whenever the notified
merger does not generate enough cost savings, the CA rejects it. Henceforth we shall only
consider k ∈
³
2(1−c)
9 ,
2−c
9
´
, so as to deal with an interesting case. Indeed, if the industry
capacity is large enough, a duopoly is never induced to produce at full capacity even if
the cost of M is zero, whereas if the capacity is low enough, a duopoly always produces
at full capacity, even without eﬃciency gains. In other words, we leave aside cases ii) and
iii), and focus only on the more interesting and relevant case i).
Moreover, if firms anticipate the CA’s decision making process, only eﬃciently enough
mergers will be proposed, and therefore all submitted mergers shall be accepted. This is
a self selection eﬀect. In turn, if α < bα, no merger is submitted. Henceforth we shall
consider only the case where α > bα.
More importantly, the required transfer is higher for the less eﬃcient merger. The
reason is quite simple: in this model with fixed total capacity, for the price to be constant,
firms need to produce to their full capacity. But the more eﬃciency gains it generates, the
more capacity will employ the merged entity. Therefore, more eﬃcient insiders hold less
slack capacity, so the price increase will be lower for a more eﬃcient merger, and the cor-
responding necessary divestiture as well. This conforms with the proportionality principle
advocated by competition policy practitioners, and justifies the fact that the average sale
price of divested assets is actually constant, since P
FB
∆FB(α) =
P
FB
∆FB(α) . Nevertheless, such a
proportionality principle is subject to an implementation problem if eﬃciency gains cap-
tured here by the parameter α are not observed by the CA. We deal with this asymmetric
information problem in the next section.
6.3.3 Optimal divestitures with asymmetric information: a regulated
sale price mechanism
The asymmetric information game is basically the same as before, but takes into ac-
count the changes due to the inobservability of the merger type:
In the first stage, the merging firms learn their eﬃciency level and submit a merger
proposal to the CA. The parameter α is now private information of the merging firms,
and the latter may or may not report it truthfully.
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In the second stage, the CA evaluates the consequences of the merger taking into
account its own merger control objective. It proposes a divestiture contract accordingly,
if such a contract exists; if not, it rejects the merger. The divestiture contract will contain
the amount of assets to be divested, ∆, and the corresponding sale price P .
In the third stage, the insiders accept or reject the divestiture. If they accept,
assets will be transferred to the outsider at the price P determined by the CA.
In the fourth stage, the outsider, having observed the insiders’ choice to accept or
not the divestiture contract, decides whether to take over or not the divested assets.
In the fifth stage, conditional on the divestiture contract being accepted, the
Cournot market equilibrium is determined taking into account the amount of asset transfer
required by the CA. The merger is abandoned whenever one of the parties rejects the
contract.
The CA and the outsider have a common prior on the merger’s types (ρ and 1 − ρ),
but at stage four the outsider observes the menu of contracts proposed by the CA, as well
as the contract chosen by the merged entity, and thus revises its prior beliefs.
According to the revelation principle, we restrict to truthful direct revelation mecha-
nisms, and look for a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
To start with, when information is asymmetric and the only revelation instrument em-
ployed is the asset transfer, the CA is no longer able to make the insiders reveal truthfully
their eﬃciency level, i.e. their type, since they always choose the lowest level of divestitures
which is proposed. Indeed, should the CA propose the former First Best levels of divesti-
ture ∆FB(α) and ∆FB(α), associated with the previous symmetric-information prices, i.e.
equal to the outsider’s willingness to pay, we can show that the high-cost merged firm
has incentives to choose the low asset transfer destined to the low-cost merged entity.
Explicitly, the following holds (see proof in the final section):
ΠM(∆FB (α) ;α) +Πo(∆FB (α) ;α)−Π| {z }
=P
FB
< ΠM(∆FB(α);α) +Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π| {z }
=PFB
(6.5)
In other words, if the first best levels of divestitures are required, mimicking is more
profitable than truth-telling for the less eﬃcient type. Indeed, when the optimal symmet-
rical information divestitures are sold for a price equal to the outsider’s willingness to pay
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(P
FB
or PFB respectively), the less eﬃcient merged entity prefers the lower asset transfer,
which will enable it to hold spare capacity and thus increase its profit through the price
raise. As a result, in order to induce truthful revelation, a second instrument is necessary.
We propose here to use the regulation of the monetary transfer between the insiders
and the outsider that accompanies the asset takeover. In case this idea should trigger
the critique that the CA behaves as a sheer market regulator, we claim that it is worth
analyzing it for several reasons. Firstly, it allows us to test its theoretical relevance for the
merger control. Secondly, because the frontier between pure regulation and merger control
has already been blurred by the very use of structural divestitures, meant to modify the
very market structure. After all, "introducing the possibility of remedies ... puts the
merger control oﬃce in a position close to that of an industry specific regulator" (Rey
(2003, p.130)).
The incentive contract determined by the CA will thus contain a given sale price P
for an amount of divested assets ∆. Two Incentive Constraints (IC) are added to the
programme of the CA in order to induce revelation of information. Hence, the programme
of the CA writes:
max
{(∆,P ),(∆,P )}
∆≥0,∆≥0
ρW (∆;α) + (1− ρ)W
¡
∆;α
¢
(AS)
s.t.



CS (∆;α) = CS
¡
∆;α
¢
= CS0
ΠM (∆;α) + P ≥ ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ P
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ P ≥ ΠM (∆;α) + P
ΠM (∆;α) + P ≥ 2Π
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ P ≥ 2Π
Πo (∆;α)− P ≥ Π
Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
− P ≥ Π
where the contracts (∆;P ) and
¡
∆;P
¢
are destined for types α and α respectively.
Note that unlike a standard screening programme, there is no direct transfer between
the ’agent’ and the ’principal’. Instead, the CA fixes the monetary transfer between the
agent and a third party, the outsider, and uses it as an incentive device. The lump-
sum transfer between firms does not aﬀect total industry profit, and is diﬀerent from the
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informal suggestion of Röller et al. (2001) to introduce an explicit licence to merge, to
the extent that in our model the monetary transfer does not benefit directly the CA, so
we actually avoid the direct implication of the CA in the merger process as an explicit
regulator.
Note equally that since the contract we look for induces information revelation, i.e.
separation of types, in equilibrium the priors of the outsider necessarily coincide with
its revised beliefs. As in the symmetric information configuration, CA implicitly uses a
supplementary choice variable to solve the screening problem, namely the possibility of
shut-down (i.e. refuse the merger of the less eﬃcient type), hence the positivity constraints
on the asset transfers. Finally, the equality constraints on Consumers’ Surplus as well as
the participation constraints highlight the three-party negotiation. Indeed, the additional
instrument we propose to screen mergers, the sale price of the divested assets, is merely
a lump-transfer between the outsider and the insiders, therefore it stands for a particular
distribution of the total industry profit. To achieve screening, the contracts proposed by
the CA need to reconcile the often conflicting objectives of the insiders and the outsider,
so as to ensure the industry firms’ participation. In other words, the above programme is
actually designed to make the parties involved agree on an incentive-compatible sharing
of their total profit.
Before presenting and characterizing the optimal contracts we give the following lemma:
Lemma 6.2
For any ∆ < ∆, ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
> ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
.
See proof in the final section.
This inequality stands for a standard single crossing condition. It states that the eﬃ-
cient merged firm benefits more from a low asset divestiture than the ineﬃcient one. In
other words, the eﬃcient merged firm attaches more value to capacity than the ineﬃcient
one. The intuition goes as follows: following merger and the ensuing increase in capacity,
the eﬃcient insiders are always able to produce the same quantity as the ineﬃcient ones,
and can thus guarantee themselves the same revenue. Yet, thanks to the synergy cost
reduction, their profit is actually higher, hence their willingness to receive w.r.t. the mon-
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etary payment of a given divestiture is lower. As in any standard principal-agent model,
this lemma makes room for screening. We can therefore derive the optimal contracts
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6.1
Denote (∆, P ) ,
¡
∆, P
¢
the divestiture contracts proposed with asymmetric information,
solution of the programme (AS); the following hold:
(i) No shut-down
When α > bα, then ∆ = ∆FB(α) and ∆ = ∆FB(α). Prices are P = Πo(∆;α) − Π
and P = P −ΠM (∆;α) +ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
. Moreover, there exists a threshold eα such that for
α > eα, P < 0.
(ii) Shut-down of less eﬃcient type
When α < bα, type α merger is rejected by oﬀering a single contract: ∆ = ∆FB(α)
and P = 2Π−ΠM (∆;α)
See proof in the final section.
The optimal contracts have two main characteristics. First, there is no distortion
of asset divestitures and the merger clearance decision is unchanged as compared with
the case of symmetric information. Second, the price of the low divestiture is distorted
downwards, whereas the price of the high divestiture is not distorted at all (meaning it still
equals the outsider’s willingness to pay), so that the average divestiture price increases
now with the level of divestiture. To sum up, we obtain no distortion at all in terms of
asset transfers, and distortion ’at the top’ for the monetary transfers.
The intuition behind the design of these contracts proceeds in two steps.
First of all, we have previously emphasized that the CA must distort asset prices and
possibly divestiture levels so as to obtain separation of types. Otherwise, both types choose
the low level of divestiture. Note however that since the asset price is a lump-sum transfer
between firms without impact on the CA’s objective, the CA can distort prices at no cost.
Secondly, it remains to show that price distortion alone is suﬃcient to lead both firms
to choose the optimal levels of divestiture disclosed in Lemma 6.1. For that purpose
the CA must lower the price of the low level of divestitures so as to deter the ineﬃcient
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firm from choosing such a contract. According to Lemma 6.2, a given divestiture is more
distorting for the eﬃcient merged firm than for the ineﬃcient one, and thus the willingness
to receive for the First Best asset transfer ∆FB is lower for the eﬃcient merged entity.
Hence, to induce the ineﬃcient merged entity to give up the low asset transfer ∆FB, the
corresponding price needs to be lower than the outsider’s willingness to pay. To sum up,
it is enough to keep the price of the high First Best divestiture equal to the outsider’s
willingness to pay, and in turn to set for the low First Best divestiture a price inferior to
the outsider’s willingness to pay.
Moreover, in a particular configuration, the asset price can be negative, so that the
CA would require the eﬃcient merged entity to subsidize the outsider. Specifically, if the
eﬃcient firm has very substantial cost savings, the optimal level of divestiture required
to the eﬃcient firm is so low, that in order to prevent the ineﬃcient merged firm from
choosing it, the corresponding distortion on the sale price will make it negative.
A low price of divested assets was often interpreted as a signal of failure of the divesti-
ture process - the European Commission’s Merger Remedies Study, October 2005 (p.103),
recalls that "remedies were less eﬀective in at least three divestiture cases where the pur-
chaser had acquired the divested business for free, or at a negative price"22. We claim
however that a more eﬃcient merger can signal itself as such by accepting a divestiture
contract combining a low average asset price and a low quantity of assets divested. In
contrast, an ineﬃcient merged firm will reveal itself as such by accepting to divest a large
quantity of assets for a high average price. The underlying intuition is that in the present
model, the ineﬃcient entity owns more slack capacity and values assets less than the eﬃ-
cient one. This is the reason why the ineﬃcient insiders agree to divest a larger quantity
of assets in exchange for a higher price, while the eﬃcient ones accept a low sale price so
as to divest less assets.
Still, the CA might have to reject the less eﬃcient merger due to the absence of
optimal divestiture, i.e. when α < bα. However, with asymmetric information and no
price distortion, both types of insiders will submit their merger. Therefore, to extract
22See also Farrell (2003), or the Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, by the US De-
partment of Justice, October 2004.
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information, the CA will distort downwards the price for the low divestiture, so as to
incite the submission of the highly eﬃcient merger only. Point (ii) of our Proposition 6.1
actually gives the value of P that contradicts the participation constraint of α, while still
ensuring that of α. For this price, only the eﬃcient merger will be submitted.
Our proposition suggests that regulating the sale price of divested assets enables the
implementation of a kind of licence to merge. The way the merged entity will pay to
be allowed to merge depends on its level of eﬃciency. Indeed, the divestiture imposes a
cost to the merged entity, which will have to give up some of its assets. Still, the above-
mentioned licence is not the amount of assets to divest, but actually the combination of
a divestiture and its sale price. The ineﬃcient merged firm essentially ’pays’ by giving up
more assets while still being handsomely paid in return, whereas the eﬃcient one ’pays’
by foregoing part of the monetary transfer from the outsider (and possibly the whole) for
the lower divestiture made. Hence, one way to interpret our result is that a divestiture
trustee appointed by the CA might tell an eﬃcient merger proposal from an ineﬃcient one
using such a non linear tariﬀ for asset divestitures23.
Note that this mechanism bears no risk of ineﬃcient or distorting lobbying activities on
behalf of the parties involved. In particular, the outsider will not oppose the more eﬃcient
merger, because the more eﬃcient insiders will transfer less assets at a depreciated price,
and the profit sharing is favourable to the outsider, who pays less than his maximum
willingness to pay. In short, our mechanism is designed to make all three parties agree on
an incentive-compatible distribution of the industry profit. In other words, by making use
of a three-party incentive-compatible negotiation, the CA can make sure that no lobbying
activities occur.
Within the debate concerning the frontier between competition policy and regulation,
our proposition is meant to draw attention to the best instruments that should be used
to address the anticompetitive eﬀects of merger. We argue that while price distortion
is considered as highly interventionist and prohibited in the typical view of competition
23To put it short, the divestiture trustee might ask the merged entity the following question: "Would
you rather rather transfer a larger divestiture package to obtain a high price in return from the purchaser,
or are you willing to forego the monetary payment but divest less?". According to our model, the less
eﬃcient merged entity will agree to the former, while the more eﬃcient merged entity will prefer the latter.
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policy, in a merger control context the most distorting tool is more likely to be the asset
transfer, rather than a lump-sum monetary transfer between industry firms. Indeed,
whereas the monetary transfer does not aﬀect market behaviour of firms, the amount
of divested assets has a direct impact on firms’ production decisions. As a result, in
order to induce firms to reveal eﬃciency gains, the use of monetary transfer appears less
interventionist than the transfer of physical assets.
Further discussion
We address next some of the possible questions raised by our proposition of additional
instrument within the revelation contract menu. More precisely, we are going to further
discuss two points in particular, namely the wide range of sale prices we allow for in our
mechanism, and the possibility to use a monetary transfer to the central budget instead
of interfering with the divestiture sale price.
To start with, recall that despite the information asymmetry, types are perfectly
screened in our model, and only divestiture sale prices get distorted. To be precise, the
distortion only concerns the sale price for the eﬃcient type’s divestiture. Intuitively, this
is so because it is the ineﬃcient type who has incentives to mimic, so the menu contract
basically distorts the price received by the ’honest’ eﬃcient type, so as to make the cor-
responding low divestiture less desirable to the mimicking type. Hence one might realize
that complete distortion, i.e. also aﬀecting divestiture levels, is likely to be necessary if a
positivity constraint were imposed on the asset sale prices. Actually, we show in the final
section by means of a very simple intuitive reasoning that the outcome would be instead
the shutdown of the ineﬃcient merger, through the unique divestiture contract given in
Proposition 6.1. This is due to the fact that the necessary distortion on asset transfers
would fail to maintain constant the market price, as a result of which the CA would prefer
to prevent ineﬃcient mergers from being submitted, rather than not being able to fully
remedy them afterwards.
This might be diﬀerent however if the demanding constant Consumer Surplus con-
straint were relaxed. Intuitively, (see again the final section for an outline of the reason-
ing) even if the additional screening instrument is no longer the divestiture sale price, but
instead a monetary payment (a tax, basically) to the budget, the qualitative results are
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the same. One would have to completely give up the constant market price requirement
in order to obtain substantially diﬀerent results. But doing so, i.e. modeling a CA that
maximizes a sum of Consumer Surplus and collected tax, subject only to incentive and
participation constraints, would require first of all supplementary assumptions ensuring
the concavity of this objective function w.r.t. the divestiture level. The result would then
be predictable based on a standard principal-agent framework (the mechanism would no
longer involve a three-party negotiation actually), and it would involve a downward tax
distortion for the eﬃcient type and an upwards asset transfer distortion for the ineﬃcient
type w.r.t. the situation where total welfare is maximized with symmetric information.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter aims to contribute to the economic analysis of merger remedies. We
propose a revelation mechanism allowing the design of optimal merger divestitures when
information is asymmetric between firms and the CA w.r.t. the synergy generated by
the merger. Our revelation mechanism replicates the typical behavior of a CA, namely
decision making based on thresholds of announced eﬃciencies. In our framework, shut-
down of the least eﬃcient type is possible. Basically, mergers will only be accepted if they
generate enough synergies, which is what the merger control practically aims at.
Our results show that a contract menu combining the divestiture with its sale price is
a powerful screening device, leading to perfect information revelation, in addition to the
complete competitive relief and the lowest industry profit distortion.
We acknowledge of course the modelling of a CA actively modifying the market struc-
ture, but then any structural merger remedy is precisely meant to do this. Taking into
account the reluctance of competition authorities to actually employ this instrument for
the screening of merger projects, we can nevertheless insist on the ability of the price
of divested assets to contribute to signalling on behalf of merging partners the merger
eﬃciency gains.
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6.5 Proofs
Post-merger Cournot equilibrium. Successful Remedies:
These are the transfers for which both firms produce up to their post-merger capacity:
forM , 2k−∆, and for o, k+∆. Checking that the Best Reply function yield in equilibrium
precisely the post-merger capacities allows us to compute the limits of the relevant range
for the divestiture:
for M : BRM(qo = k +∆) = 1+α−c−(k+∆)2 ≥ 2k −∆⇔ ∆ ≥ 5k − α− (1− c) = ∆1
for o: BRo(qM = 2k −∆) = 1−c−(2k−∆)2 ≥ k +∆⇔ ∆ ≤ (1− c)− 4k = ∆2
It is straightforward to check that for ∆ < ∆1, the outsider produces up to its full
capacity, but the merged firm holds slack capacity, whereas for ∆ > ∆2 the reverse is true.
Note that ∆1 > 0 as long as α ≤ 5k − (1− c), a necessary condition being k ≥ 1−c5 so as
to have positive cost savings.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. As seen before, successful remedies belong to [∆1,∆2], with
∆1 = 5k − α − (1 − c). The First Best level of divestiture is actually ∆1: we show it
next to be the lowest positive asset transfer that satisfies the objective of maximizing
total surplus under the binding constraint on the consumers’ surplus. Indeed, it suﬃces
to show that industry profits are decreasing with the amount of divestiture when the
latter induces production to full capacity in order to select the lowest divestiture as the
∆FB(α) = 5k−α−(1−c); and since ΠM+Πo = (1−3k−c+α)(2k−∆)+(1−3k−c)(k+∆),
it is straightforward that ∂
∂∆
¡
ΠM +Πo
¢
= −α < 0, q.e.d.
The existence of ∆FB (α) is ensured as long as the interval [∆1,∆2] exists and is
well defined. Define bα as the threshold value of cost savings for which ∆1 = ∆2: bα =
9k−2(1−c). The threshold bα corresponds to the shut-down limit, and is positive provided
that k ≥ 2(1−c)9 . Therefore, whenever α < bα, we have ∆1 > ∆2 , so the CA rejects all
mergers, since there is no transfer ∆ for which firms produce both to full capacity. In turn,
for α ≥ bα,∆FB(α) = 5k−α−(1−c) and since α > α we obtain directly∆FB(α) < ∆FB(α).
In case bα is zero, case (ii), for all mergers there exists a positive transfer such that the
CA’s objective is fulfilled. In the last case (case (iii)), the shutdown range covers the whole
interval, so there are no transfers that can make both firms operate to full capacity.
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Finally, since assets are divested to the outsider for a price equal to its willingness to
pay, corresponding prices are given by: PFB = Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π = (P (3k)− c)∆FB(α)
and P
FB
= Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π = (P (3k)− c)∆FB(α).
Proof - incentive to mimic.
ΠM(∆FB(α);α) +Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π| {z }
=P
FB
≤ ΠM(∆FB(α);α) +Πo(∆FB(α);α)−Π| {z }
=PFB
⇔ [P (3k)− c+ α] · ¡2k −∆FB(α)¢+ [P (3k)− c] · ¡k +∆FB(α)¢ <£
P (k +∆FB(α) +BRMα (k +∆
FB(α)))− c+ α
¤ ·BRMα (k +∆FB(α))
− [P (3k)− c] · ¡k +∆FB(α)¢
⇔ [P (3k)− c] · ¡∆FB(α)−∆FB(α)¢ <£
P (k +∆FB(α) +BRMα (k +∆
FB(α)))− c+ α
¤ ·BRMα (k +∆FB(α))
− [P (3k)− c+ α] · ¡2k −∆FB(α)¢
⇔ (1− 3k − c) · (α− α) <
³
1− 3k − c+ α+α2
´2
− (1− 3k − c+ α)2
⇔ 14 (α− α) · (α+ 3α) < 0 which is true since 0 ≤ α < α
Proof of Lemma 6.2. A necessary condition for the two incentives constraints to hold
is ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
> ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
. We prove this below.
To start with, the profit of the merged firm writes generally as follows:
ΠM (∆;α) =
£
P (k +∆+BRM(k +∆))− c+ α
¤ ·BRM(k +∆)
where BRM(k +∆) = min
³
1+α−c−(k+∆)
2 , 2k −∆
´
We show next that ∂
2ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆∂α < 0.
Starting from the above profit’s expression, basically two cases are possible: given the
asset transfer ∆, the merged entity M either produces to full capacity or not.
If M produces to full capacity, its profit writes ΠM (∆;α) =
³
1+α−c−(k+∆)
2
´2
(see the
post-merger Cournot equilibrium details in the beginning of this section). In this case,
∂ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆ = 2
³
1+α−c−(k+∆)
2
´
· ¡−12¢ < 0, whereas ∂2ΠM (∆;α)∂∆∂α = ¡−12¢ < 0, q.e.d.
If M does not produce to full capacity, then its profit is ΠM (∆;α) = (1 − 3k − c +
α)(2k −∆). In this case, ∂Π
M (∆;α)
∂∆ = −(1 − 3k − c + α) < 0, and
∂2ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆∂α = −α < 0,
q.e.d.
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Conclusion: since α > α, the cross derivative ∂
2ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆∂α < 0 yields equivalently
∂
∂α
³
∂ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆
´
< 0⇔ ∂Π
M (∆;α)
∂∆ >
∂ΠM (∆;α)
∂∆
⇔ ∂
∂∆
¡
ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM (∆;α)
¢
> 0,∀∆
⇔ for any ∆ < ∆,
¡
ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM (∆;α)
¢
<
¡
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢¢
⇔ ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
< ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
, ∀ ∆ 6= ∆, q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 6.1.
• No shut-down
For P = Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π and P = Πo (∆;α)−Π, both firms prefer the contract (∆, P ),
since the following inequality holds for the ineﬃcient type:
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
< ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
In turn, if P = 2Π−ΠM (∆;α) , then ΠM (∆;α) + P < ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ P
so both firms prefer the contract (∆, P ).
By continuity of P , there exist P and P = Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π with
Πo (∆;α)−Π ≥ P > 2Π−ΠM (∆;α)
such that ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
= P − P
This latter condition ensures that P − P > ΠM (∆;α) − ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
, i.e. separation of
types, thanks to the single-crossing condition (see Lemma 2).
We show next there exists eα such that for α > eα, P < 0
First of all, note that for ∆ = 0, P < 0 necessarily, because:
P = P −
¡
ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢¢
= Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π−
¡
ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢¢
= (P (3k)− c) · ¡k +∆¢− (P (3k)− c) · k
−
¡
(P (3k)− c+ α) · (2k −∆)− (P (3k)− c+ α) · ¡2k −∆¢¢
= (P (3k)− c) ·∆− (P (3k)− c+ α) ¡∆−∆¢
⇒ for ∆ = 0, this yields (P (3k)− c) ·∆− (P (3k)− c+ α)∆ < 0
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Moreover, ∆ = 0⇔ 5k − α− (1− c) = 0⇔ α = 5k − (1− c)
To sum up, for α = 5k − (1− c) (which by the way is > bα), P < 0
But, for α = α, P = P , thus P > 0
Therefore, by continuity and monotonicity24 of P , there exists a eα > bα such that for
α > eα,P < 0
Last but not least, we can show that a suﬃcient condition for this threshold eα to be
< c is to have k < 15 , which is compatible with our condition for positive cost savings,
namely k ≥ 1−c5 .
• Shut-down of less eﬃcient merger
When α < bα, the optimal response from the CA is to reject the α, simply because
it is the only way to keep the price constant - see Lemma 6.1, which shows that
when there is no transfer ∆ that can keep the price constant, the CA rejects the
merger. To prevent therefore the submission of the α merger, it is enough to set
P = 2Π−ΠM (∆;α), which violates the participation constraint of the α type.
Further discussion.
• Positivity constraints on divestiture sale prices
The necessary condition for information revelation is for both incentive constraints to
hold simultaneously:
ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
≥ P − P ≥ ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
Adding positivity constraints on P and P to the asymmetric information programme
would raise a problem only for certain levels of eﬃciencies. Actually, such a constraint
will not concern P , but only be relevant for the eﬃciency levels α > eα for which P < 0.
The point is that by imposing P > 0 for these high eﬃciency levels, the price diﬀerence
P − P will become equal to a fixed value. This will eventually prevent the relevant α−
type incentive constraint from being satisfied: P − P ≥ ΠM (∆;α) − ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
, since
24 It is straightforward to show that P is decreasing with α, given its expression computed above: P =
(P (3k)− c) ·∆− (P (3k)− c+ α) ∆−∆
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the diﬀerence ΠM (∆;α)−ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
varies with ∆(α), (actually, it decreases with ∆(α)
and increases with ∆(α) through the profits respective monotonicity). To prevent this,
the necessary asset transfer distortion will require first of all that ∆SB(α) > ∆FB(α),
so as to keep ΠM (∆;α) − ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
≤ P − P. Eventually, i.e. for even higher α, even
the other type’s divestiture distortion ∆
SB
(α) < ∆
FB
(α) might be necessary, not only
to ensure the α− type incentive constraint, but equally the α− type one by the same
token. But when this is the case, applying ∆
SB
(α) to the less eﬃcient merged entity no
longer keeps the market price constant, because the required divestiture no longer induces
full capacity production. Therefore, given the constant Consumer Surplus constraint, the
CA will rather prevent the α− type merger from being submitted by proposing a single
divestiture contract, the one accepted only by the α− type merger.
• Monetary transfer to the budget instead of regulating the divestiture sale price
Basically, the programme will now write:
max{(∆,t),(∆,t)}
∆≥0,∆≥0
ρ (CS (∆;α) + t) + (1− ρ)
¡
CS
¡
∆;α
¢
+ t
¢
s.t.



CS (∆;α) = CS
¡
∆;α
¢
= CS0
ΠM (∆;α) + (Πo (∆;α)−Π)− t ≥ ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+
¡
Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π
¢
− t
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+
¡
Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π
¢
− t ≥ ΠM (∆;α) + (Πo (∆;α)−Π)− t
ΠM (∆;α) + (Πo (∆;α)−Π)− t ≥ 2Π
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+
¡
Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
−Π
¢
− t ≥ 2Π
since now the insiders capture entirely the outsider’s willingness to pay for the asset
transfer through the sale price they require in their take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer25.
Even if the CA’s objective function writes now CS(∆;α) + t, this will not essentially
alter our initial results. To see that, note that the necessary condition (basically, the single
crossing condition) for information revelation writes now:¡
ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
¢
−(ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
) ≥ t−t ≥ (ΠM (∆;α)+Πo (∆;α))−
(ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
)
25The case where both instruments are available besides the asset transfer would be much interesting,
but also highly complex, and would enable the comparison between the regulation of the sale price and
the tax to the regulator in terms of their respective eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency as revelation instruments.
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The point is, as long as one looks for the asset transfers ∆ ≤ ∆2, i.e. that induce
production to full capacity on behalf of the outsider and eventually satisfy CS (∆;α) =
CS
¡
∆;α
¢
= CS0, the condition ∂
2
∂∆∂α
¡
ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
¢
< 0 holds, which is ba-
sically the same condition as before but applied to total industry profit. To obtain the
sign of this derivative it is enough to work simple derivations on the profit functions:
ΠM (∆;α) =



¡
1+α−c−k−∆
2
¢2
, if M does not produce to full capacity
(1− 3k − c+ α) (2k −∆), if it does
and Πo (∆;α) =



¡
1−α−c−k−∆
2
¢
(k +∆) , if M does not produce to full capacity
(1− 3k − c) (k +∆), if it does
.
As before (see Lemma 6.2), the cross derivative ∂
2
∂∆∂α
¡
ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
¢
< 0
ensures that the revelation is possible, i.e.¡
ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
¢
− (ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
) >
(ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α))− (ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
).
Furthermore, ∂
∂∆
¡
ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
¢
< 0 for the asset transfers ∆ ≤ ∆2 that we
consider, which implies t− t ≥ 0 since
(ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α))− (ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
) ≥ 0.
Given all this, and following our initial reasoning on the sale prices P and P to
characterize the optimal contract, the outcome will be the following: so as to ensure
CS (∆;α) = CS
¡
∆;α
¢
= CS0, the asset transfers will be the same as with symmetric
information, whereas the monetary transfer will satisfy t = ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
− 3Π
and t =
¡
ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
¢
− (ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+ Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
) + t, where t ≥ t obviously
and t also satisfies the α-type participation constraint. Moreover, by its very definition,
combined with the single-crossing condition, t ensures the α-type incentive constraint. In
short, this means no distortion of the asset transfers, but only of the ’tax’ paid by the
eﬃcient merged entity.
If, instead, the constant Consumer Surplus constraint no longer applies, it is enough
to replace the above expressions for t and t into the CA’s objective function to obtain
the direction of the ensuing asset transfers. More precisely, the programme becomes:
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max∆≥0,∆≥0


ρ

 CS (∆;α) +
¡
ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
¢
−(ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
) +ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
− 3Π


+(1− ρ)
¡
CS
¡
∆;α
¢
+ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
− 3Π
¢


Therefore, assuming that the sum of Consumer Surplus and industry profits is concave
w.r.t. the asset transfer, the derivatives yield:
ρ ∂
∂∆
¡
CS (∆;α) +
¡
ΠM (∆;α) +Πo (∆;α)
¢¢
= 0, and
(1− ρ) ∂
∂∆
¡
CS
¡
∆;α
¢
+ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢¢
+ρ(
¡
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢¢
−(ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+
Πo
¡
∆;α
¢
) = 0
Comparing with the levels ∆ and ∆ that maximize total welfare (and no longer Con-
sumer Surplus) under symmetric information, ∆ is clearly the same, whereas ∆ is higher
with asymmetric information, because (1− ρ) ∂
∂∆
¡
CS
¡
∆;α
¢
+ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢¢
= ρ


¡
(ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢¢
−
¡
ΠM
¡
∆;α
¢
+Πo
¡
∆;α
¢¢| {z }
<0

 < 0
In other words, the eﬃcient type’s tax payment is downward distorted but its asset
transfer is the same as with symmetric information, whereas the ineﬃcient type’s tax
payment is not distorted ( it equals the entire willingness to pay), but its asset transfer
exceeds the symmetric information level.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The important thing is to never stop questioning...
The essays in this dissertation aimed to contribute to the theoretical analysis of hor-
izontal mergers’ rationale, market consequences and antitrust treatment. As such, they
concentrated on the unilateral eﬀects of horizontal mergers, in particular the potential
eﬃciencies generated by the concentration, and on the merger remedies as the main in-
strument of merger regulation employed by competition authorities.
The first part of the thesis examined in two spatial models the individual private in-
centives to merge and some of the welfare consequences of such a decision, in terms of
post-merger location or product design choices, the ensuing spatial equilibrium, and possi-
bly the resulting consumer surplus. The second part of the dissertation has instead focused
on the strategic interaction between the merging firms and the competition authorities in
a context of asymmetric information w.r.t. the merger’s competitive eﬀect, and concluded
in terms of optimal merger policy.
Although our analyses succeed in providing additional insight into the horizontal
merger rationale and profitability, as well as some possible recommendations in terms
of merger control, alternative approaches and assumption choices deserve notice and may
provide some directions for future research. We address this next.
The first part of the dissertation contains two essays, both proposing spatial analyses
of horizontal merger decisions and of their consequences by taking into account the firms’
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optimal location choices following the merger. In so doing, Chapters 2 and 3 share the
same underlying spatial framework, the shipping Cournot model of spatial price discrim-
ination. More precisely, this framework is employed in its very simple but extensively
used version, based on identical constant linear transport cost (in quantity shipped and
distance). However, an alternative assumption, such as transport cost convexity for in-
stance, would be useful in eliminating the less ’robust’ of the multiple location equilibria
obtained for the circular market merger analysis in Chapter 2. Yet, keeping the linearity
assumption was essential in checking the robustness of the paradox-profitability solution
proposed in the spatial literature, since the method required to keep the same assumptions
save the one we wished to test for, the spatial representation of the market. In addition,
the linearity assumption partly explains the multiplicity equilibria result we obtain, which
does represent in itself a by-product of our analysis.
A further debatable point concerning the (un)profitability result obtained in Chapter
2 is the fact that the generalization to a n-firm oligopoly is not yet available. As one of
the main problems raised is sorting out the multiple location equilibria, again, the convex
transport cost may be useful, but this has been left for future research.
A similar generalization-related issue concerns the analysis proposed in Chapter 3.
Admittedly, we devise a particular case to examine in a spatial setting the relationship
between merger and spin-oﬀ. The point is actually to highlight the possibility of comple-
mentarity between the two business strategies, which is why we do not look for a more
general set up - although it would be interesting to generalize the intuition that spin-oﬀs
(be they divisionalization or divestitures) can improve merger profitability. Arguably, sev-
eral extensions would be straightforward, such as allowing for transport cost diﬀerences
between the diﬀerent industry firms, or considering several buyers for the spun-oﬀ assets.
We leave this for further research.
The second part of this dissertation focused on asset sales as merger remedies and on
cost savings stemming from merger eﬃciency gains, but from a normative perspective. The
purpose of this second part was to examine the strategic interaction between the merging
firms and the competition authorities in a reality-consistent framework of asymmetric
information, so as to draw conclusions on the optimal profile of the merger policy in light
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of their respective individual incentives and vested interests w.r.t. the merger’ eventual
market outcome.
In Chapter 5, when analyzing the impact of merger remedies on the ex ante incentives
provided by the eﬃciency defence and more generally, by the merger control, a key point is
the information problem that the competition authority faces w.r.t. the merger’s eﬃcien-
cies. Admittedly, our formal treatment of the imperfect information could be enriched, to
the extent that all the relevant information is condensed in an exogenous, cost-free and
imperfect signal for the competition authority to observe and exploit. We acknowledge
that modelling instead the costly eﬀort to be able to send a (credible) signal on behalf
of the interested parties, or that of processing the relevant information for the antitrust
agency, would result in a more realistic and rich analysis. Notwithstanding, we feel that
our qualitative results would not be substantially modified.
Similarly, some particular modelling choice have important implications for the results
obtained in Chapter 6. On the one hand, dealing with a capacity-constrained industry
simplified the design of the contract menu we propose to extract the merging firms’ private
information. Our results would only gain in generality by extending this contract-theory
approach to the more frequent case in the literature, that of individual cost determined by
the firm’s asset holdings. This extension is yet left for future research, as is the possibility
to draw a more comprehensive analysis of such a revelation mechanism. More precisely,
it would be useful to allow for both the regulation of the divested assets’ sale price and
the direct monetary transfer to the state budget as revelation instruments in the contract
menu, besides the amount of the divestiture required. This would enable a comparison of
the two instruments, and would therefore provide indications as to the best instrument
to use. By so doing, we expect to enhance the scope of the main result of the analysis in
Chapter 6, that of arguing the eﬀectiveness of a revelation mechanism based on divestitures
and their sale price.
Appendix A
Merger to duopoly
• Post-merger location equilibria
Case 1: 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ 1
Profit of the single-store in z:
9×Π(2) [z] = R z0 [a+ (d− x)− 2(z − x)]2 dx+ R dz [a+ (d− x)− 2(x− z)]2 dx
+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− d)− 2(x− z)]2 dx+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x)− 2(x− z)]
2
dx
+
R 1−d
z+1/2 [a+ (1− d− x)− 2(1− x+ z)]
2
dx+
R 1
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d)− 2(1 + z − x)]
2
dx
= 12d−
1
2a− 2ad+ a2 + d2 −
8
3d
3 + 2z2 + 4ad2 − 8dz2 + 112
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
¡
1
12 + a
2 − 12a+
1
2d− 8z2d− 2ad+ d2 + 2z2 + 4ad2 −
8
3d
3
¢
= 4z − 16dz = 0, z = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
¡
1
12 + a
2 − 12a+
1
2d− 8z2d− 2ad+ d2 + 2z2 + 4ad2 −
8
3d
3
¢
= 4− 16d ≤ 0
Profit of the merged firm:
9×Π(2)merged =
R z
0 [a+ (z − x)− 2(d− x)]
2
dx+
R d
z
[a+ (x− z)− 2(d− x)]2 dx
+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z)− 2(x− d)]2 dx+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (x− z)− 2(1− d− x)]
2
dx
+
R 1−d
z+1/2 [a+ (1 + z − x)− 2(1− d− x)]
2
dx+
R 1
1−d [a+ (1 + z − x)− 2(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx
= 4ad− d− 12a+ a2 + 4d2 −
8
3d
3 + 2z2 − 8ad2 − 8dz2 + 112
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
¡
4ad− d− 12a+ a2 + 4d2 −
8
3d
3 + 2z2 − 8ad2 − 8dz2 + 112
¢
= 4a+8d−16ad−8d2−
8z2 − 1 = 0
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Solution is:
n
d = 12 − a+
1
4
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2 − 16z2)
o
,
n
d = 12 − a−
1
4
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2 − 16z2)
o
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
¡
4ad− d− 12a+ a2 + 4d2 −
8
3d
3 + 2z2 − 8ad2 − 8dz2 + 112
¢
= 8 − 16d − 16a ≤ 0,
Solution is:
©
1
2 − a ≤ d
ª
Since:
h
1
2 − a+
1
4
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2 − 16z2)
i
z=0
= 12−a+
1
4
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2) > 1/4, the
solution (z,d) to the system of FOCs satisfying the SOCs is: z = 0, d =
1
2 − a+
1
4
p
(2− 8a+ 16a2)
Case 2: 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1
Profit of the single-store in z:
9×Π(2) [z] = R z0 [a+ (d− x)− 2(z − x)]2 dx+ R dz [a+ (d− x)− 2(x− z)]2 dx
+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− d)− 2(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x)− 2(x− z)]
2
dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d)− 2(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2 [a+ (x− 1 + d)− 2(1 + z − x)]
2
dx
= 52d−
1
2a+ 2z − 2ad− 8dz + a2 − 3d2 − 2z2 +
8
3z
3 + 4ad2 + 8d2z − 14
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
¡
5
2d−
1
2a+ 2z − 2ad− 8dz + a2 − 3d2 − 2z2 +
8
3z
3 + 4ad2 + 8d2z − 14
¢
= 8d2−4z−
8d+8z2+2, Solution is:
n
z = 14 +
1
4
p
(−3 + 16d− 16d2)
o
,
n
z = 14 −
1
4
p
(−3 + 16d− 16d2)
o
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
¡
5
2d−
1
2a+ 2z − 2ad− 8dz + a2 − 3d2 − 2z2 +
8
3z
3 + 4ad2 + 8d2z − 14
¢
= 16z−4 ≤
0, Solution is:
©
z ≤ 14
ª
Profit of the merged firm:
9×Π(2)merged =
R z
0 [a+ (z − x)− 2(d− x)]
2
dx+
R d
z
[a+ (x− z)− 2(d− x)]2 dx
+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z)− 2(x− d)]2 dx+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (x− z)− 2(1− d− x)]
2
dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− z)− 2(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2 [a+ (1 + z − x)− 2(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx
= d− 12a+ 2z + 4ad− 8dz + a2 − 2z2 +
8
3z
3 − 8ad2 + 8d2z − 14
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
¡
d− 12a+ 2z + 4ad− 8dz + a2 − 2z2 +
8
3z
3 − 8ad2 + 8d2z − 14
¢
= 4a− 8z − 16ad+
16dz + 1 = 0, Solution is:
n
d = 116
1+4a−8z
a−z
o
Second Order Condition:
APPENDIX A 172
∂2
∂d2
¡
d− 12a+ 2z + 4ad− 8dz + a2 − 2z2 +
8
3z
3 − 8ad2 + 8d2z − 14
¢
= 16z − 16a ≤ 0,
Solution is {z ≤ a} Always satisfied
We solve for the solution of the FOCs simultaneous system:



z = 14 −
1
4
p
(−3 + 16d− 16d2)
d = 116
1+4a−8z
a−z
and find that the solution satisfying the SOCs and the initial conditions is: z = 1/4 = d, 1− d = 3/4
Case 3: 0 ≤ d ≤ z ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1
Profit of the single-store in z:
9×Π(2) [z] = R d0 [a+ (d− x)− 2(z − x)]2 dx+ R zd [a+ (x− d)− 2(z − x)]2 dx
+
R 1/2
z
[a+ (x− d)− 2(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x)− 2(x− z)]
2
dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d)− 2(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2 [a+ (x− 1 + d)− 2(1 + z − x)]
2
dx
= 52d−
1
2a+ 2z − 2ad− 8dz + a2 − 3d2 +
8
3d
3 − 2z2 + 4ad2 + 8dz2 − 14
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
¡
5
2d−
1
2a+ 2z − 2ad− 8dz + a2 − 3d2 +
8
3d
3 − 2z2 + 4ad2 + 8dz2 − 14
¢
= 16dz−4z−
8d+ 2 = 0, Solution is:
©
z = 12
ª
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
¡
5
2d−
1
2a+ 2z − 2ad− 8dz + a2 − 3d2 +
8
3d
3 − 2z2 + 4ad2 + 8dz2 − 14
¢
= 16d−4 ≤
0, Solution is:
©
d ≤ 14
ª
Profit of the merged firm:
9×Π(2)merged =
R d
0 [a+ (z − x)− 2(d− x)]
2
dx+
R z
d
[a+ (z − x)− 2(x− d)]2 dx
+
R 1/2
z
[a+ (x− z)− 2(x− d)]2 dx+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (x− z)− 2(1− d− x)]
2
dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− z)− 2(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2 [a+ (1− x+ z)− 2(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx
= d− 12a+ 2z + 4ad− 8dz + a2 +
8
3d
3 − 2z2 − 8ad2 + 8dz2 − 14
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
¡
d− 12a+ 2z + 4ad− 8dz + a2 +
8
3d
3 − 2z2 − 8ad2 + 8dz2 − 14
¢
= 04a−8z−16ad+
8d2 + 8z2 + 1 = 0,
Solution is:
n
d = a+ 14
p
(16a2 − 2− 8a+ 16z − 16z2)
o
,
n
d = a− 14
p
(16a2 − 2− 8a+ 16z − 16z2)
o
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
¡
d− 12a+ 2z + 4ad− 8dz + a2 +
8
3d
3 − 2z2 − 8ad2 + 8dz2 − 14
¢
= 16d − 16a ≤ 0,
Solution is: {d ≤ a} Always satisfied.
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Since
h
a− 14
p
(16a2 − 2− 8a+ 16z − 16z2)
i
z=1/2
= a − 14
p
(16a2 + 2− 8a) < 1/4,
the solution of the system of simultaneous FOCs is: z = 1/2, d = a−
1
4
p
(16a2 + 2− 8a)
Remark: case 3 basically coincides with case 1, up to a 180◦ rotation; optimal z is now
opposite to its first value, and the optimal d-s are in fact symmetric w.r.t the 1/4 point.
• Profitability analysis
Evaluating the merged profit for the Type 1 pattern:
Π
(2)
merged [type 1] =
1
9

 4ad− d−
1
2a+ a
2 + 4d2
−83d3 + 2z2 − 8ad2 − 8dz2 +
1
12


z=0,d= 1
2
−a+1
4
√
(2−8a+16a2)
=
³
5a2 − 32a−
16
3 a
3 + 16
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 23a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 43a2
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 14
´
1
9
Evaluating the merged profit for the Type 2 pattern:
Π
(2)
merged [type 2] =
1
9
£
d− 12a+ 2z + 4ad− 8dz + a2 − 2z2 +
8
3z
3 − 8ad2 + 8d2z − 14
¤
z=1/4,d=1/4
= 19
¡
a2 + 124
¢
Profitability for Type 1 post-merger equilibrium:
 equidistant firms merged2 type 1
 2  1
16
 127
324
 1
2
a  a2
 1
9
5a2  3
2
a  16
3
a3  1
6
2 8a2  4a  1
 2
3
a 2 8a2  4a  1  4
3
a2 2 8a2  4a  1  1
4
 55
2592
 5
48
a  31
72
a2  1
54 2  8a  16a2
 2
27
a 2  8a  16a2  427a2 2  8a  16a2  1627a3
PlotAHH55LêH2592LL+H5êH48LL∗a−HH31LêH72LL∗a^2−H1êH54LL∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L +H2êH27LL ∗a∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L −H4êH27LL∗a^2∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L +HH16LêH27LL∗a^3,8a,0,5<E
Plotting this expression with Mathematica shows
that the range of profitability is a  1.5, 3.6:
1 2 3 4 5
-0.02
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
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profits diametrical firms (firms at 0 and 1/2)  merged2 type 1
 1
16
 1
2
a  a2  1
4
 1
16
7
12
 1
2
a  a2 
1
9
 3
2
a  1
4
 5a2  1
6
2  8a  16a2 
 2
3
a 2  8a  16a2   43 a2 2  8a  16a2   163 a3
 5
48
a  31
72
a2  7
288
 1
54 2  8a  16a2 
 2
27
a 2  8a  16a2   427 a2 2  8a  16a2   1627 a3
PlotAH5êH48LL∗a−HH31LêH72LL∗a^2+H7êH288LL−H1êH54LL∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L +H2êH27LL∗a∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L −H4êH27LL∗a^2∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L +HH16LêH27LL∗a^3,8a, 0, 5<E
Plottingthis expression with Mathematica shows
that the range of profitability is a  1.5,3.57
1 2 3 4 5
-0.02
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
profits common location firms (firms at 0) merged2 type 1
 2  1
16
 1
2
a  a2  1
4

1
9
 3
2
a  1
4
 5a2  1
6
2  8a  16a2 
2
3
a 2  8a  16a2  43 a2 2  8a  16a2  163 a3
 5
48
a  31
72
a2  1
288
 1
54 2  8a  16a2
 2
27
a 2  8a  16a2  427 a2 2  8a  16a2  1627 a3
PlotAH5êH48LL∗a−HH31LêH72LL∗a^2+H1êH288LL−H1êH54LL∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L +H2êH27LL∗a∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L −H4êH27LL∗a^2∗èH2−8∗a+16∗a^2L +HH16LêH27LL∗a^3,8a, 0, 5<E
Plotting this expression with Mathematica shows
that the range of profitability is a  1.5, 4.01
1 2 3 4 5
-0.04
-0.02
0.02
0.04
0.06
Profitability for Type 2 post-merger equilibrium:
P
profits equidistant firms - Π(2)merged [type 2] =
2× 116 ×
¡
127
324 −
1
2a+ a
2
¢
− 19
¡
a2 + 124
¢
= 1152592 −
1
16a+
1
72a
2
115
2592 −
1
16a+
1
72a
2 ≤ 0, Solution is: {0.883 23 ≤ a, a ≤ 3.616 8}
Therefore the merger is profitable if a ∈ (1.5, 3.61].
P
profits diametrical firms (firms at 0 and 1/2) - Π(2)merged [type 2] =
1
16
¡
−12a+ a2 +
1
4
¢
+ 116
¡
7
12 −
1
2a+ a
2
¢
− 19
¡
a2 + 124
¢
= − 116a+
1
72a
2 + 41864
− 116a+
1
72a
2 + 41864 ≤ 0, Solution is: {0.967 10 ≤ a, a ≤ 3.532 9}
Therefore the merger is profitable if a ∈ (1.5, 3.53].
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P
profits common location firms (firms at 0) - Π(2)merged [type 2] =
2× 116
¡
−12a+ a2 +
1
4
¢
− 19
¡
a2 + 124
¢
= − 116a+
1
72a
2 + 23864
− 116a+
1
72a
2 + 23864 ≤ 0, Solution is: {0.476 35 ≤ a, a ≤ 4.023 6}
Therefore the merger is profitable if a ∈ (1.5, 4.023].
These results are summarized in Table 2.1.
Merger to triopoly
• Location equilibria
For each subcase, we explicitly write the profit functions and derive the optimal loca-
tions by solving out for the solution of the system of three FOCs and checking against the
SOCs (unknowns are z, y, and d). The equilibrium values are obtained with Mathematica
and summarized at the end of this subsection.
Case 1: 0 6 z 6 y 6 d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ 1
Profit of outsider located at z:
Π(3) [z]×16 = R z0 [a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(z − x)]2 dx+R yz [a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R d
y
[a+ (x− y) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− y) + (x− d)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (x− y) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R y+1/2
z+1/2

 a+ (x− y) + (1− d− x)
−3(1− x+ z)


2
dx
+
R 1−d
y+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ y) + (1− d− x)
−3(1− x+ z)


2
dx+
R 1
1−d

 a+ (1− x+ y) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(1− x+ z)


2
dx
= 12d−
1
2a− 2ad− 6yz + a2 + d2 −
8
3d
3 + 2y2 − 4y3
+6z2 + 4z3 + 4ad2 + 4dy2 − 12dz2 − 12yz2 + 12y2z + 112
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = −24yz − 24dz − 6y + 12y2 + 12z2 + 12z = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = −24y − 24d+ 24z + 12 ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
z ≤ y + d− 12
ª
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Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R z0 [a+ (z − x) + (d− x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+R yz [a+ (x− z) + (d− x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
+
R d
y
[a+ (x− z) + (d− x)− 3(x− y)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z) + (x− d)− 3(x− y)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R y+1/2
z+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ z)+
(1− d− x)− 3(x− y)


2
dx
+
R 1−d
y+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ z) + (1− d− x)
−3(1− x+ y)


2
dx+
R 1
1−d

 a+ (1− x+ z) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(1− x+ y)


2
dx
= 12d−
1
2a− 2ad− 6yz + a2 + d2 −
8
3d
3 + 6y2 − 4y3
+2z2 + 4z3 + 4ad2 − 12dy2 + 4dz2 − 12yz2 + 12y2z + 112
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 12y − 6z − 12z2 + 24yz − 12y2 − 24dy = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = −24y − 24d+ 24z + 12 ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
−d+ z + 12 ≤ y
ª
Profit of the merged firm:
Π
(3)
merged×16 =
R z
0 [a+ (z − x) + (y − x)− 3(d− x)]
2
dx+
R y
z
[a+ (x− z) + (y − x)− 3(d− x)]2 dx
+
R d
y
[a+ (x− z) + (x− y)− 3(d− x)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z) + (x− y)− 3(x− d)]2 dx+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (x− y)− 3(1− d− x)]
2
dx+
R y+1/2
z+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ z)+
(x− y)− 3(1− d− x)


2
dx+
R 1−d
y+1/2 [a+ (1− x+ z) + (1− x+ y)− 3(1− d− x)]
2
dx+
R 1
1−d

 a+ (1− x+ z)+
(1− x+ y)− 3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= −32d+2y2+2yz+2z2+
1
12 − 12z2d+4z2y+9d2− 4zy2−
4
3z
3+ 43y
3− 12dy2− 8d3−
1
2a+ a
2 + 6ad− 12ad2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged = −
3
2 − 12z2 + 18d− 12y2 − 24d2 + 6a− 24ad = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = 18− 48d− 24a ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
3
8 −
1
2a ≤ d
ª
The simultaneous system of FOCs is solved with Mathematica:
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z∈ Reals&&y∈ Reals&&d∈ Reals&&a∈ Reals;
z≥ 0&&y≥0&&d> 0&&a>2;
Reduce@8−H3ê2L−12∗z^2+18∗d−12∗y^2−24∗d^2+6∗a−24∗a∗dm0,
12∗y−6∗z−12∗z^2+24∗y∗z−12∗y^2−24∗d∗ym0,
−24∗y∗z−24∗d∗z−6∗y+12∗y^2+12∗z^2+12∗zm 0<,8z,y,d<D
Out[3]= d== 14 &&y == −
1
4 &&z== −
1
4 »»
d== 14 &&y ==
1
4 &&z == −
1
4 »»d== 14 &&y== 14 &&z== 14 »»
d== 120 H13−16aL&&y == 120 H1+8aL&&z== 120 H−1− 8aL »»
d== 18
ik3−4a−"5− 8a+ 16a2 y{&&y == 0&&z == 0»»
d== 18
ik3−4a+"5− 8a+ 16a2 y{&&y == 0&&z == 0
None of these solutions is compatible with either the initial conditions defining case 1
or the SOCs. (For instance, d = z = y = 1/4 contredicts the SOC w.r.t.y: −d+ z + 12 ≤
y ⇔ −14 +
1
4 +
1
2 ≤
1
4).
Case 2: 0 ≤ z ≤ y ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 6 y + 1/2 6 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]×16 = R z0 [a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(z − x)]2 dx+R yz [a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R d
y
[a+ (x− y) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− y) + (x− d)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (x− y) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d a+[(x− y) + (x− 1 + d)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx
+
R y+1/2
z+1/2

 a+ (x− y) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (1 + y − x) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= 52d− y + 4y2 + 4yd− 6yz − 3d2 − 12dz + 12zy2 + 12zd2 − 4d2y + 8z3 −
1
4 −
16
3 y
3 +
3z − 12z2y + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = −6y − 12d+ 12y2 + 12d2 + 24z2 + 3− 24yz = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = 48z − 24y ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
z ≤ 12y
ª
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R z0 [a+ (z − x) + (d− x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+R yz [a+ (x− z) + (d− x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
+
R d
y
[a+ (x− z) + (d− x)− 3(x− y)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z) + (x− d)− 3(x− y)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− z) + (x− 1 + d)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx
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+
R y+1/2
z+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ z)
+(x− 1 + d)− 3(x− y)


2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (1 + z − x)+
(x− 1 + d)− 3(1 + y − x)


2
dx
= 52d+3y−12yd−6yz−3d2+4dz+12zy2−4zd2+12d2y+
8
3z
3+4z2− 14−z−12z2y+a2−
a
2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 3− 12d− 6z + 24yz + 12d2 − 12z2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = 24z ≤ 0
Remark : Given this Second Order Condition, case 2 cannot possibly obtain ratio-
nal and positive solutions.
Case 3: 0 ≤ d 6 z 6 y 6 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]×16 = R d0 [a+ (d− x) + (y − x)− 3(z − x)]2 dx+R zd [a+ (x− d) + (y − x)− 3(z − x)]2 dx
+
R y
z
[a+ (x− d) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y
[a+ (x− d) + (x− y)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (x− y)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (x− y)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx
+
R y+1/2
z+1/2 [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (x− y)− 3(1 + z − x)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1 + y − x)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= 52d− y + 12z2d+ 4y2 + 4yd− 6yz − 3d2 − 12dz + 12zy2 − 4dy2
+4z3 − 14 +
8
3d
3 − 4y3 + 3z − 12z2y + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = 24dz − 6y − 12d+ 12y2 + 12z2 + 3− 24yz = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = 24d+ 24z − 24y ≤ 0, Solution is: {z ≤ −d+ y}
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R d0 [a+ (d− x) + (z − x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+R zd [a+ (x− d) + (z − x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
+
R y
z
[a+ (x− d) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y
[a+ (x− d) + (x− z)− 3(x− y)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (x− z)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (x− z)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx
+
R y+1/2
z+1/2 [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (1− x+ z)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(1 + y − x)


2
dx
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= 52d+ 3y − 4z2d− 12yd− 6yz − 3d2 + 4dz + 12zy2 + 12dy2 + 4z3 + 4z2 −
1
4 +
8
3d
3 −
4y3 − z − 12z2y + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 3− 12d− 6z + 24yz + 24yd− 12y2 − 12z2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = 24d+ 24z − 24y ≤ 0, Solution is: {d+ z ≤ y}
Profit of the merged firm
Π
(3)
merged×16 =
R d
0 [a+ (y − x) + (z − x)− 3(d− x)]
2
dx+
R z
d
[a+ (y − x) + (z − x)− 3(x− d)]2 dx
+
R y
z
[a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(x− d)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y
[a+ (x− y) + (x− z)− 3(x− d)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (x− y) + (x− z)− 3(1− d− x)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− y) + (x− z)− 3(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx
+
R y+1/2
z+1/2 [a+ (x− y) + (1− x+ z)− 3(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ y)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= 92d+ 3y + 12z
2d− 4y2 − 12yd+ 2yz − 3d2 − 12dz − 4zy2 + 12dy2 − 43z3 − 4z2
+8d3 + 43y
3 − 12a+ a2 + 3z + 4z2y − 12ad2 + 6ad−
11
12
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged =
9
2 + 12z
2 − 12y − 6d− 12z + 12y2 + 24d2 − 24ad+ 6a = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = −6 + 48d− 24a ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
d ≤ 18 +
1
2a
ª
The simultaneous system of FOCs is solved with Mathematica:
In[1]:= Reduce@8H9ê2L+12∗z^2−12∗y−6∗d−12∗z+12∗y^2+
24∗d^2−24∗a∗d+6∗am 0,
3−12∗d−6∗z+24∗y∗z+24∗y∗d−12∗y^2−12∗z^2m 0,
24∗d∗z−6∗y−12∗d+12∗y^2+12∗z^2+3−24∗y∗zm 0<,8z,y,d<D
Out[1]= d== 14 &&y ==
1
4 &&z ==
1
4 »»
d== 14 &&y ==
3
4 &&z ==
1
4 »» d == 14 &&y == 34 &&z== 34 »»
d== 120 H−3+ 16aL &&y== 120 H11+ 8aL&&z == 120 H9− 8aL »»
d== 18
ik1+4a−" 5− 8a+ 16a2 y{ &&y == 12 &&z == 12 »»
d== 18
ik1+4a+" 5− 8a+ 16a2 y{ &&y == 12 &&z == 12
However, none of these solutions is compatible with either the initial conditions defining
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case 3, or the SOCs. Case 3 obtains no valid solution.
Case 4: 0 ≤ z ≤ y ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]×16 = R z0 [a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(z − x)]2 dx+R yz [a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R d
y
[a+ (x− y) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− y) + (x− d)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (x− y) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
z+1/2

 a+ (x− y)+
(1− d− x)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
+
R y+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− y) + (x− 1 + d)− 3(1 + z − x)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (1 + y − x)+
(x− 1 + d)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= −y − 12d− 12z2y − 12z2d+ 4y2 + 4yd− 6yz + 3d2
+12zy2 + 4z3 + 6z2 − 163 y3 − 4d2y − 4d3 +
1
4 + a
2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = −24yz − 24dz − 6y + 12y2 + 12z2 + 12z = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = −24y − 24d+ 24z + 12 ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
z ≤ y + d− 12
ª
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R z0 [a+ (z − x) + (d− x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+R yz [a+ (x− z) + (d− x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
+
R d
y
[a+ (x− z) + (d− x)− 3(x− y)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z) + (x− d)− 3(x− y)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
z+1/2

 a+ (1 + z − x)+
(1− d− x)− 3(x− y)


2
dx
+
R y+1/2
1−d [a+ (1 + z − x) + (x− 1 + d)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (1 + z − x)+
(x− 1 + d)− 3(1 + y − x)


2
dx
= 3y + 72d− 6yz + 2z2 + 4z2d− 12z2y − 5d2 − 12dy + 12zy2
+12d2y + 4z3 + 43d
3 − 512 + a2 −
a
2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 3− 6z − 12z2 − 12d+ 24yz + 12d2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = 24z ≤ 0
Remark : In light of this SOC, case 4 cannot possibly yield positive solutions.
APPENDIX A 181
Case 5: 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ y ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]×16 = R z0 [a+ (d− x) + (y − x)− 3(z − x)]2 dx+R dz [a+ (d− x) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R y
d
[a+ (x− d) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y
[a+ (x− d) + (x− y)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (x− y)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (x− y)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx
+
R y+1/2
z+1/2 [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (x− y)− 3(1 + z − x)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1 + y − x)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= 52d− y + 3z − 12z2y − 3d2 + 4dy − 12dz + 4y2 − 6yz + 12zd2+
12zy2 + 8z3 − 43d3 − 4y2d− 4y3 −
1
4 + a
2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = 3− 24yz − 12d− 6y + 12d2 + 12y2 + 24z2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = −24y + 48z ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
z ≤ 12y
ª
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R z0 [a+ (d− x) + (z − x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+R dz [a+ (d− x) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
+
R y
d
[a+ (x− d) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y
[a+ (x− d) + (x− z)− 3(x− y)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (x− z)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (x− z)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx
+
R y+1/2
z+1/2 [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (1− x+ z)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(1 + y − x)


2
dx
= 52d+ 3y − z − 3d2 − 6yz + 4z2 −
1
4 − 12z2y + 4dz − 12dy
−4zd2 + 12zy2 + 83z3 + 4d3 + 12y2d− 4y3 + a2 −
a
2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 3− 6z − 12z2 − 12d+ 24yz + 24dy − 12y2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = 24z + 24d− 24y ≤ 0, Solution is: {z + d ≤ y}
Profit of the merged firm
Π
(3)
merged×16 =
R z
0 [a+ (y − x) + (z − x)− 3(d− x)]
2
dx+
R d
z
[a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(d− x)]2 dx
+
R y
d
[a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(x− d)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y
[a+ (x− y) + (x− z)− 3(x− d)]2 dx
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+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (x− y) + (x− z)− 3(1− d− x)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d

 a+ (x− y) + (x− z)
−3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
+
R y+1/2
z+1/2 [a+ (x− y) + (1− x+ z)− 3(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ y)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= 92d+ 3y + 3z − 3d2 − 4y2 + 2yz − 4z2 + 4z2y − 12dz − 12dy+
12zd2 − 4zy2 + 83z3 + 4d3 + 12y2d+
4
3y
3 − 12a+ a2 + 6ad− 12ad2 −
11
12
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged =
9
2 − 6d− 12z − 12y + 24dz + 12d2 + 12y2 + 6a− 24ad = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = −6 + 24z + 24d− 24a ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
d ≤ 14 − z + a
ª
We solve the simultaneous system of FOCs with Mathematica:
In[1]:= Reduce@8H9ê2L −6∗d−12∗z−12∗y+24∗d∗z+12∗d^2+12∗y^2+6∗a−24∗a∗dm 0,
3−6∗z−12∗z^2−12∗d+24∗y∗z+24∗d∗y−12∗y^2m 0,
3−24∗y∗z−12∗d−6∗y+12∗d^2+12∗y^2+24∗z^2m 0<,8z, y, d<D
Thereisnorationalsolutiontothissystem.
Case5hasnovalidsolution.
Case 6: 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ y ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ y + 1/2 ≤ 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]×16 = R z0 [a+ (d− x) + (y − x)− 3(z − x)]2 dx+R dz [a+ (d− x) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R y
d
[a+ (x− d) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y
[a+ (x− d) + (x− y)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (x− y)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
z+1/2

 a+ (1− d− x)+
(x− y)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
+
R y+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (x− y)− 3(1 + z − x)]
2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1 + y − x)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= −12d− y − 12z2d− 12z2y + 3d2 + 4dy + 4y2 − 6yz + 12zy2+
4z3 + 6z2 − 163 d3 − 4y2d− 4y3 +
1
4 + a
2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = −24dz − 24yz − 6y + 12y2 + 12z2 + 12z = 0
Second Order Condition:
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∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = −24d− 24y + 24z + 12 ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
z ≤ d+ y − 12
ª
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R z0 [a+ (d− x) + (z − x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+R dz

 a+ (d− x)+
(x− z)− 3(y − x)


2
dx
+
R y
d
[a+ (x− d) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y
[a+ (x− d) + (x− z)− 3(x− y)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (x− z)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
z+1/2

 a+ (1− d− x)+
(1− x+ z)− 3(x− y)


2
dx
+
R y+1/2
1−d

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1− x+ z)− 3(x− y)


2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(1 + y − x)


2
dx
= 72d+ 3y − 6yz + 2z2 + 4z2d− 12z2y − 5d2 − 12dy + 12zy2+
12y2d+ 4z3 + 163 d
3 − 4y3 − 512 + a2 −
a
2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 3− 6z − 12z2 − 12d+ 24yz + 24dy − 12y2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = 24z + 24d− 24y ≤ 0, Solution is: {z + d ≤ y}
Profit of the merged firm
Π
(3)
merged×16 =
R z
0 (a+(y−x)+(z−x)−3(d−x))2dx+
R d
z

 a+ (y − x)+
(x− z)− 3(d− x)


2
dx
+
R y
d
(a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(x− d))2dx+
R 1/2
y
(a+ (x− y) + (x− z)− 3(x− d))2dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2

 a+ (x− y)+
(x− z)− 3(1− d− x)


2
dx+
R 1−d
z+1/2

 a+ (x− y)+
(1− x+ z)− 3(1− d− x)


2
dx
+
R y+1/2
1−d

 a+ (x− y)+
(1− x+ z)− 3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx+
R 1
y+1/2

 a+ (1 + y − x)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= 32d+3y− 4y2+2yz+2z2− 12z2d+4z2y+3d2− 12dy− 4zy2+12y2d−
4
3z
3+ 43y
3−
5
12 −
1
2a+ a
2 + 6ad− 12ad2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged =
3
2 − 12z2 + 6d− 12y + 12y2 + 6a− 24ad = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = 6− 24a ≤ 0
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We solve the simultaneous system of FOCs with Mathematica:
In[1]:= Reduce@8H3ê2L −12∗z^2+ 6∗d− 12∗y+ 12∗y^2+6∗a− 24∗ a∗dm 0,
3− 6∗z− 12∗z^2− 12∗d+ 24∗y∗z+ 24∗d∗y− 12∗y^2m 0,
−24∗d∗z−24∗ y∗z−6∗y+12∗ y^2+ 12∗z^2+ 12∗zm 0<,8z, y, d<D
Out[1]= a == 14 &&d ==
1
4 && z ==
1
2 H−1 + 2 yL »»
a == 14 &&y ==
1
2 && z == 0 »»
d == 14 &&z ==
1
2 H−1 + 2 yL && −1 + 4 a ≠ 0
The solution satifying all conditions is z = 0, y = 1/2, d = 1/4
Case 7: 0 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ y ≤ 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]× 16 = R z0

 a+ (d− x)+
(1− y + x)− 3(z − x)


2
dx+
R d
z

 a+ (d− x)+
(1− y + x)− 3(x− z)


2
dx
+
R y−1/2
d
[a+ (x− d) + (1− y + x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1/2
y−1/2 [a+ (x− d) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
z+1/2

 a+ (1− d− x)
+(y − x)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
+
R y
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (y − x)− 3(1 + z − x)]
2
dx+
R 1
y

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(x− y)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= 92d+ 8y − 6z + d2 − 10y2 + 18yz − 6z2 − 12z2d+ 12z2y
−8dy − 12zy2 − 4z3 − 83d3 + 4y2d+ yr3 −
23
12 + a
2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = −6 + 18y − 12z − 24dz + 24yz − 12y2 − 12z2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = −12− 24d+ 24y − 24z ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
y − 12 − d ≤ z
ª
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R z0

 a+ (d− x)+
(z − x)− 3(1− y + x)


2
dx+
R d
z

 a+ (d− x)
+(x− z)− 3(1− y + x)


2
dx
+
R y−1/2
d

 a+ (x− d) + (x− z)
−3(1− y + x)


2
dx+
R 1/2
y−1/2 [a+ (x− d) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]
2
dx
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+
R z+1/2
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
z+1/2

 a+ (1− d− x)+
(1− x+ z)− 3(y − x)


2
dx
+
R y
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (1 + z − x)− 3(y − x)]
2
dx+
R 1
y

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(x− y)


2
dx
= −232 d− 6z + d2 − 6y2 + 18yz − 10z2 + 4z2d+ 12z2y + 24dy − 12zy2 − 4z3 −
8
3d
3 −
12y2d+ 4y3 + 2512 + a
2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = −12y + 18z + 12z2 + 24d− 24yz − 24dy + 12y2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = −12− 24d+ 24y − 24z ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
y ≤ 12 + d+ z
ª
Profit of the merged firm
Π
(3)
merged × 16 =
R z
0

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(z − x)− 3(d− x)


2
dx+
R d
z

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(x− z)− 3(d− x)


2
dx
+
R y−1/2
d

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(x− z)− 3(x− d)


2
dx+
R 1/2
y−1/2

 a+ (y − x)+
(x− z)− 3(x− d)


2
dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2

 a+ (y − x) + (x− z)
−3(1− d− x)


2
dx+
R 1−d
z+1/2

 a+ (y − x)+
(1− x+ z)− 3(1− d− x)


2
dx
+
R y
1−d

 a+ (y − x) + (1 + z − x)
−3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx+
R 1
y

 a+ (x− y)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= −272 d− 8y + 2z + 9d2 + 6y2 − 6yz + 6z2 +
41
12 − 12z2d− 4z2y + 24dy
+4zy2 + 43z
3 − 8d3 − 12y2d− 43y3 −
1
2a+ a
2 + 6ad− 12ad2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged = −
27
2 + 18d− 12z2 + 24y − 24d2 − 12y2 + 6a− 24ad = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = 18− 48d− 24a ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
3
8 −
1
2a ≤ d
ª
We solve the simultaneous system of FOCs with Mathematica:
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In[2]:= Reduce@8−HH27L ê 2L + 18∗ d − 12∗ z^2 + 24∗ y − 24 ∗ d^2 − 12∗ y^2 +
6∗ a − 24 ∗ a∗ d m 0,
−12∗ y + 18∗ z + 12∗ z^2 + 24∗ d − 24 ∗ y∗ z − 24∗ d∗ y +
12∗ y^2 m 0,
−6 + 18∗ y − 12∗ z − 24∗ d∗ z + 24∗ y∗ z − 12∗ y^2 − 12 ∗ z^2 m
0<, 8z, y, d<D
Out[2]= d == 14 && y ==
3
4 && z == −
1
4 »»
d == 14 && y ==
3
4 && z ==
1
4 »» d == 14 && y == 54 && z == 14 »»
d == 120 H13 − 16 aL && y == 120 H19 − 8 aL && z == 120 H1 + 8 aL »»
d == 18
ik3 − 4 a − " 5 − 8 a + 16 a2 y{ && y == 1 && z == 0 »»
d == 18
ik3 − 4 a + " 5 − 8 a + 16 a2 y{ && y == 1 && z == 0
The unique solution is z = 1/4, y = /4, d = 1/4
Case 8: 0 ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ d ≤ z ≤ 1/2 ≤ y ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]× 16 = R y−1/20

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(d− x)− 3(z − x)


2
dx+
R d
y−1/2

 a+ (y − x)+
(d− x)− 3(z − x)


2
dx
+
R z
d
[a+ (y − x) + (x− d)− 3(z − x)]2 dx+
R 1/2
z
[a+ (y − x) + (x− d)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R y
1/2 [a+ (y − x) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
y
[a+ (x− y) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− y) + (x− 1 + d)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2

 a+ (x− y)+
(x− 1 + d)− 3(1− x+ z)


2
dx
= 3z+ 52d− y+4y2− 6zy+4dy−
1
4 − 4dy2+12zy2− 3d2− 12dz− 12z2y− 4y3+
8
3d
3+
12z2d+ 4z3 + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = 3− 6y + 12y2 − 12d− 24zy + 24dz + 12z2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = 24z + 24d− 24y ≤ 0
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R y−1/20

 a+ (z − x) + (d− x)
−3(1− y + x)


2
dx+
R d
y−1/2

 a+ (z − x)+
(d− x)− 3(y − x)


2
dx
+
R z
d
[a+ (z − x) + (x− d)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+
R 1/2
z
[a+ (x− z) + (x− d)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
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+
R y
1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (1− d− x)− 3(y − x)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
y

 a+ (x− z)+
(1− d− x)− 3(x− y)


2
dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− z) + (x− 1 + d)− 3(x− y)]
2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2

 a+ (1 + z − x)+
(x− 1 + d)− 3(x− y)


2
dx
= −z+ 52d+3y+12zy2− 6zy+12dy2− 12dy+4z2+4zd− 3d2− 12z2y− 4y3+
8
3d
3−
4z2d− 14 + 4z3 + a2 −
a
2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 3 + 24zy − 6z + 24dy − 12d− 12z2 − 12y2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = 24z + 24d− 24y ≤ 0, Solution is: {z + d ≤ y}
Profit of the merged firm:
Π
(3)
merged×16 =
R y−1/2
0

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(z − x)− 3(d− x)


2
dx+
R d
y−1/2

 a+ (y − x)+
(z − x)− 3(d− x)


2
dx
+
R z
d
[a+ (y − x) + (z − x)− 3(x− d)]2 dx+
R 1/2
z
[a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(x− d)]2 dx
+
R y
1/2

 a+ (y − x) + (x− z)
−3(1− d− x)


2
dx+
R 1−d
y

 a+ (x− y)+
(x− z)− 3(1− d− x)


2
dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d

 a+ (x− y) + (x− z)
−3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2

 a+ (x− y) + (1 + z − x)
−3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= 3z + 92d+ 3y − 4y2 + 2zy − 12dy − 4z2 + 12dy2 − 4zy2 − 3d2 − 12dz + 4z2y
+43y
3 + 8d3 + 12z2d− 43z3 −
1
2a−
11
12 + a
2 + 6ad− 12ad2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged =
9
2 − 12y + 12y2 − 6d− 12z + 24d2 + 12z2 + 6a− 24ad = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = −6 + 48d− 24a ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
d ≤ 18 +
1
2a
ª
We solve the simultaneous system of FOCs with Mathematica:
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In[3]:= Reduce@8H9ê2L−12∗y+12∗y^2−6∗d−12∗z+24∗d^2+12∗z^2+6∗a−24∗a∗dm0,
3−6∗y+12∗y^2−12∗d−24∗z∗y+24∗d∗z+12∗z^2m 0,
3+24∗z∗y−6∗z+24∗d∗y−12∗d−12∗z^2−12∗y^2m 0<,8z,y,d<D
Out[3]= d== 14 &&y ==
1
4 &&z ==
1
4 »»
d== 14 &&y ==
3
4 &&z ==
1
4 »» d == 14 &&y == 34 &&z== 34 »»
d== 120 H−3+ 16aL &&y== 120 H11+ 8aL&&z == 120 H9− 8aL »»
d== 18
ik1+4a−" 5− 8a+ 16a2 y{ &&y == 12 &&z == 12 »»
d== 18
ik1+4a+" 5− 8a+ 16a2 y{ &&y == 12 &&z == 12
The unique solution is z = 1/4, y = 3/4, d = 1/4
Case 9: 0 ≤ z ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y ≤ 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]×16 = R z0

 a+ (d− x) + (1− y + x)
−3(z − x)


2
dx+
R y−1/2
z

 a+ (d− x)+
(1− y + x)− 3(x− z)


2
dx
+
R d
y−1/2 [a+ (d− x) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− d) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (y − x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx
+
R y
z+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(y − x)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx+
R y
z+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(y − x)− 3(1 + z − x)


2
dx+
= 4d2y + 132 d+
16
3 y
3 − 12z2 + 12zd2 − 3112 − 12zy2 − 3z + 9y − 12y2 + 18yz + 12z2y −
7d2 − 4dy − 12dz + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = −24z + 12d2 − 12y2 − 3 + 18y + 24yz − 12d = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = −24 + 24r ≤ 0
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R z0

 a+ (d− x) + (z − x)
−3(1− y + x)


2
dx+
R y−1/2
z

 a+ (d− x)+
(x− z)− 3(1− y + x)


2
dx
+
R d
y−1/2 [a+ (d− x) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]
2
dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− d) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (1− d− x) + (x− z)− 3(y − x)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (x− 1 + d) + (x− z)− 3(z − x)]
2
dx
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+
R y
z+1/2

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1 + z − x)− 3(y − x)


2
dx+
R 1
y

 a+ (x− 1 + d)+
(1− x+ z)− 3(x− r)


2
dx
= −12d2y − 192 d −
16
3 z
3 − 8z2 − 4zd2 + 114 − 12zy2 − 7z − 3y + 18yz + 12z2y + 9d2 +
12dr + 4dz + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = −12d2 − 24yz − 3 + 18z + 12z2 + 12d = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = −24p ≤ 0
Profit of the merged firm:
Π
(3)
merged×16 =
R z
0

 a+ (1− y + x) + (z − x)
−3(d− x)


2
dx+
R y−1/2
z

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(x− z)− 3(d− x)


2
dx
+
R d
y−1/2 [a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(d− x)]
2
dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(x− d)]2 dx
+
R 1−d
1/2 [a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(1− d− x)]
2
dx+
R z+1/2
1−d [a+ (y − x) + (x− z)− 3(x− 1 + d)]
2
dx
+
R y
p+1/2

 a+ (y − x) + (1 + z − x)
−3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx+
R 1
y

 a+ (x− y) + (1− x+ z)
−3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= −12d2y − 152 d−
16
3 y
3 + 163 z
3 + 12zd2 − 12a+ a2 + 6ad− 12ad2 + 4zy2 + 5z − 11y
+12y2 − 6yz + 4112 − 4z2y + 9d2 + 12dy − 12dz
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged = −24dy −
15
2 + 24dz + 6a− 24ad+ 18d+ 12y − 12z = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = −24r + 24p− 24a+ 18 ≤ 0
We solve the simultaneous system of FOCs with Mathematica:
In[4]:= Simplify@Reduce@8−24∗z+12∗d^2−12∗y^2−3+18∗y+24∗y∗z−12∗dm0,
−12∗d^2−24∗y∗z−3+18∗z+12∗z^2+12∗dm0,
−24∗d∗y−HH15Lê2L+24∗d∗z+6∗a−24∗a∗d+18∗d+12∗y−12∗zm0<, 8z,y,d<DD
The only rational candidates are
a== 14 &&y ==
− 32 + 3d+
1
2
è−3+ 16d−16d2 − dè−3+ 16d−16d2
−2+ 4d &&z ==
1
4
ik1−" −3+16d− 16d2 y{»»
a== 14 &&y ==
− 32 + 3d−
1
2
è−3+ 16d−16d2 + dè−3+ 16d−16d2
−2+ 4d &&z ==
1
4
ik1+" −3+16d− 16d2 y{»»
d== 14 &&y ==
3
4 &&z ==
1
4 &&−1+4a ≠ 0»»
and it is straightforward to obtain that the unique solution is z = 1/4, y = 3/4, d = 1/4
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Case 10: 0 ≤ z ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ y ≤ 1− d ≤ 1
Profit of outsider firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]× 16 = R z0

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(d− x)− 3(z − x)


2
dx+
R y−1/2
z

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(d− x)− 3(x− z)


2
dx
+
R d
y−1/2 [a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (y − x) + (x− d)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2

 a+ (y − x) + (1− d− x)
−3(x− z)


2
dx+
R y
z+1/2

 a+ (y − x) + (1− d− x)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
+
R 1−d
y

 a+ (x− y) + (1− d− x)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx+
R 1
1−d

 a+ (x− y) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= 5y− 12d− 6z− 12z2d+12z2y− 4z3− 6z2+18zy+3d2+4dy− 8y2− 12zy2− 4dy2+
4y3 − 34 −
16
3 d
3 + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = −6− 24zd+ 24zy − 12z2 − 12z + 18y − 12y2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = 24y − 24d− 24z − 12 ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
y − d− 12 ≤ z
ª
Profit of outsider firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R z0

 a+ (z − x) + (d− x)
−3(1− y + x)


2
dx+
R y−1/2
z

 a+ (x− z) + (d− x)
−3(1− y + x)


2
dx
+
R d
y−1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (d− x)− 3(y − x)]
2
dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z) + (x− d)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2

 a+ (x− z) + (1− d− x)
−3(y − x)


2
dx+
R y
z+1/2

 a+ (1 + z − x) + (1− d− x)
−3(y − x)


2
dx
+
R 1−d
y

 a+ (1− x+ z) + (1− d− x)
−3(x− y)


2
dx+
R 1
1−d

 a+ (1− x+ z) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(x− y)


2
dx
= 9y + 72d − 6z + 4z2d + 12z2y − 4z3 − 10z2 + 18zy − 5d2 − 12dy − 12y2 − 12zy2 +
12dy2 + 4y3 + 163 d
3 − 1712 + a2 −
a
2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 9 + 12z2 + 18z − 12d− 24y − 24zy + 24dy + 12y2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = −24− 24z + 24d+ 24y ≤ 0, Solution is: {y ≤ 1 + z − d}
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Profit of the merged firm:
Π
(3)
merged×16 =
R z
0

 a+ (z − x)+
(1− y + x)− 3(d− x)


2
dx+
R y−1/2
z

 a+ (x− z)+
(1− y + x)− 3(d− x)


2
dx
+
R d
y−1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (y − x)− 3(d− x)]
2
dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z) + (y − x)− 3(x− d)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2

 a+ (x− z)+
(y − x)− 3(1− d− x)


2
dx+
R y
z+1/2

 a+ (1 + z − x)+
(y − x)− 3(1− d− x)


2
dx
+
R 1−d
y

 a+ (1− x+ z)+
(x− y)− 3(1− d− x)


2
dx+
R 1
1−d

 a+ (1− x+ z)+
(x− y)− 3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= y + 32d+ 2z − 12z2d− 4z2y +
4
3z
3 + 6z2 − 6zy + 3d2 − 12dy + 4zy2 + 12dy2 − 43y3 −
1
2a+ a
2 + 6ad− 12ad2 − 112
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged =
3
2 − 12z2 + 6d− 12y + 12y2 + 6a− 24ad = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = 6− 24a ≤ 0
We solve the simultaneous system of FOCs with Mathematica:
In[5]:= Reduce@8H3ê2L−12∗z^2+6∗d−12∗y+12∗y^2+6∗a−24∗a∗dm 0,
9+12∗z^2+18∗z−12∗d−24∗y−24∗z∗y+24∗d∗y+12∗ y^2m 0,
−6−24∗z∗d+24∗z∗y−12∗z^2−12∗z+18∗y−12∗y^2m0<,8z,y,d<D
Out[5]= a== 14 &&d ==
1
4 &&z ==
1
2 H−1+ 2yL »»
a== 14 &&y ==
1
2 &&z == 0»» d== 14 &&z== 12 H−1+2yL &&−1+ 4a ≠ 0
From which the only solution is z = 0, y = 1/2, d = 1/4
Case 11: 0 ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ z ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ y ≤ 1− d ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1
Profit of firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]× 16 = R y−1/20

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(d− x)− 3(z − x)


2
dx+
R z
y−1/2

 a+ (y − x)+
(d− x)− 3(z − x)


2
dx
+
R d
z
[a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (y − x) + (x− d)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R y
1/2

 a+ (y − x) + (1− d− x)
−3(x− z)


2
dx+
R 1−d
y

 a+ (x− y) + (1− d− x)
−3(x− z)


2
dx
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+
R z+1/2
1−d

 a+ (x− y) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(x− z)


2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2

 a+ (x− y) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= 52d − y + 3z − 12dz + 4y2 − 6yz + 12d2z −
4
3d
3 − 14 − 12z2y − 3d2 + 4dy + 12zy2 −
4y2d+ 8z3 − 4y3 + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = 3− 12d− 6y + 12d2 − 24yz + 12y2 + 24z2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = −24r + 48p ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
z ≤ 12y
ª
Profit of firm located at y:
Π(3) [y]×16 = R y−1/20

 a+ (z − x)+
(d− x)− 3(1− y + x)


2
dx+
R z
y−1/2

 a+ (z − x)+
(d− x)− 3(y − x)


2
dx
+
R d
z
[a+ (x− z) + (d− x)− 3(y − x)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z) + (x− d)− 3(y − x)]2 dx
+
R y
1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (1− d− x)− 3(y − x)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
y
[a+ (x− z) + (1− d− x)− 3(x− y)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d

 a+ (x− z)+
(x− 1 + d)− 3(x− y)


2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ z)+
(x− 1 + d)− 3(x− y)


2
dx
= 52d + 3y − z + 4dz − 6yz − 4d2z + 4z2 + 4d3 −
1
4 − 12z2y − 3d2 − 12dy + 12zy2 +
12y2d+ 83z
3 − 4y3 + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂y
Π(3) [y] = 3− 6z − 12z2 − 12d+ 24yz + 24dy − 12y2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂y2
Π(3) [y] = 24z + 24d− 24y ≤ 0, Solution is: {z + d ≤ y}
Profit of the merged firm:
Π
(3)
merged×16 =
R y−1/2
0

 a+ (z − x)+
(1− y + x)− 3(d− x)


2
dx+
R z
y−1/2

 a+ (z − x)+
(y − x)− 3(d− x)


2
dx
+
R d
z
[a+ (x− z) + (y − x)− 3(d− x)]2 dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (x− z) + (y − x)− 3(x− d)]2 dx
+
R y
1/2 [a+ (x− z) + (y − x)− 3(1− d− x)]
2
dx+
R 1−d
y
[a+ (x− z) + (x− y)− 3(1− d− x)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1−d

 a+ (x− z) + (x− y)
−3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx+
R 1
z+1/2

 a+ (1− x+ z) + (x− y)
−3(x− 1 + d)


2
dx
= 92d+ 3y + 3z − 12dz − 4y2 + 2yz + 12d2z − 4z2 + 4d3 + 4z2y − 3d2
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−12dy − 4zy2 + 12y2d+ 83z3 +
4
3y
3 − 1112 −
1
2a+ a
2 + 6ad− 12ad2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂d
Π
(3)
merged =
9
2 − 12z + 24dz + 12d2 − 6d− 12y + 12y2 + 6a− 24ad = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂d2
Π
(3)
merged = 24z + 24d− 6− 24a ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
d ≤ −z + 14 + a
ª
We solve the simultaneous system of FOCs with Mathematica:
z∈ Reals&&y ∈ Reals&&d∈ Reals&&a ∈ Reals;
z≥ 0&&y ≥0&&d≥ 0&&a >2;
Reduce@8H9ê2L−12∗z+24∗d∗z+12∗d^2−6∗d−12∗y+12∗y^2+6∗a−24∗a∗dm 0,
3−6∗z−12∗z^2−12∗d+24∗y∗z+24∗d∗y−12∗y^2m 0,
3−12∗d−6∗y+12∗d^2−24∗y∗z+12∗y^2+24∗z^2m0<, 8z, y,d<D
Thissystemyieldsnorationalsolution.
Case11hasnovalidsolution.
Case 12: 0 ≤ z ≤ y − 1/2 ≤ d ≤ 1/2 ≤ z + 1/2 ≤ 1− d ≤ y ≤ 1
Profit of firm located at z:
Π(3) [z]× 16 = R z0

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(d− x)− 3(z − x)


2
dx+
R y−1/2
z

 a+ (1− y + x)+
(d− x)− 3(x− z)


2
dx
+
R d
y−1/2 [a+ (y − x) + (d− x)− 3(x− z)]
2
dx+
R 1/2
d
[a+ (y − x) + (x− d)− 3(x− z)]2 dx
+
R z+1/2
1/2

 a+ (y − x) + (1− d− x)
−3(x− z)


2
dx+
R y
p+1/2

 a+ (y − x) + (1− d− x)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
+
R 1−d
y

 a+ (x− y) + (1− d− x)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx+
R 1
1−d

 a+ (x− y) + (x− 1 + d)
−3(1 + z − x)


2
dx
= 5y− 12d− 6z− 12z2d+12z2y− 4z3− 6z2+18zy+3d2+4dy− 8y2− 12zy2− 4dy2+
4y3 − 34 −
16
3 d
3 + a2 − a2
First Order Condition:
∂
∂z
Π(3) [z] = −6− 24zd+ 24zy − 12z2 − 12z + 18y − 12y2 = 0
Second Order Condition:
∂2
∂z2
Π(3) [z] = 24y − 24d− 24z − 12 ≤ 0, Solution is:
©
y − d− 12 ≤ z
ª
Remark : Given the initial conditions defining case 12, namely z ≤ y− 1/2 ≤ d, it
is clear that this SOC can never be satisfied, therefore case 12 yields no solution.
Appendix B
Profitability analysis
• Pre-merger equilibrium
Profit values
Π1,2,3(x
∗
1) =


1
64a+
9
128x
∗
1 +
3
16ax
∗
1 +
1
16a
2
−3364(x∗1)2 +
23
32(x
∗
1)
3 − 916a(x∗1)2 +
7
768


x∗1=
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+ 11
46
= 25736a+
1
16a
2 − 92944
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 316a
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´
−3364
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´2
+ 2332
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´3
− 916a
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´2
+ 2298832
Π4(x
∗
1) =


5
128x
∗
1 − 364a−
1
16ax
∗
1 +
1
16a
2
−1364(x∗1)2 +
17
96(x
∗
1)
3 + 316a(x
∗
1)
2 + 11768


x∗1=
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+11
46
= 116a
2 − 27736a−
5
2944
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 116a
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´
−1364
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´2
+ 1796
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´3
+ 316a
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´2
+ 2098832
Π1,2,3(x
∗
1)+Π4(x
∗
1) =


10 979
97 336a
2 − 7537194 672a+
153
12 167a
3 + 745292 008
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13
+ 19173 002a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 5124 334a2
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 22 0431168 032


Evaluating this expression for the values of the demand parameter retained, we obtain
those in Table 3.1. For instance,
[Π1,2,3(x
∗
1) +Π4(x
∗
1)]a=1.5
=


10 979
97 336a
2 − 7537194 672a+
153
12 167a
3 + 745292 008
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+
191
73 002a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 5124 334a2
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 22 0431168 032


a=1.5
= 0.276 63
and [Π1,2,3(x∗1) +Π4(x
∗
1)]a=2 = 0.484 81
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• Post-merger equilibrium
ΠM1,2,3,4 =
4
9ax
M
2 − 19xM2 −
1
18a +
2
9x
M
1 x
M
2 +
4
9ax
M
1 x
M
2 +
1
9a
2 − 13
¡
xM1
¢2
+ 1327
¡
xM1
¢3
+
1
9
¡
xM2
¢2
+ 127
¡
xM2
¢3 − 23a ¡xM1 ¢2 − 23a ¡xM2 ¢2 − 13 ¡xM1 ¢ ¡xM2 ¢2 + 19 ¡xM2 ¢ ¡xM1 ¢2 + 136
This profit will be evaluated for the same values of the demand parameter as before - the
corresponding values of
¡
xM1
¢∗ and ¡xM2 ¢∗ have been obtained by solving the simultaneous
system of FOCs for the desired values of a :
The First Order Conditions’ system was the following:



∂
∂xM1
ΠM1,2,3,4 =
2
9x
M
2 − 23xM1 −
4
3ax
M
1 +
4
9ax
M
2 +
2
9x
M
1 x
M
2 +
13
9
¡
xM1
¢2 − 13 ¡xM2 ¢2 = 0 and
∂
∂xM2
ΠM1,2,3,4 =
4
9a+
2
9x
M
1 +
2
9x
M
2 +
4
9ax
M
1 − 43axM2 −
2
3x
M
1 x
M
2 +
1
9
¡
xM1
¢2
+ 19
¡
xM2
¢2 − 19 = 0
the Second Order Conditions (SOCs) are:



∂2
∂(xM1 )
2Π
M
1,2,3,4 =
26
9
¡
xM1
¢
− 43a+
2
9
¡
xM2
¢
− 23 ≤ 0 and
∂2
∂(xM2 )
2Π
M
1,2,3,4 =
2
9
¡
xM2
¢
− 23
¡
xM1
¢
− 43a+
2
9 ≤ 0
Resolution method:
To find particular solutions to the FOCs system, the latter is evaluated for
the target value of the demand parameter a, then the resulting two-unknown
variable system is solved directly by using the Solve then Numeric commands
in the Compute menu of the ScientificWorkplace main menu (version 4.0 or
higher).
Start by denoting
¡
xM1
¢
by p and
¡
xM2
¢
by r, so as to largely simplify nota-
tions - this is important, to the extent that our initial notations xM1 and x
M
2
appear to interfere with the well functioning of the computing Maple applica-
tion within ScientificWorkplace. Working with simpler notations ensures that
Maple yields no programme error.
For a = 1.5, the FOC system will write:

2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=3/2
=

 −
8
3p+
8
9r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
8
9p−
16
9 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 59 = 0


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Applying the Solve Numeric command we obtain:
Solution is:



[p = −4. 297 6, r = −10. 796] , [p = 1. 494 5, r = 0.793 82] ,
[p = 0.115 37, r = 0.363 55] , [p = −1. 812 3, r = 6. 138 7]



Since the two solutions correspond to locations on the segment, between 0 and 1/2,
the only possible solution would be [p = 0.115 37, r = 0.363 55], but we still check against
the SOCs:£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.115 37,r=0.363 55
= −43a− 0.252 59 < 0£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.115 37,r=0.363 55
= 0.226 10− 43a < 0 for a = 1.5
Conclusion: for a = 1.5⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.115 35,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.363 54.
For a = 2,


2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=2
=

 −
10
3 p+
10
9 r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
10
9 p−
22
9 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 79 = 0


Solution is:



[p = 0.117 64, r = 0.366 63] , [p = −5. 970 1, r = −14. 961] ,
[p = 1. 899 3, r = 0.911 22] , [p = −2. 546 9, r = 8. 182 9]


£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.117 64,r=0.366 63
= −43a− 0.245 34 < 0£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.117 64,r=0.366 63
= 0.225 27− 43a < 0 for a = 2
Conclusion: fora = 2⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.0.11764,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.36663
for a = 2.5,


2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=5/2
=

 −4p+
4
3r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
3p−
28
9 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 1 = 0


Solution is:



[p = 2. 304 9, r = 1. 028 7] , [p = −3. 281 8, r = 10. 227] ,
[p = −7. 642 2, r = −19. 124] , [p = 0.119 05, r = 0.368 4]


£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.119 05,r=0.368 4
= −43a− 0.240 88 < 0£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.119 05,r=0.368 4
= 0.224 72− 43a < 0 for a = 2.5
Conclusion: fora = 2.5⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.119 05,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.368 4
for a = 3,


2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=3
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=

 −
14
3 p+
14
9 r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
14
9 p−
34
9 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 119 = 0


Solution is:



[p = 2. 710 9, r = 1. 146 2] , [p = −4. 016 9, r = 12. 27] ,
[p = −9. 314, r = −23. 286] , [p = 0.120 00, r = 0.369 56]


£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.120 00,r=0.369 56
= −43a− 0.237 88 < 0£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.120 00,r=0.369 56
= 0.224 35− 43a < 0 for a = 3
Conclusion: for a = 3⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.120 0,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.369 56
for a = 3.5,


2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=7/2
=

 −
16
3 p+
16
9 r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
16
9 p−
40
9 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 139 = 0


Solution is:



[p = 3. 117 1, r = 1. 263 8] , [p = −4. 752 1, r = 14. 314] ,
[p = −10. 986, r = −27. 448] , [p = 0.120 69, r = 0.370 36]


£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.120 69,r=0.370 36
= −43a− 0.235 7 < 0£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.120 69,r=0.370 36
= 0.224 06− 43a < 0 for a = 3.5
Conclusion: for a = 3.5⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.120 69,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.370 36
for a = 4,


2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=4
=

 −6p+ 2r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
2p− 469 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 53 = 0


Solution is:



[p = −5. 487 3, r = 16. 357] , [p = 3. 523 5, r = 1. 381 4] ,
[p = 0.121 21, r = 0.370 96] , [p = −12. 657, r = −31. 609]


£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.121 21,r=0.370 96
= −43a− 0.234 07 < 0£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.121 21,r=0.370 96
= 0.223 85− 43a < 0 for a = 4
Conclusion: for a = 4⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.121 21,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.370 96
for a = 4.5,


2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=9/2
=

 −
20
3 p+
20
9 r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
20
9 p−
52
9 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 179 = 0


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Solution is:



[p = −6. 222 5, r = 18. 4] , [p = −14. 329, r = −35. 771] ,
[p = 0.121 62, r = 0.371 43] , [p = 3. 929 9, r = 1. 498 9]


£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.12162,r=0.37143
= −43a− 0.232 78 < 0£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.12162,r=0.37143
= 0.223 68− 43a < 0 for a = 4.5
Conclusion: for a = 4.5⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.121 62,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.37143
for a = 5,


2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=5
=

 −
22
3 p+
22
9 r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
22
9 p−
58
9 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 199 = 0


⇒ p = 0.121951, r = 0.371793£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.121951,r=0.371793
= −43a− 0.231 74 < 0£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.121951,r=0.371793
= 0.223 54− 43a < 0 for a = 5
Conclusion: for a = 5⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.121951,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.371793
for a = 6,


2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3ap+
4
9ar +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
4
9a+
2
9p+
2
9r +
4
9ap−
4
3ar −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 − 19 = 0


a=6
=

 −
26
3 p+
26
9 r +
2
9pr +
13
9 p
2 − 13r2 = 0
26
9 p−
70
9 r −
2
3pr +
1
9p
2 + 19r
2 + 239 = 0


⇒ p = 0.122449, r = 0.372339£
26
9 p−
4
3a+
2
9r −
2
3
¤
p=0.122449,r=0.372339
= −43a− 0.230 18£
2
9r −
2
3p−
4
3a+
2
9
¤
p=0.122449,r=0.372339
= 0.223 33− 43a
Conclusion: for a = 6⇒
¡
xM1
¢∗
= 0.122449,
¡
xM2
¢∗
= 0.372339
By replacing these values in the profit expression for the group, ΠM1,2,3,4, we obtain the
values entered in Table 3.2
• Post-merger partial divisionalization equilibrium
Profit evaluation:
Π1,2+Π3,4 = 2Π1,2 = 2×
£
1
4az −
1
16z −
1
32a+
1
16a
2 + 16z
3 − 12az2 +
1
64
¤
z=a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2 =
= 58a
2− 316a−
2
3a
3+ 148
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 112a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1+16a2
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1+
1
32
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Evaluating this expression for the values of the demand parameter retained, we obtain
the values reported in Table 3.4. For instance,h
5
8a
2 − 316a−
2
3a
3 + 148
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 112a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 16a2
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 132
i
a=1.5
=
0.287 18
andh
5
8a
2 − 316a−
2
3a
3 + 148
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 112a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 16a2
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 132
i
a=2
=
0.505 76
Price analysis
The general price expression is: P (x) = a − Q∗(x), where Q∗(x) is total output at
market point x.
• Compare prices before and after merger
Price before merger (1,2,3 - 4 - 5)
- for x ∈ [0;x∗1] , Pbef = a −
a−3(x∗1−x)+2(1/2−x)
4 − 2
a−3(1/2−x)+(1/2−x)+(x∗1−x)
4 =
1
4a −
3
4x+
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
- for x ∈ [x∗1; 1/2] , Pbef = a −
a−3(x−x∗1)+2(1/2−x)
4 − 2
a−3(1/2−x)+(1/2−x)+(x−x∗1)
4 =
1
4a−
1
4x−
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
Price after merger (1,2,3,4 - 5)
- for x ∈
£
0,
¡
xM1
¢∗¤
, Pmerger(x) = a −
a−2((xM1 )
∗−x)+( 1
2
−x)
3 −
a−2( 1
2
−x)+((xM1 )
∗−x)
3 =
1
3a+
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 23x+ 16
- for x ∈
·¡
xM1
¢∗
,
(xM1 )
∗
+(xM2 )
∗
2
¸
, Pmerger(x) = a−
a−2(x−(xM1 )
∗
)+( 1
2
−x)
3 −
a−2( 1
2
−x)+(x−(xM1 )
∗
)
3 =
1
3a−
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗
+ 16
- for x ∈
·
(xM1 )
∗
+(xM2 )
∗
2 ,
¡
xM2
¢∗¸
, Pmerger(x) = a−
a−2((xM2 )
∗−x)+( 1
2
−x)
3 −
a−2( 1
2
−x)+((xM2 )
∗−x)
3 =
1
3a+
1
3
¡
xM2
¢∗ − 23x+ 16
- for x ∈
£¡
xM2
¢∗
, 12
¤
, Pmerger(x) = a −
a−2(x−(xM2 )
∗
)+( 1
2
−x)
3 −
a−2( 1
2
−x)+(x−(xM2 )
∗
)
3 =
1
3a−
1
3
¡
xM2
¢∗
+ 16
With multi-plant spatial Cournot competition, a plant’s market area extends up to the
mid-distance from the next plant belonging to the same firm (see Pal and Sarkar (2002)).
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Therefore, one needs first compare (
xM1 )
∗
+(xM2 )
∗
2 and x
∗
1 so as to determine intervals for
the post-merger comparison.
Since
a
¡
xM1
¢∗ ¡
xM2
¢∗ (xM1 )∗+(xM2 )∗
2 x
∗
1
1.5 0.11535 0.36354 0.239 45 > 0.146 28
2 0.11764 0.36663 0.242135 > 0.150 62
2.5 0.11905 0.36840 0.243 725 > 0.153 45
3 0.12 0.36956 0.244 78 > 0.155 44
3.5 0.12069 0.37036 0.245 53 > 0.156 91
4 0.12121 0.37096 0.246 085 > 0.158 04
4.5 0.12162 0.37143 0.246 525 > 0.158 94
5 0.121951 0.371793 0.246 87 > 0.159 67
6 0.122449 0.372339 0.247 39 > 0.160 78
the price comparison will be performed on the following intervals:
◦) for x ∈
£
0;
¡
xM1
¢∗¤
,∆P = Pmerger−Pbefore =
¡
1
3a+
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 23x+ 16¢−¡14a− 34x+ 14x∗1 + 14¢ =
1
12a+
1
12x+
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 14x∗1 − 112 > 0 given the values of a, x, x∗1 and ¡xM1 ¢∗, because
∆P
x∈[0;(xM1 )
∗
] =
µ
1
12
a− 1
12
¶
| {z }
>0
+
1
12
x|{z}
≥0
+
·
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 1
4
x∗1
¸
x∗1=0.146 28,(xM1 )
∗
=0.11535| {z }
0.001 88
> 0
◦) for x ∈
£¡
xM1
¢∗
;x∗1
¤
,∆P = Pmerger−Pbefore =
¡
1
3a−
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗
+ 16
¢
−
¡
1
4a−
3
4x+
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
¢
=
1
12a+
3
4x−
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 14x∗1 − 112 > 0, by the same token
◦) for x ∈
·¡
xM1
¢∗
;
(xM1 )
∗
+(xM2 )
∗
2
¸
, ∆P = Pmerger − Pbefore =
¡
1
3a−
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗
+ 16
¢
−¡
1
4a−
1
4x−
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
¢
= 112a+
1
4x−
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗
+ 14x
∗
1 − 112 > 0, by the same token
◦) for x ∈
·
(xM1 )
∗
+(xM2 )
∗
2 ;
¡
xM2
¢∗¸
,∆P = Pmerger−Pbefore =
¡
1
3a+
1
3
¡
xM2
¢∗ − 23x+ 16¢−¡
1
4a−
1
4x−
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
¢
= 112a−
5
12x+
1
3
¡
xM2
¢∗
+ 14x
∗
1 − 112 > 0, by the same method
◦) for x ∈
£¡
xM2
¢∗
; 1/2
¤
,∆P = Pmerger−Pbefore =
¡
1
3a−
1
3
¡
xM2
¢∗
+ 16
¢
−
¡
1
4a−
1
4x−
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
¢
=
1
12a+
1
4x−
1
3
¡
xM2
¢∗
+ 14x
∗
1 − 112 > 0, by the same method
• Price comparison: divestiture - merger
Price after spin-oﬀ/divestiture (1,2 - 3,4 - 5)
- for x ∈ [0, z∗] , Pdiv(x) = a−
a−3( 1
2
−x)+2(z∗−x)
4 −2
a−2(z∗−x)+( 1
2
−x)
4 =
1
4a+
1
2z
∗− 34x+
1
8
- for x ∈
£
z∗, 12
¤
, Pdiv(x) = a−
a−3( 1
2
−x)+2(x−z∗)
4 −2
a−2(x−z∗)+( 1
2
−x)
4 =
1
4a+
1
4x−
1
2z
∗+ 18
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Compare (
xM1 )
∗
+(xM2 )
∗
2 with z
∗:
a
¡
xM1
¢∗ ¡
xM2
¢∗ (xM1 )∗+(xM2 )∗
2 z
∗
1.5 0.11535 0.36354 0.239 45 > 0.225 24
2 0.11764 0.36663 0.242135 > 0.232 23
2.5 0.11905 0.36840 0.243 725 > 0.236 15
3 0.12 0.36956 0.244 78 > 0.238 66
3.5 0.12069 0.37036 0.245 53 > 0.240 40
4 0.12121 0.37096 0.246 085 > 0.241 68
4.5 0.12162 0.37143 0.246 525 > 0.242 65
5 0.121951 0.371793 0.246 87 > 0.243 43
6 0.122449 0.372339 0.247 39 > 0.244 57
Thus the price comparison will be performed as follows:
◦) for x ∈
£
0;
¡
xM1
¢∗¤
,∆P = Pdiv−Pmerger =
¡
1
4a+
1
2z
∗ − 34x+
1
8
¢
−
¡
1
3a+
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 23x+ 16¢ =
1
2z
∗ − 112x −
1
12a −
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 124 < 0, because the expression is decreasing with x, and£
1
2z
∗ − 112x−
1
12a−
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 124¤(xM1 )∗=0.11535,z∗=0.225 24,x=0 = 3. 250 3 × 10−2 − 112a < 0
for any a ≥ 1.5
◦) for x ∈
£¡
xM1
¢∗
; z∗
¤
,∆P = Pdiv−Pmerger =
¡
1
4a+
1
2z
∗ − 34x+
1
8
¢
−
¡
1
3a−
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗
+ 16
¢
=
1
2z
∗ − 34x−
1
12a+
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 124 < 0 by the same method
◦) for
·
z∗;
(xM1 )
∗
+(xM2 )
∗
2
¸
,∆P = Pdiv−Pmerger =
¡
1
4a+
1
4x−
1
2z
∗ + 18
¢
−
¡
1
3a−
1
3
¡
xM1
¢∗
+ 16
¢
=
1
4x−
1
12a−
1
2z
∗ + 13
¡
xM1
¢∗ − 124 < 0, by the same token
◦) for x ∈
·
(xM1 )
∗
+(xM2 )
∗
2 ;
¡
xM2
¢∗¸
, ∆P = Pdiv − Pmerger =
¡
1
4a+
1
4x−
1
2z
∗ + 18
¢
−¡
1
3a+
1
3
¡
xM2
¢∗ − 23x+ 16¢ = 1112x− 112a− 12z∗ − 13 ¡xM2 ¢∗ − 124 < 0 by the same token
◦) for x ∈
£¡
xM2
¢∗
; 1/2
¤
,∆P = Pdiv−Pmerger =
¡
1
4a+
1
4x−
1
2z
∗ + 18
¢
−
¡
1
3a−
1
3
¡
xM2
¢∗
+ 16
¢
=
1
4x−
1
12a−
1
2z
∗ + 13
¡
xM2
¢∗ − 124 < 0 by the same method
• Price comparison between divestiture and initial situation/before merger
Price before merger (1,2,3 - 4 - 5):
Compare z∗ = a− 14
√
16a2 − 8a+ 2 with x∗1 = 623a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146³
a− 14
√
16a2 − 8a+ 2
´
−
³
6
23a−
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 1146
´
=
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= 1723a+
1
23
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 14
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 1146 > 0 for all26 a ∈ [1.5; 6]
65432
0.08375
0.0825
0.08125
0.08
x
y
Price comparison:
◦) for x ∈ [0;x∗1] ,∆P = Pdiv−Pbefore =
¡
1
4a+
1
2z
∗ − 34x+
1
8
¢
−
¡
1
4a−
3
4x+
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
¢
=
1
2z
∗ − 14x∗1 −
1
8£
1
2z
∗ − 14x∗1 −
1
8
¤
z∗=a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2,x∗1=
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+ 11
46
= 1023a+
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13−
1
8
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 1792 < 0,∀a ∈ [1.5, 6]
Compute "gain" for consumers:R 6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+ 11
46
0
³
10
23a+
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 18
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 1792
´
dx
= 491058a+
51
529a
2+ 454232
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 171058a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 11368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1
− 392a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 1184
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 2134232
◦) for x ∈ [x∗1; z∗] ,∆P = Pdiv−Pbefore =
¡
1
4a+
1
2z
∗ − 34x+
1
8
¢
−
¡
1
4a−
1
4x−
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
¢
=
1
2z
∗ − 12x+
1
4x
∗
1 − 18£
1
2z
∗ − 12x+
1
4x
∗
1 − 18
¤
z∗=a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2,x∗1=
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+11
46
=
= 1323a−
1
2x−
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 18
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 346 < 0,∀a ∈ [1.5, 6]
Compute "gain" for consumers:R a−1
4
√
16a2−8a+2
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+ 11
46
³
13
23a−
1
2x−
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 18
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 346
´
dx
= 1023a
2− 51184a−
1
184
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+ 192a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+ 17368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1−
5
46a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 1368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 45736
◦) for x ∈ [z∗; 1/2] ,∆P = Pdiv−Pbefore =
¡
1
4a+
1
4x−
1
2z
∗ + 18
¢
−
¡
1
4a−
1
4x−
1
4x
∗
1 +
1
4
¢
=
1
2x−
1
2z
∗ + 14x
∗
1 − 18
26The subsequent price comparisons hold for the same interval - we basically obtain them by plotting
the expressions, since the latter are ’simple’, i.e. funtion of one variable only, the demand parameter.
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£
1
2x−
1
2z
∗ + 14x
∗
1 − 18
¤
z∗=a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2,x∗1=
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+11
46
,x=a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2 =
3
46a−
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 346 < 0,∀a ∈ [1.5, 6]
but
£
1
2x−
1
2z
∗ + 14x
∗
1 − 18
¤
z∗=a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2,x∗1=
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+11
46
,x=1/2
= 18
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1−
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 1023a+
17
92 > 0,∀a ∈ [1.5, 6]
In order to determine the eﬀect on consumer, one needs first to find the locationbx starting from which price goes up:£
1
2x−
1
2z
∗ + 14x
∗
1 − 18
¤
z∗=a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2,x∗1=
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+11
46
= 12x−
10
23a−
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+
1
8
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 346
1
2x −
10
23a −
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 18
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 − 346 = 0, Solution is:
20
23a +
1
46
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 14
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 323 = bx
evaluate ∆P
∆P =
£
1
2x−
1
2z
∗ + 14x
∗
1 − 18
¤
z∗=a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2,x∗1=
6
23
a− 1
23
√
20a+36a2+13+ 11
46
= 12x−
10
23a−
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 18
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 346
Compute "gain" over [z∗; bx]R 20
23
a+ 1
46
√
20a+36a2+13− 1
4
√
2
√
8a2−4a+1+ 3
23
a− 1
4
√
16a2−8a+2


1
2x−
10
23a−
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13
+18
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 346

 dx
= 1023a
2− 51184a−
1
184
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+ 192a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+ 17368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1−
5
46a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 1368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 45736
Compute "loss" over [bx; 1/2]R 1/2
20
23
a+ 1
46
√
20a+36a2+13− 1
4
√
2
√
8a2−4a+1+ 3
23


1
2x−
10
23a−
1
92
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13
+18
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 346

 dx
= 4691058a
2−11994232a−
17
4232
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+ 5529a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+ 17368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1−
5
46a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 1368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 113316 928
Total eﬀect on consumers throughout the market [0; 1/2]:

49
1058a+
51
529a
2 + 454232
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 171058a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13
− 11368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 392a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 1184
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13− 2134232


+


10
23a
2 − 51184a−
1
184
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 192a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13
+ 17368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 546a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 1368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 45736


+


469
1058a
2 − 11994232a−
17
4232
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 5529a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13
+ 17368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 546a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1− 1368
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13 + 113316 928


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= 10311058a
2−272529a+
5
4232
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+ 92116a
√
20a+ 36a2 + 13+ 116
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1−
1
4a
√
2
√
8a2 − 4a+ 1 + 3294232 < 0,∀a ∈ [1.5, 6]
meaning that the total gain of consumers over [0; bx] > total loss of consumers over
[bx; 1/2]
Conclusion: Overall positive eﬀect of divestiture
Supplementary material: Profitability analysis when the
outsider is a two-plant firm
Pre-merger equilibrium
Let one of the firms operate two outlets instead of only one as before. The total
number of stores active on the market is now 6, within the following pattern: the two
merger partners operate three and one store respectively, whereas the future-to-be outsider
operates two.
Following the analysis of Pal and Sarkar (2002) on spatial multi-plant Cournot com-
petition on the segment market, we know that the two-store firm will locate its outlets
symmetrically on each side of the segment mid-point. In turn, the three-plant firm will
locate one of them exactly at the segment centre, sharing it together with the single-plant
firm, whereas the two remaining outlets take symmetric locations on each side. Denote m
the location of the left-hand side store of the three-store plant, and q that of the left-hand
side plant of the two-plant firm. These locations need to be determined so as to compute
the pre-merger profits.
Following the same notations as in the body of the chapter 3, and given the 6 stores
active now on the market, let Π1,2,3 the profit for the three-plant firm, Π4,5 that of the
two-plant firm, and finally Π6 the profit of the single-store firm.
Profits27 write:
Π6 = 2


Rm
0
³
a−3(1/2−x)+(q−x)+(m−x)
4
´2
dx+
R q
m
³
a−3(1/2−x)+(q−x)+(x−m)
4
´2
dx+R m+1/2
2
q
³
a−3(1/2−x)+(x−q)+(x−m)
4
´2
dx+
R 1/2
m+1/2
2
³
a−3(1/2−x)+(x−q)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx

 =
27The profits’ expression implicitly take into account the fact that in the pre-merger location equilibrium,
not only 0 < m < q < 1/2, but also q < m+1/2
2
. This condition will be checked below for every couple of
solutions found.
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7
128m−
3
64a+
3
64q−
1
16am−
1
8aq+
1
16mq+
1
16a
2− 2164m2+
5
32m
3− 516q2+
1
3q
3+ 316am
2+ 14aq
2− 14
mq2 + 516m
2q + 23768
Π1,2,3 = 2


Rm
0
³
a−3(m−x)+(q−x)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx+
R q
m
³
a−3(x−m)+(q−x)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx+R m+1/2
2
q
³
a−3(x−m)+(x−q)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx+
R 1/2
m+1/2
2
³
a−3(1/2−x)+(x−q)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx

 =
1
64a+
3
128m−
1
64q+
3
16am−
1
8aq−
3
16mq+
1
16a
2− 964m2+
25
32m
3+ 316q
2− 13q3−
9
16am
2+ 14aq
2+ 34
mq2 − 1516m2q +
1
256
Π4,5 = 2


Rm
0
³
a−3(q−x)+(m−x)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx+
R q
m
³
a−3(q−x)+(x−m)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx+R m+1/2
2
q
³
a−3(x−q)+(x−m)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx+
R 1/2
m+1/2
2
³
a−3(x−q)+(1/2−q)+(1/2−x)
4
´2
dx

 =
5
16aq−
1
256m−
5
128q−
3
32am−
3
128a−
9
32mq+
1
8amq+
1
16a
2+ 27128m
2+ 55192m
3+ 132q
2+ 532am
2−
3
4aq
2 + 1716mq
2 − 3732m2q +
19
1536
To determine the pre-merger locations m and q, we need to solve for the pre-merger
location equilibrium. For that, we compute the FOCs w.r.t. m and q on the corresponding
profits. Their system will yield equilibrium candidate locations, which we will afterwards
check against the SOCs.
The FOCs are:



∂
∂m
Π1,2,3 =
3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
∂
∂q
Π4,5 =
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0
and the SOC write therefore:



∂2
∂m2
Π1,2,3 =
75
16m−
9
8a−
15
8 q −
9
32 ≤ 0
∂2
∂q2
Π4,5 =
17
8 m−
3
2a+
1
16 ≤ 0
As before, the system of FOCs is too complex to allow general solutions, so, as before,
we are going to identify particular solutions, corresponding to the same set of values of the
demand parameter a that have been retained before28. To identify the solutions, the Maple
application of the ScientificWorkplace kit is employed, through the Solve then Numeric
commands in the Compute main menu.
For a = 1.5,


3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0


a=1.5
=

 −
2461
1250m−
3
16q −
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 30 469100 000 = 0
− 332m−
35
16q +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 + 42 969100 000 = 0

,
28With still three firms on the market, the same conditions applies in order to guarantee positive quan-
tities in equilibrium at every market point: a ≥ 1.5.
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Solution is:



[m = 1. 345 8, q = 2. 663 3] , [m = 1. 728 1, q = 2. 145 4] ,
[m = 0.148 18, q = 0.208 48] ,
£
m = 0.590 46, q = −3. 086 5× 10−2¤



where the solution satisfying the SOC is m∗ = 0.148 18, q∗ = 0.208 48, because:£
75
16m−
9
8a−
15
8 q −
9
32
¤
m∗=0.14818,q∗=0.20848
= 2. 244 4× 10−2 − 98a < 0
and
£
17
8 m−
3
2a+
1
16
¤
m∗=0.14818,q∗=0.20848
= 0.377 38− 32a < 0 for a = 1.5
Moreover, the condition q∗ < m
∗+1/2
2 holds: 0.20848 <
0.14818+0.5
2 = 0.324 09
- for a = 2:


3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0


a=2
=

 −
81
32m−
3
16q −
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 51128 = 0
− 132m−
47
16q +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 + 75128 = 0

,
Solution is:



[m = 1. 860 9, q = 3. 418 4] , [m = 2. 210 5, q = 2. 916 8] ,
[m = 0.152 61, q = 0.212 09] ,
£
m = 0.769 8, q = −9. 473 2× 10−2¤



From which the equilibrium locations are m∗ = 0.152 61, q∗ = 0.212 09
because
£
75
16m−
9
8a−
15
8 q −
9
32
¤
m∗=0.152 61,q∗=0.212 09
= 3. 644 1×10−2− 98a < 0 for a = 2
and
£
17
8 m−
3
2a+
1
16
¤
m∗=0.152 61,q∗=0.212 09
= 0.386 80− 32a
in addition to q∗ < m
∗+1/2
2 ⇔ 0.212 09 <
0.152 61+0.5
2 = 0.326 31
- for a = 2.5:


3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0


a=5/2
=

 −
99
32m−
3
16q −
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 63128 = 0
1
32m−
59
16q +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 + 95128 = 0

,
Solution is:



[m = 2. 403 4, q = 4. 128 7] , [m = 0.155 35, q = 0.214 20] ,
[m = 0.948 25, q = −0.160 15] , [m = 2. 668 1, q = 3. 736]



The equilibrium locations are by the same token: m∗ = 0.15535, q∗ = 0.2142
- for a = 3:


3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0


a=3
=

 −
117
32 m−
3
16q −
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 75128 = 0
3
32m−
71
16q +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 + 115128 = 0

,
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Solution is:



[m = 1. 126 3, q = −0.226 37] , [m = 0.157 20, q = 0.215 57] ,£
m = 3. 036 4− 5. 154 1× 10−2i, q = 4. 697 9 + 7. 815 4× 10−2i¤ ,£
m = 3. 036 4 + 5. 154 1× 10−2i, q = 4. 697 9− 7. 815 4× 10−2i¤



thus the equilibrium are, by the same token: m∗ = 0.157 20, q∗ = 0.215 57
- for a = 3.5:


3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0


a=7/2
=

 −
135
32 m−
3
16q −
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 87128 = 0
5
32m−
83
16q +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 + 135128 = 0

,
Solution is:



[m = 3. 537 4− 0.173 23i, q = 5. 463 9 + 0.266 72i] ,
[m = 3. 537 4 + 0.173 23i, q = 5. 463 9− 0.266 72i] ,
[m = 1. 304 1, q = −0.293 05] , [m = 0.158 53, q = 0.216 55]



therefore the equilibrium locations are m∗ = 0.158 53, q∗ = 0.216 55
- for a = 4:


3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0


a=4
=

 −
153
32 m−
3
16q −
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 99128 = 0
7
32m−
95
16q +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 + 155128 = 0

,
Solution is:



[m = 1. 481 9, q = −0.360 02] , [m = 0.159 53, q = 0.217 27] ,
[m = 4. 038 7− 0.254 08i, q = 6. 230 2 + 0.395 66i] ,
[m = 4. 038 7 + 0.254 08i, q = 6. 230 2− 0.395 66i]



from which the equilibrium locations are: m∗ = 0.159 53, q∗ = 0.217 27
- for a = 4.5:


3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0


a=9/2
=

 −
171
32 m−
3
16q −
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 111128 = 0
9
32m−
107
16 q +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 + 175128 = 0

,
Solution is:



[m = 0.160 32, q = 0.217 83] , [m = 4. 540 1− 0.326 06i, q = 6. 996 6 + 0.512 2i] ,
[m = 4. 540 1 + 0.326 06i, q = 6. 996 6− 0.512 2i] , [m = 1. 659 5, q = −0.427 19]



therefore the equilibrium locations are: m∗ = 0.160 32, q∗ = 0.217 83
- for a = 5:


3
16a−
9
32m−
3
16q −
9
8am−
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 3128 = 0
5
16a−
9
32m+
1
16q +
1
8am−
3
2aq +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 − 5128 = 0


a=5
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=

 −
189
32 m−
3
16q −
15
8 mq +
75
32m
2 + 34q
2 + 123128 = 0
11
32m−
119
16 q +
17
8 mq −
37
32m
2 + 195128 = 0

,
Solution is:



[m = 5. 041 6− 0.394 07i, q = 7. 763 1 + 0.623 34i] ,
[m = 5. 041 6 + 0.394 07i, q = 7. 763 1− 0.623 34i] ,
[m = 0.160 95, q = 0.218 28] , [m = 1. 837 1, q = −0.494 49]



thus the equilibrium solutions are: m∗ = 0.160 95, q∗ = 0.218 28
Evaluating the profit functions for these values of the demand parameter and the
corresponding equilibrium locations we obtain the following in terms of pre-merger total
profits for the three-store firms and the single-store one:
a,m∗, q∗ Π1,2,3 Π6 Π1,2,3 +Π6
a = 1.5,m = 0.14818, q = 0.20848 0.167 77 7.116 4× 10−2 0.238 93
a = 2,m = 0.152615, q = 0.212092 0.285 12 0.147 50 0.432 62
a = 2.5,m = 0.15535, q = 0.2142 0.433 63 0.254 22 0.687 85
a = 3,m = 0.1572, q = 0.21557 0.613 40 0.392 24 1.005 6
a = 3.5,m = 0.15853, q = 0.21655 0.824 42 0.561 53 1.386 0
a = 4,m = 0.15953, q = 0.21727 1.066 7 0.762 09 1.828 8
a = 4.5,m = 0.16032, q = 0.21783 1.340 2 0.993 92 2.334 1
a = 5,m = 0.16095, q = 0.21828 1.645 1.257 2.902
Post-merger equilibrium
Following the merger between the three-store firm and the single-store one, the re-
sulting location equilibrium will be established between the two-store outsider and the
four-store merged entity.
This pattern has already been worked out explicitly by Pal and Sarkar (2002), as an
example for their general method of identifying location equilibria on the linear market in
case of multi-plant Cournot competition. Basically, the two-store outsider will take up its
monopoly locations, 1/4 and 3/4, whereas the four plants of the merged entity will locate
each within one of the four interval thus created on the segment. Following the proof
in Pal and Sarkar (2002), their respective locations are denoted d2 ,
1−d
2 ,
1+d
2 ,
2−d
2 , where
d = a−
q
a2 − a2 +
1
8 . Given that the merged entity’s profit writes
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Π1,2,3+6 = 2


R d
2
0
µ
a−2(d
2
−x)+( 1
4
−x)
3
¶2
dx+
R 1
4
d
2
µ
a−2(x−d
2
)+( 1
4
−x)
3
¶2
dx
+
R 1−d
2
1
4
µ
a−2( 1−d
2
−x)+(x− 1
4
)
3
¶2
dx+
R 1
2
1−d
2
µ
a−2(x− 1−d
2
)+(x−1
4
)
3
¶2
dx


evaluating this expression for d = a−
q
a2 − a2 +
1
8 yields
Π1,2,3+6 =
4
9a
2− 112a−
16
27a
3+ 154
q
a2 − 12a+
1
8−
5
27a
q
a2 − 12a+
1
8+
16
27a
2
q
a2 − 12a+
1
8+
1
144
The next step is to evaluate this expressions for the values retained for the demand
parameter, so as to find the values of the post-merger joint profit of the insiders:
a 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Π1,2,3+6 0.25113 0.44559 0.69559 1.0012 1.3623 1.7789 2.2512 2.7789
Conclusion: a straight comparison between the pre- and post-merger joint profit of
insiders reveals that, as for the example constructed in the body of Chapter 3, the merger
is only profitable for the lowest values for the demand parameter a ∈ [1.5, 3], and becomes
unprofitable when demand grows larger.
Post-merger partial divisionalization equilibrium
In what follows, we consider partial divisionalization on behalf of the merged entity,
meaning spinning oﬀ into two two-store independent divisions. We will thus be able to
compare the profitability of this subsequent divisionalization with that of the ’simple’
merger, as well as w.r.t. the initial joint profit of the insiders.
To compute the profitability of this partial divisionalization, we need first the location
equilibrium determined after this spin-oﬀ. Basically, three two-firm independent firms
compete on the segment now, so following (again) the results obtained by Pal and Sarkar
(2002), regardless of the number of firms on the linear city, as long as they all operate the
same number of stores, the multi-plant monopoly locations are chosen in equilibrium. In
short, each of the three firms will locate one outlet at 1/4, and the second at 3/4.
The profit for one firm writes therefore:
Π1,2 = 2
µR 1/4
0
³
a−3( 1
4
−x)+2( 1
4
−x)
4
´2
dx+
R 1/2
1/4
³
a−3(x−1
4
)+2(x−1
4
)
4
´2
dx
¶
= 116a
2 − 164a+
1
768
The joint profit after divisionalization (i.e. of the two-division group) amounts there-
fore to:
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Π1,2 +Π3,6 = 2
¡
1
16a
2 − 164a+
1
768
¢
= 18a
2 − 132a+
1
384
which, evaluated for the values of the demand parameters used so far, yields:
a 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Π1,2 +Π3,6 0.23698 0.4401 0.70573 1.0339 1.4245 1.8776 2. 3932 2.9714
To better seize the profitability comparison, we give next a summarizing table with
the joint profit made by the insiders before merger, afterwards, and after the subsequent
partial divisionalization:
a Π1,2,3 +Π6 Π1,2,3+6 Π1,2 +Π3,6
1.5 0.238 93 0.25113 0.23698
2 0.432 62 0.44559 0.4401
2.5 0.687 85 0.69559 0.70573
3 1.005 6 1.0012 1.0339
3.5 1.386 0 1.3623 1.4245
4 1.828 8 1.7789 1.8776
4.5 2.334 1 2.2512 2.3932
5 2.902 2.7789 2.9714
Conclusion: for the lowest values of the demand parameter, a ∈ {1.5, 2}, the
partial divisionalization is not more profitable than the complete integration of aﬃliates,
although it can ensure a higher profit w.r.t. the pre-merger situation. Notwithstanding
this diﬀerence with the example discussed in the body of Chapter 3, for all the other
values of the demand parameter, again, we obtain that the partial divisionalization
following merger increases more the profits than the simple integration does.
In other words, this example shows that the complementarity between merger and partial
divisionalization within a two-stage business strategy to increase profits is robust to a
change in the number of plants owned by the remaining market rival.
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Résumé 
 
Cette thèse contribue à l’étude théorique des concentrations horizontales, du point de vue 
positif comme normatif. La première partie analyse les motivations et les conséquences des 
fusions horizontales dans un cadre spatial. Le premier chapitre propose une revue de la 
littérature théorique consacrée à cette problématique. Le deuxième chapitre étudie l’impact du 
choix optimal de localisation post-fusion sur la profitabilité de la concentration. Le troisième 
chapitre prolonge cette analyse en considérant la possibilité pour la concentration d’être suivie 
de la formation de divisions indépendantes, ce qui peut s’avérer encore plus profitable grâce à 
une relocalisation optimale. La deuxième partie de la thèse se concentre sur les stratégies des 
autorités de la concurrence lorsqu’il existe des asymétries d’information sur les 
caractéristiques des fusions proposées. On analyse alors le profile optimal du contrôle des 
concentrations compte tenu de l’interaction stratégique entre les autorités et les firmes 
fusionnantes. Le quatrième chapitre dresse le bilan des conséquences de cette interaction 
stratégique pour la théorie et la pratique du contrôle des fusions. Le cinquième chapitre étudie 
l’impact des mesures correctives sur la prise en compte des gains d’efficacité pour 
l’évaluation des concentrations et conclut sur l’opportunité de combiner les deux procédés 
quand l’information est asymétrique. Le dernier chapitre propose un mécanisme de révélation 
basé sur les mesures correctives pour extraire l’information privée des firmes fusionnantes 
lors du contrôle des concentrations. 
 
Mots-clé :  fusions d’entreprises, oligopoles, industrie - localisation, concurrence –  
  politique publique 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation aims to provide further theoretical insight, both positive and normative, for 
the analysis of horizontal mergers. The first part will examine the individual private 
incentives to merge and some of the ensuing welfare consequences in a spatial framework. 
The first chapter will review the theoretical literature dealing with horizontal market 
concentration in spatial models. The second chapter focuses on the impact of optimal post-
merger location choice for merger profitability. Chapter three examines instead in a spatial 
setting the profitability link between acquisition and de-acquisition, given the possibility to 
optimally locate ex-post. The second part of the dissertation analyses the strategic interaction 
between the merging firms and the competition authorities, in light of their respective 
individual incentives and given the information asymmetry on the merger characteristics, so 
as to draw conclusions and make recommendations for the optimal profile of merger policy. 
Chapter four takes stock on the challenges raised by this strategic interaction for both the 
theory and practice of merger control. Chapter five examines the impact of merger remedies 
for the merger efficiency defence, and concludes on the opportunity to apply them both within 
an optimal merger control. The last chapter sheds light on the design of divestiture contracts 
with asymmetric information, and proposes a revelation mechanism based on merger 
remedies to optimally screen notified mergers. 
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